HomeMy WebLinkAbout2019CV2848 - Kimberly Chancellor V. City Of Fort Collins And Stephan Sparacio - 001 - Complaint And Jur Demand1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 19-cv-02848
KIMBERLY CHANCELLOR,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF FORT COLLINS, a municipality, and
STEPHAN SPARACIO, in his individual capacity,
Defendants.
COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND
Plaintiff Kimberly Chancellor, by and through her attorney David Lane of KILLMER,
LANE & NEWMAN, LLP, respectfully alleges for her Complaint and Jury Demand as follows:
I. INTRODUCTION
1. Mid-afternoon on October 6, 2017, Plaintiff Kimberly Chancellor was driving
home from Front Range Community College in Fort Collins where she was studying to be a
nurse.
2. During the drive home, she noticed an unfamiliar man on a motorcycle following
her. He followed her into the parking lot of her apartment complex and parked next to her,
making her extremely nervous. As she walked quickly toward her apartment building, the driver
of the motorcycle started shouting at her.
3. Reasonably fearing for her safety, Ms. Chancellor continued to walk away until
the man—off-duty Fort Collins Police Officer Stephen Sparacio—identified himself as a police
officer and informed her she would be arrested and taken to jail.
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4. Officer Sparacio grabbed Ms. Chancellor’s arm, shoved his badge in her face, and
pulled her back toward her car while demanding her license and registration.
5. Ms. Chancellor looked through her purse for her license, but maintained
suspicions about Officer Sparacio’s aggressive behavior so started to slowly back away from
him.
6. Officer Sparacio responded by suddenly grabbing Ms. Chancellor and throwing
her face-down on the asphalt. While she was prone on the ground, not resisting or threatening
him in any way, Officer Sparacio pinned Ms. Chancellor to the ground with his knee and
bodyweight on her back.
7. The use of force against Ms. Chancellor was grossly excessive in violation of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and resulted from the deliberately
indifferent customs, practices, training, supervision and/or discipline of Defendant City of Fort
Collins.
8. Ms. Chancellor brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer
Sparacio and the City of Fort Collins for violating the rights guaranteed to her by the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
9. This action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States and is
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1331.
10. Jurisdiction supporting Plaintiff’s claim for attorney fees and costs is conferred by
42 U.S.C. § 1988.
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11. Venue is proper in the District of Colorado pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). All
of the events alleged herein occurred within the State of Colorado, and all of the parties were
residents of the State at the time of the events giving rise to this Complaint.
III. PARTIES
12. At all times relevant to this complaint, Plaintiff Kimberly Chancellor was a
citizen of the United States of America and a resident of the State of Colorado.
13. At all times relevant to this complaint, Defendant Stephen Sparacio was a citizen
of the United States and a resident of the State of Colorado. At all relevant times, Officer
Sparacio was acting within the scope of his official duties and employment and under color of
state law in his capacity as a law enforcement officer for Fort Collins Police Services (“FCPS”).
14. Defendant City of Fort Collins (“Fort Collins”) is a Colorado municipal
corporation and is the legal entity responsible for itself and for FCPS.
IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
A. Defendant Sparacio used excessive force during the arrest of Ms. Chancellor.
15. Plaintiff Kimberly Chancellor is a 27 year-old woman who lives in Fort Collins,
Colorado. She is a student at Front Range Community College in Fort Collins where she is
studying to be a nurse.
16. Ms. Chancellor is 5’2” tall and approximately 105 pounds.
17. Mid-afternoon on October 6, 2017, Ms. Chancellor was driving home from Front
Range Community College after class.
18. While driving home, she noticed an unfamiliar man in a leather jacket following
her on a motorcycle. He continued to follow her as she pulled into the parking lot of her
apartment complex and parked right next to her.
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19. This made Ms. Chancellor extremely nervous because he was not the tenant who
parked in the spot next to hers, and she did not otherwise recognize him.
20. When Ms. Chancellor exited her car, the man shouted at her, “hey! Stop! Hey
you!”
21. Reasonably fearing for her safety, Ms. Chancellor quickly walked away from the
man and toward her apartment.
22. It was not until Ms. Chancellor was near the door of her apartment complex that
the man informed her that he was a police officer and that he was going to arrest her and take her
to jail. Ms. Chancellor immediately stopped and turned around.
23. Unbeknownst to Ms. Chancellor until that point, the man was an off-duty officer
with Fort Collins Police Services—Defendant Stephan Sparacio.
24. Officer Sparacio grabbed Ms. Chancellor’s arm and shoved his badge in her face.
He told Ms. Chancellor that he was going to arrest her for resisting arrest.
25. Still holding on to Ms. Chancellor’s arm, Officer Sparacio pulled Ms. Chancellor
back toward her car and demanded that she show her identification.
26. Frightened by Officer Sparacio’s aggressive behavior and worried that he was not
actually a police officer, Ms. Chancellor asked Officer Sparacio if she could call the police to
verify that he was an officer or call her parents. Officer Sparacio refused and demanded to see
her license and registration.
27. Ms. Chancellor placed her purse on the ground and crouched down to look for her
license. While doing so, she explained to Officer Sparacio that she had initially walked away
from him because she did not know who he was, why he was following her, or that he was a
police officer.
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28. When Ms. Chancellor attempted to stand back up from her crouched position,
Officer Sparacio started aggressively reaching out to grab her.
29. Feeling extremely nervous and in fear for her safety, Ms. Chancellor attempted to
back away, but Officer Sparacio immediately grabbed her by the arm.
30. Officer Sparacio then violently pulled Ms. Chancellor toward him and slammed
her face-down to the ground. Ms. Chancellor screamed in terror and shock.
31. Officer Sparacio pinned Ms. Chancellor down on the asphalt with his knee and
bodyweight on her back, pressing her face into the gravel and twisting her arm behind her back.
32. With her free hand, Ms. Chancellor attempted to use her phone to record what
was happening, but Officer Sparacio grabbed her phone and threw it away from her.
33. A bystander called 911 to report a man assaulting a woman in the parking lot.
34. Another bystander, who worked as a security guard at a nearby business, saw
Officer Sparacio pursue Ms. Chancellor and heard Ms. Chancellor scream. When he walked over
to the parking lot to investigate, Officer Sparacio asked him if Officer Sparacio could use his
handcuffs.
35. Officer Sparacio then handcuffed Ms. Chancellor and left her on the ground.
36. Officer Sparacio called Fort Collins Dispatch for assistance and, moments later,
four uniform officers arrived on the scene.
37. Ms. Chancellor’s handcuffs were removed and returned to the security guard.
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38. Ms. Chancellor was issued a citation for careless driving and obstructing a police
officer, and then she was allowed to leave.1
39. Ms. Chancellor went straight to her apartment, extremely distressed and
traumatized from Officer Sparacio’s use of force against her.
40. Ms. Chancellor suffered from multiple cuts and bruises on her face, arms, and
knees. She had an egg-sized bump and a cut on her forehead that lasted for a week, and a one- to
two-inch cut on her forearm. She also had dirt in her mouth, gravel all over her face, and the
sweater she wore was torn and covered in dirt.
B. Defendant Fort Collins’ policies, customs practices, and/or lack of adequate training
and supervision caused the violations of Ms. Chancellor’s constitutional rights.
41. As detailed below, it has recently been the custom and actual practice of FCPS to
ratify and condone the use of excessive force by FCPS officers. As a result, it has become
customary among FCPS officers to use unjustified and excessive force because FCPS has
communicated to its officers that such force is authorized and, indeed, expected, and when used
will be defended or covered up by the supervisory and municipal apparatus of the City
42. FCPS officers have repeatedly used excessive force against individuals like Ms.
Chancellor who did not threaten or resist officers. For instance, in December of 2013, FCPS
officers similarly brutalized Stanley Cropp, an eighty-year-old man with Alzheimer’s disease and
dementia. Mr. Cropp was aggressively, unjustifiably, and unreasonably tackled by FCPS officers
while taking a walk in his neighborhood. Mr. Cropp was taken to Larimer County jail. The
excessive force claims against the City of Fort Collins and FCPS settled for $113,000.
1 Ms. Chancellor ultimately pleaded guilty to careless driving and the obstruction
charge was dismissed.
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43. In another case roughly a year before Ms. Chancellor’s, FCPS officers similarly
used excessive force against another member of the community. On or about October 20, 2016,
FCPS officers seized Dakota McGrath, who was suspected of third-degree assault, a
misdemeanor. Mr. McGrath, who had gotten out of his car and was walking in an alleyway, had
earbuds in and did not hear the officer approach. The officer caught up to Mr. McGrath and
struck him in the head or neck with a steel baton, causing Mr. McGrath to fall to the ground,
unconscious. Mr. McGrath regained consciousness but remained on the ground, dazed, when the
officer struck Mr. McGrath’s leg multiple times with the baton, fracturing his leg in several
places. On information and belief, the case was settled for an undisclosed amount.
44. In July of 2016, FCPS were called to Enan Joe Heneghan’s house for a noise
complaint. Mr. Heneghan turned down the music. The officer proceeded to search Mr.
Heneghan’s home without a warrant and without his consent, and unjustifiably and unreasonably
pepper sprayed him in the face when he refused to show officers his ID. The City of Fort Collins
settled Mr. Heneghan’s case for $150,000.
45. In December 2016, with absolutely no justification, a FCPS officer violently
struck Sean Slatton’s lower leg with his metal baton and then seconds later pepper sprayed him
in the face. By the time FCPS then wrongfully arrested Mr. Slatton, he was essentially blind and
needed to go to the hospital. Because Mr. Slatton had committed no crime, all charges against
him were dropped
46. On April 6, 2017, Michaella Surat was outside a bar in Fort Collins celebrating
her twenty-second birthday when police officers were called regarding an altercation inside the
bar. When Ms. Surat approached officers who were speaking with her boyfriend, one officer told
her to “back off” and pushed her shoulder. Ms. Surat told the officer not to touch her. The officer
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then grabbed and held on to Ms. Surat’s wrist and put her in a rear wristlock hold. Ms. Surat
repeatedly asked the officer why he was touching her and what she did wrong. The officer
responded by slamming Ms. Surat face-first to the ground – clearly an excessive use of force on
someone who posed no danger to the officer. Ms. Surat’s chin slammed into the sidewalk,
causing a concussion, cervical strain, and a large and painful contusion on her chin.
47. After video footage of Ms. Surat’s encounter with FCPS surfaced, FCPS
spokesperson Kate Kimble told the media that the officer used “standard arrest control.” This
statement makes explicit Fort Collins’ custom and practice of unconstitutional use of force.
48. Last but not least, FCPS officers used excessive force in an egregious incident
against Natasha Patnode, a woman accused of shoplifting at a Target store on March 29, 2018.
An FCPS officer struck Ms. Patnode more than sixty times with his fist or baton while she was
already on the ground and restrained. Another FCPS officer arrived and the officers tased Ms.
Patnode multiple times, again while she was already restrained on the ground. The FCPS
officers’ use of force blatantly exceeded the Fourth Amendment’s scope of reasonableness.
49. Defendant Fort Collins knew or had constructive knowledge, based on its history
and widespread practice of its officers using excessive force and its condoning of those actions,
that its officers would utilize excessive and unnecessary force against people like Ms.
Chancellor.
50. Because Defendant Fort Collins created and tolerated a custom of deliberate
indifference and has continuously failed, despite the obvious need to do so, to adequately train
and supervise FCPS officers in these areas, citizens, including Ms. Chancellor, have repeatedly
been subjected to violations of their constitutional rights.
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51. Defendant Fort Collins has fostered “a policy of inaction” in the face of
knowledge that FCPS officers were routinely violating specific constitutional rights, which
constitutes the functional equivalent of a decision by Fort Collins itself to violate the
Constitution.
52. Moreover, FCPS’ persistent failure to meaningfully investigate and discipline
numerous FCPS officers for their similar uses of excessive force reflects a custom, policy, or
practice of encourage, tolerating and/or blatantly illegal and improper conduct. These
encouragements, toleration of, and ratifications demonstrate that such police misconduct is
carried out pursuant to the policies of and regimen of training provided by Fort Collins, and that
such conduct is customary within FCPS.
53. Likewise, FCPS’s deliberate and conscious failure to correct prior constitutional
violations based on similar conduct constituted an affirmative choice to ratify the conduct, and to
send a clear message in doing so to its law enforcement officers that such misconduct is
acceptable and approved. It is Fort Collins’ responsibility to properly train its officers to ensure
they perform their duties correctly and to discipline, rather than ratify and encourage, their
improper conduct, so that officers can learn from their mistakes and perform their jobs correctly
moving forward, and be deterred from engaging in misconduct that violates the constitutional
rights of people with whom the police interact. Fort Collins’ failure to do so has clearly
communicated to FCPS’s officers, including Defendant Sparacio, that excessive force is
authorized and tacitly (or explicitly) encouraged.
54. Fort Collins’ past ratification and toleration of similar illegal conduct thus caused
and was the moving force behind the Defendant Sparacio’s use of excessive force against Ms.
Chancellor.
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C. Defendant Fort Collins is liable for Defendant Sparacio’s violation of Ms.
Chancellor’s rights.
55. The unlawful conduct of FCPS officers, as set forth in detail herein, amounts to a
custom and widespread practice so pervasive and well-established as to constitute a custom or
usage with the force of law.
56. Given FCPS’s history and widespread practice of officers using excessive force,
Fort Collins knew of the need to provide additional or better training and supervision in this
respect and made a deliberate choice to not adequately train and supervise FCPS officers in
avoiding excessive force and.
57. Fort Collins knew or should have known that its acts or omissions in this regard
were substantially certain to cause FCPS officers to violate individuals constitutional rights, and
it consciously or deliberately chose to disregard this obvious risk of harm in adhering to its
policy and custom of failing to provide additional or better training and supervision to FCPS
officers regarding how to avoid excessive force.
58. Defendant Fort Collins was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights, because Fort Collins knew that individuals in Ms. Chancellor’s position would be at a
substantial risk of suffering dangerous consequences from Fort Collins’ failure to properly train
and supervise its employees.
59. Defendant Fort Collins could have and should have pursued reasonable methods
for the training and supervising of such employees, or discipling them if they engaged in
misconduct, but intentionally chose not to do so.
60. Defendant Fort Collins policy of failing to act in the face of a history of excessive
force against people, and its custom, policy, and practice in failing to properly train and
supervise its employees despite such history and knowledge or constructive knowledge of such
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history, were the moving force and proximate cause of Defendant Sparacio’s violation of Ms.
Chancellor’s constitutional rights.
61. Defendant Fort Collins’ custom, policy, and practice of encouraging, condoning,
tolerating, and ratifying excessive force, as described herein, and the subsequent cover-ups of
such constitutional violations, were the moving force behind, and proximate cause of, Defendant
Sparacio’s violation of Ms. Chancellor’s constitutional rights.
62. Defendant Fort Collin’s acts or omissions caused Ms. Chancellor damages in that
she suffered physical and mental pain, humiliation, fear, anxiety, loss of enjoyment of life and
sense of security and individual dignity, among other injuries, damages, and losses.
63. Defendant Fort Collin’s actions, as described herein, deprived Ms. Chancellor of
the rights, privileges, liberties, and immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States
of America, and caused her other damages.
64. All of the acts described herein were done by Defendant Sparacio intentionally,
knowingly, willfully, wantonly, maliciously and/or recklessly in disregard for Ms. Chancellor’s
federally protected rights, and were done pursuant to the preexisting, deliberately indifferent
official custom, policy, practice, training, and supervision.
V. STATEMENT OF CLAIM FOR RELIEF
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
42 U.S.C. § 1983
Fourth & Fourteenth Amendment Violation – Excessive Force
(Against All Defendants)
65. Plaintiff hereby incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set
forth herein.
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66. At all times relevant to the subject matter of this Complaint, Defendant Sparacio
was acting under color of state law in his capacity as an FCPS officer and within the scope of his
employment.
67. At the time when Ms. Chancellor was seized, she had a clearly established
constitutional right under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution to be secure
in her person from unreasonable seizure through excessive force.
68. Defendant Sparacio is not entitled to qualified immunity. Any reasonable law
enforcement officer knew or should have known of this clearly established right.
69. Defendant Sparacio’s arrest of Ms. Chancellor by, among other things, grabbing
her by the arm and throwing her face-first on the asphalt, used greater force than was reasonably
necessary to effectuate the seizure.
70. Defendant Sparacio’s use of force was objectively unreasonable in light of the
circumstances confronting him.
71. Defendant Sparacio’s excessive use of force caused extreme pain to Ms.
Chancellor’s head, forearm, and knees, which were painfully cut and bruised. She also suffered
physical and mental injury, including pain and suffering, humiliation, and other injuries,
damages, and losses due to Defendant Sparacio’s actions. These injuries are not de minimis.
72. Defendant Sparacio’s actions, as described herein, were undertaken intentionally,
maliciously, willfully, wantonly, and/or in reckless disregard of Ms. Chancellor’s federally
protected rights, which entitles Ms. Chancellor to punitive damages.
73. Defendant Sparacio used excessive force in accordance with custom, policy,
practice, and training provided and promulgated by Defendant Fort Collins.
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74. Defendant Fort Collins established policies, customs and/or practices in violation
of the Constitution.
75. Defendant Fort Collins developed and maintained law enforcement-related
policies, customs, and/or practices exhibiting or resulting in a deliberate indifference to the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment protected constitutional rights of persons in Fort Collins,
which proximately caused the violation of Ms. Chancellor’s constitutional rights.
76. Defendant Fort Collins failed to properly train and supervise its employees with
regard to lawful seizures and lawful use of force.
77. Defendant Fort Collins has a duty to protect the constitutional rights of the
members of the public from violations of those rights by members of their police department.
78. In light of the duties and responsibilities of those law enforcement officers that
participate in providing safety and security for citizens and arrestees, the need for specialized
training and supervision is so obvious, and the inadequacy of training and supervision is so
likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights such as those described herein, that
Defendant Fort Collins is liable for its failure to do so.
79. The inadequate training and supervision provided by Defendant Fort Collins
resulted from a conscious or deliberate choice to follow a course of action from among various
alternatives. Defendant Fort Collins could have and should have pursued reasonable methods
for the training and supervising of such employees, yet failed to do so.
80. Defendant Fort Collins’ policies, customs, or practices in failing to train and
supervise its employees were the proximate cause of, and moving force behind, the violation of
Ms. Chancellor’s constitutional rights, which caused her damages as set forth above.
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VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court enter judgment in her
favor and against Defendants, and grant:
(a) Appropriate declaratory and other injunctive and/or equitable relief;
(b) Compensatory and consequential damages, including damages for physical injury,
emotional distress, loss of reputation, humiliation, loss of enjoyment of life, and other
pain and suffering on all claims allowed by law in an amount to be determined at trial;
(c) All economic losses on all claims allowed by law;
(d) Punitive damages on all claims allowed by law and in an amount to be determined
at trial;
(e) Attorney’s fees and the costs associated with this action, as well as expert witness
fees, on all claims allowed by law;
(f) Pre- and post-judgment interest at the lawful rate to the maximum extent allowed
by law; and
(g) Any further relief that this court deems just and proper, and any other relief as
allowed by law.
PLAINTIFF REQUESTS A TRIAL TO A JURY ON ALL ISSUES SO TRIABLE.
Dated this 4th day of October 2019.
KILLMER, LANE & NEWMAN, LLP
s/ David Lane
David Lane
1543 Champa Street, Suite 400
Denver, Colorado 80202
Tel: (303) 571-1000
Fax: (303) 571-1001
dlane@kln-law.com
Attorney for Plaintiff
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Reinstated or Reopened. (4) Check this box for cases reinstated or reopened in the district court. Use the reopening date as the filing date.
Transferred from Another District. (5) For cases transferred under Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a). Do not use this for within district transfers or
multidistrict litigation transfers.
Multidistrict Litigation – Transfer. (6) Check this box when a multidistrict case is transferred into the district under authority of Title 28 U.S.C.
Section 1407.
Multidistrict Litigation – Direct File. (8) Check this box when a multidistrict case is filed in the same district as the Master MDL docket.
PLEASE NOTE THAT THERE IS NOT AN ORIGIN CODE 7. Origin Code 7 was used for historical records and is no longer relevant due to
changes in statue.
VI. Cause of Action. Report the civil statute directly related to the cause of action and give a brief description of the cause. Do not cite jurisdictional
statutes unless diversity. Example: U.S. Civil Statute: 47 USC 553 Brief Description: Unauthorized reception of cable service
VII. Requested in Complaint. Class Action. Place an "X" in this box if you are filing a class action under Rule 23, F.R.Cv.P.
Demand. In this space enter the actual dollar amount being demanded or indicate other demand, such as a preliminary injunction.
Jury Demand. Check the appropriate box to indicate whether or not a jury is being demanded.
VIII. Related Cases. This section of the JS 44 is used to reference related pending cases, if any. If there are related pending cases, insert the docket
numbers and the corresponding judge names for such cases.
Date and Attorney Signature. Date and sign the civil cover sheet.
Case 1:19-cv-02848 Document 1-1 Filed 10/04/19 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 2
u 4 Reinstated or
Reopened
u 5 Transferred from
Another District
(specify)
u 6 Multidistrict
Litigation -
Transfer
u 8 Multidistrict
Litigation -
Direct File
VI. CAUSE OF ACTION
Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity):
Brief description of cause:
VII. REQUESTED IN
COMPLAINT:
u CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION
UNDER RULE 23, F.R.Cv.P.
DEMAND $ CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint:
JURY DEMAND: u Yes uNo
VIII. RELATED CASE(S)
IF ANY
(See instructions):
JUDGE DOCKET NUMBER
DATE SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY
RECEIPT # AMOUNT APPLYING IFP JUDGE MAG. JUDGE
$3'RFNHW
'LVWULFWRI&RORUDGR
KIMBERLY CHANCELLOR,
Larimer
Killmer Lane & Newman, LLP
1543 Champa Street, Suite 400
Denver, CO 80202 303-571-1000
CITY OF FORT COLLINS,
STEPHAN SPARACIO
Larimer
42 U.S.C. § 1983
Civil Rights, excessive force
10/04/2019 /s/ David A. Lane
Case 1:19-cv-02848 Document 1-1 Filed 10/04/19 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 2