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HomeMy WebLinkAboutCONOCO SERVICE STATION - EXPANSION OF A NON-CONFORMING USE - 57-88 - CORRESPONDENCE - RESPONSE TO APPLICANTDeveloplWnt Services Planning Department June 20, 1988 Mr. Bob Gallenstein Brady Oil Company 333 West Drake Road Fort Collins, CO. 80526 Dear Bob: C1 As it appears our travel schedules conflict, I have elected to write and enclose the case "Bethlehem Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Lakewood, 626 p.2d 668 (Colo. 1981). The City Attorney has reviewed your request for enlargement of a non- conforming use at the business at the southwest corner of Taft Hill Road and Mulberry Street. In light of the comments made at the Conceptual Review meeting of May 23, 1988 regarding the dedication of 10 feet of right-of-way along Taft, the City Attorney has also reviewed the "Bethlehem Lutheran" case. It is the finding of the City Attorney that the City's request for 10 feet of additional right-of-way is reasonable. The decision was based upon the fact that the request reflects the need for the City to provide public safety in the form of a future left turn lane in Taft Hill Road. The decision is also based on the fact that the request is not unduly oppressive and would not prevent the continued use and enjoyment of the property. Finally, the dedication is found to logically relate to the request for the enlargement of the existing use. As far as the edge of the canopy encroaching over the future dedicated area, the City Attorney suggested that the air rights remain with the property and that the dedication involve the surface rights only. This way, the City would not have to issue an encroachment permit and the canopy could remain as is until future road widening becomes a reality. Please keep in mind that the actual construction of the road widening would not begin until all the necessary dedication on both sides of the street and further to the south were obtained. Similar dedications will be requested of these particular parcels as they come in for redevelopment or at the time of the construction project. 300 LaPorte Avenue • P.O. Box 580 - Fort Collins, CO 50522-0580 • (303) 221-6750 0 Page 2 E r It is my hope that the enclosed document will give the background with which our decision was made. I also sincerely hope that the door remains open for you to proceed with your redevelopment plans. I believe that there are areas for compromise that will allow Staff to recommend approval to the Planning and Zoning Board and I encourage a full exploration of those possibilities. As I will be on vacation until June 30, 1988, please feel free to contact any member of our staff if you need assistance in preparing your submittal for July 5, 1988 for the August 22, 1988 Planning and Zoning Board hearing. Sincerely, Ted Shepard City Planner Encl. 668 Colo. 626 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES BETHLEHEM EVANGELICAL LUTHER- AN CHURCH, a Colorado Non-profit Corporation, and Tamminga Construc- tion Company, Inc., a Colorado Corpora- tion, Plaintiffs -Appellees, V. CITY OF LAKEWOOD, a Colorado Corpo- ration, the City Council of the City of Lakewood; Carolyn Bacher, Sharon Carr, Don DeDecker, Carl Neu, Gaylor Smith, Paul Thompson, Lester Willson, Bill Wilson and Robert Wright as mem- bers thereof; City of Lakewood Plan- ning Commission; Kenneth Cameron, Sarah Masterson, Howard Revie, Antho- ny Sabatini and John Kelly as members thereof; and Charles L. Gillett, Superin- tendent of Code Enforcement and Chief Building Official of the City of Lake- wood, County of Jefferson, State of Col- orado, Defendants -Appellants. No. 28521. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. April 6, 1981. As Modified on Denial of Rehearing April 27, 1981. welfare, improvements and dedications of land for street purposes should be made conditions to issuance of building permit; (3) building permit may be conditioned on construction of public improvements at cost of property owner; (4) dedication of strips of land to city for street purposes was not an unconstitutional taking of property ex- cept insofar as required dedication included portion of church improvement already con- structed; and (5) requirement that church, as a condition of building permit, construct, pay for, and dedicate public improvements was not a violation of freedom of religion. Church brought review proceeding combined with declaratory judgment action and petition for injunctive relief to have declared void and unconstitutional action of city in imposing conditions on issuance of building permit for construction of gymna- sium. The District Court, Jefferson Coun- ty, George G. Priest, J., ruled against de- fendants and city appealed. The Supreme Court, Lee, J., held that: (1) section of municipal code allowing conditions to be imposed on issuance of building permit if public improvements were necessitated by proposed construction provided sufficient standard to guide department of communi- ty services in making its determination; (2) evidence before planning commission on re- view was clearly sufficient to support deter- mination of department of community serv- ices that, in interest of public safety and Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 1. Constitutional Law =-48(3) Legislative enactment is presumptively valid and one who challenges it has heavy burden to establish its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. 2. Municipal Corporations *-601.3 Section of municipal code allowing con- ditions to be imposed on issuance of build- ing permit if public improvements were ne- cessitated by proposed construction provid- ed sufficient standard to guide department of community services in making its deter- mination; moreover, discretion delegated by legislature was circumscribed as to na- ture and extent of improvements that could be required by provision that improvements be constructed in full compliance with legis- latively adopted "engineering regulations, design standards and construction specifica- tions." C.R.S.1973, 31-15-702. 3. Municipal Corporations *-601.1 Evidence before planning commission on review was clearly sufficient to support determination of department of community services that, in interest of public safety and welfare, improvements and dedications of land for street purposes should be made conditions to issuance of building permit sought by church for construction of gym- nasium. C.R.S.1973, 31-15-702. 4. Municipal Corporations *-429 Owner of property abutting street may be required to pay costs of public improve- BETHLEHEM EV. LUTH. CHURCH v. CITY OF LAKEWOOD Colo. 669 Cite as, Colo., 626 P.2d 668 ments, such as streets, street paving, curbs, 10. Constitutional Law a84 gutters and sidewalks, on theory that prop- Requirement that church, as a condi- erty is especially benefited by improve- tion of building permit, construct, pay for, ments over and above general benefit to and dedicate public improvements was not a at large. C.R.S.1973, 31-15-702. violation of freedom of religion since inter- public s, Municipal Corporations 3:-601.1 ference, if any, with free exercise of reli- In view of statutory scheme that per- gion was minimal. Const. Art. 2, § 4; U.S. assessment of property improvement C.A.Const. Amend. 1. mits costs to abutting property, when property seeks to put his property to enlarged owner use which reasonably necessitates, in inter- Donald E. Mielke, Lakewood, for plain- est of public safety and welfare, installation tiffs -appellees. of sidewalks, curbs, gutters and street serv- icing, building permit may be conditioned Gorsuch, Kirgis, Campbell, on construction of such public improve- ver, Robert E. Warren, Jr., Solomon & Zim- for 4 ments at cost of property owner. C.R.S. merman, David A. Solomon, Denver, + 1973, 31-15-702. defendants -appellants. 1 6. Eminent Domain a=2(1.2) Except insofar as required dedication LEE, Justice. included portion of church improvements This case arises out of the action of the already constructed, condition of building appellant, City of Lakewood (City), in im- permit requiring dedication by church of posing certain conditions upon the issuance strips of land to city for street purposes was of a building permit sought by appellee, not an unconstitutional taking of property Bethlehem Evangelical Lutheran Church without compensation, where interest of (Church), for the construction of a gymnasi- public required dedication and dedication um. The Church successfully brought a was reasonably necessary for purpose of C.R.C.P. 106 review proceeding combined promoting public safety and was not unduly with a declaratory judgment action and pe- oppressive upon church. Const. Art. 2, tition for injunctive relief to have declared § 25; U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14. void and unconstitutional the action of the 7. Eminent Domain *-2(1) City in imposing conditions on the issuance Governmental action in form of regula- of a building permit. From the adverse tion may not be so onerous as to constitute ruling of the district court, the City brings a taking which constitutionally requires this appeal. We reverse the judgment. compensation. Const. Art. 2, § 25; U.S.C. The Church, in addition to its church fa- A.Const. Amend. 14. cilities, owns and operates the Bethlehem S. Municipal Corporations *-601.1 Lutheran School on its property located at To justify city's imposition of condition the intersection of 22nd Avenue and Wads - requiring dedication of land for street pur- worth Boulevard in the City of Lakewood. poses, it must appear that interests of pub- In 1975 the Church embarked on a program lic require such imposition and that means to enlarge its school facilities by construc- are reasonably necessary for accomplish- tion of a gymnasium. It applied for a ment of purpose, and not unduly oppressive building permit and, in accordance with the upon individuals. requirements of section 14.13.010 of the 9. Municipal Corporations *-601.1 Lakewood Municipal Code, the application for a building permit was referred to the Church construction is subject to such Department of Community Services for re - reasonable regulations as may be necessary Section 14.13.010 provides: to promote public health, safety or general welfare. Const. Art. 2, § 4; U.S.C.A.Const. view. "Public Improvements. —City of Lake - Amend. 1. wood '_Municipal Code. Colo. Rep. 624-U6 P 2d-9 f W 670 Colo. 626 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES "Applications for building permits shall be reviewed by the Department of Com- munity Services to determine whether the proposed construction will require the installation or construction of public im- provements, such as street paving, curbs, gutters, sidewalks, drainage facilities, or other public improvements. "If it is determined by the Department of Community Services that any such public improvements are necessitated by the proposed construction, the Depart- ment of Community Services shall so in- form the Building Official, and in such event a condition shall be inserted in the building permit which shall require the construction of such public improvement or public improvements by the permittee and the dedication thereof to the city. The cost of any such improvements shall be borne by the permittee, and the con- struction thereof shall be at the sole cost, risk and expense of the permittee, subject to the provisions of any applicable city ordinance, regulations or policies. "In addition, any contractor holding a building license pursuant to Section 14.- 04.060 is subject to the suspension or rev- ocation procedures set forth in Section 14.04.060. Failures to comply with the provisions for public improvements re- quired by this section shall be violations of this building code and, as such, shall constitute grounds for the suspension or revocation of a license. "All such improvements are to be con- structed in full compliance with the City of Lakewood Engineering Regulations, Design Standards and Construction Spec- ifications as adopted by city council Reso- lution 71-3, as amended." As a result of this review procedure, the Department of Community Services, as a condition for the issuance of the building permit, required that the Church make cer- tain street improvements and dedicate cer- tain land to the City for its use. In particu- lar, the City required that 1. This action was commenced April 30. 1976. The Church was permitted to construct the gymnasium without compliance with the build- ing permit conditions, pending 11 • - ' (A) The following property is to be dedicated as public right of way: ,,(1) To the City of Lakewood, the east 25 feet for Vance Street and "(2) To the City of Lakewood, approxi- mately the north 15 feet for West 22nd Avenue. The new right of way line is to be 6" in back of the existing walk and "(3) To the State of Colorado, approxi- mately the west 8 feet of the south 280 feet for Wadsworth Blvd. The new right of way line is to be 6 inches behind the new 5 foot attached concrete sidewalk. n In addition, the City required that the Church construct and pay for curb, gutter, sidewalk, and street improvements on a portion of those dedicated strips. The esti- mated cost of the improvements was $16,- 900, including a Wo contingency for infla- tion. The Church appealed the decision of the Department of Community Services to the Planning Commission pursuant to section 14.04.050 of the municipal code. After an evidentiary hearing, the Planning Commis- sion affirmed the determination of the De- partment of Community Services. The Church then commenced the district court action for review and for declaration of invalidity and injunctive relief.' The district court found that the ordi- nance relied upon to validate this action, section 14.13.010, Lakewood Municipal Code, was without standards to guide ad- ministrative action; that the requirement that the Church dedicate the parcels to the City and State was a taking of property without compensation in violation of the United States Constitution, Amend. XIV, and Art. II, sec. 25, of the Colorado Consti- tution; and that the requirement that the Church pay for the improvements was a violation of freedom of religion guaranteed by the United States Constitution, Amend. I, and Art. II, sec. 4, of the Colorado Consti- tution. and a final determination of the validity of the conditions. A Certificate of occupancy was issued November 26, 1976. BETHLEHEM E`'. LUTH. CHURCH v. CITY OF LAKEWOOD Colo. 671 Cite as, Colo.. 626 P.2d 668 The Church argued here and in the dis- trict court that section 14.13.010 of the Lakewood Municipal Code improperly dele- gates legislative authority without the im- position of standards sufficient to guide the discretion of the Department of Community Services. We do not agree. [1] Initially, we observe, as has been so often stated, that a legislative enactment is presumptively valid and one who challenges it has a heavy burden to establish its uncon- stitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. Fry Roofing Co. v. Dept. of Health, 179 Colo. 223, 499 P.2d 1176 (1972). Further- more, such an enactment must be read as a whole to ascertain whether adequate stan- dards have been provided. It is clear that, as a statutory city, the exercise of its power through its Building Department and Planning Commission in imposing conditions pursuant to section 14.- 13.010 of the municipal code derives from its authority to provide for and regulate the streets, alleys, sidewalks, crosswalks, curbs and gutters, and traffic. Section 31-15- 702, C.R.S.1973. [21 The ordinance in question requires that the Department of Community Serv- ices determine whether the proposed con- struction will require the installation or construction of public improvements, such as street paving, curbs, gutters, sidewalks, drainage facilities, or other public improve- ments. In making this determination, the department must inquire whether the "pub- lic improvements are necessitated by the proposed construction." If so, conditions may be imposed on the issuance of the building permit. In our view, the standard of "necessity" is a sufficient standard to guide the Department of Community Serv- ices in making its determination, consider- ing the broad power of the City to provide for and regulate the use of streets, alleys, and sidewalks and the City's correlative ob- ligation and duty to maintain the same for the users thereof. Implicit in the standard of "necessity" is the requirement that the City make provision for the safety and wel- fare of the general public, particularly in relation to increased vehicular and pedestri- an traffic that may be generated by the construction of a proposed building —here, a school gymnasium. Although it is a general and broad standard, "necessity" as a stan- dard for the guidance of an administrative agency has been held sufficient in the con- text of other statutes delegating legislative authority. Colo. Auto. & Truck Wreckers v. Dept. of Rev., Colo., 618 P.2d 646 (1980); Fry Roofing v. Dept. of Health, supra; State v. Arizona Mines Supply Co., 107 Ariz. 199, 484 P.2d 619 (1971). See also American Power & L. Co. v. S. E. C., 329 U.S. 90, 67 S.Ct. 133, 91 L.Ed. 103 (1946); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 63 S.Ct. 1375, 87 L.Ed. 1774 (1943). See generally Asphalt Paving Co. v. County Commissioners, 162 Colo. 254, 425 P.2d 289 (1967); Swisher v. Brown, 157 Colo. 378, 402 P.2d 621 (1965); Hazlet v. Gaunt, 126 Colo. 385, 250 P.2d 188 (1952). We find that the standard of neces- sity is sufficient in the context in which it is used in the ordinance under consideration. Holding as we do that the standard of "necessity" is sufficient, the ordinance does not leave the imposition of conditions to the whim of the Department of Community Services, but as heretofore noted the condi- tions must be related to the public safety of the user of the sidewalks and streets. Moreover, the ordinance requires that such improvements be constructed in full compli- ance with legislatively adopted "engineer- ing regulations, design standards and con- struction specifications." Thus, the dele- gated discretion is circumscribed as to the nature and, extent of the improvements that may be required. As an additional safeguard from arbitrary abuse, the imposi- tion of the conditions is subject to review by the Planning Commission. In the present case, review was had, extensive tes- timony presented, and the determination of the Department of Community Services was affirmed. II. In the context of this case, we note that the City did not initiate the proceedings 672 Colo. 626 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES which resulted in the conditions imposed requiring that portions of the Church prop- erty be dedicated for street purposes. The necessity for the requirement of dedication and installation of public improvements was occasioned by the Church's proposed use of its property to accommodate a school gym- nasium. The evidence before the Planning Commission clearly demonstrated that the need for the widened streets, the curbs, gutters, sidewalks and street paving was created by the proposed construction of the school gymnasium. The impact from the use of the property for such purposes, the evidence showed, would result in an in- creased vehicular and pedestrian flow of traffic going by, in, and out of the school facilities, interference with existing traffic patterns on adjacent streets, and an in- crease in the danger to the users of the property, particularly the school children. Existing problems occasioned by the present lack of street improvements would be aggravated by the expanded use of the school property.2 Additionally, more rapid deterioration would occur to the adjacent streets, West 22nd Avenue and Vance Street, which were paved with two lanes of asphalt, largely without curb, gutter or sidewalk, and thus entail greater mainte- nance by reason of the increased traffic caused by the expanded property use. [3] The evidence before the Planning Commission on review clearly was suffi- cient to support the determination of the Department of Community Services that, in the interest of the public safety and wel- fare, the public improvements and the dedi- cations of land for street purposes should be made conditions to the issuance of the gym- nasium building permit. The Church argues, however, that the City may not legally use its police power to force the Church to construct public im- provements at the Church's expense and to 2. The district court acknowledged this to some degree when it found: "The requirements the Citv has made are in the good interest of the City but the only real problem that was ad- vanced that 1 thought was of substance, was children walking out between cars and the safety factor of busses double-parking." compel the Church to dedicate its property to public use for street purposes without paying just compensation. [41 As to the requirement that the Church construct the public improvements, the City has broad statutory authority to widen, pave, and otherwise improve the streets; to provide for the construction and maintenance of sidewalks, curbs and gut- ters; and to assess the costs of street sur- facing and improvements, and the side- walks, curbs and gutters upon adjacent abutting property. Section 31-15-702, C.R. S.1973.3 The theory upon which the owner of the property abutting a street may be required to pay the costs of public improve- ments, such as streets, street paving, curbs, gutters and sidewalks, is that the property is especially benefited by the improvements over and above the general benefit to the public at large. Watson v. Fort Collins, 86 Colo. 305, 281 P. 355 (1929); County Com- missioners v. City, 66 Colo. 111, 180 P. 301 (1919). [5] In view of the statutory scheme that permits the assessment of these property improvement costs to the abutting proper- ty, we have no difficulty in holding that when a property owner seeks to put his property to an enlarged use which reason- ably necessitates, in the interest of public safety and welfare, the installation of side- walks, curbs, gutters and street surfacing, a building permit may be conditioned on the construction of such public improvements at the cost of the property owner. We do not find that the imposition of such a condition is unreasonable or a misuse of the police power. [6] The Church further contends that, even if the imposition of the condition that the Church construct the public improve- ments at its expense is a valid use of the 3. The exercise of this power may be through the mechanism of public improvement distncts initiated by petition of the abutting property owners or by direct action of the City. Section 31 25-501 et seq.: section 31 35-301 et seq.. C.R.S.1973. BETHLEHEM EV. LUTH. CHURCH v. CITY OF LAKEWOOD Colo. ;73 Cite as, Colo., 626 P.2d 668 police power, still, the further condition re- quiring the dedication of strips of land to the City for street purposes is in effect an unconstitutional taking of property without compensation in violation of the United States Constitution, amend. XIV, and the Colorado Constitution, art. II, sec. 25. We do not agree, except insofar as the required dedication might include a portion of the Church improvements already constructed. We do not view the proceeding to be one of eminent domain requiring the payment of compensation for the property required to be dedicated for street purposes. Rath- er, the imposition of the condition of dedica- tion is an exercise of the police power. It is the Church which is seeking to obtain the benefits from an enlarged use of its proper- ty, and the duty rests upon it to comply with reasonable -conditions conceived in the public interest, to prevent and avoid ad- verse effects on the vehicular and pedestri- an traffic on the streets adjacent to the Church property. There is a recognized dis- tinction between the exercise of the power of eminent domain and the exercise of the police power which results in non -compen- satory reasonable restrictions in respect to private interests which must yield to the public interest. Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal.2d 31, 207 P.2d 1, 11 A.L.R.2d 503 (1949). This principle has been noted in cases involving platting of subdivisions, zoning, and rezoning, where dedications of land for street and other purposes have been made conditions for governmental approval. Frisco Land and :'Mineral Co. v. State, 74 Ca1.App.3d 736, 141 Cal.Rptr. 820 (1977) and City of Carbondale v. Brewster, 78 I11.2d 111, 34 Ill.Dec. 838, 398 N.E.2d 829 (1979); and see Ayres, su- pra. [71 The exercise of the police power for such purposes, however, is not without limi- tation. The governmental action in the form of regulation may not be so onerous as to constitute a taking which constitutionally requires compensation. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 82 S.Ct. 987, 8 L.Ed2d 130 (1962). 626 P1d—!3 "The police power cannot extend be- yond the necessities of the case and be made a cloak to destroy constitutional rights as to the inviolateness of private property. House v. Flood Control Dist., 25 Ca12d 384, 153 P.2d 950, 952 (1944)._ An arbitrary, conceived exaction will be nullified as a disguised attempt to take private property for public use without resort to eminent domain. Mid -way Cab- inet Fixture Mfg. v. County of San Joa- quin, 257 Cal.App.2d 181, 65 Cal.Rptr. 37 (1967). A strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to war- rant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 S.Ct. 158, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922)." Transamerica Title Insurance Co. v. City of Tucson, 23 Ariz. App. 385, 533 P.2d 693 (1975). In King's Mill Homeowners v. Westmin- ster, 192 Colo. 305, 557 P.2d 1186 (1976), the general principle was recognized that condi- tions imposed in the exercise of the police power are valid as long as they are "reason- ably conceived." See also Transamerica Ti- tle Insurance, supra. The test as more explicitly enunciated by the United States Supreme Court is stated in Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, supra, as follows: "The classic statement of the rule in Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137, 14 S.Ct. 499, 501, 38 L.Ed. 385, 388 (1894), is still valid today: 'To justify the State in ... interpos- ing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public ... require such interfer- ence; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accom- plishment of the purpose, and not un- duly oppressive upon individuals.' "Even this rule is not applied with strict precision, for this Court has often said that 'debatable questions as to rea- sonableness are not for the courts but for the legislature .... " E. g., Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 388, 52 S.Ct. 581, 585, 76 L.Ed. 1167, 1179 (1932)." 1; 674 Colo. 626 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES [81 The same criteria are applicable to the City's imposition of the condition re- quiring the dedication of land for street purposes. Examined by the Goldblatt crite- ria, the interest of the public requires the dedication, and the dedication is reasonably tbly necessary for the purpose public safety and is not unduly oppressive upon the Church. Stated otherwise, the condition is neither arbitrary nor capricious, but rather is reasonably conceived to avoid danger to the pedestrian and vehicular traf- fic on the streets adjacent to the Church. Other states have upheld similar require- ments against claims that the required dedi- cations constituted an unlawful taking without compensation. Sommers v. Los Angeles, 254 Cal.App.2d 605, 62 Cal.Rptr. 523 (1967) and Gerla v. Tacoma, 12 Wash. App. 883, 533 P.2d 416 (1975). Sommers, supra, is particularly enlightening. The plaintiff there sought to expand a service station which was located at the intersec- tion of two busy streets. As a condition to the approval of the expansion plans, the City of Los Angeles required the dedication of certain parcels of land for the use in street improvements necessitated by the proposed improvements. The court found that: "It is appropriate here to point out that it is the appellants, not the city, who wish to put their property to an expanded use notwithstanding the complications in traffic now and the interference in the use of the streets to their full capacity i the immediate vicinity by the additions in -and -out traffic at the station. If a pellants desire the benefits resultin from the installation of the improvement in question they must meet any ble conditions imposed by the city befor, they can compel the city to issue th permit for such improvements. (Se Southern Pacific Co. v. City of Los Ang( les, supra, 242 Cal.App•2d 38, at p. 47, Cal.Rptr. 197.) In the circumstances matter hei disclosed we cannot say, law, that the condition imposed by tl 4. The record indicates that the officials ofhe wl Citv did not intend to encroach uponro ria of the Church building and that app P city was not reasonable. And the fact the requested dedication and the im- provement of the streets and intersection would 'incidentally benefit the city as a whole is an irrelevant consideration.' (Southern Pacific Co. v. City of Los An- geles, supra, at p. 51, 51 Cal.Rptr. at p. 204 )" We are thus persuaded that the City's action here does not constitute an unconsti- tutional taking of private property without just compensation, except as hereinafter noted. It follows that if the Church desires the benefits resulting from the improve- ment of its property, it must comply with reasonable conditions imposed by the City for dealing with traffic problems caused by that improvement. A problem arises because of the condition requiring the dedication of "approximately the north 15 feet for West 22nd Avenue. The new right of way line is to be 6" in The back of the existing walk line•would en- croach new right-of-way on a portion of the north wall of one of the Church buildings. The Church's im- portant interest in owning its building out- weighs the City's interest in this particular six-inch strip of land. Such under requirement wouldGold- would be unduly oppressivejustified under blatt test and could not be j the police power but rather would require the payment of compensation for the por- tion of the building wall taken. We agree n with the district court's ruling that insofar l as the required dedication along West 22nd p- Avenue encroaches on the Church building g it is an impermissible exercise of the police is power.' III. [91 Finally, the district court observed generally that the law provides preferential treatment for churches. However, church construction is subject to such treoreasonable regulations as may be necessary Promote the public health, safety, or general wel- adjustments would be made in order to avoid this consequence. PEOPLE v. LUXFORD Cite as, Cob„ 626 P.2d 675 fare. Board of Zoning Appeals v. Decatur Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses, 233 Ind. 83, 117 N.E.2d 115 (1954); Allendale Cong. of Jeho- vah's Witnesses v. Grosman, 30 N.J. 273, 152 A.2d 569 (1959); and 2 Anderson, American Law of Zoning, § 12.18 (1976); see East Side Bapt. Ch. v. Klein, 175 Colo. 168, 487 P.2d 549 (1971); Sherman v. Simms, 143 Tex. 115, 183 S.W.2d 415 (1944); Note, Churches and Zoning, 70 Harv.L.Rev. 1428 (1957); Annot., 74 A.L.R.2d 377; Cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940); and Mur- dock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 63 S.Ct. 870, 87 L.Ed. 1292 (1943). This court has previously held that churches are subject to the police power when the state can show a substantial inter- est. Pillar of Fire v. DURA, 181 Colo. 411, 509 P.2d 1250 (1973) and DURA v. Pillar of Fire, 191 Colo. 238, 552 P.2d 23 (1976) (here- inafter referred to as Pillar of Fire 1 and Pillar of Fire II, respectively). "' ' ' [W]e must balance the inter- ests involved in the controversy before us and recognize that the state must show a substantial interest without a reasonable alternate means of accomplishment if the state is to be constitutionally allowed to take the birthplace of the Pillar of Fire Church ' ' `." Pillar of Fire I, supra [101 In the present case, the interfer- ence, if any, with the free exercise of reli- gion is minimal. Unlike Pillar of Fire I and Pillar of Fire H, where an entire church building was to be condemned in the inter- est of slum clearance, in this case the church is merely required to upgrade streets surrounding its property and dedi- cate a small portion of its property to public use. The City has a substantial interest in developing streets which will facilitate the safe and free flow of traffic. The City is also interested in the maintenance of and liability for the streets within its jurisdic- tion. It is not reasonable to require the City to condemn every parcel of land neces- sary for street improvements when those improvements are necessitated by construc- tion by abutting landowners. Colo. 675 The following cases cited by the Church, in our view, are inapposite. Englewood v. Apostolic Christian Church, 146 Colo. 374, 362 P.2d 172 (1961), dealt with a total ban of churches from most areas of that city. There is no such ban here, only a reasonable regulation. Westchester Reform Temple v. Brown, 22 N.Y.2d 488, 293 N.Y.S.2d 297, 239 N.E.2d 891 (1968), dealt with restrictions which had the effect of barring an expan- sion of the church building itself. The con- struction was necessitated by increased community demand. In that case, the court held that the interest in protecting the free- dom of religious exercise outweighed the governmental interest. The required per- formance wou..i have resulted in a prohibi- tive $100.000 added cost to the church. No such financial burden is sought to be im- posed on the Church in the present case. We hold that the requirement that the Church construct, pay for, and dedicate public improvements, is not a violation of freedom of religion guaranteed by the Colo- rado and United States Constitutions. The judgment is reversed except as to the six-inch strip behind the existing sidewalk on West 22nd Avenue upon which the north wall of the Church building encroaches, as to which the judgment is affirmed. w O S KEY NUMBERSY$TEM T PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Complainant, V. Richard G. LUXFORD, Attorney -Respondent. No. 81SA77. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. April 6, 1981. In original proceeding in discipline, the Supreme Court, Quinn, J., held that negoti-