HomeMy WebLinkAbout2017CV884 - CHAYCE ANDERSON V. FCPS OFFICER JASON SHUTTERS - 156 - PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO THE AMENDED RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGEIN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 1:17-CV-00884-CMA-STV
CHAYCE AARON ANDERSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JASON SHUTTERS,
Defendant.
PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTION TO THE AMENDED RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED
STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2),
Plaintiff Chayce Aaron Anderson (“Mr. Anderson”), by and through undersigned counsel,
submits this Objection to the Amended Recommendation of United States Magistrate
Judge (Dkt. 152).
CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE
Pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(A), undersigned counsel for Mr. Anderson
conferred with counsel for Defendant regarding this Objection. Defendant opposes the
relief requested herein.
INTRODUCTION
The Amended Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge
(“Recommendation”) was issued on November 19, 2019 (Dkt. 152) in response to
Defendant Jason Shutters’ (“Defendant”) Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt.128) and
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the parties’ subsequent briefing. (See Dkt. 133 (Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment); Dkt. 136 (Defendant’s Reply in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment); Dkt. 137-1 (Plaintiff’s Surreply to Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment); Dkt. 146 (Order granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Surreply
and accepting Dkt. 137-1); Dkt. 147 (Defendant’s Sur-response).) The Recommendation
recommends that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 128) be granted and
that the above-captioned case be dismissed. (Dkt. 152 at 18.) In pertinent part, the
Recommendation found that Mr. Anderson failed to establish either prong of the qualified
immunity analysis, noting that “while excessive handcuffing may constitute excessive
force, a plaintiff cannot prevail on an excessive force handcuffing claim unless either: (1)
the plaintiff timely informs the officer that the handcuffs are too tight, or (2) the officer is
otherwise made aware that the handcuffs are too tight.” (Dkt. 152 at 9 (citing cases).)
The Recommendation found that Mr. Anderson failed to inform Defendant that the
handcuffs were too tight or that his wrists were in pain. It also found that Mr. Anderson
failed to set forth specific facts or evidence to demonstrate that Defendant should have
otherwise been aware of any problems with the handcuffs. (Dkt. 152 at 14-15.)
Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Anderson, a reasonable jury
could conclude that Defendant was aware that the handcuffs he placed on Mr. Anderson
were too tight because (1) Defendant further tightened the handcuffs on Mr. Anderson
after asking Mr. Anderson if the handcuffs were too tight; (2) Mr. Anderson complained of
wrist pain within mere minutes of the over-tightening; and (3) Defendant was kept away
from Mr. Anderson following the arrest. These uncontroverted pieces of evidence support
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the reasonable inference that Defendant knew that the handcuffs were too tight.
Accordingly, whether Defendant knew or was otherwise made aware that the handcuffs
were too tight is a fact dispute for the jury to decide. Mr. Anderson respectfully requests
that this Court reject the Recommendation and deny Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), “a party may serve and file specific written objections
to the proposed findings and recommendations” “[w]ithin 14 days after being served with
a copy of the recommended disposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). In resolving the
objections, “[t]he district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s
disposition that has been properly been objected to.” Id. at 72(b)(3); see Summers v.
State of Utah, 927 F.2d 1165, 1167 (10th Cir. 1991) (“De novo review is statutorily and
constitutionally required when written objections to a magistrate’s report are timely filed
with the district court.”). “The district judge may accept, reject, or modify the
recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate
judge with instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
ARGUMENT
I. Whether Defendant Knew or Was Made Aware of Mr. Anderson’s Wrist Pain
is a Disputed Material Fact.
As the summary judgment movant, Defendant has the burden to show “that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court must “construe the factual record and
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Allen v.
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Muskogee, Okla., 199 F.3d 837, 839-40 (10th Cir. 1997). Indeed, “this usually means
adopting … the plaintiff’s version of the facts.” Todd v. Montoya, 877 F. Supp. 2d 1048,
1087 (D.N.M. 2012) (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007)).
In excessive force cases, the Tenth Circuit precludes a finding of qualified
immunity where either the officer ignored timely complaints or was otherwise made aware
that the handcuffs were too tight. Vondrak v. City of Las Cruces, 535 F.3d 1198, 1209
(10th Cir. 2012); see Dkt. 152 at 9 (acknowledging disjunctive standard). Knowledge is
almost always proven by circumstantial evidence. See U.S. v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 521
(2008); U.S. v. Barrow, 448 F.3d 37, 44 (1st Cir. 2016) (“A jury may reasonably infer
knowledge from circumstantial evidence[.]”); Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 852 (9th Cir.
2002) (“a jury’s finding for a plaintiff in an excessive force case may unquestionably rest
on inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence.”).
Here, the facts viewed in favor of Mr. Anderson support the inference that
Defendant had knowledge the handcuffs he placed on Mr. Anderson were too tight.
The undisputed facts show that Mr. Anderson was compliant and cooperative
during his arrest. (Dkt. 133 at 3 (citing Dkt. 133-4 at 38:2-12).) Yet Defendant chose to
tighten Mr. Anderson’s handcuffs further after Defendant initially placed the handcuffs on
Mr. Anderson without issue. (Dkt. 133 at 4 (citing Dkt. 133-4 at 43:15-19; audio recording
at 4:34; Dkt. 133-11 at ¶¶ 8-9).) Indeed, almost immediately after Defendant further
tightened the handcuffs on Mr. Anderson, Mr. Anderson complained that he was suffering
from wrist pain. (Dkt. 133 at 10; Dkt. 133-6 at 19:22-20:5 (transport took 10-15 minutes);
id. at 20:13-20 (Mr. Anderson’s complaints of wrist pain to Officer Edmonds).) Mr.
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Anderson continued to complain to officers when he arrived at the Fort Collins Police
Department (“FCPD”) facility. (Dkt. 133-7 at 19:14-15 (photos taken by Det. Tracy
because of Mr. Anderson’s wrist pain complaints); Dkt. 133-7 at 26:3-5 (Mr. Anderson’s
complaints of wrist pain to Det. Tracy); Dkt. 133-3 at 32:17-33:15 (Sgt. Cochran informed
of Mr. Anderson’s wrist pain complaints by Det. Tracy).) Additionally, just 10-15 minutes
later, upon arrival at the FCPD facility, Defendant was kept away from Mr. Anderson.
(Dkt. 133 at 4; Dkt. 133-6 at 20:2-5; Dkt. 133-3 at 39:10-13; Dkt. 133-3 at 40:12-15; Dkt.
133-3 at 41:13-16; Dkt. 133-3 at 42:18-25).)
From these facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Anderson, a jury could
find that Defendant knew or was made aware that Mr. Anderson’s handcuffs were too
tight. See Vondrak v. City of Las Cruces, 535 F.3d 1198, 1209 (10th Cir. 2012) (finding
officers not entitled to qualified immunity on excessive force claim of unduly tight
handcuffing where officers ignored timely complaints or were otherwise made aware that
handcuffs were too tight). Indeed, Defendant asked Mr. Anderson about the tightness of
the handcuffs prior to further tightening the handcuffs, but Defendant did not ask the same
question after further tightening the handcuffs. In combination with the fact that
Defendant was intentionally recording the interaction, it is reasonable to infer that
Defendant knew this further tightening would cause Mr. Anderson pain. It is also
undisputed that Mr. Anderson complained of wrist pain within minutes of the over-
tightening. (Dkt. 152 at 3-4, 14.) Multiple officers testified that they were aware of Mr.
Anderson’s wrist pain complaints within minutes of the arrest. (Dkt. 133-7 at 26:3-5 (Mr.
Anderson’s complaints of wrist pain to Det. Tracy); Dkt. 133-3 at 32:17-33:15 (Sgt.
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Cochran informed of Mr. Anderson’s wrist pain complaints by Det. Tracy).) Thus, a jury
could infer that Defendant was aware, within minutes after the over-tightening, that Mr.
Anderson was complaining of wrist pain. Finally, it is undisputed that Defendant was kept
away from Mr. Anderson upon arrival at the FCPD facility. A jury could reasonably infer
from this fact that Defendant knew he had excessively tightened Mr. Anderson’s
handcuffs, injuring Mr. Anderson, and necessitating the separation between Defendant
and Mr. Anderson.
Therefore, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Anderson,
whether Defendant knew or was made aware that Mr. Anderson’s handcuffs were too
tight remains a disputed material fact precluding summary judgment. See Bocchino v.
City of Atlantic City, 179 F. Supp. 3d 387, (D.N.J. 2016) (“Accordingly, [a] decision as to
qualified immunity is ‘premature when there are unresolved disputes of historical facts
relevant to the immunity analysis.’”) (quoting Phillips v. City of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224,
242 n.7 (3d Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Recommendation found
Defendant’s knowledge to be critical to each prong of the qualified immunity analysis.
See Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998) (“An issue of fact
is ‘material’ if under the substantive law it is essential to the proper disposition of the
claim.”). And a reasonable jury could find that Defendant had the requisite knowledge
that Mr. Anderson’s handcuffs were too tight. See Allen, 199 F.3d at 839 (finding a
“dispute is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party”).
CONCLUSION
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Defendant’s knowledge of the tightness of Mr. Anderson’s handcuffs and his
knowledge of Mr. Anderson’s contemporaneous complaints about wrist pain shows there
remains a disputed material fact about whether Defendant knew he had excessively
tightened Mr. Anderson’s handcuffs. Mr. Anderson respectfully requests that the Court
reject the Amended Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge of November
19, 2019 (Dkt. 152) and deny Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 128).
Dated this 3rd day of December 2019.
s/ Alexandra L. Lakshmanan
Alexandra L. Lakshmanan
Christopher J. Casolaro
Travis Jordan
Heather Campbell Burgess
FAEGRE BAKER DANIELS LLP
1144 Fifteenth Street, Suite 3400
Denver, CO 80202
Telephone: (303) 607-3500
Facsimile: (303) 607-3600
allie.lakshmanan@faegrebd.com
christopher.casolaro@faegrebd.com
travis.jordan@faegrebd.com
heather.burgess@faegrebd.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that on December 3, 2019, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTION TO THE AMENDED RECOMMENDATION OF
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE was served on the following counsel of record
via the Court’s CM/ECF e-file system:
Mark S. Ratner, Esq.
HALL & EVANS, L.L.C.
1001 Seventeenth Street, Suite 300
Denver, Colorado 80202
Ratnerm@hallevans.com
Attorney for Defendant
s/ Alexandra L. Lakshmanan
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