HomeMy WebLinkAbout2018CV220 - STACY LYNNE V. NOAH BEALS, SENIOR PLANNER, AND JEREMY CALL - 030 - ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR POST-TRIAL RELIEF1
DISTRICT COURT, LARIMER COUNTY,
STATE OF COLORADO
Larimer County Justice Center
201 LaPorte Avenue, Suite 100
Fort Collins, Colorado 80521-2761
970-494-3500
Plaintiff:
STACY LYNNE,
v.
Defendants:
NOAH BEALS
▲ COURT USE ONLY ▲
Case Number: 2018 CV 220
Courtroom: 3C
ORDER DENYING PLAINITFF’S MOTION FOR POST-TRIAL RELEIF
THIS MATTER is before the court on Plaintiff’s motion for post-trial relief under
C.R.C.P. Rule 59. The Court has reviewed the motion, response and reply. After careful
consideration, the Court finds and orders as follows:
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed her Complaint on December 4, 2018, asserting a claim for defamation
against Defendant Beals. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and a request for attorney’s fees on January 11, 2019. In its order dated April 3, 2019
the Court granted Defendant Beals’ motion to dismiss under C.R.C.P. Rule 12(b)(1) finding that
the Plaintiff had failed to sufficiently plead facts to support a finding that the Court had subject
matter jurisdiction. Specifically, the Court determined in its April 3, 2019 Order that Plaintiff
DATE FILED: June 2, 2019 10:21 AM
CASE NUMBER: 2018CV220
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failed to plead that Mr. Beals’ statements were “willful and wanton.” The court further
determined that Plaintiff failed to allege in her Complaint that Defendant Beals’ statements were
made with “actual malice.” Finding that Plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead her claim, the Court
dismissed this matter, without prejudice.
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR POST-TRIAL RELIEF UNDER C.R.C.P. RULE 59
1
In her motion for post-trial relief under C.R.C.P. Rule 59 Plaintiff asserts that she
correctly plead her claims and that her pleading asserts the required factual allegations to
establish both that Defendant Beals acted willfully and wantonly and that his statements were
made with “actual malice.” as required under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act
(“CGIA”). The court determined that Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Beals should be
dismissed under C.R.C.P. Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
2
LEGAL STANDARD
Under the CGIA, a public employee is “immune from liability in any claim for
injury…which lies in tort…which arises out of an act or omission of such employee occurring
during the performance of his duties and within the scope of his employment unless the act or
omission causing such injury was willful and wanton.” C.R.S. § 24-10-118(2)(a) (emphasis
added). When a governmental entity or employee raises the defense of immunity under the
CGIA, the district court must make factual findings to ensure that the court has jurisdiction to
hear the case. City and County of Denver v. Dennis, 418 P.3d 489, 494 (Colo. 2018). When a
plaintiff sues a governmental entity or employee and that entity or employee moves to dismiss
1 It is not entirely clear to the Court whether a Rule 59 motion is the appropriate avenue to challenge the Court’s
order which dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint, without prejudice.
3
for lack of jurisdiction, the plaintiff has the burden of proving jurisdiction. Id. Plaintiff is
afforded the reasonable inferences from her undisputed evidence. Id.
In any action where allegations are made that the public employees’ acts or omissions
were willful and wanton, the specific factual basis of such allegations shall be stated in the
complaint. Gray v. University of Colorado Hosp. Authority, 284 P.3d 191, 198 (Colo. App.
2012). Conclusory allegations are insufficient. Id. C.R.S. § 24-10-110(5) provides, in relevant
part:
(a) In any action in which allegations are made that an act or omission of a public
employee was willful and wanton, the specific factual basis of such allegations shall be
stated in the complaint.
(b) Failure to plead the factual basis of an allegation that an act or omission of a public
employee was willful and wanton shall result in dismissal of the claim for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Under the CGIA, waivers of immunity for acts or omissions that are “willful and
wanton” only apply to public employees, not to public entities. Gray at 196. The phrase “willful
and wanton” is not defined in the CGIA. However, a number of courts to address the issue have
applied the definition set forth in Colorado's exemplary damages statute, C.R.S. § 13–21–102.
The statute defines willful and wanton conduct as “conduct purposefully committed which the
actor must have realized as dangerous, done heedlessly and recklessly, without regard to
consequences, or of the rights and safety of others, particularly the plaintiff.” Id.; see Moody v.
Ungerer, 885 P.2d 200, 205 (Colo. 1994); see also Navratil v. Parker, 726 F.Supp. 800, 805 (D.
Colo. 1989) (applying Colorado law, district court held that defendant would only be liable for
willful and wanton conduct if he acted with the intent to injure, or in conscious disregard of the
probability that his acts would result in injury to the plaintiff). At a minimum, the complaint
must allege “specific facts to support a reasonable inference that the employee was acting with a
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conscious disregard of the probability that the employee’s acts would result in injury to the
plaintiff.
DISCUSSION
In its order dated April 3, 2019, the Court determined that Plaintiff failed to meet the
pleading requirements set forth in the caselaw and as required under C.R.S. § 24-10-110(5). The
Court specifically determined that Plaintiff failed to specifically allege in her Complaint that the
actions of Defendant Beals were willful or wanton.
3
Further, the Court determined that
Plaintiff’s Complaint failed to allege specific facts to support a conclusion that Beals’ actions
were willful and wanton. Ultimately, the Court determined that Plaintiff’s Complaint failed to
meet the pleading requirements of the CGIA which requires that Plaintiff allege specific facts to
support a reasonable inference that the employee was consciously aware or was acting with a
conscious disregard of the probability that the employee’s acts would result in injury to Plaintiff.
C.R.S. § 24-10-110(5); L.J. v. Carricato, 413 P.3d 1280, 1288 (Colo. App. 2018).
In her motion seeking relief under C.R.C.P. 59 Plaintiff simply restates the arguments
previously rejected by the Court. Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff’s request for post-trial
relief under C.R.C.P. 59. Further, while Plaintiff again requests an evidentiary hearing to provide
support for her pleading, the Court has determined that there is no material factual dispute as to
the statements alleged to be made by Defendant Beals. Accordingly, an evidentiary hearing
would not address the insufficiency of the Plaintiff’s pleading.
ORDER
Plaintiff’s motion for post-trial relief under C.R.C.P. Rule 59 is hereby denied.
3 Plaintiff does set forth in her Complaint case law as to what “willful and wanton” conduct encompasses, but never
alleges in the Complaint that Beals’ actions were willful and wanton.
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SO ORDERED: June 2, 2019.
BY THE COURT:
__________________________________
Stephen J. Jouard
District Court Judge