HomeMy WebLinkAbout2018CV149 - SUTHERLAND V. CITY OF FORT COLLINS, STEVE MILLER & IRENE JOSEY - 112 - TIMNATH'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO VACATE ORDER GRATNING TIMNATH AND COMPASS MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEESDISTRICT COURT, LARIMER COUNTY, COLORADO
201 LaPorte Avenue
Fort Collins, CO 80521
COURT USE ONLY
Plaintiff:
ERIC SUTHERLAND, pro se
v.
Defendants:
THE CITY OF FORT COLLINS, et al.
Counsel for The Timnath Development Authority and
Compass Mortgage Corporation:
Eric R. Burris, admitted pro hac vice
BROWNSTEIN HYATT FARBER SCHRECK, LLP
201 Third Street NW, Suite 1800
Albuquerque, NM 87102
Phone: 505.244.0770
Email: eburris@bhfs.com
Cole J. Woodward, #50199
BROWNSTEIN HYATT FARBER SCHRECK, LLP
410 Seventeenth Street, Suite 2200
Denver, CO 80202-4432
Phone: 303.223.1100
Email: cwoodward@bhfs.com
Co-Counsel for The Timnath Development Authority:
Robert G. Rogers, #43578
Casey K. Lekahal, #46531
WHITE BEAR ANKELE TANAKA & WALDRON
2154 E. Commons Ave., Suite 2000
Centennial, CO 80122
Phone: 303.858.1800
Emails: rrogers@wbapc.com; clekahal@wbapc.com
Case Number: 2018CV149
Division: 3C
RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO
VACATE ORDER GRANTING TIMNATH DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY AND COMPASS MORTGAGE CORPORATION’S
MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES PURSUANT TO RULE 60(B)
Defendants The Timnath Development Authority (“TDA”) and Compass Mortgage
Corporation (“Compass”), by and through their counsel of record, White Bear Ankele Tanaka &
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Waldron Attorneys at Law and Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP, hereby submit the
following Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion To Vacate Order Granting Timnath
Development Authority and Compass Mortgage Corporation’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees
Pursuant to Rule 60(b) (the “Response”).
INTRODUCTION
In his Motion to Vacate Order Granting Timnath Development Authority’s and Compass
Mortgage Corporation’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to Rule 60(B) (the “Motion”),
Plaintiff asks the Court to revisit the issue of fees and costs in this matter for the third time.
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The
Motion presents no new, different, or evolved material facts or legal arguments that relate to the
Court’s prior decision on this issue. Plaintiff also makes no attempt to tie the unsupported facts
and theories in the Motion to the legal standard that applies to a motion under Rule 60. It lies
within the discretion of the Court to deny the Motion on that basis alone.
The Motion asserts that the TDA lacks capacity to sue, which is nonsensical, and
explicitly contravened by black letter law. As Plaintiff well knows, Colorado’s Urban Renewal
Act (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-25-104 et seq., the “URA”) provides that an urban renewal authority
“shall be conclusively deemed to have been established” where it provides proof that it filed a
certificate of formation with the Colorado Dept. of Local Affairs (“DOLA”). Colo. Rev. Stat. §
31-25-104 (1)(d). Plaintiff is already in possession of that certificate, and attached it to his
Motion as an exhibit. Mot. at Ex. 4. Plaintiff is once again making allegations with knowledge
that they lack any basis in law or fact, which was the basis for the award of attorneys’ fees that is
the subject of this Motion.
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Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Grant of Attorneys’ Fees and Bill of Costs
on September 24, 2018.
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In sum, the Motion presents neither a cognizable legal theory entitling Plaintiff to relief,
nor any facts in support thereof. Consequently the Motion should be denied.
STANDARD OF LAW
Rule 60 allows Colorado Courts to revise their judgments when “significant new matter
of fact or law arises which is extrinsic to [the judgment] because of not having been presented to
the court.” E.B. Jones Const. Co., v. City and C’nty of Denver, 717 P.2d 1009, 1013 (Colo. App.
1986). In order to obtain relief under Rule 60, “the moving party must clearly establish the
existence of one of the grounds of relief afforded by the Rule.” Id. Here, Plaintiff seeks relief
from the Court’s September 10, 2019 under Rule 60(b)(2), which allows the Court to provide
relief from its earlier judgment in cases of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect.” Mot. at 6; Colo. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
ARGUMENT
A. Plaintiff’s Assertion that TDA is Improperly Constituted is Yet Another Improper
Attempt to Enforce the URA.
Despite his various musings regarding the supposed basis for his Motion, Plaintiff is
doing nothing more than again seeking to circumvent the fact that taxpayers lack standing to
enforce procedural requirements of the URA against an urban renewal authority. Initially,
Plaintiff’s Unamended Complaint claimed that the TDA was improperly constituted under the
URA because its “governing board did not include a representative appointed by the Board of
County Commissioners, a school board member and another member to be appointed by the
special districts levying property taxes within the URA plan area.” Unam. Compl., ¶ 11. The
Court dismissed that claim and found it to be substantially frivolous because Plaintiff, as a
taxpayer, lacks standing to enforce the URA against an Urban Renewal Authority such as TDA.
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Olson v. City of Golden. 53 P.3d 747, 752 (Colo.App. 2002). Order Granting Def.’s Joint Mot.
to Dismiss at 3.
Now, Plaintiff incorrectly alleges that TDA failed to comport with the procedural
requirements of the URA when the Timnath Town Council designated itself as the governing
board of the TDA, and did not change the membership of the governing board in response to
2015 amendments to the URA. Mot. at 10. This claim is premised on the same erroneous theory
of law asserted in the Unameded Complaint, i.e. that the 2015 amendments to the URA apply
retroactively to urban renewal authorities created on or before January 1, 2016 (like TDA). The
text of the statute makes clear that there is no such retroactive effect. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-25-
107(9.7)(b).
The limitations on standing established under Olson apply equally to all of the URA’s
procedural requirements. As with Plaintiff’s claims made in the Unamended Complaint, this new
claim is substantially frivolous regardless of the veracity of its underlying facts and legal theories
because Plaintiff lacks standing to enforce the procedural requirements of the URA under Olson.
B. Plaintiff Cannot Make the Required Showing of Mistake, Inadvertence, Surprise, or
Excusable Neglect in Support of the Motion Because He Has Been in Possession of
All Facts Alleged in the Motion Since the Inception of This Litigation.
In the Motion to Vacate, Plaintiff rehashes the same flawed interpretation of Colorado’s
law of standing that has been considered and rejected by this Court at least four times. The
Motion includes no material facts that could alter the Court’s analysis on the issue of fees and
costs. Instead, Plaintiff takes this opportunity to heap more abuse on TDA, Compass and this
Court. Setting that aside, Plaintiff makes no attempt to connect his flawed discussion of the law
of standing with the grounds for relief established by Rule 60. The Motion does not specify
which ground for relief provided in Rule 60(b)(2) Plaintiff is trying to invoke, or present facts or
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evidence that could satisfy any of those possible bases. These failures are fatal to Plaintiff’s
Motion.
In an apparent effort to meet his burden under Rule 60, Plaintiff alleges that TDA lacks
capacity to sue or be sued. Mot. at 5. While Plaintiff alleges he did not discover this supposed
lack of capacity until November of 2018 because TDA engaged in an elaborate subterfuge when
it filed and subsequently withdrew counterclaims for abuse of process, he provides no supporting
evidence for those allegations.
2 Id. at 5-6. Even if Plaintiff’s accusations regarding this alleged
subterfuge were true, which they are not, they would not establish that the Order is a product of
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.
Specifically, the Motion does not state how TDA’s alleged counterclaim subterfuge could
have prevented Plaintiff from discovering prior to November of 2018 that the TDA was
improperly constituted. Indeed, it shows quite the opposite – that this information has been
available to Plaintiff for nearly eleven months. In this regard, the Motion alleges that TDA has
been improperly constituted since August 2015. Mot. at 13. The meeting minutes that Plaintiff
relies upon to indicate that the TDA is not constituted in accordance with his incorrect
interpretation of the URA are dated May 8, 2018. Those minutes are a public record, and are
available via the Town of Timnath’s website.
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Despite this, Plaintiff has made no allegations to
show why he could not have known these facts before now. As such, given the level of interest
this issue has obviously garnered with Plaintiff, one is left with the distinct impression that
2
These same claims were ultimately adjudicated in Town of Timnath et al v. Sutherland,
2018CV30567, where TDA and the Town of Timnath obtained money damages as well as
injunctive relief barring Mr. Sutherland from future pro se litigation in the 8
th
Judicial District.
3
Agendas and Meetings Page, Town of Timnath, https://timnath.org/government/agendas-and-
minutes/ (last visited April 1, 2019).
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Plaintiff has been in possession of all facts that underlie his erroneous theory that the TDA lacks
capacity to sue or be sued since at least May 8, 2018, just twelve days after he filed his
Unamended Complaint. Considering Plaintiff cannot make the required showing of mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect in order to obtain relief under Rule 60(b), his Motion
should be denied.
C. Plaintiff’s Assertion That His Unamended Complaint Stated a Claim Under
Colorado’s Open Meeting Law is Both False and Immaterial.
The Motion to Vacate also features a novel but ineffective attempt to convert Plaintiff’s
claim that TDA failed to comport with the Colorado’s Urban Renewal Act (Colo. Rev. Stat. §
31-25-101 et seq.) into a claim under Colorado’s Open Meeting Law (Colo. Rev. Stat § 24-6-
401). Mot. at 8-9. Even if this was procedurally possible at this stage in this action, which it is
not, it would violate the Permanent Injunction that issued against Plaintiff in Town of Timnath et
al v. Eric Sutherland, 2018CV30567 on March 28, 2019. That Order bars Plaintiff from entering
any new claims in the 8
th
Judicial District without representation by an attorney or prior leave of
the Court. Ex. A, Perm. Inj., ¶ 1. In that regard, it is not sufficient that Plaintiff simply file a
motion asking for leave to amend his claims. Rather, recognizing the harm that Plaintiff has
inflicted with his serial, frivolous pro se litigation, the Permanent Injunction sets forth specific
procedures that Plaintiff must follow before he can initiate any pro se claims in any court in
Larimer County. Id., ¶ 1-2. Plaintiff has been subject to and aware of these requirements since
December 13, 2018, when the trial court in 2018CV30567 entered a Temporary Restraining
Order that is substantively identical to the March 28 Permanent Injunction. Ex. B, T.R.O.
Plaintiff has not even attempted to meet these requirements.
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Furthermore, the Unamended Complaint contains no reference to Colorado’s Open
Meeting Law of any kind. Plaintiff’s untimely and baseless attempt to amend his claims eight
months after they were dismissed warrants no consideration from the Court. It similarly has no
bearing on the Court’s analysis of Plaintiff’s Motion under Rule 60.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendants Timnath Development Authority and Compass
Mortgage Corporation request that this Court deny Plaintiff’s Motion.
DATED this 1
st
day of April, 2019.
BROWNSTEIN HYATT FARBER SCHRECK, LLP
Original signature on file at offices of Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck
pursuant to C.R.C.P. 121 § 1-26
By: s/Cole J. Woodward
Eric R. Burris, admitted pro hac vice
Cole J. Woodward, #50199
Robert G. Rogers, #43578
Casey K. Lekahal, #46531
WHITE BEAR ANKELE TANAKA AND WALDRON
Attorneys for The Timnath Development Authority and
Compass Mortgage Corporation
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this 1
st
day of April, 2019, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO
VACATE ORDER GRANTING TIMNATH DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND
COMPASS MORTGAGE CORPORATION’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
PURSUANT TO RULE 60(B) was filed with the Court and served via Colorado Courts E-filing
System on all counsel of record and pro se Plaintiff as follows:
By E-Mail and Regular Mail
Eric Sutherland
3520 Golden Currant Boulevard
Fort Collins, CO 80521
Phone: 970.224.4509
Email: sutherix@yahoo.com
s/Penny G. Lalonde
Penny G. Lalonde, Paralegal
19063094