HomeMy WebLinkAbout2017CV219 - ERIC SUTHERLAND V. CITY OF FORT COLLINS, ET AL - 024 - ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR POST-TRIAL RELIEF1
Plaintiff Eric Sutherland (hereinafter referred to as “Plaintiff”) filed a Motion for
Post-Trial Relief alleging that he is entitled to relief under C.R.C.P. Rule 59(a)(3) and
(4), because this Court made “grave errors of law” in its Order re Petition for a Contest
Concerning the Form and Content of the City of Fort Collins (hereinafter referred to as
“the Order”) filed September 4, 2017. Defendant The City of Fort Collins (hereinafter
referred to as “the City”) filed a Response objecting to Plaintiff’s Motion, and Plaintiff
filed a Reply. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Motion is without merit, and denies his
request for post-trial relief.
DISTRICT COURT, LARIMER COUNTY,
COLORADO
Larimer County Justice Center
201 Laporte Avenue, Suite 100
Fort Collins, CO 80521-2761
(970) 498-6100
Plaintiff: ERIC SUTHERLAND,
v.
Defendant: THE CITY OF FORT COLLINS
Indispensable Party: Angela Myer, Larimer
County Clerk and Recorder
COURT USE ONLY
By the Court: The Honorable Thomas R. French
Case Number: 2017 CV 219
Courtroom: 5C
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR POST-TRIAL RELIEF
DATE FILED: October 24, 2017 2:59 PM
CASE NUMBER: 2017CV219
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The primary purpose of a Rule 59 motion asking a court to amend its findings or
judgment is to give the court an opportunity to correct any errors that it may have made.
In re Marriage of Jones, 668 P.2d 980, 981 (Colo. App. 1983). The Court finds, after
review of the Order, Plaintiff’s filings, and the Response filed by the City, that the Order
is proper based upon the analysis and rulings therein.
The Court elects not to do a detailed analysis and response to Plaintiff’s Motion
and arguments raised, because the Court has already filed a seventeen-page order
detailing its analysis and rulings. The Court believes that it is appropriate to briefly
address the arguments raised by Plaintiff, including two arguments first raised by
Plaintiff in the Motion.
I. Jurisdiction
Plaintiff chose to file his Petition with the Court to challenge the form and content
of the submission clause in the City’s ballot issue under C.R.S. § 1-11-203.5. Now, he
questions the Court’s jurisdiction to review the submission clause under the form and
content criteria found in Section 6(b) of City Charter Article X, but nevertheless
contends that the Court does have the jurisdiction to review the submission clause
under the criteria in C.R.S. § 31-11-111(3). In support of his argument, Plaintiff cites
City Charter Article VII, § 1 and Town of Frisco v. Baum, 90 P.3d 845 (Colo. 2004).
Section 1 of City Charter Article VII states, “[t]here shall be a Municipal Court
vested with original jurisdiction of all causes arising under the City’s Charter and
ordinances” (emphasis added). Plaintiff argues that this grant of original jurisdiction to
the City’s Municipal Court means that the interpretation and application of the City’s
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Charter is outside the jurisdiction of this Court, based on the Colorado Supreme Court’s
decision in Baum.
However, the Court finds it has concurrent jurisdiction with the City’s Municipal
Court to hear this matter. “Concurrent jurisdiction” is defined as “[j]urisdiction that might
be exercised simultaneously by more than one court over the same subject matter and
within the same territory, a litigant having the right to choose the court in which to file
the action.” Black’s Law Dictionary (2014, Tenth Edition).
Moreover, Baum is inapposite. In Baum, the Town of Frisco’s charter expressly
granted to its municipal court “exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters arising
under the Charter, the ordinances, and other enactments of the Town” (emphasis
added). 90 P.3d at 846. The Supreme Court held that it was within Frisco’s home rule
powers under Article XX, § 6.c. of the Colorado Constitution to define the jurisdiction of
its municipal court with respect to matters of strictly local and municipal concern, but not
for matters of statewide concern. Id. at 849. The Court concluded in Baum, that
because the subject matter of the action before it was of strictly local concern, Frisco’s
grant of “exclusive original jurisdiction” to its municipal court required the action to be
filed in the first instance in Frisco’s municipal court. Id. at 850.
Here, the Court finds that the City Charter does not grant the Municipal court
“exclusive original jurisdiction”, but rather concurrent jurisdiction. This interpretation is
buttressed by a 1989 election in the City which resulted in an amendment to Section 1
of City Charter Article VII. Prior to the City’s March 7, 1989 election, the first sentence
of Section 1 in Charter Article VII read: “[t]here shall be a Municipal Court vested with
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exclusive original jurisdiction of all causes arising under the Charter and the ordinances
of the city” (emphasis added). At the 1989 City election, the voters considered and
approved the following amendment to Section 1 of Charter Article VII:
PROPOSED CHARTER AMENDMENT NO. 10
An amendment to Article VII, Section 1 of the City Charter,
eliminating reference to the Municipal Court’s jurisdiction as being
‘exclusive,’ thereby clarifying that City Ordinances can create civil
remedies in other courts of competent jurisdiction.
Based upon the amendment to the City Charter, the Court finds that the intent of
the current Section 1 in Article VII is to vest in the City’s Municipal Court concurrent
jurisdiction over matters arising under the City’s Charter and ordinances that are of
strictly local and municipal concern, and not exclusive original jurisdiction over such
matters. Therefore, the Court finds that it has jurisdiction to hear this matter and render
decisions based upon the applicable law, including provisions of the City’s Charter.
II. Criteria to Judge the Ballot Question
Plaintiff argues that the Court erred in applying the form and content criteria in
Article X, § 6(b) of the City Charter, instead of the criteria of C.R.S. § 31-11-111(3), as
the exclusive authority for deciding the sufficiency of the ballot question presented. The
Court addressed this argument at length in its Order and does not deem it necessary to
repeat that analysis or those findings. The Court finds that it properly applied the form
and content criteria as stated in its Order and incorporates, by reference, that analysis
and those findings.
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III. TABOR Arguments
Plaintiff argues that TABOR applies. This issue was addressed in detail in the
Court’s Order. The Court finds that TABOR does not apply for the reasons stated in its
Order, and incorporates that portion of its Order by reference.
IV. Single-Subject Requirement
Plaintiff briefly argues that the ballot question violates the single subject
requirement in Article V, § 1(5.5) of the State Constitution. The State Constitutional
requirement referenced by Plaintiff only applies to statewide ballot measures, not to
municipal ballot questions, such as the one at issue in this Motion. Bruce v. City of
Colo. Springs, 200 P.3d 1140, 1145 (Colo. App. 2008); Art. V, §1(9).
For all the reasons stated above, the Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion for Post-Trial
Relief.
SO ORDERED: October 24, 2017.
____________________________
Thomas R. French
District Court Judge