HomeMy WebLinkAbout2017CV884 - CHAYCE ANDERSON V. FCPS OFFICER JASON SHUTTERS - 017 - ORDER TO DISMISS IN PART AND TO DRAW CASEIN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 17-cv-00884-GPG
CHAYCE AARON ANDERSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
CARA BOXBERGER (in their individual capacity only),
JASON SHUTTERS (in their individual capacity only), and
MARK DELANO (in their individual capacity only),
Defendants.
ORDER TO DISMISS IN PART AND TO DRAW CASE
Plaintiff, Chayce Aaron Anderson, is a prisoner in the custody of the Colorado
Department of Corrections. Mr. Anderson initiated this action by filing pro se a Prisoner
Complaint (ECF No. 1) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On April 13, 2017, Magistrate
Judge Gordon P. Gallagher ordered Mr. Anderson to file an amended complaint that is
legible and that clarifies the claims he is asserting. On May 10, 2017, Mr. Anderson filed
an Amended Prisoner Complaint (ECF No. 9).
The Court must construe the Amended Prisoner Complaint liberally because Mr.
Anderson is not represented by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520-21 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10
th
Cir. 1991). If the Amended
Prisoner Complaint reasonably can be read “to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff
could prevail, [the Court] should do so despite the plaintiff’s failure to cite proper legal
authority, his confusion of various legal theories, his poor syntax and sentence
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construction, or his unfamiliarity with pleading requirements.” Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.
However, the Court should not be an advocate for a pro se litigant. See id.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court must review the Amended Prisoner
Complaint because Mr. Anderson is a prisoner and he is seeking redress from an officer
or employee of a governmental entity. Pursuant to § 1915A(b), the Court is required to
dismiss the Amended Prisoner Complaint, or any portion of the Amended Prisoner
Complaint, that is legally frivolous or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. A legally frivolous claim is one in which the plaintiff asserts the
violation of a legal interest that clearly does not exist or asserts facts that do not support
an arguable claim. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). For the reasons
stated below, the Court will dismiss the Amended Prisoner Complaint in part.
Mr. Anderson’s claims stem primarily from his prosecution and conviction in
Larimer County District Court case number 15CR1466. Mr. Anderson alleges he was
falsely convicted by a jury on one count of sexual assault on a helpless victim and
acquitted of burglary. He further alleges he was sentenced on February 3, 2017, and
that he appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals in March 2017. Defendant Cara
Boxberger is the Larimer County deputy district attorney who prosecuted case number
15CR1466. Defendant Jason Shutters is a police officer who investigated the case and
testified against Mr. Anderson. Defendant Mark Delano is a jailhouse informant who
testified against Mr. Anderson in exchange for a reduced sentence. Mr. Anderson is
suing each Defendant in his or her individual capacity.
Mr. Anderson asserts six claims for relief, each of which has multiple subparts.
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He first claims his Sixth Amendment rights were violated because Ms. Boxberger and
Officer Shutters encouraged and assisted Mr. Delano in providing false testimony at Mr.
Anderson’s trial about a jailhouse confession (claim 1(a)) and he was denied counsel
when he allegedly made the jailhouse confession (claim 1(b)). He contends in the first
subpart of his second claim that Officer Shutters violated his Fourth Amendment rights by:
refusing to inform Mr. Anderson about the nature or cause of the investigation in August
2015 (claim 2(a)(i)), denying counsel (claim 2(a)(ii)), and using excessive force (claim
2(a)(iii)). Mr. Anderson further contends in his second claim that Officer Shutters
violated his Fourth Amendment rights by allowing a rape kit examination to be performed
on Mr. Anderson at the Poudre Valley Hospital in the presence of an unauthorized nurse
(claim 2(b)); using entrapment by questioning Mr. Anderson about a traffic accident (claim
2(c)); and making false statements in an affidavit and providing false testimony at
hearings and trial (claim 2(d)). In his third claim Mr. Anderson contends that Ms.
Boxberger and Officer Shutters violated a confidentiality provision in the Federal Juvenile
Delinquency Act as well as his constitutional right to confidentiality by disclosing sealed
juvenile records (claim 3(a)); that Ms. Boxberger and Officer Shutters made statements at
court hearings and exposed confidential information that defamed Mr. Anderson and
violated due process (claim 3(b)); and that Ms. Boxberger made statements at court
hearings that slandered Mr. Anderson (claim 3(c)). Mr. Anderson contends in his fourth
claim that Ms. Boxberger and Officer Shutters violated his constitutional rights by
providing false testimony and failing to present exculpatory evidence (claim 4(a)) and by
withholding, concealing, or destroying exculpatory evidence (claim 4(b)). In his fifth
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claim Mr. Anderson contends that Ms. Boxberger and Officer Shutters violated his
constitutional rights by malicious prosecutorial overcharging (claim 5(a)), the absence of
a lawful plea offer (claim 5(b)), and malicious prosecution/abuse of discretion in
presenting false evidence and withholding exculpatory evidence (claim 5(c)). Finally,
Mr. Anderson contends in his sixth claim that Ms. Boxberger violated his constitutional
rights by subjecting him to malicious prosecutorial misconduct (claim 6(a)) and
orchestrated perjury (claim 6(b)).
In addition to seeking damages as relief, Mr. Anderson makes a brief reference to
injunctive relief or a temporary restraining order to prevent future wrongs. However, a
“plaintiff cannot maintain a declaratory or injunctive action unless he or she can
demonstrate a good chance of being likewise injured in the future.” Facio v. Jones, 929
F.2d 541, 544 (10
th
Cir. 1991). Mr. Anderson fails to allege facts that demonstrate a
good chance he will face the same or similar injuries as those alleged in the amended
complaint. As a result, he fails to demonstrate that entry of injunctive relief or a
temporary restraining order will have any effect on Defendants’ behavior towards him.
See Green v. Branson, 108 F.3d 1296, 1300 (10
th
Cir. 1997). Thus, the claims for
injunctive relief or a temporary restraining order are legally frivolous and must be
dismissed.
Many of Mr. Anderson’s claims for damages also must be dismissed. To the
extent the claims for damages implicate the validity of Mr. Anderson’s conviction, the
claims are barred by the rule in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Pursuant to
Heck, if a judgment necessarily would imply the invalidity of a criminal conviction or
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sentence, the action does not arise until the conviction or sentence has been reversed on
direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by an authorized state
tribunal, or called into question by the issuance of a federal habeas writ. See Heck, 512
U.S. at 486-87. In short, a civil rights action “is barred (absent prior invalidation) no
matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the
prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings) if
success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its
duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005).
The Court finds that claims 1(a), 1(b), 2(c), 2(d), 4(a), 4(b), 5(a), 5(b), 5(c), 6(a),
and 6(b) necessarily imply the invalidity of Mr. Anderson’s conviction and are barred by
Heck. Although Mr. Anderson resists this conclusion, the Court is not persuaded. It is
clear that claims of malicious prosecution implicate the validity of a conviction. See
Heck, 512 U.S. at 484-86. Similarly, claims regarding denial of a fair trial, perjured
testimony, withholding exculpatory evidence, and prosecutorial misconduct also implicate
the validity of a conviction and are barred by Heck. See Glaser v. City and Cty. of
Denver, 557 F. App’x 689, 701 (10
th
Cir. 2014) (claims regarding denial of fair trial,
perjured testimony, and withholding of exculpatory evidence implicate validity of
conviction); Baldwin v. O’Connor, 466 F. App’x 717, 717 (10
th
Cir. 2012) (claim alleging
prosecutorial misconduct implicates validity of conviction). Finally, although Fourth
Amendment claims do not necessarily imply the invalidity of a criminal conviction, such
claims are barred by Heck in the absence of actual, compensable injury beyond the injury
of being convicted. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.7; see also Baldwin, 466 F. App’x at
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717-18 (affirming dismissal under Heck of Fourth Amendment search and seizure claim
because the plaintiff failed to allege any injury other than his conviction).
It is apparent that Mr. Anderson has not invalidated the validity of the challenged
conviction. Therefore, claims 1(a), 1(b), 2(c), 2(d), 4(a), 4(b), 5(a), 5(b), 5(c), 6(a), and
6(b) are barred by the rule in Heck and must be dismissed. The dismissal of the claims
barred by Heck will be without prejudice. See Fottler v. United States, 73 F.3d 1064,
1065 (10
th
Cir. 1996).
The Court next will address claims 2(a) and 2(b). As noted above, Mr. Anderson
contends in claim 2(a) that Officer Shutters violated his Fourth Amendment rights by: (i)
refusing to inform him about the nature or cause of the investigation during questioning in
August 2015, (ii) denying counsel during the questioning, and (iii) using excessive force in
applying handcuffs. Mr. Anderson contends in claim 2(b) that Officer Shutters violated
his Fourth Amendment rights by allowing a rape kit examination to be performed on Mr.
Anderson at the Poudre Valley Hospital in the presence of an unauthorized nurse. He
specifically alleges the following in support of claims 2(a) and 2(b):
Defendant Shutters knowingly and intentionally caused the
following sequence of events in connection to the way he
apprehended the plainti[ff] at approximately 10:30 p.m. on the
evening of August 29
th
, 2015:
1. Shutters never read plainti[ff]’s Miranda rights.
2. Shutters never informed plainti[ff] of cause or nature of
accusations.
3. Shutters stated, “I have questions about ‘another case.’”
4. Shutters never informed plainti[ff] “what case,” or even disclosed
the fact that he was investigating an alleged sexual assault.
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5. Shutters used excessive force in applying handcuffs.
6. Shutters intentionally caused nerve damage by not locking
handcuffs, and overcranking handcuffs.
7. Shutters directly caused swelling in wrists that resulted in
excruciating physical pain to the plainti[ff] daily, or on a continuing
basis.
8. Shutters left plainti[ff] alone in an interrogation room in a shaken
condition having trouble staying conscious and breathing for nearly
1-2 hours.
9. Shutters inhibited proper photographing of wounds for multiple
hours.
10. Shutters inhibited proper medical care by denying originally [sic]
access to E.M.T.’s into police station.
11. Shutters attempted to interrogate plaintiff from behind while
plainti[ff] was strapped to stretcher within an emergency ambulance.
12. Shutters prevented and inhibited proper medical attention in the
E.R., and convinced the doctor to deny subsequent medical
attention.
13. Shutters instructed assistant detective Neil to perform a “rape kit”
on plainti[ff], allowed a male nurse to stand in and watch the plainti[ff]
to be stripped naked and photographed.
14. Assistant Detective Neil’s participation was PASSIVE, since he
was instructed by a superior investigator, Corporal Shutters.
15. Shutters[’] participation was ACTIVE, and he individually caused
injuries to the plainti[ff], and he personally allowed the plainti[ff] to be
physically humili[ated] by instructing Neil to strip the plainti[ff] and
photograph him naked in front of a member of the general public, an
E.R. nurse, and also a homosexual. Shutters allowed [the] nurse to
watch plainti[ff]’s rape kit. The plainti[ff] contends the E.R. nurse’s
participation was involuntary, or PASSIVE, due to being allowed in
room by Shutters. This has permanently scarred plainti[ff] for life.
16. The Poudre Valley Hospital’s policy involves “sit-in” nurses, at
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least in the E.R.
(ECF No. 9 at 16-17.)
These factual allegations do not support arguable constitutional claims with
respect to Mr. Anderson’s assertions that Officer Shutters refused to inform him about the
nature or cause of the investigation during questioning in August 2015 (claim 2(a)(i)) or
denied counsel during the questioning (claim 2(a)(ii)). Therefore, those claims will be
dismissed as legally frivolous. The Court will not address at this time the merits of claim
2(a)(iii), in which Mr. Anderson contends Officer Shutters used excessive force. The
Court also will not address at this time the merits of claim 2(b), in which Mr. Anderson
contends Officer Shutters allowed a rape kit examination to be performed in the presence
of an unauthorized nurse.
The Court next will address claim 3. Mr. Anderson primarily contends in claim
3(a) that Ms. Boxberger and Officer Shutters violated a confidentiality provision in the
Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act found in 18 U.S.C. § 5038 by disclosing sealed juvenile
records. Although Mr. Anderson also makes a vague and conclusory reference to a
constitutional right to confidentiality, he does not allege specific facts that support an
arguable constitutional violation with respect to claim 3(a). Therefore, to the extent claim
3(a) is premised on an alleged constitutional violation, the claim is legally frivolous and
must be dismissed.
The contention that disclosure of Mr. Anderson’s juvenile criminal history violated
18 U.S.C. § 5038 also lacks merit. That statute provides in relevant part that
“[t]hroughout and upon the completion of the juvenile delinquency proceeding, the
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[juvenile records] shall be safeguarded from disclosure to unauthorized persons.” 18
U.S.C. § 5038(a). Mr. Anderson does not allege he was the subject of any federal
juvenile delinquency proceedings to which that statute applies. Furthermore, he fails to
demonstrate the existence of a private right of action for damages under § 5038. See,
e.g., Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10
th
Cir. 2007) (dismissal of claims
alleging violations of criminal statutes proper if criminal statutes do not provide for a
private right of action). Therefore, to the extent claim 3(a) is premised on an alleged
violation of § 5038, the claim also will be dismissed as legally frivolous.
Mr. Anderson contends in claim 3(b) that Ms. Boxberger and Officer Shutters
made statements at court hearings and exposed confidential information that defamed
Mr. Anderson and violated due process. Mr. Anderson specifically alleges that Ms.
Boxberger falsely depicted him as someone who is unable to keep a job and was
previously convicted of a felony sexual offense. He alleges that Officer Shutters shared
confidential information regarding one of Mr. Anderson’s juvenile cases to unauthorized
persons.
To the extent claim 3(b) is asserted against Ms. Boxberger, the claim is barred by
absolute prosecutorial immunity. “[A]cts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the
initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of [her] role as
an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute immunity.” Buckley
v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993). The Court applies a functional test to
determine if absolute immunity is appropriate because immunity “is justified and defined
by the functions it protects and serves, not by the person to whom it attaches.” Forrester
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v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988). The determinative factor in this functional approach
“is ‘advocacy’ because that is the prosecutor’s main function and the one most akin to
[her] quasi-judicial role.” Rex v. Teeples, 753 F.2d 840, 843 (10
th
Cir. 1985). Thus,
absolute prosecutorial immunity encompasses claims that the prosecutor “knowingly
used false testimony and suppressed material evidence.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 413 (1976). “Whether the claim involves withholding evidence, failing to correct a
misconception or instructing a witness to testify evasively, absolute immunity from civil
damages is the rule for prosecutors.” Robinson v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 940 F.2d 1369,
1373 n.4 (10
th
Cir. 1991). The portion of claim 3(b) that is asserted against Ms.
Boxberger is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity because the facts alleged by Mr.
Anderson demonstrate that Ms. Boxberger was acting in her role as an advocate for the
State.
Mr. Anderson’s allegation in claim 3(b) that Officer Shutters defamed his good
reputation in violation of due process by exposing confidential information also does not
support a cognizable claim. It is clear that defamation, by itself, is not actionable in a §
1983 claim. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233 (1991); Angel v. Torrance Cty.
Sheriff's Dep’t, 183 F. App’x 707, 708 (10
th
Cir. 2006). Therefore, the portion of claim
3(b) that is asserted against Officer Shutters also is legally frivolous and must be
dismissed.
Finally, Mr. Anderson contends in claim 3(c) that Ms. Boxberger made statements
at court hearings that slandered Mr. Anderson. The Court finds that claim 3(c) must be
dismissed based on absolute prosecutorial immunity for the same reasons discussed
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above in connection with claim 3(b).
As noted above, the Court will not address at this time the merits of claims 2(a)(iii)
and 2(b). Instead, the case will be drawn to a presiding judge and, if applicable, to a
magistrate judge. See D.C.COLO.LCivR 8.1(c). Because claims 2(a)(iii) and 2(b) are
asserted only against Officer Shutters, the other Defendants will be dismissed as parties
to this action. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the claims for injunctive relief and a temporary restraining order as
well as claims 2(a)(i), 2(a)(ii), 3(a), 3(b), and 3(c) are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b). It is
FURTHER ORDERED that claims 1(a), 1(b), 2(c), 2(d), 4(a), 4(b), 5(a), 5(b), 5(c),
6(a), and 6(b) are dismissed without prejudice as barred by the rule in Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477 (1994). It is
FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Cara Boxberger and Mark Delano are
dismissed as parties to this action. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that this case shall be drawn to a presiding judge and, if
applicable, to a magistrate judge.
DATED at Denver, Colorado, this 6
th
day of July , 2017.
BY THE COURT:
s/Lewis T. Babcock
LEWIS T. BABCOCK, Senior Judge
United States District Court
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