HomeMy WebLinkAbout2016CV144 - FARVER V. CITY OF FORT COLLINS - 008 - CITY OF FORT COLLINS ANSWERDISTRICT COURT, LARIMER COUNTY, COLORADO
201 La Porte Ave., Suite 100
Fort Collins, CO 80521
Plaintiff: VIRGINIA FARVER,
v.
Defendants: CITY OF FORT COLLINS, FORT
COLLINS CITY COUNCIL, DARIN ATTEBERRY,
FORT COLLINS UTILITIES, FORT COLLINS
UTILITIES MANAGEMENT and STAFF, DENNIS
SUMNER, STEVE CATANACH; and DOES 1-100.
COURT USE ONLY
Kimberly B. Schutt, #25947
WICK & TRAUTWEIN, LLC
323 South College Avenue, Suite 3
P.O. Box 2166, Fort Collins, CO 80522
Phone Number: (970) 482-4011
E-mail: kschutt@wicklaw.com
FAX Number: (970) 482-8929
John R. Duval, #10185
FORT COLLINS CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
P.O. Box 580
Fort Collins, CO 80522
Phone: (970) 221-6520
Email: jduval@fcgov.com
Case Number: 2016 CV 144
Courtroom:
DEFENDANTS’ ANSWER
COMES NOW all of the above-named defendants (“Defendants”), by and through
counsel, Kimberly B. Schutt of Wick & Trautwein, LLC, and John R. Duval of the Fort Collins
City Attorney’s Office, and for their Answer to the Plaintiff’s Summons, Complaint for
Damages, Declaratory Order and Injunction (“the Complaint”), state to the Court as follows:
GENERAL DENIAL
The pro se plaintiff, Virginia Farver (“Plaintiff”), has filed a 47-page Complaint
consisting of 157 numbered allegations, challenging the implementation of the Advanced Meter
Fort Collins Project (“Project”) by the City of Fort Collins (“City”) through the City’s Electric
Utility (“Electric Utility”). While the Complaint purports to assert causes of action for
negligence, fraud, deceit and willful misrepresentation, the primary arguments made in the
Complaint relate to the Plaintiff’s claim that the Project allegedly was never authorized by the
Fort Collins City Council and thus the City’s implementation of the Project and collection of a
meter-reading fee from citizens refusing to participate in the Project are contrary to law.
DATE FILED: June 10, 2016 2:31 PM
FILING ID: 4B63EBAB6078B
CASE NUMBER: 2016CV144
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Plaintiff does not appear to seek any damages for an alleged personal injury related to the tort
claims she has referenced, but rather seeks declaratory and injunctive relief from the Court based
on the purported invalidity of the Project, and reimbursement of the fees she has paid to the City
for manual meter reading.
Suffice it to say, the Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to comply with C.R.C.P. 8’s requirement
that litigants provide a “short and plain statement” of their claim. While the Defendants have
very meritorious grounds for challenging the numerous legal flaws in the Complaint through the
filing of a motion to dismiss, the Defendants will instead wait and file a thorough Motion for
Summary Judgment to have the Court address the various legal claims and defenses, since that
type of proceeding would likely be a better use of the Court’s time and resources.
In the meantime, the Defendants will instead generally deny the Plaintiff’s assertions that
the Project was never properly authorized and implemented by the City. The City’s contrary
argument was succinctly stated in Deputy City Attorney John Duval’s January 12, 2016 letter to
the Plaintiff denying her Notice of Claim. A copy of that letter is attached to this Answer as
Exhibit “A” and incorporated herein by reference. Subject to this general denial, the Defendants
will also answer the Plaintiffs’ extensive allegations to the best of their ability, as set forth
below.
ANSWER
1. Paragraph 1 of the Complaint does not appear to call for an admission or denial,
but the Defendants admit that Virginia L. Farver is the named plaintiff in the Complaint.
2. With regard to the allegations in Paragraph 2 of the Complaint, the Defendants
are without personal knowledge as to the Plaintiff’s reason for bringing this action, but deny that
the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act, C.R.S. §24-10-101, et seq., provides her any remedy
or places any affirmative duty on the Defendants for the circumstances outlined in the
Complaint. The statute speaks for itself. The Defendants therefore deny the allegations of
Paragraph 2.
3. With regard to the allegations in Paragraph 3 of the Complaint, the Defendants
read the Complaint as primarily challenging the validity of the City’s implementation of the
Project, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief related thereto, and therefore admit the
Plaintiff’s statement that the primary issue she has presented to the Court is whether the
Defendants can lawfully charge her a monthly meter reading fee. As stated above and for the
reasons stated in John Duval’s letter attached to this Answer as Exhibit A, the Defendants deny
that implementing the Project was unauthorized or that it was contrary to statute or the Fort
Collins City Charter and Code. The Defendants therefore deny the remaining allegations in
Paragraph 3 of the Complaint.
4. Paragraph 4 of the Complaint consists of several separate unnumbered paragraphs
making assertions regarding the replacement of “analog meters” with “smart” electric meters and
alleged distinctions between the different types of meters. The Defendants generally admit that
the City spent several million dollars, a large part of which was provided by a federal grant, to
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implement the Project, and that the Project generally involved replacing most of the older
electro-mechanical electric meters with a communicating digital electric meter (often referred to
as a “smart” meter) on homes and businesses throughout Fort Collins. Not all meters in use
before the Project were electro-mechanical, nor did all of them have an analog display, although
the vast majority did. Solid state, or digital electric meters, have been used by utilities for over
20 years, and meter communications with some commercial customers have been utilized within
the City since the 1980’s.
The Defendants also generally admit there are various differences between the older
electric meters and the newer “smart” meters, the most significant difference being that the
“smart” meter can be read remotely rather than requiring that it be read at its location by an
individual meter reader. The manual meter reading was generally done monthly (it was
generally not estimated) and its cost was built into the calculation of the rate charged to the
customer. Since it was an embedded cost charged to all customers, it was not separated out and
itemized on utility bills.
The Defendants also admit that, for utility customers who did not want a “smart” meter
installed on their homes, the City offered an option of installing a newer digital meter that does
not communicate wirelessly to allow for remote reading. Because these types of meters still
require manual meter reading at the location of the meter, the City imposed a meter-reading fee
for customers electing to have this type of meter. Since that fee is not charged to all Electric
Utility customers, it is now itemized as a separate cost on the bills of those customers who opted
not to have the “smart” meter installed on their homes.
The Defendants generally deny the remaining allegations of Paragraph 4 of the
Complaint, as stated by the Plaintiff.
5. With regard to Paragraph 5 of the Complaint, the Defendants deny that the
Colorado Governmental Immunity Act, C.R.S. §24-10-109, confers jurisdiction here. The Act
speaks for itself.
6. With regard to Paragraph 6 of the Complaint, the Defendants admit that venue is
proper in the Larimer County District Court.
7. With regard to Paragraph 7 of the Complaint, the Defendants deny that immunity
has been waived under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act, to the extent the Act even
applies to this action which appears to only seek declaratory and injunctive relief. The Act
speaks for itself.
8. With regard to Paragraph 8 of the Complaint, the Defendants admit that the
Plaintiff sent a letter dated September 23, 2015, purporting to be a notice of claim related to the
Project. Defendants further admit that the letter was sent via certified mail to the address stated
in Paragraph 8. However, the Defendants may deny that the notice of claim is legally valid as to
all claims which have been referenced in the Complaint, subject to further discovery.
9. Paragraph 9 does not call for an admission or denial from these Defendants.
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10. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth of the allegations in paragraph 10 of the Complaint and, therefore, deny such
allegations.
11. Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 11 and 12 of the Complaint. The
January 12, 2016 letter from John Duval, attached to this Answer as Exhibit A, speaks for itself.
12. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth of the allegations in paragraph 13 of the Complaint and, therefore, deny such
allegations.
13. On information and belief, the Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 14
of the Complaint.
14. The Defendants admit Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Complaint.
15. With regard to Paragraph 17 of the Complaint, the Defendants admit that the Fort
Collins City Council and Mayor govern the City of Fort Collins according to the Fort Collins
City Charter, and that the website cited in the Complaint is one of the places where the Charter
can be found. However, Defendants deny that Plaintiff attached a complete copy of the City
Charter to the Complaint, or that the April 2011 Charter is the version of the Charter currently in
effect. A complete and current copy of the City Charter and Code (current through ordinance
adopted April 19, 2016) can be found on the City’s website at
www.fcgov.com/cityclerk/code.php
16. The Defendants admit Paragraph 18 of the Complaint.
17. The Defendants deny the allegations of Paragraph 19 of the Complaint, as stated.
Defendants admit that the utility involved in the Project is formally known as the Fort Collins
Electric Utility, although it is informally referred to by other names. The Defendants also admit
that the Electric Utility currently provides service to over 73,000 homes and businesses in an
area over 55 square miles. The Defendant denies that the Electric Utility’s principal place of
business is located at 117 N. Mason Street in Fort Collins, as that address is simply for its billing
office; the primary place of operations for the Electric Utility is located at 700 Wood Street in
Fort Collins.
18. The Defendants admit Paragraphs 20 and 21 of the Complaint.
19. Defendants deny the allegations of Paragraphs 22, as stated. Steve Catanach was
the Light & Power Operations Manager through February 1, 2015, when he left employment
with the City.
20. The Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 23 of the Complaint and, therefore, deny such
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allegations. The Defendants further deny that the Plaintiff has properly pled a claim against
unknown defendants under C.R.C.P. 9(a)(2).
21. The Defendants deny the allegations of Paragraph 24 of the Plaintiff’s Complaint,
as stated. The statute speaks for itself and does not provide the pleading requirements for this
Complaint.
22. The allegations of Paragraph 25 of the Complaint appear to simply be an
introductory paragraph and do not call for an admission or denial from these Defendants. To the
extent Paragraph 25 contains any substantive allegations, these Defendants admit and deny any
such allegations consistently with the preceding paragraphs of this Answer.
23. The Defendants generally admit the allegations in Paragraphs 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
31, and 32 of the Complaint, to the extent that Deputy City Manager Jeff Mihelich sent a letter
dated April 21, 2015 containing those statements, among others. The letter speaks for itself.
The Defendants deny the date allegation in paragraph 30 of the Complaint, as the actual date
referenced in Mr. Mihelich’s letter is October 27, 2009.
24. With regard to the allegations contained in Paragraph 33 of the Complaint, the
Defendants generally admit that the Plaintiff communicated on one or more occasions with City
personnel during that timeframe to express objections to the City’s Advanced Meter Fort Collins
Project.
25. With regard to the allegations of Paragraph 34 of the Complaint, the Defendants
admit that Dennis Sumner made a courtesy phone call to the mobile phone of Craig Farver on or
about November 18, 2013, to discuss the fact that the Farvers had not accepted certified letters
sent to their home notifying them that the City would terminate their power service due to their
failure to either allow for installation of a “smart” meter or for the alternative option of a digital
meter without the wireless communication technology. The Defendants further admit that Mr.
Sumner made concerted and repeated efforts for over 20 minutes to explain that the alternative
meter option did not contain the “smart” wireless technology about which the Plaintiff was
concerned, and offered several times to allow the Plaintiff and her husband to inspect the two
different meters, and to provide whatever information they needed to understand how the
alternative digital meter worked. The Defendants deny that Dennis Sumner was the head of the
Fort Collins Utility at the time of the phone call, or that he contacted the Plaintiff herself by
telephone immediately prior to calling Craig Farver. The Defendants further admit that the
phone call between Craig Farver and Dennis Sumner was recorded, and that the recording of that
discussion speaks for itself. As to the remaining allegations of Paragraph 34 of the Complaint, it
is the Defendants’ understanding that the Plaintiff’s adult son died of brain cancer, but they have
no personal knowledge as to the other information regarding what took place in California. To
the extent Paragraph 34 of the Complaint contains any further substantive allegations, the
Defendants deny them as stated.
26. With regard to the allegations of Paragraph 35 of the Complaint, the Defendants
admit that the City received a letter dated November 27, 2013 addressed to Steve Catanach from
the law firm of Jorgensen, Brownell & Pepin, and that the letter represented that the firm
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represented Ms. Ruth Ann Shay regarding a notice that her power service would be terminated.
The letter speaks for itself. The Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 35 of the Complaint and,
therefore, must deny such allegations.
27. With regard to Paragraph 36 of the Complaint, the Defendants generally admit
that representatives of the City removed the original electric meter from the Plaintiff’s home and
installed in its place a digital meter, and that police officers were present. The Defendants deny
that Dennis Sumner was the head of the Fort Collins Utilities. Defendants are without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations
in Paragraph 36 of the Complaint and, therefore, deny such allegations.
28. The Defendants admit and deny the allegations of Paragraph 37 of the Complaint
consistently with the admissions and denials in Paragraph 25 of this Answer as set forth above.
29. With regard to the allegations of Paragraph 38 of the Complaint, the Defendants
admit that the City began charging an $11 fee for manual meter-reading at Plaintiff’s residence
(for an account listed in the name of Craig Farver) as of April 2014, and that the monthly utility
bill including the $11 fee has been continually paid since that time. The Defendants further
admit that the City could, pursuant to City ordinances, terminate service to Plaintiff’s residence
if the monthly utility bill was not paid. Defendants are without information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 38 of the Complaint and,
therefore, must deny such allegations.
30. With regard to the allegations of Paragraph 39 of the Complaint, the Defendants
admit that the Plaintiff wrote a letter dated February 10, 2015 addressed to “City of Fort Collins”
which contained in part the quoted statements. The letter, in its entirety, speaks for itself.
31. The Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 40 of the Complaint.
32. With regard to the allegations of Paragraph 41, 42 and 43 of the Complaint, the
Defendants admit that the Plaintiff exchanged numerous communications with Wanda Nelson
and Christine Macrina during that timeframe, in an effort to further clarify what documents the
Plaintiff was seeking due to the vague and constantly changing scope of her requests. The
copies of multiple email communications speak for themselves and generally reflect the
statements set forth in paragraphs 42 and 43 of the Complaint, among many other statements not
set forth in the Complaint. The Defendants deny ever failing or refusing to provide the Plaintiff
with any documents she requested; to the contrary, City representatives made repeated efforts to
understand what she was asking for and to respond as best as they could under the
circumstances.
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33. With regard to Paragraph 44 of the Complaint, the Defendants admit the Plaintiff
requested a phone conference, which the City willingly provided, in an effort to further clarify
and discuss what records the Plaintiff was seeking from the City. To the extent that Paragraph
44 of the Complaint contains any further substantive allegations, the City admits and denies the
allegations consistently with paragraph 32 of this Answer as set forth above.
34. The Defendants generally admit the allegations of Paragraphs 45 and 46 of the
Complaint. The email communications referenced in the paragraphs speak for themselves.
35. With regard to the allegations of Paragraphs 47 through 52 of the Complaint, the
Defendants generally admit that the Plaintiff participated in a phone conference with several City
representatives, including Deputy City Manager Jeff Mihelich, on or about April 13, 2015, and
that the purposes of the phone conference was to discuss her open records request. The
Defendants further admit that the Plaintiff has submitted a written statement which appears to
contain her impressions of that phone conference. The Defendants deny that the written
statement is anything other than the Plaintiff’s own impressions from that phone conference. To
the extent that Paragraphs 47 through 52 of the Complaint contain any further substantive
allegations, the Defendants deny them, as stated. The Defendants again refer to the letter from
John Duval attached to this Answer as Exhibit A, which is incorporated herein by reference, as
to the City’s process for authorization and implementation of the Project.
36. With regard to the allegations of Paragraphs 53 and 58 of the Complaint, the
Defendants admit that the Plaintiff requested a letter from City representatives following the
phone conference of April 13, 2015, and that the City obliged her request by providing a letter
dated April 21, 2015, signed by Deputy City Manager Jeff Mihelich. That letter, which contains
in part the excerpts quoted in paragraphs 55 and 56 of the Complaint, speaks for itself. To the
extent these paragraphs 53 through 58 contain any further substantive allegations, the
Defendants deny said allegations.
37. With regard to the allegations of Paragraph 59 of the Complaint, the Defendants
deny that the Plaintiff has been injured or the claimed nature of her injuries. Defendants are
without personal knowledge as to when the Plaintiff allegedly learned certain facts, however,
subject to further discovery, Defendants deny that April 13, 2015 was the date on which she first
knew or should have known of any claimed injury.
38. With regard to the allegations of Paragraphs 60 through 66 of the Complaint, the
Defendants admit that Plaintiff submitted to the City a notice of claim dated September 23, 2015,
asking the City to accept the claim and pay her compensation for injuries and damages. The
Defendants further admit that Deputy City Attorney John Duval provided a responsive letter
dated January 12, 2016, which is attached to this Answer as Exhibit A. The letter from John
Duval speaks for itself. For the reasons stated in the letter, the Defendants deny the validity of
any claim made by the Plaintiff or that she is entitled to any compensation. To the extent that
Paragraphs 60 through 66 contain any further substantive allegations, the Defendants deny the
same.
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39. Paragraphs 67 through 86 of the Complaint do not appear to contain any
substantive factual allegations, but instead contain the Plaintiff’s recitation of the arguments she
made in her notice of claim with references to various provisions of the City Charter, state
statutes, and Mr. Duval’s letter of January 12, 2016. Defendants generally deny the
“allegations” and arguments raised by the Plaintiff in these paragraphs. The referenced
provisions of the City Charter and state statutes speak for themselves, as does the Duval letter
attached hereto as Exhibit A. Plaintiff’s arguments are more appropriately made in a motion and
not in a “short and concise statement of the claim for relief” required by C.R.C.P. 8.
40. With regard to the allegations of Paragraph 87 through 91 of the Complaint, the
Defendants admit that notice dated November 19, 2013 was sent to the Plaintiff’s residence and
that its subject was the termination of utility service. The Defendants further admit that notice
was sent to Plaintiff’s residence after multiple other communications were sent regarding the
need to upgrade the electric and/or water metering equipment at the property. The Defendants
also admit that similar notices were sent to other Electric Utility customers who likewise failed
to respond to prior multiple communications regarding the same issue and/or failed to cooperate
in the installation of a “smart” meter or the offered alternative digital meter, which were required
for the provision of utility service following implementation of the Project. The referenced
notice speaks for itself and follows the City Code provisions regarding the City’s operation and
provision of utility services and the legal obligations of citizens related thereto. Defendants deny
that Plaintiff was penalized or injured. To the extent said paragraphs of the Complaint contain
any further substantive allegations, the Defendants deny the same.
41. With regard to the allegations of paragraph 92 of the Complaint, the Defendants
again state that the letter from John Duval, attached to this Answer as Exhibit A, speaks for
itself.
42. Paragraphs 93 through 110 of the Complaint do not appear to contain any
substantive factual allegations, but instead again contain the Plaintiff’s recitation of the
arguments she made in her notice of claim referring to various provisions of the City Charter,
City Code, state statutes, and Mr. Duval’s letter of January 12, 2016. Defendants generally deny
the “allegations” and arguments raised by the Plaintiff in these paragraphs. The referenced
provisions of the City Charter, City Code and state statutes speak for themselves, as does the
Duval letter attached to this Answer as Exhibit A. Plaintiff’s arguments are more appropriately
made in a motion and not in a “short and concise statement of the claim for relief” required by
C.R.C.P. 8.
43. With regard to Paragraphs 111 through 119 of the Complaint, the Defendants
admit that the City sent a letter to the Plaintiff dated April 23, 2013 which made the quoted
statement. Again, these paragraphs contain no substantive factual allegations but instead contain
legal arguments made by the Plaintiff which are more appropriately made in a motion and are
not in a “short and concise statement of the claim for relief” required by C.R.C.P. 8. Defendants
generally deny these “allegations” and arguments made by the Plaintiff, and further deny that the
Project was implemented without proper authorization or oversight. To the extent these
paragraphs contain any further substantive allegations, the Defendants deny the same.
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44. Paragraph 120 of the Complaint appears to be simply the title of the Plaintiff’s
first cause of action, and thus does not require an admission or denial. To the extent said
paragraph contains any substantive allegations, the Defendant deny the same.
45. In answer to Paragraph 121 of the Complaint, the Defendants incorporate herein
by reference the answers set forth above in paragraphs 1 through 44 of this Answer.
46. The Defendants deny all allegations of Paragraphs 122 through 125 of the
Complaint that they acted without authorization in implementing the Project, that the Plaintiff
was injured or that they are liable to the Plaintiff.
47. Paragraph 126 of the Complaint appears to be simply the title of the Plaintiff’s
second cause of action, and requires no admission or denial. To the extent said paragraph
contains any substantive allegations, the Defendant deny the same.
48. In answer to Paragraph 127 of the Complaint, the Defendants incorporate herein
by reference the answers set forth above in paragraphs 1 through 47 of this Answer.
49. The Defendants deny all allegations of Paragraphs 128 through 131 of the
Complaint that they failed to exercise appropriate oversight over the Fort Collins utilities, that
the Plaintiff was injured or that they are liable to the Plaintiff.
50. Paragraph 132 of the Complaint appears to be simply the title of the Plaintiff’s
third cause of action, and requires no admission or denial. To the extent said paragraph contains
any substantive allegations, the Defendant deny the same.
51. In answer to Paragraph 133 of the Complaint, the Defendants incorporate herein
by reference the answers set forth above in paragraphs 1 through 50 of this Answer.
52. The Defendants deny all allegations of Paragraphs 134 through 137 of the
Complaint that the defendants were negligent, that the Plaintiff was injured by said purported
negligence, or that they are liable to the Plaintiff.
53. Paragraph 138 of the Complaint appears to be simply the title of the Plaintiff’s
fourth cause of action, and requires no admission or denial. To the extent said paragraph
contains any substantive allegations, the Defendant deny the same.
54. In answer to Paragraph 139 of the Complaint, the Defendants incorporate herein
by reference the answers set forth above in paragraphs 1 through 53 of this Answer.
55. The Defendants deny all allegations of Paragraphs 140 through 142 of the
Complaint that they engaged in any fraud, that the Plaintiff was injured as a result of said
purported fraud, or that they are liable to the Plaintiff.
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56. Paragraph 143 of the Complaint appears to be simply the title of the Plaintiff’s
fifth cause of action, and requires no admission or denial. To the extent said paragraph contains
any substantive allegations, the Defendants deny the same.
57. In answer to Paragraph 144 of the Complaint, the Defendants incorporate herein
by reference the answers set forth above in paragraphs 1 through 56 of this Answer.
58. The Defendants deny all allegations of Paragraphs 145 through 149 of the
Complaint that they engaged in any willful misrepresentations to the Plaintiff, that the Plaintiff
was injured as a result of said purported willful misrepresentations, or that they are liable to the
Plaintiff.
59. Paragraph 150 of the Complaint appears to be simply the title of the Plaintiff’s
sixth cause of action, and requires no admission or denial. To the extent said paragraph contains
any substantive allegations, the Defendant deny the same.
60. In answer to Paragraph 151 of the Complaint, the Defendants incorporate herein
by reference the answers set forth above in paragraphs 1 through 59 of this Answer.
61. The Defendants deny all allegations of Paragraphs 151 through 156 of the
Complaint that they engaged in any deceit, that the Plaintiff was injured as a result of said
purported deceit, or that they are liable to the Plaintiff.
62. The Defendants hereby deny each and every allegation of the Complaint not
expressly admitted hereinabove.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
1. The Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
2. One or more of the Plaintiff’s claims may be barred by the applicable statute of
limitations and/or the doctrine of laches.
3. The Plaintiff may have failed to comply with certain notice requirements of the
Colorado Governmental Immunity Act, C.R.S. § 24-10-101, et seq., thus depriving this Court of
subject matter jurisdiction to consider one or more of her claims.
4. The Defendants may have immunity for certain tort claims alleged by the
Plaintiff, pursuant to the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act, C.R.S. § 24-10-101, et seq.,
thus depriving this Court of subject matter jurisdiction to consider one or more of her claims.
5. One or more of the Plaintiffs’ claims may be barred by the doctrine of waiver
and/or estoppel.
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6. The Plaintiff has failed to allege her claims of fraud, willful misrepresentation
and/or deceit with sufficient particularity required by C.R.C.P. 9(b), requiring dismissal and/or
amendment of said claims.
7. Plaintiffs’ allegations consist largely of legal conclusions and interpretations of
the City Charter, City Code provisions, state statutes and other documents, all of which speak for
themselves.
8. The Project was at all times properly authorized and implemented in accordance
with the applicable provisions of the City Code and Charter.
9. Plaintiff may not be the real party in interest.
10. The Plaintiff has failed to allege her claims against unknown defendants as
required by C.R.C.P. 9(2), requiring dismissal and/or amendment of said claims.
11. The Plaintiff’s Complaint violates C.R.C.P. 8, requiring a short and plain
statement of the relief requested, and therefore must be dismissed and/or amended.
12. Defendants reserve the right to add or delete affirmative defenses based on
information gathered in the investigation or discovery of this case.
WHEREFORE, all of the Defendants respectfully pray that the Court enter judgment in
their favor and against the Plaintiff, and award the Defendants their reasonable attorney’s fees,
expert witness fees, costs and such further relief as the Court shall deem just and proper.
DATED this 10th day of June, 2016.
WICK & TRAUTWEIN, LLC
This document was served electronically pursuant to
C.R.C.P. 121 §1-26. The original pleading signed by
Kimberly B. Schutt is on file at the offices of Wick &
Trautwein, LLC
By: s/Kimberly B. Schutt
Kimberly B. Schutt, #25947
Attorneys for Defendant
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And
John R. Duval, #10185
FORT COLLINS CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
P.O. Box 580
Fort Collins, CO 80522
(970) 221-6520
CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC FILING
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
DEFENDANTS’ ANSWER was filed via Integrated Colorado Courts E-Filing System (ICCES)
and served this 10th day of June, 2016, on the following:
Sent by U.S. Mail to:
Virginia L. Farver
1214 Belleview Drive
Fort Collins, CO 80526
Pro se Plaintiff
/s/ Jody L. Minch_______________________
[The original certificate of electronic filing signed by Jody L. Minch
is on file with the law offices of Wick & Trautwein, LLC.]