HomeMy WebLinkAbout2019-cv-901 - Surat V. City Of Fort Collins, Et Al. - 214 - Order On Motions In LimineIN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge William J. Martínez
Civil Action No. 19-cv-0901-WJM-NRN
MICHAELLA LYNN SURAT,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF FORT COLLINS, a municipality,
Defendant.
ORDER ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE
Before the Court are: (1) Plaintiff Michaella Lynn Surat’s Motion In Limine
(“Plaintiff’s MIL”) (ECF No. 206); and (2) Defendant City of Fort Collins’s Amended
Motion In Limine (“Defendant’s MIL”) (ECF No. 205). Both motions are ripe. (ECF Nos.
206, 209, 210, 213.)
For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s MIL is granted in part and denied in part, and
Defendant’s MIL is granted.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
“The admission or exclusion of evidence lies within the sound discretion of the
trial court . . . .” Robinson v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 16 F.3d 1083, 1086 (10th Cir. 1994);
see also United States v. Golden, 671 F.2d 369, 371 (10th Cir. 1982) (“Trial judges
have discretion to decide whether an adequate foundation has been laid for the
admission of evidence.”).
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, “[e]vidence is relevant if: (a) it has any
Case No. 1:19-cv-00901-WJM-NRN Document 214 filed 11/16/23 USDC Colorado pg 1 of
11
2
tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would without the evidence; and
(b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Relevant evidence is
generally admissible and should only be excluded “if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the
jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R.
Evid. 403. “Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.” Fed. R. Evid. 402.
II. MONELL THEORY
Defendant raises the issue of Plaintiff purportedly invoking different theories of
Monell liability, making defending this case something of a “moving target.” (ECF No.
210 at 3 n.1.) In Plaintiff’s reply brief, she explains that she is “proceeding on the failure
to train Monell theory of liability.” (ECF No. 212 at 1 n.1.)
To clarify this issue for both parties before trial, the Court will hold Plaintiff to this
representation and allow her to present evidence supporting a failure to train theory—
and no other theory of Monell liability—at trial.
III. PLAINTIFF’S MIL
A. Plaintiff’s Affirmative Defense of Self-Defense at Criminal Trial
Plaintiff requests that the Court exclude evidence regarding the affirmative
defense of self-defense raised at Plaintiff’s criminal trial. (ECF No. 206 at 2–4.) She
states that the affirmative defense of self-defense at her criminal trial related solely to
Heck-barred1 liability for “the force which provoked the resistance” rather than the force
at issue here, “the force used to end that resistance.” (Id. at 4.) Therefore, Plaintiff
argues that “a prior jury’s determination that her resistance to arrest was unjustified by
1 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
Case No. 1:19-cv-00901-WJM-NRN Document 214 filed 11/16/23 USDC Colorado pg 2 of
11
3
self-defense at some point during the interaction prior to Officer Klamser’s takedown is
irrelevant to the specific question of whether the takedown was excessive under the
Fourth Amendment—and ultimately, whether the City of Fort Collins failed to train its
officers that such conduct is unconstitutional.” (Id.) Plaintiff clarifies that she is not
asking the Court to exclude evidence of her convictions for resisting arrest and
obstructing a peace officer. (Id.)
Defendant contests the underlying premise that there is a bright line separating
the two force categories—Officer Klamser’s force provoking Plaintiff’s resistance and his
use of force ending Plaintiff’s resistance—and argues they are “inextricably interwoven.”
(ECF No. 210 at 2–3.) According to Defendant, “Plaintiff’s resistance to arrest in the
first instance caused Officer Klamser’s force in the second instance. It is impossible to
extricate Plaintiff’s failed self-defense argument from this event and doing so would be
misleading to the jury.” (Id. at 3.)
In her reply, Plaintiff acknowledges that “[t]his Court has previously ruled that it
must be taken as given ‘that Klamser had first attempted to subdue Surat through lawful
lesser force,’ as well as ‘that he was attempting to effect an arrest and, in the process,
the arrestee’s actions were subjecting him to, or threatening him with, physical force or
violence, or putting him at substantial risk of bodily injury.’” (ECF No. 212 at 3 (citing
ECF No. 84 at 14–15).) In light of this ruling, Plaintiff explains that she is “asking this
Court to simply leave the jury’s knowledge at that, rather than specifically permitting
evidence or instruction that Plaintiff raised an affirmative defense of self that was
rejected by a separate jury.” (Id.) She raises the concern that delving into details of the
criminal jury’s determinations will improperly influence the jury in this case. (Id.) In
Case No. 1:19-cv-00901-WJM-NRN Document 214 filed 11/16/23 USDC Colorado pg 3 of
11
4
other words, “[f]aced with evidence that a prior jury had already determined that
Plaintiff’s actions were not justified by self-defense, a civil jury could easily
misunderstand this to mean that all of Officer Klamser’s actions were determined by a
criminal jury to be justified as well.” (Id.)
Having considered the parties’ arguments, the Court grants this portion of
Plaintiff’s MIL. Evidence that Plaintiff presented an affirmative defense of self-defense
is excluded; in other words, the Court excludes evidence of the fact that Plaintiff
presented the legal theory of self-defense at her criminal jury trial, as well as the fact
that the jury rejected that theory.
B. Plaintiff’s Performance While on Probation
Plaintiff requests that the Court exclude evidence or testimony regarding her
unauthorized use of marijuana while on probation pursuant to Rules 402 and 403. (ECF
No. 206 at 5.) She argues that her performance while on probation is not relevant and
is unfairly prejudicial with no probative value. (Id.)
Defendant responds that Plaintiff’s performance on probation is relevant to her
alleged damages. (ECF No. 210 at 4.) Specifically, Defendant quotes from Plaintiff’s
deposition and identifies statements she made indicating that “her conviction and
sentence are a component of her emotional distress damages.” (Id.) According to
Defendant, “[q]uestioning Plaintiff about the conditions, length, and her performance on
probation is relevant to the jury’s evaluation of her damages. Plaintiff blames the City
for the fact she was on probation, yet she unquestionably is responsible for the
extension of her probation. The City must be permitted to question Plaintiff about her
performance on probation because her actions contributed to her alleged damages.”
(Id. at 4–5.)
Case No. 1:19-cv-00901-WJM-NRN Document 214 filed 11/16/23 USDC Colorado pg 4 of
11
5
Plaintiff replies that this is not a wrongful arrest claim, and therefore, her criminal
sentence will not be part of her damages. (ECF No. 212 at 4.)
Having considered the parties’ arguments, the Court grants this portion of
Plaintiff’s MIL. The Court concludes that while evidence that Plaintiff’s probation was
extended due to her unauthorized marijuana use may to some degree be relevant to her
emotional distress damages, such evidence’s probative value is significantly
outweighed by its prejudicial value to Plaintiff. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. However, the
Court will hold Plaintiff to her representation that “this is not a wrongful arrest claim, and
therefore [her] criminal sentence will not be part of her damages.” (Id.)
C. Officer Klamser’s Previous Awards or Promotions
Plaintiff seeks to exclude evidence of any of Officer Klamser’s commendations,
awards, and promotions, arguing they have nothing to do with whether Defendant had
an unconstitutional policy of training officers to use excessive force. (ECF No. 206 at
6.) She relies on Rules 402 and 403 and a habeas case from the Western District of
Oklahoma that does little to support her argument. (ECF No. 212 at 5 (citing Brown v.
Franklin, 2009 WL 3415300, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 16, 2009) (explaining the term
“bolstering” under Oklahoma law)).)
Defendant responds that Officer Klamser’s testimony concerning his prior awards
and promotions is customary, as witnesses often testify regarding their relevant
background and experience. (ECF No. 210 at 5.) Further, Defendant contends that
“Officer Klamser’s law enforcement experience, including his prior awards and
promotions, is relevant to his knowledge of law enforcement techniques and his
decision to use a rowing arm takedown, all of which is relevant to the reasonableness of
this maneuver under the circumstances.” (Id.)
Case No. 1:19-cv-00901-WJM-NRN Document 214 filed 11/16/23 USDC Colorado pg 5 of
11
6
The Court denies this portion of Plaintiff’s MIL. Testimony of this nature is often
introduced at trial, and the Court concludes that it will not unfairly prejudice Plaintiff
under Rule 403.
IV. DEFENDANT’S MIL
A. Previous Complaints of Excessive Force Involving City of Fort Collins
Police Officers
Defendant requests that the Court preclude Plaintiff from introducing evidence of
formal and informal complaints of excessive force, lawsuits, settlements, internal affairs
investigations, or other allegations of improper conduct involving City of Fort Collins
Police Officers, including but not limited to the Mason, Wiedrich, Cropp, McGrath,
Heneghan, Chancellor, Patnode, and Slatton matters. (ECF No. 205 at 3.) Moreover,
Defendant clarifies that its MIL “is intended to seek preclusion of not only the exhibits
and/or testimony referenced in the Complaint and previous Final Pretrial Order, but all
potential exhibits and/or references to other complaints, internal investigations,
settlements, and alleged misconduct unrelated to the present matter.” (Id. at 4.)
Defendant states that the matters Plaintiff intends to introduce lack similarity to the facts
in this matter, rendering such information irrelevant to the one claim before the jury.
(Id.)
Further, Defendant contends that “[t]o be factually similar, Plaintiff’s potential
evidence of previous complaints, internal investigations, and misconduct, must involve
the use of a rowing arm takedown, on an uncooperative and intoxicated arrestee, who
interfered with an officer’s interview of a suspect, refused his directions to stay away,
struck him multiple times, subjected him to physical force or violence and put him at
substantial risk of bodily injury.” (Id. at 5 (citing ECF No. 84 at 15).) However,
Case No. 1:19-cv-00901-WJM-NRN Document 214 filed 11/16/23 USDC Colorado pg 6 of
11
7
according to Defendant, the matters Plaintiff raises do not involve “a situation where a
police officer attempted to effectuate an arrest, while first attempting to use a lesser
degree of force, and the officer was subjected to or threatened with physical force,
violence, or faced a substantial risk of bodily injury.” (Id. at 6.)
Plaintiff responds that “Defendant’s argument is premised on a faulty assumption
that these prior uses of force will be introduced to demonstrate a theory of Monell
liability based on an informal custom or policy.” (ECF No. 209 at 1.) Instead, “Plaintiff
intends to only introduce evidence of Fort Collins’[s] prior excessive uses of force in the
specific context of resistance to arrest.” (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff explains that she “will focus
on the facts of those cases to corroborate Plaintiff’s claim that Fort Collins[’s] training on
use of force in response to resistance is constitutionally deficient, which is a purpose
other than proving liability in cases with settlements and is therefore compliant with Fed.
R. Evid. 408.” (Id.) Importantly, Plaintiff does not address Defendant’s primary
objection to this evidence: its lack of factual similarity to the instant case.
In its reply, Defendant focuses its objections to this evidence, noting that despite
Plaintiff limiting her Monell theory to failure to train, she “still must establish the
existence of a municipal policy or custom that was the moving force behind the alleged
constitutional deprivation.” (ECF No. 213 at 1–2.) Defendant objects to Plaintiff’s
introduction of such evidence because her “approach necessarily attempts to establish
a pattern and practice of alleged constitutional violations in an effort to demonstrate
deliberate indifference, while at the same time failing to consider whether there is any
necessary factual similarity with the events surrounding Plaintiff’s arrest.” (Id. at 3.)
Further, Defendant points out that by “not addressing any of the underlying facts of the
Case No. 1:19-cv-00901-WJM-NRN Document 214 filed 11/16/23 USDC Colorado pg 7 of
11
8
previous matters, Plaintiff fails to establish that any of those incidents actually implicate
any training or lack thereof. Plaintiff has merely identified previous matters she believes
resulted from excessive force[.]” (Id.)
Having considered the parties’ arguments, the Court grants this portion of
Defendant’s MIL. Plaintiff is precluded from introducing evidence of formal and informal
complaints of factually dissimilar excessive force lawsuits, settlements, internal affairs
investigations, or other allegations of improper conduct involving City of Fort Collins
Police Officers, including the Mason, Wiedrich, Cropp, McGrath, Heneghan, Chancellor,
Patnode, and Slatton matters. The Court’s ruling is based on Plaintiff’s failure to
address the issue of how factually similar or comparable the matters described above
are to the facts of her own case, even on an arguably less stringent failure to train
theory. However, this Order should not be read to preclude Plaintiff from introducing
evidence of matters involving Fort Collins police arising out of facts sufficiently similar to
the facts of this case such that the facts and outcomes of those putatively comparable
matters would be relevant to a determination of Plaintiff’s claims under a failure to train
theory.2
B. Police Protests or Other Incidents Involving Use of Force by Law
Enforcement
Defendant requests that the Court preclude Plaintiff from mentioning or otherwise
2 The Court will not here draw the line regarding what constitutes sufficiently similar facts
such that evidence of those facts will be admissible at trial. However, to provide some guidance
to the parties, the Court notes that it does not adopt Defendant’s very narrow formulation of
what constitutes a factually similar matter: “[t]o be factually similar, Plaintiff’s potential evidence
of previous complaints, internal investigations, and misconduct, must involve the use of a rowing
arm takedown, on an uncooperative and intoxicated arrestee, who interfered with an officer’s
interview of a suspect, refused his directions to stay away, struck him multiple times, subjected
him to physical force or violence and put him at substantial risk of bodily injury.” (ECF No. 205
at 5.)
Case No. 1:19-cv-00901-WJM-NRN Document 214 filed 11/16/23 USDC Colorado pg 8 of
11
9
referring to police protests or other incidents involving the use of force by law
enforcement, including but not limited to incidents related to George Floyd, Breonna
Taylor, and Eric Garner. (ECF No. 205 at 9.) Defendant states that Plaintiff does not
object to this request. (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff does not address this request in her response.
(See ECF No. 209.)
Relying on Defendant’s representation and Plaintiff’s lack of response, the Court
grants this portion of Defendant’s MIL and precludes Plaintiff from mentioning or
otherwise referring to unrelated police protests or other incidents involving the use of
force by law enforcement generally, including but not limited to George Floyd, Breonna
Taylor, and Eric Garner.
C. Plaintiff’s Traumatic Brain Injury
Defendant requests that the Court preclude Plaintiff from mentioning or otherwise
referring to Plaintiff suffering a traumatic brain injury. (ECF No. 205 at 9.) Specifically,
Defendant states that throughout this litigation, Plaintiff has represented that she
suffered a traumatic brain injury. (Id.) However, Defendant states that Plaintiff has
offered no expert medical testimony that any such injury occurred and requests that
Plaintiff should be precluded from mentioning a traumatic brain injury pursuant to
Federal Rules of Evidence 402 and 602.
In response, Plaintiff provides general explanations regarding concussions,
which she states are commonly known as a mild traumatic brain injury. (ECF No. 209
at 4.) She states that she “will not seek to mislead the jury with regard to Plaintiff’s
injuries, which will clearly be understood to be a concussion, and so Plaintiff should not
be precluded from using a common synonymous term for concussion.” (Id. at 4–5.)
Notably, Plaintiff does not state that she has an expert witness prepared to testify as to
Case No. 1:19-cv-00901-WJM-NRN Document 214 filed 11/16/23 USDC Colorado pg 9 of
11
10
any of the medical information regarding traumatic brain injury.
The Court observes that Plaintiff’s response is vague in terms of what medical
care or diagnosis she received after her interaction with Officer Klamser, and she does
not contest Defendant’s assertion that there has been no expert medical testimony that
a traumatic brain injury occurred. (ECF No. 205 at 9; ECF No. 209 at 4–5.) Having
considered the parties’ arguments, the Court grants this portion of Defendant’s MIL and
precludes Plaintiff from describing her injuries as a “traumatic brain injury.” However,
Plaintiff remains free to describe her injuries in her own lay terms at trial.
D. Punitive Damages
Defendant requests that the Court preclude Plaintiff from mentioning or otherwise
referring to punitive damages. (ECF No. 205 at 1, 10.) See Newport v. Fact Concerts,
453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981) (“[W]e hold that a municipality is immune from punitive
damages under 42 U. S. C. § 1983.”). Further, Defendant states that Plaintiff does not
object to precluding a reference to punitive damages, unless and until any such
damages are authorized. (ECF No. 205 at 1.) Plaintiff does not address punitive
damages in her response. (See ECF No. 209.)
Relying on Defendant’s representation and Plaintiff’s lack of response, the Court
grants this portion of Defendant’s MIL and precludes Plaintiff from mentioning or
otherwise referring to punitive damages.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, the Court ORDERS:
1. Plaintiff’s MIL (ECF No. 206) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as
set forth above; and
2. Defendant’s MIL (ECF No. 205) is GRANTED as set forth above.
Case No. 1:19-cv-00901-WJM-NRN Document 214 filed 11/16/23 USDC Colorado pg 10 of
11
11
Dated this 16th day of November, 2023.
BY THE COURT:
______________________
William J. Martínez
Senior United States District Judge
Case No. 1:19-cv-00901-WJM-NRN Document 214 filed 11/16/23 USDC Colorado pg 11 of
11