HomeMy WebLinkAbout2023-cv-1339 - Groves V. V. City Of Fort Collins, Et Al. - 042 - City, Heaton, Bogosian Mot Dismiss Am Compl
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-1339-RM-STV
Derrick Groves,
Plaintiff.
v.
City of Fort Collins;
Jason Haferman;
Sergeant Allen Heaton; and
Corporal Jason Bogosian.
Defendants.
DEFENDANTS CITY OF FORT COLLINS, SERGEANT ALLEN HEATON, AND
“CORPORAL” JASON BOGOSIAN’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S
AMENDED COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) AND REQUEST
FOR QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Defendants City of Fort Collins, Sergeant Allen Heaton, and Sergeant Jason Bogosian,
sued as “Corporal Jason Bogosian,”1 through their undersigned counsel, Hall & Evans, LLC,
submit the following as their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6):
CERTIFICATE OF CONFERRAL
Undersigned Counsel conferred with Counsel for the Plaintiff. Plaintiff objects to the relief
requested herein.
1 Jason Bogosian is a Sergeant with the City of Fort Collins Police Department. For consistency, he will be
referred to Corporal Bogosian in this Motion.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This matter arises out of Plaintiff’s arrest on April 7, 2022, by former Fort Collins Police
Officer, Jason Haferman, and the subsequent investigation and prosecution for the crime of
Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”). Plaintiff claims Defendant Haferman’s actions somehow
implicate the City of Fort Collins (“City”), as well as Sergeant Heaton, and Corporal Bogosian, as
Defendant Haferman’s supervisors. The Complaint attempts to set forth claims against the City,
Sergeant Heaton, and Corporal Bogosian, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for an unconstitutional
pattern and practice, failure to train and supervise, and violation of “due process” under the Fourth
Amendment. (See Pltfs. Cmp., ECF 41, Second Claim for Relief at ¶¶ 170 to 189).
For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s claims against the City, Sergeant Heaton, and
Corporal Bogosian, should be dismissed. In particular, the claims rely on conclusory allegations
while at the same time fail to allege facts sufficient to satisfy minimal federal pleading standards
established pursuant to Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). Additionally, the
doctrine of qualified immunity and the lack of allegations respecting any particularized behavior
or personal participation also preclude Plaintiff’s claims against Sergeant Heaton and Corporal
Bogosian. See Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1262-63 (10th Cir.1976) (personal participation
is an essential allegation in a section 1983 claim…”); See also Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416,
1423 (10th Cir.1997) (“Individual liability under § 1982 must be based on personal involvement
in the alleged constitutional violation.”)
With respect to the claims against the City, “(a) municipality may not be held liable under
§ 1983 solely because its employees inflicted injury on the plaintiff.” Hinton v. City of Elwood,
Kan., 997 F.2d 774, 782-83 (10th Cir.1993), citing Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). In other words, Plaintiff cannot predicate liability on a theory
of respondeat superior. Instead, to establish liability against a municipality, a plaintiff must show
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a public entity’s policy or custom existed, and a direct causal link between the policy or custom
and the injury alleged. City of Canton Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385-86 (1989). Plaintiff
identifies no such policy or custom.
II. STANDARD
To state a claim for relief, a federal complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). At the pleading
stage, it is not the defendant’s or the court’s responsibility to guess at plaintiff’s claims. Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). A § 1983 complaint must, under Rule 12, “make clear exactly
who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each individual with fair notice as to the
basis of the claims against him or her.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir.
2008). Likewise insufficient, is a plaintiff’s more active-voice yet undifferentiated contention
‘defendants’ infringed his rights.” Pahls v. Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210, 1225-26 (10th Cir. 2013).
“Rather, it is incumbent upon a plaintiff to identify specific actions taken by particular defendants
in order to make out a viable § 1983 claim.” Pahls, 718 F.3d at 1226. The mere metaphysical
possibility some plaintiff could prove some set of facts for the claims is insufficient; the complaint
must give reason to believe this plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support
for these claims. Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007).
All well-pleaded factual allegations are viewed favorably to the non-moving party. Brown v.
Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1162 (10th Cir. 2011). All conclusory statements of law, however, are
set aside. Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 2011). Rule 8, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court, forbids “labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action.” Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2012).
To any extent Sergeant Heaton or Corporal Bogosian are alleged to have violated Plaintiff’s
Constitutional rights based on their individualized behavior, the doctrine of qualified immunity
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shields them from any damages claimed. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806-807 (1982).
Qualified immunity affords public officials immunity from suit and exists to “protect them from
undue interference with their duties, and from potentially disabling threats of liability.” Elder v.
Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 514 (1994), citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 806. Qualified immunity protects
all governmental officials performing discretionary functions from civil liability as long as their
conduct does not violate clearly established Constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
Qualified immunity is not only a defense to liability, but also immunity from suit. Mitchell
v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). “One of the purposes of immunity, absolute or qualified, is
to spare a defendant not only unwarranted liability, but unwarranted demands customarily imposed
upon those defending a long-drawn-out lawsuit.” Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991).
“These burdens include distraction of officials from their governmental responsibilities, the
inhibition of discretionary decision making, the deterrence of able people from public service, and
the disruptive effects of discovery on governmental operations.” Hannula v. City of Lakewood,
907 F.2d 129, 130 (10th Cir. 1990). Courts should, therefore, resolve the purely legal question
raised by a qualified immunity defense at the earliest possible state in the litigation. Medina v.
Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1127-28 (10th Cir. 2001).
When a defendant pleads the defense of qualified immunity, a plaintiff bears a heavy two-
part burden of proving that: (1) the defendants’ actions violated a constitutional right, and; (2) the
right was clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue. Mick v. Brewer, 76 F.3d 1127,
1134 (10th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). To survive dismissal, the plaintiff must at least allege
that the right was “clearly established” in a “particularized” sense. Wilson v. Meeks, 52 F.3d 1547,
1552 (10th Cir. 1995), citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). “[F]or a right to
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be ‘particularized,’ there must ordinarily be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point,
or ‘clearly established weight of authority’ from other courts.” Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 citing
Medina v. City & County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir. 1992).
III. ARGUMENT
A. Plaintiff fails to set forth any specific allegations against Sergeant Heaton
or Corporal Bogosian establishing their personal participation in the
alleged constitutional violation.
Plaintiff ’s claims against Sergeant Heaton and Corporal Bogosian, are based on alleged
supervisory positions over Defendant Haferman. (See ECF 41, ¶¶ 170; 176, respectively).
Premising claims merely as a result of a “respondeat superior” relationship, however, is improper.
“Under § 1983, government officials are not vicariously liable for the misconduct of their
subordinates. ‘There is no concept of strict supervisor liability under § 1983.’” Serna v. Colo.
Dept. of Corrections, 455 F.3d 1146, 1151 (10th Cir. 2006), citing Jenkins v. Wood, 81 F.3d 988,
994 (10th Cir. 1996). Liability against a supervisor, therefore, must be premised on some direct
action by the supervisor. Serna, 455 F.3d at 1151, citing Scull v. New Mexico, 236 F.3d 588, 600
(10th Cir. 2000). “Supervisors are only liable under §1983 for their own culpable involvement in
the violation of a person's constitutional rights. To establish supervisor liability under § 1983, ‘it
is not enough for a plaintiff merely to show a defendant was in charge of other state actors who
actually committed the violation. Instead, . . . the plaintiff must establish ‘a deliberate, intentional
act by the supervisor to violate constitutional rights.’’” Serna, 455 F.3d at 1151, citing Jenkins, 81
F.3d at 994-95. “In short, the supervisor must be personally ‘involved in the constitutional
violation,’ and a ‘sufficient causal connection’ must exist between the supervisor and the
constitutional violation.” Serna, 455 F.3d at 1151 (emphasis added) citing Rios v. City of Del Rio,
444 F.3d 417, 425 (5th Cir. 2006). An affirmative link means Plaintiff must properly allege not
only that the subordinate violated the Constitution, but also the “active participation or
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acquiescence of the supervisor in the constitutional violation by the subordinates.” Serna, 455 F.3d
at 1151, citing Holland v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2001), and Green v.
Branson, 108 F.3d 1296, 1302 (10th Cir. 1997). “(T)he supervisor’s state of mind is a critical
bridge between the conduct of a subordinate and his own behavior. Because ‘mere negligence’ is
not enough to hold a supervisor liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish the supervisor acted
knowingly or with ‘deliberate indifference’ that a constitutional violation would occur.” Serna,
455 F.3d at 1151, citing Green,108 F.3d at 1302.
In addition to a culpable state of mind, Plaintiff must also establish some sort of personal
participation in the alleged Constitutional violation. “Personal participation by a defendant is an
essential element of a civil rights action.” Weiss v. Vasquez, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183467, at
*10 (D. Colo. Oct. 6, 2022), referring to Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1262-63 (10th Cir.
1976). “There must be an affirmative link between the alleged constitutional violation and each
defendant's participation, control or direction, or failure to supervise.” Weiss , 2022 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 183467 at * 10, referring to Butler v. City of Norman, 992 F.2d 1053, 1055 (10th Cir.
1993). To establish supervisor liability pursuant to § 1983, Plaintiff must assert that any named
individual: (i) personally participated in the conduct; (ii) exercised control or direction over it; (iii)
failed to supervise; (iv) failed to train; or (v) tacitly authorized the conduct that resulted in a
constitutional deprivation. See Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1162 (10th Cir. 2008).
Here, Plaintiff recounts his arrest on April 7, 2022, but nowhere in his Complaint does he
identify any specific involvement of either Sergeant Heaton or Corporal Bogosian, implicating a
violation of any constitutional rights. In particular, Plaintiff alleges he was driving his Tesla Model
Y, which had “beta Autosteer.” (ECF 41 at ¶ 61). Plaintiff’s phone rang, and he picked it up to
see who was calling. As he did so, the Autosteer overcorrected and sent Mr. Grove’s Tesla over
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an embankment. (ECF 41 at ¶ 62). Mr. Groves subsequently called the police, and Defendant
Haferman arrived on scene. (ECF 41 at ¶ 64). Defendant Haferman began questioning Mr. Groves,
and soon learned he was on probation. (ECF 41 at ¶ 65). Defendant Haferman asked Mr. Groves
to complete roadside tests. (ECF 41 at ¶ 66). Plaintiff claims Defendant Haferman administered
the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test incorrectly and recorded what he considered clues of
impairment in Mr. Grove’s eyes (ECF 41 at ¶ 67). Defendant Haferman also noted impairment
indicators such as “pupils of different sizes” (ECF 41 at ¶ 67). Mr. Groves was told by Defendant
Haferman that because he suspected him of “being on drugs,” he would have to submit to a blood
test. (ECF 41 at ¶ 67). Plaintiff claims it was Defendant Haferman alone who decided to give Mr.
Groves the “full Haferman-wrongful DUI-arrest treatment” in his arrest report (ECF 41 at ¶ 79).
Defendant Haferman alleged Mr. Groves had “bloodshot, glassy eyes, and his pupils appeared to
be different sizes.” (ECF 41 at ¶ 79). Defendant Haferman also claimed Mr. Groves’ eyes “did
not complete [the] HGN test as a sober person.” (ECF 41 at ¶ 79). Plaintiff alleges Defendant
Haferman “omitted from his report all of Mr. Groves’ comments regarding his innocence and all
of the evidence related to his speech, balance, movements, walking, and comprehension that
universally indicated he was sober and unimpaired.” (ECF 41 at ¶ 80). The blood draw was
performed, and on May 26, 2022, Defendant Haferman received Mr. Groves’ blood results which
were negative (ECF 41, ¶ 94)2.
Nowhere in the recitation of Defendant Haferman’s interaction with Plaintiff on April 7,
2022, is either Sergeant Heaton or Corporal Bogosian mentioned. Plaintiff criticizes the roadside
tests and conclusions of Defendant Haferman as the basis for the wrongful arrest and violation of
2 The Defendants reserve the right to contest the validity of these facts in any subsequent
proceedings.
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his constitutional rights. There are no allegations, however, identifying Sergeant Heaton or
Corporal Bogosian’s participation in the roadside tests, involvement in the conclusions of
Defendant Haferman, or any other actions which might be construed as a violation of Plaintiff’s
Constitutional rights. According to Plaintiff’s own allegations, it was Defendant Haferman who
allegedly: (i) began questioning Mr. Groves, and learned he was on probation (ECF 41 at ¶ 65);
(ii) asked Mr. Groves to complete roadside tests (ECF 41 at ¶ 66); (iii) administered the Horizontal
Gaze Nystagmus test incorrectly (ECF 41 at ¶ 67); (iv) considered clues of impairment in Mr.
Grove’s eyes, and recorded them as such (ECF 41 at ¶ 67); (v) noted (allegedly incorrectly)
impairment indicators such as “pupils of different sizes” (ECF 41 at ¶ 67); (vi) made the decision
to tell Mr. Groves he suspected him of “being on drugs,” and would need to submit to a blood test.
(ECF 41 at ¶ 67), and; (vii) omitted from his report comments regarding Mr. Groves’ innocence
and “evidence” related to his speech, balance, movements, walking, and comprehension (ECF 41
at ¶ 80).
There are no non-conclusory allegations establishing any affirmative link between
Defendant Haferman’s actions, the alleged constitutional violations, and involvement by Sergeant
Heaton or Corporal Bogosian. Weiss , 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183467, at * 10, referring to Butler,
992 F.2d at 1055. There are also no non-conclusory allegations Sergeant Heaton or Corporal
Bogosian exercised control or direction over Defendant Haferman’s determinations with respect
to Mr. Groves, failed to supervise the specific stop of Mr. Groves, or tacitly authorized Defendant
Haferman’s conduct resulting in any constitutional deprivation. See Fogarty, 523 F.3d at 1162 and
Currier, 242 F.3d 925.
The allegations in the Complaint identifying Sergeant Heaton and Corporal Bogosian, fail
to describe any specific action taken which might have possibly violated Mr. Groves’
constitutional rights. For example, the Complaint states, “(a)s of March 20, 2021…Sergeant
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Heaton and Corporal Bogosian…personally, again had notice that Haferman was wrongfully
arresting innocent people.” (ECF 41 at ¶¶ 31(a) to (g)-32). But these allegations refer to the arrest
of “C.B.” and not Plaintiff (ECF 41 at ¶ 31). These allegations have nothing to do with Plaintiff,
and are also conclusory and insufficient to state a claim for relief against Sergeant Heaton or
Corporal Bogosian. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78. There is no information
to suggest either Sergeant Heaton or Corporal Bogosian had any sort of “notice,” especially
regarding the specific arrest of Plaintiff.
Likewise, other allegations in the Complaint with respect to Corporal Bogosian, also fail
to describe any specific action which violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. For example,
Plaintiff refers to an interaction where Corporal Bogosian noted a purported mistake made by Mr.
Haferman, consisting of noting a clue of impairment on a standardized roadside test, which was
“not a clue of impairment at all.” (ECF 41 at ¶ 30). Plaintiff alleges Corporal Bogosian
“confronted Haferman about his repeated misrepresentation of impairment evidence,” and in
nothing other than a conclusory assertion, states “(t)his was the first of many red flags…” (ECF
33 at ¶ 30(c) and (e)). These conclusory allegations do not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation, and therefore any claim against Corporal Bogosian should be dismissed pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to meet federal pleading standards.
B. Sergeant Heaton and Corporal Bogosian are entitled to qualified
immunity.
As discussed above, Plaintiff bears a heavy, two-part burden of overcoming the defense of
qualified immunity. In particular, Plaintiff must properly allege that: (1) the defendants’ actions
violated a constitutional right, and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the conduct
at issue. Mick, 76 F.3d at 1134.
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1. Plaintiff fails to establish a constitutional violation.
As argued above, there are no allegations identifying specific action taken by either
Sergeant Heaton or Corporal Bogosian, which might have possibly violated Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights. (See § III (A), supra). Plaintiff’s inability to comply with federal pleading
standards, and to identify a constitutional violation, is likewise detrimental to his burden with
respect to the defense of qualified immunity.
2. Plaintiff fails to identify a clearly established right.
To survive dismissal, the plaintiff must show that the right was “clearly established” in a
“particularized” sense. Wilson, 52 F.3d at 1552. “[F]or a right to be ‘particularized,’ there must
ordinarily be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or ‘clearly established weight
of authority’ from other courts.” Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 citing Medina, 960 F.2d 1498.
Here, Plaintiff alleges Sergeant Heaton and Corporal Bogosian violated Plaintiff’s Fourth
Amendment rights by failing to supervise and/or train Defendant Haferman with respect to his
DUI arrest. Plaintiff’s allegations rest on the notion Sergeant Heaton purportedly failed to review
other DUI arrests thereby precipitating Haferman’s actions with respect to Plaintiff (ECF 41 at ¶¶
170-175), and Corporal Bogosian somehow did not fulfill his duty to intermittently review
Haferman’s work (ECF 41 at ¶¶ 176-180). Besides being improperly speculative, a search of
Tenth Circuit jurisprudence fails to reveal any particularized case allowing for the imposition of
Constitutional liability on these theories, including a failure to review previous DUI arrests
unrelated to a plaintiff’s arrest. Without any clearly established authority, Plaintiff can state no
claim for a Constitutional violation, and both Sergeant Heaton and Corporal Bogosian are entitled
to qualified immunity.
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C. Plaintiff fails to properly set forth any proper allegations to maintain a
claim against the City of Fort Collins.
Plaintiff’s claims against the City of Fort Collins (“City”) fare no better than those against
Sergeant Heaton or Corporal Bogosian. To establish liability of a public entity under 42 U.S.C.
§1983, “a plaintiff must show (1) the existence of a municipal custom or policy and (2) a direct
and causal link between the custom or policy and the violation alleged.” Jenkins, 81 F.3d at 993
citing City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 385. The Supreme Court described the requirements a plaintiff
must meet to impose public entity liability as follows: “It is not enough for a §1983 plaintiff merely
to identify conduct properly attributable to the municipality. The plaintiff must also demonstrate
that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury
alleged. That is, a plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree
of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the
deprivation of federal rights.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404
(1997) (emphasis added).
Under these standards, municipal liability may arise only out of official customs or policies,
or for the actions of a final policymaker to any extent that such policies, customs, or policymakers
can be shown to be responsible for a constitutional violation. See Brown, 520 U.S. at 403-404.
Establishing deliberate conduct and the “requisite degree of culpability,” means municipal liability
attaches only where “a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various
alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the
subject matter in question.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986); Myers v.
Oklahoma Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 151 F.3d 1313, 1319 (10th Cir. 1998).
“Where a plaintiff claims that the municipality has not directly inflicted an injury, but
nonetheless has caused an employee to do so, rigorous standards of culpability and causation must
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be applied to ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of its
employee.” Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep’t, 717 F.3d 760, 770 (10th Cir.
2013), citing Brown, 520 U.S. at 405. “The causation element is applied with especial rigor when
the municipal policy or practice is itself not unconstitutional, for example, when
the municipal liability claim is based upon inadequate training, supervision, and deficiencies in
hiring.” Schneider, 717 F.3d at 770, citing Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983Litigation Claims &
Defenses, § 7.12.
“[A] plaintiff seeking to establish municipal liability on the theory that a facially
lawful municipal action has led an employee to violate a plaintiff's rights must demonstrate that
the municipal action was taken with ‘deliberate indifference’ as to its known or obvious
consequences.” Schneider 717 F.3d at 770 (10th Cir. 2013) citing Brown, 520 U.S. at 407; See
also City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989). “The deliberate indifference standard may be
satisfied when the municipality has actual or constructive notice that its action or failure to act is
substantially certain to result in a constitutional violation, and it consciously or deliberately
chooses to disregard the risk of harm.” Schneider, 717 F.3d at 771, citing Barney v. Pulsipher,
143 F.3d 1299, 1307 (10th Cir. 1998).
Plaintiff supports his claim against the City on generalized allegations it had a duty to train
and supervise Defendant Haferman; it and was somehow aware of his propensity for wrongfully
arresting citizens to increase his DUI arrest numbers by falsifying his reports, and; it deliberately
chose not to remedy the situation. (ECF 41 at ¶ 184). The Complaint alleges the City’s “failure to
supervise and train Haferman” was the moving force behind Plaintiff’s wrongful arrest (ECF 41
at ¶ 185), and those actions “violated plaintiff’s federal constitutional rights.” (ECF 33 at ¶ 186).
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Those allegations, however, are factually unsupported in the Complaint, conclusory, and improper
under federal pleading standards. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78.
There are simply no allegations in the Complaint establishing deliberate indifference by
the City with respect to any specific policy or custom, nor are there any allegations the City’s
actions (or failure to act) was substantially certain to result in a violation of Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights, and that the City consciously or deliberately chose to disregard any such
harm. Schneider, 717 F.3d at 771, citing Barney, 143 F.3d at 1307 (10th Cir. 1998). Any claim
against the City should be dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
Wherefore, Defendants, City of Fort Collins, Sergeant Allen Heaton, and Sergeant Jason
Bogosian, respectfully request the Court grant their Motion, order both Sergeant Heaton and
Sergeant Bogosian are entitled to qualified immunity, dismiss all claims against them with
prejudice, and for entry of any other relief deemed just.
Respectfully submitted this 31st day of October, 2023.
s/ Mark S. Ratner
Mark S. Ratner, Esq.
Robert A. Weiner, Esq.
Katherine N. Hoffman, Esq.
Hall & Evans, L.L.C.
1001 17th Street, Suite 300, Denver, CO 80202
303-628-3300 /Fax: 303-628-3368
ratnerm@hallevans.com
weinerr@hallevans.com
hoffmank@hallevans.com
ATTORNEYS FOR THE CITY OF FORT
COLLINS, ALLEN HEATON, AND JASON
BOGOSIAN
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE (CM/ECF)
I hereby certify that on the 31st day of October 2023, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing DEFENDANTS CITY OF FORT COLLINS, SERGEANT ALLEN HEATON,
AND “CORPORAL” JASON BOGOSIAN’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S
AMENDED COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) AND REQUEST
FOR QUALIFIED IMMUNITY was filed with the Court via CM/ECF and served on the
below-listed party by email:
Sarah Schielke, Esq.
sarah@lifeandlibertylaw.com
Matthew Haltzman, Esq.
matthew@haltzmanlaw.com
Jonathan M. Abramson, Esq.
jonathan@kandf.com
Yulia Nikolaevskaya, Esq.
julie@kandf.com
s/ Sarah Stefanick
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