HomeMy WebLinkAbout2023CV30276 - Higgins V. V. City Of Fort Collins, Et Al. - 027 - Pl's First Amended Complaint1
District Court, Larimer, Colorado
201 LaPorte Avenue, Ste 100
Fort Collins, CO 80521
Phone: (970) 498-6100
↑ Court Use Only ↑
Christian Higgins
Plaintiff,
vs.
City of Fort Collins, C&L Water Solutions, Inc., Sunbelt
Rentals, Inc., Kodiak Field Services, LLC, and BCH Services,
LLC
Defendants
Karl W. Hager #52710
VanMeveren Law Group, P.C.
123 N College Avenue, Suite 112
Fort Collins, CO 80524
Telephone (970) 495-9741
Fax (970) 495-6854
Email: khager@vanmeverenlaw.com
Case No. 2023CV30276
Division: 4C
PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND
COMES NOW, Plaintiff, Christian Higgins, by and through undersigned counsel,
VanMeveren Law Group, P.C., Karl W. Hager appearing, and states as her First Amended
Complaint against Defendants as follows:
I. PARTIES
1.At all times pertinent hereto, Plaintiff Christian Higgins (“HIGGINS”) was and is a private
individual and resident of Larimer County, with a mailing address of 1440 Edora Road,
Fort Collins, Colorado 80525.
2.At all times pertinent hereto, Defendant City of Fort Collins (“the CITY”), was and is a
home rule municipality of the State of Colorado, situated in Larimer County, with an
official mailing address of P.O. Box 580, Fort Collins, Colorado 80522. The principal
physical address of the CITY is 300 LaPorte Avenue, Building B, Fort Collins, Colorado
80521.
EXHIBIT A
2
3. At all times pertinent hereto, Defendant C&L Water Solutions, Inc. (“C&L”) was and is a
corporation licensed to do business in Colorado with a principal office address of 112249
Mead Way, Littleton, Colorado 80125. The registered agent for C&L is Chrystalla Larson,
with a mailing address of P.O. Box 631100, Littleton, Colorado 80163.
4. At all times pertinent hereto, Defendant Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. (“SUNBELT”) was and is a
foreign corporation with a principal office address of 1799 Innovation Point, Fort Mill,
South Carolina 29715. SUNBELT is licensed to do business in Colorado and the registered
agent is C T Corporation System with a mailing address of 7700 E Arapahoe Road, Suite
220, Centennial, Colorado 80112.
5. At all times pertinent hereto, Defendant Kodiak Field Services, LLC (“KODIAK”) was
and is a limited liability company with a principal office address of 1153 M1/4 Road,
Loma, Colorado 81524. KODIAK is licensed to do business in Colorado and the registered
agent is Colorado Registered Agent LLC with a mailing address of 1942 Broadway Street,
Suite 314C, Boulder, Colorado 80302.
6. At all times pertinent hereto, Defendant BCH Services, LLC (“BCH”) was and is a limited
liability company with a principal office address of 454 Eclipse Drive, Colorado Springs,
Colorado 80905. BCH is licensed to do business in Colorado and the registered agent is
Brandon Henry with a mailing address of 454 Eclipse Drive, Colorado Springs, Colorado
80905.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
7. Jurisdiction is appropriate in this Court pursuant to C.R.S. § 13-1-124.
8. Venue is appropriate in this Court pursuant to Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure 98(c).
9. HIGGINS complied with the jurisdictional notice requirement to the CITY under C.R.S.
§24-10-109.
10. This Court has jurisdiction over the CITY because the CITY has waived immunity pursuant
to C.R.S. § 24-10-106(1)(d)(I), as set forth below.
11. This Court further has jurisdiction over the CITY because the CITY has waived immunity
pursuant to C.R.S. § 24-10-106(1)(f), as set forth below.
12. The injuries suffered by HIGGINS are the direct result of a dangerous condition created
by the CITY that physically impeded the flow of traffic.
13. The CITY’s duty to HIGGINS to keep the roads safe is non-delegable.
EXHIBIT A
3
14. The CITY, through its subcontractors, stretched a five-inch fortified, pressurized hose (the
“HOSE”) from a fire hydrant across Welch Street at night in a dimly light area thereby
creating a dangerous condition.
15. The HOSE stretched across Welch Street impeded the flow of traffic of both cars and
bicycles.
16. The HOSE stretched across Welch Street at night was a road condition that created a chance
of injury, damage, or loss which exceeded the bounds of reason.
17. The HOSE stretched across Welch Street constituted an unreasonable risk to the health and
safety of the public.
18. Plaintiff’s injuries are the result of a physical condition of a public facility.
19. The dangerous condition should have, and would have, been known by the CITY if the
Defendants had exercised reasonable care.
20. The dangerous condition was proximately caused by the acts or omissions of the CITY
through its independent contractors maintaining the roadway on Welch Street during
sewage remediation.
21. It was reasonably foreseeable that: (a) cyclists such as HIGGINS would use the roadway
at Welch Street at night, (b) it would be difficult for a cyclist to see the hose at night and
(c) that serious injury, such as the injuries suffered by HIGGINS, could result from the
dangerous condition.
22. The knowledge of the dangerous condition of the CITY’s subcontractor is imputed to the
CITY.
23. The acts and omissions of the CITY’s subcontractors (the other Defendants) are imputed
to the CITY.
24. Defendant Sunbelt created the dangerous condition. Because Sunbelt created the dangerous
condition, it knew about it. However, Sunbelt, in derogation of its duties, failed to advise
the other Defendants or traffic control about the dangerous condition it created.
25. The CITY knew or should have known of the dangerous condition due to its relationship
with the Defendants and the contractual obligations in place at the time of the INCIDENT.
26. The HOSE was connected to a fire hydrant under the CITY’s control, operation and
maintenance and was being used as part of a sewage remediation project which results in
the operation and maintenance of a public water facility and sanitation facility as
contemplated by C.R.S. § 10-24-106(1)(f).
EXHIBIT A
4
27. “Operation” means the “act or omission of a public entity or public employee in the
exercise and performance of the powers, duties and functions vested in them by law with
respect to the purposes of any public power or sanitation facility.”
28. “Maintenance” is defined as “the act or omission of a public entity or public employee in
keeping a facility in the same general state of repair or efficiency as initially constructed
or in preserving a facility from decline or failure.”
29. The use of the hydrant and HOSE by Defendants was undertaken to keep a facility in the
same general state of repair or efficiency as initially constructed and/or to preserve a facility
from decline or failure.
30. Plaintiff’s injuries are also a result of the CITY’s operation and maintenance of a public
water facility and/or a public sanitation facility.
III. GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
31. At all times material to the allegations of this Complaint, the CITY owned, controlled
and/or maintained Welch Street, the shared-use roadway located in Fort Collins, Larimer
County, Colorado.
32. Welch Street is located within the municipal limits of the CITY.
33. Prior to October 8, 2021 the CITY was engaged in a Utilities project (“Utilities Project”)
which included rehabilitating a sewer line that runs underneath Spring Creek Trail, near
Welch Street.
34. As part of said Utilities Project, the CITY contracted with C&L to perform sewer bypass
services around the ongoing construction site.
35. On or before October 8, 2021, the CITY and C&L began carrying out remediation work
connected to the sewage spill.
36. On or before October 8, 2021, The CITY and C&L subcontracted with SUNBELT,
KODIAK and BCH (collectively, all “Defendants”) to assist in the aforementioned sewage
remediation work.
37. Prior to October 8, 2021, in performing the sewage spill remediation, Defendants
connected, or caused to be connected, a large, pressurized hose with an approximate 5-inch
diameter to a fire hydrant in the 1700 block of Welch Street near Edora Park (the “HOSE”).
The HOSE was laid completely across Welch Street.
EXHIBIT A
5
38. On October 8, 2021 at approximately 9:00 p.m., the HOSE remained stretched completely
across Welch Street in the roadway.
39. Upon information and belief, prior to October 8, 2021, during operation of the Utilities
Project a bypass hose was dislodged from a nearby manhole and began spilling sewage
into Spring Creek pond in or near Edora Park, adjacent to Welch Street.
40. On October 8, 2021 at approximately 9:00 p.m., Welch Street remained open and
accessible to motorists, cyclists and pedestrians. There were no warning signs, additional
lighting or other traffic-control devices used to alert motorists, cyclists or pedestrians of
the HOSE’s presence in the roadway. No alternate routes were suggested or made
available.
41. Defendant C&L was required (a) to install traffic devices and relocate them as necessary,
(b) continuously review and maintain all traffic control measures to assure that adequate
provisions have been made for the safety of the public and workers, (c) supervise, inspect
and direct the work performed on behalf of CITY, (d) to keep on the work site a “competent
resident superintendent who will be C&L’s representative and shall have authority to act
on behalf of C&L, (d) to protect the safety over persons or property, protecting them from
damage, injury or loss, (e) to erect and maintain all necessary safeguards for safety and
protection of the public, and (f) to designate a qualified and experienced safety
representative at the site whose duties and responsibilities shall be the prevention of
accidents and the maintaining and supervising of safety precautions and programs.
42. All of C&L’s and the other Defendants’ duties were the primary responsibility of the CITY
and nondelegable.
43. The Defendants did not have a representative on site at the time the HOSE was left across
the street at night.
44. No Defendant underwent remedial measures to advise the public of the risks due to the
HOSE stretched across the street at night.
45. Defendants did not place signs or traffic control devices to alert the public of the dangerous
condition.
46. The dangerous condition was unreasonable because subcontractor Defendant Sunbelt
improperly failed to report the dangerous condition to traffic control or the other
Defendants prior to the INCIDENT.
47. On October 8, 2021, HIGGINS was riding her bicycle (equipped with a helmet, taillight
and headlight) northbound in the 1700 block of Welch Street in Fort Collins, Colorado.
EXHIBIT A
6
48. As HIGGINS was traveling northbound on Welch Street, she was unaware of the presence
of the HOSE stretched across the roadway, impeding the flow of traffic. HIGGINS
encountered the HOSE and was unable to avoid it.
49. HIGGINS was able to raise her front wheel over the HOSE at the last instant, but her rear
wheel came in contact with the HOSE and jumped her bicycle and body into the air.
HIGGINS continued to grip her handlebars as her body came forcefully down onto the top
tube of her bicycle while her feet contacted the roadway. She was violently whiplashed
through her neck and back. HIGGINS bicycle continued traveling at an appreciable speed
before losing complete control and crashing approximately 30 yards from the location of
the HOSE.
50. HIGGINS was unaware of the presence of the HOSE in the roadway prior to the incident
on October 8, 2021.
51. Welch Street and the HOSE running across Welch Street were located in an area which the
Defendants, their employees, representatives or agents regularly accessed on or before
October 8, 2021.
52. Defendants failed to post any warnings or other indicators of the presence of HOSE and
failed to establish any traffic control devices in the area where the incident occurred prior
to October 8, 2021.
53. The presence of the HOSE in the roadway constituted a physical condition of a public
facility that physically interfered with the flow of traffic.
54. The presence of the HOSE in the roadway presented unreasonable risks to the health and
safety of the public.
55. Leaving the HOSE stretched across the roadway on Welch Steet with no warnings,
additional lighting, traffic control devices or other indicators created a foreseeable chance
of injury , damage and/or loss which exceeded the bounds of reason.
56. All Defendants knew of the HOSE’s presence in the roadway or should have known of the
HOSE’s presence in the roadway through the exercise of reasonable care.
57. The HOSE’s presence in the roadway, without any warnings or traffic control devices
utilized, was proximately caused by the negligent act or omission of the Defendants in
maintaining the roadway, Welch Street.
58. As a result of the incident, HIGGINS suffered serious, permanent bodily injury, including,
but not limited to, damage/injury to her cervical spine, her ankles, her groin area, chest,
right shoulder and both elbows, as well as injury to other areas of her body.
EXHIBIT A
7
59. As a result of injuries sustained in the incident, HIGGINS required urgent medical care,
diagnostic imaging throughout her body, treatment by orthopedic and spine specialists,
physical therapy, chiropractic and massage therapy, mental health treatment, treatment
from general practitioners and medication therapy.
60. As a direct and proximate result of the incident, HIGGINS sustained and will continue to
sustain damages as more specifically alleged below.
IV. FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Premises Liability – as against the CITY)
61. HIGGINS incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 60 of this First Amended
Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
62. At all times pertinent hereto, the provisions of C.R.S. §13-21-115 were in effect.
63. At all times pertinent hereto, the CITY owned, leased or otherwise legally occupied Welch
Street where the incident occurred.
64. At all times pertinent hereto, the CITY controlled Welch Street where the incident
occurred.
65. The CITY was a “landowner” of the area of Welch Street where the incident occurred as
contemplated by C.R.S. §13-21-115.
66. At all times pertinent hereto, HIGGINS was an invitee as that term is contemplated by
C.R.S. §13-21-115.
67. The condition and existence of the HOSE in the roadway on Welch Street was a dangerous
condition on the roadway that physically interfered with the flow of traffic and presented
an unreasonable risk of harm and injury to motorists, cyclists and others.
68. The CITY knew or should have known of the dangerous condition existing on the roadway
on Welch Street where the incident occurred.
69. The CITY generally had a nondelegable duty to use reasonable care with respect to any
danger it created on the roadway of Welch Street where the incident occurred of which it
knew, its subcontractors knew, or it should have known.
70. The CITY unreasonably failed to use reasonable care with respect to the danger presented
by the condition and existence of the HOSE in the roadway on Welch Street, thereby
exposing HIGGINS to a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of physical injury or harm.
71. The CITY's conduct was an unreasonable failure to exercise care to protect against dangers
of which it knew or should have known as contemplated by C.R. S. §13-21-115.
EXHIBIT A
8
72. HIGGINS’ damages suffered as a direct and proximate result of the CITY’s failure to
exercise reasonable care in constructing, maintaining or managing the roadway on Welch
Street where the incident occurred, as contemplated by C.R.S. §13-21-115., include but are
not limited to:
a. severe physical injuries;
b. past and future medical expenses;
c. past and future pain and suffering, mental anguish and emotional distress;
d. past and future loss of the normal pursuits and pleasures in life;
e. permanent physical impairment, disability, injury and disfigurement;
f. past wage loss; and
g. other compensatory damages, including property damage.
V. SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Premises Liability – as against C&L)
73. HIGGINS incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 72 of this Complaint as if fully
set forth herein.
74. At all times pertinent hereto, the provisions of C.R.S. §13-21-115 were in effect.
75. At all times pertinent hereto, C&L legally occupied or was in control of the circumstances
existing at Welch Street where the incident occurred.
76. C&L was a “landowner” of the area of Welch Street where the incident occurred as
contemplated by C.R.S. §13-21-115.
77. At all times pertinent hereto, HIGGINS was an invitee as that term is contemplated by
C.R.S. §13-21-115.
78. The condition and existence of the HOSE in the roadway on Welch Street was a dangerous
condition on the roadway that physically interfered with the flow of traffic and presented
an unreasonable risk of harm and injury to motorists, cyclists and others.
79. C&L knew or should have known of the dangerous condition existing on the roadway on
Welch Street where the incident occurred.
EXHIBIT A
9
80. C&L generally had a duty to use reasonable care with respect to any danger on the roadway
of Welch Street where the incident occurred of which it knew or should have known.
81. C&L unreasonably failed to use reasonable care with respect to the danger presented by
the condition and existence of the HOSE in the roadway on Welch Street, thereby exposing
HIGGINS to an unreasonable risk of physical injury or harm.
82. C&L’s conduct was an unreasonable failure to exercise reasonable care to protect against
dangers of which it knew or should have known as contemplated by C.R. S. §13-21-115.
83. HIGGINS’ damages suffered as a direct and proximate result of C&L’s failure to exercise
reasonable care in maintaining or managing the roadway on Welch Street where the
incident occurred, as contemplated by C.R.S. §13-21-115, include but are not limited to:
a. severe physical injuries;
b. past and future medical expenses;
c. past and future pain and suffering, mental anguish and emotional distress;
d. past and future loss of the normal pursuits and pleasures in life;
e. permanent physical impairment, disability, injury and disfigurement;
f. past wage loss; and
g. other compensatory damages, including property damage.
VI. THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Premises Liability – as against SUNBELT)
84. HIGGINS incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 83 of this Complaint as if fully
set forth herein.
85. At all times pertinent hereto, the provisions of C.R.S. §13-21-115 were in effect.
86. At all times pertinent hereto, SUNBELT legally occupied or was in control of the
circumstances existing at Welch Street where the incident occurred.
87. SUNBELT was a “landowner” of the area of Welch Street where the incident occurred as
contemplated by C.R.S. §13-21-115.
88. At all times pertinent hereto, HIGGINS was an invitee as that term is contemplated by
C.R.S. §13-21-115.
EXHIBIT A
10
89. The condition and existence of the HOSE in the roadway on Welch Street was a dangerous
condition on the roadway that physically interfered with the flow of traffic and presented
an unreasonable risk of harm and injury to motorists, cyclists and others.
90. SUNBELT knew or should have known of the dangerous condition existing on the roadway
on Welch Street where the incident occurred.
91. SUNBELT generally had a duty to use reasonable care with respect to any danger on the
roadway of Welch Street where the incident occurred of which it knew or should have
known.
92. SUNBELT unreasonably failed to use reasonable care with respect to the danger presented
by the condition and existence of the HOSE in the roadway on Welch Street, thereby
exposing HIGGINS to an unreasonable risk of physical injury or harm.
93. SUNBELT’s conduct was an unreasonable failure to exercise reasonable care to protect
against dangers of which it knew or should have known as contemplated by C.R. S. §13-
21-115.
94. HIGGINS’ damages suffered as a direct and proximate result of SUNBELT’s failure to
exercise reasonable care in maintaining or managing the roadway on Welch Street where
the incident occurred, as contemplated by C.R.S. §13-21-115, include but are not limited
to:
a. severe physical injuries;
b. past and future medical expenses;
c. past and future pain and suffering, mental anguish and emotional distress;
d. past and future loss of the normal pursuits and pleasures in life;
e. permanent physical impairment, disability, injury and disfigurement;
f. past wage loss; and
g. other compensatory damages, including property damage.
VII. FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Premises Liability – as against KODIAK)
95. HIGGINS incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 94 of this Complaint as if fully
set forth herein.
96. At all times pertinent hereto, the provisions of C.R.S. §13-21-115 were in effect.
EXHIBIT A
11
97. At all times pertinent hereto, KODIAK legally occupied or was in control of the
circumstances existing at Welch Street where the incident occurred.
98. KODIAK was a “landowner” of the area of Welch Street where the incident occurred as
contemplated by C.R.S. §13-21-115.
99. At all times pertinent hereto, HIGGINS was an invitee as that term is contemplated by
C.R.S. §13-21-115.
100. The condition and existence of the HOSE in the roadway on Welch Street was a
dangerous condition on the roadway that physically interfered with the flow of traffic and
presented an unreasonable risk of harm and injury to motorists, cyclists and others.
101. KODIAK knew or should have known of the dangerous condition existing on the
roadway on Welch Street where the incident occurred.
102. KODIAK generally had a duty to use reasonable care with respect to any danger on
the roadway of Welch Street where the incident occurred of which it knew or should have
known.
103. KODIAK unreasonably failed to use reasonable care with respect to the danger
presented by the condition and existence of the HOSE in the roadway on Welch Street,
thereby exposing HIGGINS to an unreasonable risk of physical injury or harm.
104. KODIAK’s conduct was an unreasonable failure to exercise reasonable care to
protect against dangers of which it knew or should have known as contemplated by C.R.
S. §13-21-115.
105. HIGGINS’ damages suffered as a direct and proximate result of KODIAK’s failure
to exercise reasonable care in maintaining or managing the roadway on Welch Street where
the incident occurred, as contemplated by C.R.S. §13-21-115, include but are not limited
to:
a. severe physical injuries;
b. past and future medical expenses;
c. past and future pain and suffering, mental anguish and emotional distress;
d. past and future loss of the normal pursuits and pleasures in life;
e. permanent physical impairment, disability, injury and disfigurement;
f. past wage loss; and
g. other compensatory damages, including property damage.
EXHIBIT A
12
VIII. FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Premises Liability – as against BCH)
106. HIGGINS incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 105 of this Complaint as
if fully set forth herein.
107. At all times pertinent hereto, the provisions of C.R.S. §13-21-115 were in effect.
108. At all times pertinent hereto, BCH legally occupied or was in control of the
circumstances existing at Welch Street where the incident occurred.
109. BCH was a “landowner” of the area of Welch Street where the incident occurred as
contemplated by C.R.S. §13-21-115.
110. At all times pertinent hereto, HIGGINS was an invitee as that term is contemplated
by C.R.S. §13-21-115.
111. The condition and existence of the HOSE in the roadway on Welch Street was a
dangerous condition on the roadway that physically interfered with the flow of traffic and
presented an unreasonable risk of harm and injury to motorists, cyclists and others.
112. BCH knew or should have known of the dangerous condition existing on the
roadway on Welch Street where the incident occurred.
113. BCH generally had a duty to use reasonable care with respect to any danger on the
roadway of Welch Street where the incident occurred of which it knew or should have
known.
114. BCH unreasonably failed to use reasonable care with respect to the danger
presented by the condition and existence of the HOSE in the roadway on Welch Street,
thereby exposing HIGGINS to an unreasonable risk of physical injury or harm.
115. BCH’s conduct was an unreasonable failure to exercise reasonable care to protect
against dangers of which it knew or should have known as contemplated by C.R. S. §13-
21-115.
116. HIGGINS’ damages suffered as a direct and proximate result of BCH’s failure to
exercise reasonable care in maintaining or managing the roadway on Welch Street where
the incident occurred, as contemplated by C.R.S. §13-21-115, include but are not limited
to:
a. severe physical injuries;
b. past and future medical expenses;
EXHIBIT A
13
c. past and future pain and suffering, mental anguish and emotional distress;
d. past and future loss of the normal pursuits and pleasures in life;
e. permanent physical impairment, disability, injury and disfigurement;
f. past wage loss; and
g. other compensatory damages, including property damage.
IX. SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Negligence – as against all Defendants)
117. HIGGINS repeats and repleads the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 116 of this
Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
118. The Defendants owed a duty to HIGGINS to exercise reasonable care to protect her
from dangers of which they knew or reasonably should have known.
119. At the date and location described above, the Defendants breached their respective
duties of care.
120. The Defendants caused the HOSE to be present in the roadway on Welch Street
where the incident occurred and failed to maintain the roadway in a reasonably safe
condition.
121. Defendants failed to provide any warnings of the HOSE’s presence in the roadway
and failed to institute any traffic control devices or other protective measures.
122. Defendants allowed the HOSE to remain stretched across the roadway with no
warning signs or other indicators of its presence and created an unreasonable risk of harm
to motorists, cyclists and others by doing so.
123. The dangerous condition of the HOSE in the roadway on Welch Street caused harm
to HIGGINS.
124. HIGGINS’ damages suffered as a direct and proximate result of Defendants’
negligence include but are not limited to:
a. severe physical injuries;
b. past and future medical expenses;
c. past and future pain and suffering, mental anguish and emotional distress;
d. past and future loss of the normal pursuits and pleasures in life;
EXHIBIT A
14
e. permanent physical impairment, disability, injury and disfigurement;
f. past wage loss; and
g. other compensatory damages, including property damage.
V. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment in her favor and against Defendants for the
special and general damages she sustained, including, but not limited to, past and future health
care expenses, past and future pain and suffering, permanent impairment, emotional distress, loss
of enjoyment of life, past and future wage loss, pre and post judgment interest, expert witness
fees, costs, consequential damages, and for such other and further relief as this Court deems just
and proper.
VI. JURY DEMAND
Plaintiff hereby demands trial by a jury of six persons of all issues so triable and submits
the required jury fees with the Complaint.
Dated this 29th day of June 2023. VANMEVEREN LAW GROUP, P.C.
_s/ Karl W. Hager_____________
Karl W. Hager - #52710
123 North College Avenue, Ste 112
Fort Collins, CO 80524
Telephone: (970) 495-9741
Facsimile: (970) 495-6854
Plaintiff’s Address:
Christian Higgins
1440 Edora Road
Fort Collins, Colorado 80525
EXHIBIT A
15
CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC FILING AND SERVICE
I hereby certify that on June 29, 2023 the foregoing First Amended Complaint was filed
with the Court and served on all counsel of record via ICCES according to the Colorado Rules of
Civil Procedure.
/s/ Amy Selcke
Amy Selcke
Legal Assistant, VanMeveren Law Group, P.C.
EXHIBIT A