HomeMy WebLinkAbout2021-cv-2063-CNS-MEH - City Of Fort Collins V. Open International, Et Al. - 182 - City Mot Restrict 155IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No.: 21-cv-02063-CNS-MEH
CITY OF FORT COLLINS,
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant,
v.
OPEN INTERNATIONAL, LLC
Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff,
and
OPEN INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Defendant.
PLAINTIFF CITY OF FORT COLLINS’S MOTION TO RESTRICT ACCESS
The City of Fort Collins (the “City”), by and through its undersigned counsel, respectfully
requests that the Court maintain Level 1 restriction to its Response in Opposition to Motion to
Exclude Testimony by Non-Retained Expert Michelle Frey, PhD [Dkt. 155] and supporting
exhibits C and E [Dkt. 155-3 and 155-5]. In support thereof, the City states as follows:
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO D.C.COLO.L.CivR 7.1
Undersigned counsel conferred with counsel for Defendants. Defendants oppose the relief
requested herein, even on a provisional basis because they do “not believe there is an adequate
basis to withhold public access to materials presented to the Court to support dispositive resolution
of claims.” The City disagrees with Defendants’ position.
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ARGUMENT
1. This Court entered the parties’ Stipulated Protective Order on October 14, 2021
[Dkt. 32]. This Order provides that information related to the parties’ alleged business are either
subject to a “Confidential” or “Highly Confidential – Attorneys’ Eyes Only” designation in order
to shield them from public disclosure.
2. The City filed several Motions to Restrict Access in 2022 [Dkts. 50, 53, 66, 69, 79,
and 85].
3. During the parties’ August 12, 2022 Discovery Conference, Judge Hegarty
provisionally granted all of the Motions to Restrict Access [see Dkt. 96], stating that the Court
would likely do the same for future motions as well.
4. On January 9, 2023, the City filed its Response in Opposition to Motion to Exclude
Testimony by Non-Retained Expert Michelle Frey, PhD (“Response”) [Dkt. 155] and supporting
exhibits [Dkt. 155-1—7].
5. Pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.2, the City hereby moves to retain Level 1
restriction to the Response [Dkt. 155], as well as Exhibits C and E [Dkt. 155-3 and 155-5].
6. The City requests the above restriction in order to comply with the parties’
Protective Order and because good cause exists to restrict the documents from public access, as
they refer to and consist of confidential information.
7. Exhibits C and E [Dkt. 155-3 and 155-5] consist of excerpts of deposition
transcripts which have also been designated as Confidential pursuant to the Stipulated Protective
Order. Although the Stipulated Protective Order is not an independent basis for restricting the
Exhibit, these deposition transcripts were designated as such pursuant to the Stipulated Protective
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Order because they contain confidential information regarding the parties’ agreements and this
dispute, as well as information regarding third parties not subject to this litigation. See Nichols v.
Denver Health & Hosp. Auth., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 260696, at *12-13 (D. Colo. Oct. 29, 2020)
(finding that documents produced pursuant to protective order and designated as confidential that
were attached to nondispositive motions were not subject to the common-law right of access).
8. Although redaction of these specific Exhibits is not a reasonable or practical
alternative because they consist almost entirely of confidential information, the City submits a
redacted version of the Response that removes the confidential information referenced in Exhibits
C and E. See Exhibit 1.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, the City respectfully requests that the Court enter the redacted Response
(attached hereto as Exhibit 1) and maintain Level 1 restriction on supporting Exhibits C and E
[Dkt. 155-3 and 155-5, respectively], and for such further relief as this Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of January, 2023.
DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP
s/ Maral J. Shoaei
Case Collard
Andrea Ahn Wechter
Maral J. Shoaei
1400 Wewatta Street, Suite 400
Denver, Colorado 80202-5549
Telephone: (303) 629-3400
Fax: (303) 629-3450
E-mail: collard.case@dorsey.com
E-mail: wechter.andrea@dorsey.com
E-mail: shoaei.maral@dorsey.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff City of Fort Collins
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on January 23, 2023, I caused the foregoing document to be
electronically filed via CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the
following:
Alexander D. White
Paul D. Swanson
Hannah E. Armentrout
Anna C. Van de Stouwe
Alexandra E. Pierce
HOLLAND & HART LLP
555 17th Street, Suite 3200
Denver, CO 80202
Telephone: (303) 295-8578
adwhite@hollandhart.com
pdswanson@hollandhart.com
hearmentrout@hollandhart.com
acvandestouwe@hollandhart.com
aepierce@hollandhart.com
Attorneys for Defendants
s/ Stacy Starr
Dorsey & Whitney LLP
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Exhibit 1
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No.: 21-cv-02063-CNS-MEH
CITY OF FORT COLLINS,
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant,
v.
OPEN INTERNATIONAL, LLC
Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff,
and
OPEN INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Defendant.
PLAINTIFF CITY OF FORT COLLINS’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION
TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY BY NON-RETAINED EXPERT MICHELLE FREY, PhD
The City of Fort Collins (the “City”), by and through its undersigned counsel, hereby
submits this Response in Opposition to Defendants Open International, LLC and Open
Investments, LLC’s (“Defendants” or “Open”) Motion to Exclude Testimony by City’s Proffered
Non-Retained Expert Michelle Frey (the “Motion”) [Dkt. 122].
INTRODUCTION
Open seeks to exclude testimony by the City’s hybrid/non-retained expert, Dr. Michelle
Frey, claiming that the City failed to comply with the disclosure requirements pursuant to Rule
26(a)(2)(C). The standard for disclosing non-retained experts is significantly more lax than the
standard for disclosing retained experts. Under the “brief summary” standard, and when viewed
in light of other disclosures found to be in compliance by District of Colorado courts, the City’s
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disclosure was sufficient. This is especially true considering Open’s familiarity with and own
reliance on Dr. Frey and her opinions in its counterclaims and throughout its own case. Even if
this Court were to find that the disclosure was not sufficient under this more lax standard, the City
should be permitted to supplement its disclosure. Indeed, Open should not be permitted to present
a one-sided set of opinions while excluding those unfavorable to its case.
BACKGROUND
As set forth in Open’s Motion, Dr. Michelle Frey was disclosed as a fact witness by both
Parties in their respective initial disclosures. Mot., Dkt. 122 at 2. Open also relied on numerous
allegations related to Dr. Frey’s opinions in its Counterclaims. Dr. Frey was brought on as the
City’s second project manager during the course of the parties’ implementation project and made
assessments and recommendations and developed opinions about the entire project based on her
expertise and review.
Open based its counterclaims on, in part, those assessments and opinions. For example, in
the Counterclaims, Open relied on: (1) Dr. Frey’s competencies, skills, experience, and
background as a project manager for software implementation projects; (2) allegations concerning
Dr. Frey’s “extensive due diligence” of the City’s alleged deficiencies in its preparation of the
project, staffing on the project, leadership and governance, and related recommendations
concerning staffing and other issues; (3) Dr. Frey’s alleged analysis and determination that the
project delays and costs were largely the responsibility of the City; and (4) the various
recommendations allegedly made by Dr. Frey about the Project:
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…
Open’s Countercls. Dkt. 13, ¶¶ 83-87, 122.
Following the filing of Open’s Counterclaims, the City provided the following disclosure
in its Initial Rule 26(a)(1) Disclosures:
City’s Initial Rule 26(a)(1) Disclosures, Ex. A at 4.
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During discovery, Open continued to repeatedly rely on Dr. Frey’s analysis of the Project
and related opinions and determinations. For example, in Open’s Responses to the City’s First Set
of Interrogatories, Open relied on: (1) Dr. Frey’s identification of “risks” to successful completion
of the Project; (2) Dr. Frey’s purported analysis and determination of the City’s failure to allocate
necessary resources to the Project, define business resources for broadband, finalize business
operations for the Project’s utilities component, make clear business decisions about how the
Project will be implemented, coordinate enterprise level IT projects, and provide appropriate
project governance and management; (3) Dr. Frey’s memorandum purportedly warned that the
City had to prepared for ongoing Project “budget” issues and that it had “clear responsibilities
assigned to it” under the Parties’ contracts; and (4) Dr. Frey’s purported allocation of responsibility
for the Project delays based on her analysis of the Project. See Open’s Resp. to City’s First Set of
Interrogatories, Ex. B at 24-26.
Open likewise sent a subpoena to Vanir, Dr. Frey’s former employer, seeking significant
documents related to Dr. Frey’s involvement in the Project. And Open otherwise repeatedly relied
on Dr. Frey’s opinions in this action. See, e.g., Dkts. 43-1 and 43-2 (memoranda by Dr. Frey that
Open attached to a motion); Dkt. 64 (the City’s Motion for Protective Order, detailing Open’s use
of various memoranda drafted by Dr. Frey); Dkt. 74-1 (a Frey memorandum that Open attached to
its Response to Dkt. 64); Dep. Tr. of L. Rosintoski,
Dep. Tr. of H. Parrott, Ex. F at 445:1-15 (Open testifying about how Dr. Frey
is “a very smart person, experienced project manager, very analytical, a straight talker, and very
efficient project manager” as well as a “qualified project manager”).
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Open also deposed Dr. Frey during discovery. Prior to that deposition, the City further
disclosed Dr. Frey as a Hybrid/Non-Retained Expert Witness specifically to avoid a situation in
which Open relied on some opinions of Dr. Frey and sought to exclude others and so that Open
could depose Dr. Frey both as a fact and non-retained expert witness, should it choose to do so.
Specifically, the City disclosed that Dr. Frey would testify regarding the following:
City’s Disclosure of Hybrid/Non-Retained Witness, Ex. 1 to Mot., Dkt. 122-1. That is, the City’s
disclosure of Dr. Frey as a non-retained witness built on and clarified what Open already relied on
in support of its own case and counterclaims and what the City had already disclosed in initial
disclosures. Indeed, all of the above items go towards and support Dr. Frey’s experience in project
management and software implementation projects, as relied on by Open in its Counterclaims. In
fact, Open repeatedly relied on everything that went into Dr. Frey’s “extensive due diligence” and
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analysis of the project to make determinations and recommendations concerning the project issues,
staffing issues, delays, risks to the project, and costs—including who was responsible for the
same—throughout its counterclaims and case. Notwithstanding that, all of the above items also
go towards the City’s disclosure of Dr. Frey in its Initial Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures as having
information concerning “Defendants’ representations and failure to provide promised
functionalities, outstanding issues, troubleshooting, and City staffing.” More importantly, they are
aimed at presenting a complete set of assessments and opinions of Dr. Frey rather than the one-
sided set of opinions Open seeks to present based on Dr. Frey’s expertise.
During Dr. Frey’s deposition on October 12, 2022, Open questioned Dr. Frey on many of
the issues related to the above items. See generally Dep. Tr. of M. Frey, PhD.,
Despite this, Open purported to distance itself from the City’s
designation of Dr. Frey as a hybrid/non-retained expert witness by noting that Open’s deposition
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of Dr. Frey was in her “personal capacity” and “reserve[ing] the right to separately notice a
deposition of [her] as an expert witness during the expert discovery phrase.” Id. at 194:5-11
(emphasis added). Then, Open’s counsel ended Dr. Frey’s deposition early, declining to use its
full seven hours on the record. See id. at 194:19-21. In any event, despite Open’s reservation of
rights, it chose not to “separately notice” a deposition of Dr. Frey during the expert discovery
phase, which closed on December 9, 2022.
On November 2, 2022, counsel for Open emailed counsel for the City suggesting that the
Frey disclosure was insufficient and that the City should consider supplementing it. See Ex. D.
The City promptly replied two days later, informing Open’s counsel that it believed the disclosure
was sufficient and providing relevant case law supporting its position. See id. Open took no
further action until it filed this Motion on December 19, 2022.
ARGUMENT
As the various cases cited by Open in its Motion make clear, the standard for disclosure
under Rule 26(a)(2)(C) is markedly different from that for retained experts. Given similar
disclosures that this Court has found sufficient and since the overarching purpose of such a
disclosure is to avoid surprise or prejudice to the non-disclosing party, the City’s disclosure of Dr.
Frey was sufficient. However, should the Court find that it was not, the City should be allowed to
supplement its disclosure because all relevant factors support allowing the City to do so.
A. The City’s Disclosure of Dr. Frey As A Hybrid/Non-Retained Expert Witness
Complies with Rule 26(a)(2)(C)’s Brief Summary Requirement.
Disclosures under Rule 26(a)(2)(C) need only provide a “brief summary” of areas to which
the non-retained expert will testify. See Jorgensen v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co. LLC, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 124659, at *21 (D. Colo. Aug. 8, 2017). Open concedes that the City has provided a brief
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summary of the subject matters that Dr. Frey will testify to. See Mot., Dkt. 122 at 3 (“[the
disclosure]lists only a half-dozen topics Dr. Frey would testify about”). The requirements under
this rule “differ substantially” from the requirements for disclosing a retained expert. Id. (quoting
Davis v. GEO Corp., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34797, 2012 WL 882405, at *3 (D. Colo. Mar. 15,
2012). Under this lenient standard, courts have approved disclosures substantially similar to the
City’s disclosure of Dr. Frey. As conceded by Open in its Motion, “[t]he caselaw on what
constitutes an adequate disclosure for a non-retained expert (one who is not required to provide a
written report) is not extensive.” United States v. Durango & Silverton Narrow Gauge R.R. Co.,
2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181926, at *4-5 (D. Colo. Oct. 1, 2020).
Under the relevant case law, the City’s disclosure is adequate. For example, in Nagle v.
Mink, the defendants moved to strike a disclosure that stated the non-retained experts would each
“provide an opinion on Plaintiff’s diagnosis of diabetes.” Nagle v. Mink, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
97781, at *3 (D. Colo. Aug. 29, 2011). In their Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Expert Disclosures,
the defendants made arguments similar to those Open makes here. Specifically, those defendants
argued: “there is no description of the opinion, no description of the effects observed, and no
explanation as to the basis for concluding that the effects were related to the [medication] and not
something else. Most troubling is Plaintiff’s repeated statement that each [witness] will provide an
expert opinion that Plaintiff’s diabetes ‘affects a major life activity’ without identifying the
particular life activity affected or describing how it was affected or what was observed.” See Ex.
G. Magistrate Judge Hegarty rejected those arguments, emphasizing that the standard under Rule
26(a)(2)(C) differs substantially from that required of a retained expert. He instead found that the
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disclosures at issue met the rule’s requirement that parties provide “a summary of facts and
opinions to which the expert will testify.” Nagle, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97781 at *17.
Likewise, in Jorgensen v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel, Judge Hegarty found that a disclosure
pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2)(C) was sufficient where it stated: “These individuals are expected to
testify regarding their knowledge and experience and explain the reasonable steps that the Ritz-
Carlton took to prevent water from entering onto the patron floor area. These individuals may
discuss the nature of bar/restaurant drains and that it is impossible to prevent drain issues 100% of
the time. These individuals will describe the reasonable steps Ritz-Carlton took to protect patrons
from drain blockages and related water issues. These individuals are expected to testify consistent
with their depositions, if taken.” 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124659, at *19-22 (“Rule 26(a)(2)(C)’s
‘brief summary’ requirement does not demand more detail.”).
The City’s disclosure is not only on par with but exceeds these two examples of disclosures
found sufficient by Judge Hegarty. The City’s disclosure states that Dr. Frey will testify about:
her experience in project management, RFP responses, and software implementation projects;
what a functional matrix is, how one is used in a software implementation project, and how it was
used in this project; the implementation of highly configurable software versus software that is not
highly configurable and issues created by trying to implement the latter; how staffing and other
customer decisions are based on representations made by the vendor; how delays and risks are
addressed in fixed fee contracts for implementation contracts; and expected functionality in the
U.S. market for billing software, among other things. See generally Ex. 1 to Mot., Dkt. 122-1.
The disclosure complies with the “brief summary” requirement and therefore it satisfies the
requirements of Rule 26(a)(2)(C).
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B. Open Will Not Be Prejudiced Should the Court Find that the City Should Amend
its Disclosure.
As discussed above, this Court should find that the City’s disclosure of Dr. Frey meets the
requirements of Rule 26(a)(2)(C). However, should the Court find it was not, the Court should
also find that Open was not prejudiced and that any insufficiency is harmless, and allow the City
to supplement the disclosure.
The purpose of the disclosure requirement is to prevent prejudice by eliminating surprise
to the opposing party and by providing that party with enough information to prepare for
depositions, pre-trial motions, and trial. Carbaugh v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 96578, at *6 (D. Colo. July 16, 2014). Courts frequently allow parties to supplement their
disclosures, except where it would prejudice the non-moving party on the eve of trial. In fact, even
the cases cited by Open provided the opportunity for a party to supplement the disclosure, except
where the motion was decided a mere two days before the trial (and would thus lead to danger of
unfair surprise).1 See, e.g., Seeley v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152421, at
*18-20 (D. Colo. Sep. 6, 2018) (finding factors weighed in favor of amendment and allowing
plaintiff seven days to do so); Energy Drilling, LLC v. Pac. Energy & Mining Co., 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 140968, at *18-19 (D. Wyo. Apr. 1, 2016); c.f. Estate of Barton Grubbs v. Weld Cty.
Sheriff's Office, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 237488, at *9 (D. Colo. July 20, 2018) (not granting
opportunity to amend, as motion was decided just two days before trial, meaning moving party
would be prejudiced by a supplement on the eve of trial).
1 They also cite to a case in which a disclosure was found to be sufficient, with the exception of one paragraph that
broadly referred to a myriad of prior and future depositions and interview reports. See United States v. Durango &
Silverton Narrow Gauge R.R. Co., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181926, at *7-8 (D. Colo. Oct. 1, 2020).
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In determining whether an insufficient disclosure under Rule 26(a) is justified or harmless,
a court should look at “1) the prejudice or surprise to the party against whom the testimony is
offered; 2) the ability of the party to cure the prejudice; 3) the extent to which introducing such
testimony would disrupt the trial; and 4) the moving party's bad faith or willfulness.”
Woodworker's Supply, Inc. v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 170 F.3d 985, 993 (10th Cir. 1999); see
also Munoz v. FCA US LLC, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115580, at *10-12 (D.N.M. July 10, 2019)
(evaluating above factors and finding plaintiff’s inadequate expert disclosure harmless and
allowing amendment where defendants were not surprised by proposed testimony, disclosure was
timely, trial was not yet scheduled, and there was no evidence of gamesmanship or bad faith on
the part of the disclosing party). Open’s Motion is based only on the first factor, broadly asserting
that it will be prejudiced. See generally Mot., Dkt. 122 (lacking any argument about the inability
to cure any prejudice, lacking any argument that introduction of the testimony by Dr. Frey would
disrupt the trial, and lacking any argument about bad faith or willfulness). Accordingly, the City
addresses the first factor only.
Here, there is no danger of prejudice or surprise. As detailed above, Open is intimately
familiar with Dr. Frey, her experience, and her opinions. The City timely disclosed Dr. Frey, and
Open received the Frey disclosure prior to her deposition. Moreover, the disclosures built on and
concerned what Open has been relying on since day 1 of this case. In fact, Open’s Motion fails to
provide any explanation of which item(s) listed in the City’s disclosure of Dr. Frey are “unclear”
or how any such items are “unclear,” much less how precisely Open is prejudiced by any of those
items disclosed. This is because there can be no such argument. In fact, the six main areas of
testimony outlined in the disclosure should come as no surprise to Open, as Open has full
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knowledge of—and also relies on—Dr. Frey’s expertise, observations, determinations,
recommendations, and opinions relating to the Project and her analysis of the Project, as detailed
above.
For example, Open repeatedly relied on Dr. Frey’s experience and expertise in software
implementation projects and as a project manager and further relied on everything that went into
Dr. Frey’s “extensive due diligence” and analysis of the Project itself to make determinations, offer
opinions and recommendations concerning the project issues, staffing issues, delays, risks to the
project, and costs—including who was responsible for the same—throughout its counterclaims
and case. The City also previously disclosed her on the issues in the project, including
“Defendants’ representations and failure to provide promised functionalities, outstanding issues,
troubleshooting, and City staffing.” And Open’s counsel did ask Dr. Frey about many of the items
in the disclosure during her deposition. See
. Indeed, having satisfied itself, Open chose to end
Dr. Frey’s deposition early, foregoing the seven hours, and subsequently chose not to seek any
separate deposition of Dr. Frey during the expert discovery phase, despite making such
reservations. See id. at 194:5-11, 19-21.
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Notwithstanding the above, Open’s Motion focuses on cases where there was actual unfair
surprise or the disclosure otherwise hampered the ability of the opposing party to prepare for cross-
examination at trial. Neither exists here. For example, in Nosewiz v. Janosko, the court found that
a disclosure was insufficient because it referred to opinions and facts contained in a physician’s
medical records, but did not identify which specific records were being referred to, thus prejudicing
plaintiff as plaintiff did not know what facts from the records were at issue. Nosewicz v. Janosko,
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153242, at *13-14, 17-18 (D. Colo. Aug. 19, 2019). By contrast, the City’s
disclosure points to facts and opinions of which Open is well aware. Open cannot claim unfair
surprise or that it would be unable to cross-examine Dr. Frey at trial just because the City seeks to
rely on Dr. Frey’s “extensive due diligence” and analysis of the Project issues (as Open noted) that
are not favorable to Open’s case and counterclaims. Open is intimately familiar with the facts and
opinions underlying the disclosure. Dr. Frey and her opinions have played a key role throughout
this litigation and have been a particular focus of Open throughout the case, with Open repeatedly
relying on her analysis of the issues in the Project.
Moreover, despite the City’s prompt response to Open’s email raising concerns about the
disclosure, in which the City in good faith asserted its reasoning for why the disclosure was
sufficient (Ex. D), Open waited until after the close of fact and expert discovery (without ever
seeking a separate “expert” deposition of Dr. Frey) to file this Motion, evidencing the lack of
urgency or prejudice. The pre-trial conference in this action is still over three months away and
no trial dates have been set. Accordingly, should the Court find that the City’s disclosure of Dr.
Frey as its hybrid/non-retained witness is insufficient under Rule 26(a)(2)(C), it should also find
that “any prejudice suffered by [Open] is not irreparable” and allow the City to supplement its
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disclosure. See Munoz, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115580 at *10-12; see also Nicastle v. Adams Cty.
Sheriff's Office, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158850, at *4-5 (D. Colo. May 3, 2011) (finding that
possible prejudice to plaintiff was not irreparable where plaintiff was “extremely familiar” with
information referenced in disclosure and ordering defendant to amend disclosure).
CONCLUSION
To ensure that Open cannot rely on some of Dr. Frey’s opinions while excluding others,
the City respectfully requests that the Court deny Open’s Motion and find that the City properly
disclosed Michelle Frey as a hybrid/non-retained expert witness. In the alternative, the City
respectfully requests that the Court permit the City to supplement the disclosure.
Respectfully submitted this 9th day of January, 2023.
DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP
s/ Case Collard
Case Collard
Andrea Ahn Wechter
Maral J. Shoaei
1400 Wewatta Street, Suite 400
Denver, Colorado 80202-5549
Telephone: (303) 629-3400
Fax: (303) 629-3450
E-mail: collard.case@dorsey.com
E-mail: wechter.andrea@dorsey.com
E-mail: shoaei.maral@dorsey.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff City of Fort Collins
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on January 9, 2023 I caused the foregoing document to be electronically filed via CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following:
Alexander D. White
Paul D. Swanson
Hannah E. Armentrout
Anna C. Van de Stouwe
Alexandra E. Pierce
HOLLAND & HART LLP
555 17th Street, Suite 3200
Denver, CO 80202
Telephone: (303) 295-8578
adwhite@hollandhart.com
pdswanson@hollandhart.com
hearmentrout@hollandhart.com
acvandestouwe@hollandhart.com
aepierce@hollandhart.com
Attorneys for Defendants
s/ Wynter Wells
DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP
Case 1:21-cv-02063-CNS-MEH Document 155 Filed 01/09/23 USDC Colorado Page 15 of 15Case 1:21-cv-02063-CNS-MEH Document 182-1 Filed 01/23/23 USDC Colorado Page 16 of
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