HomeMy WebLinkAbout2019-cv-901 - Surat v. City of Fort Collins, et al. - 167 - Klamser Response re Motion to Certify Appeal as Frivolous4088263.1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 19-cv-00901-WJM-NRN
MICHAELLA LYNN SURAT,
Plaintiff,
v.
RANDALL KLAMSER in his individual capacity, and
CITY OF FORT COLLINS, a municipality,
Defendants.
DEFENDANT RANDALL KLAMSER’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ORDER CERTIFYING DEFENDANT KLAMSER’S
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL AS FRIVOLOUS AND
REQUEST FOR HEARING (ECF 161)
Defendant RANDALL KLAMSER, in his individual capacity, by and through his
attorneys, Mark S. Ratner, of Hall & Evans, L.L.C., and John R. Duval of the Fort Collins City
Attorney’s Office, hereby submit this Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Order
Certifying Defendant Klamser’s Interlocutory Appeal as Frivolous and Request for Hearing (ECF
161), as follows:
I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff alleges an excessive force claim against Officer Klamser pursuant to the Fourth
Amendment, for using a takedown maneuver during her arrest. On June 7, 2019, Defendants filed
a Motion to Dismiss (the “2019 Motion to Dismiss”) arguing Plaintiff’s excessive force claim was
barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), (ECF 23), and Plaintiff’s convictions for
resisting arrest and obstruction.
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On February 24, 2020, following briefing on the 2019 Motion to Dismiss (ECF 28 & 34),
this Court issued its Order granting in part and denying in part the Defendants’ Motion. As is
pertinent to the request for qualified immunity and this Response, this Court held Plaintiff’s claim
of excessive force arising prior to Officer Klamser’s takedown of Plaintiff was barred by Heck,
and as a result the remaining claim was limited to the question of whether Officer Klamser used
greater force than reasonably necessary to overcome Plaintiff’s resistance during the takedown
(ECF 84 at 10-13 (“In this light, the Court deems Surat to confess Defendants’ Heck argument as
to everything before the takedown, and Defendants’ motion will be granted with prejudice as to
any claim of excessive force based on Klamser’s alleged pre-takedown actions”)). This Court,
however, cautioned Plaintiff she faced a “formidable burden” under Heck, which burden would
be even more formidable if Officer Klamser subsequently raised the defense of qualified immunity
(which was not raised in the 2019 Motion to Dismiss)).
Plaintiff subsequently filed a First Amended Complaint on August 24, 2020, and on
September 14, 2020, Officer Klamser (and the City of Fort Collins) filed a Motion to Dismiss
(2020 Motion to Dismiss). Discovery concluded, and so pursuant to the Scheduling Order Officer
Klamser filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking qualified immunity, while the Motion to
Dismiss was still pending. Among the issues presented, Officer Klamser argued clearly
established law making his actions unconstitutional, was not clearly established, given the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Heck, coupled with Plaintiff’s convictions for resisting arrest and
obstruction, both of which contained elements of violence and physical force aimed at Officer
Klamser as the arresting officer.
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On April 12, 2021, this Court denied the 2020 Motion to Dismiss without prejudice as
moot. The denial was based on the determination Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
raised the same arguments as the 2020 Motion to Dismiss, and therefore superseded the 2020
Motion to Dismiss (ECF 150).
On July 13, 2021, this Court denied Officer Klamser’s Motion for Summary Judgment,
including his request for qualified immunity (ECF 154).
On August 10, 2021, Officer Klamser filed an interlocutory appeal, respecting the denial
of qualified immunity (ECF 158).
II. ARGUMENT
A. A District Court’s Determination Of Appellate Jurisdiction, Is Inappropriate.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Certify argues his appeal is frivolous because the Tenth Circuit lacks
appellate jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal as a so-called evidentiary sufficiency appeal.
Officer Klamser disputes this mischaracterization. Additionally, however, Officer Klamser notes
Plaintiff offers no precedent holding it is appropriate for a District Court to opine about an appellate
court’s appellate jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit, not this Court, must determine its own appellate
jurisdiction over Officer Klamser’s appeal. See, e.g., Amazon, Inc. v. Dirt Camp, Inc., 273 F.3d
1271, 1274 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting appellate court has an independent duty to examine its own
jurisdiction); Garrett v. Stratman, 254 F.3d 946, 951 (10th Cir. 2001) (same in qualified immunity
interlocutory appeal) Officer Klamser finds it incongruous for Plaintiff to demand this Court
declare his interlocutory appeal frivolous on the basis of this Court’s conclusion the Tenth Circuit
will lack appellate jurisdiction over the appeal. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit has its own specific
procedure for a party to file a motion to dismiss an appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. See
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10th Cir. R. 27.3(A)(1)(a). Further, it is also well-established a decision by a District Court to
certify an interlocutory appeal as frivolous does not impact an appellate court’s ability to continue
to consider the appeal. “Once a district court so certifies that the defendant’s appeal is frivolous
and thus regains jurisdiction, that does not effect our jurisdiction. ‘Rather, both the district court
and court of appeals shall have jurisdiction to proceed.’” Langley v. Adams Cty, 987 F.3d 1473,
1477 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Himes, 689 F.2d 934, 937 (10th Cir. 1982)). Thus,
Plaintiff’s argument would have this Court certify Officer Klamser’s appeal as frivolous based on
a lack of appellate jurisdiction when the Tenth Circuit has not determined it lacks appellate
jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal. Neither precedent nor logic supports such an approach.
B. Officer Klamser’s Interlocutory Appeal Is Premised On Whether There Was
No Clearly Established Law.
“A district court’s denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an
issue of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’…notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment.”
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). “The filing of a notice of appeal is an event of
jurisdictional significance-it confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district
court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” Griggs v. Provident
Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) referring to United States v. Hitchman, 587 F.2d
1357 (5th Cir. 1979). “Because this divestiture of jurisdiction is subject to abuse and can
unreasonably delay trial,…a district court may maintain jurisdiction over a defendant if the court
certifies that the defendant’s appeal is frivolous.” Langley v. Adams Cnty., 987 F.2d 1473, 1477
(10th Cir. 1993). This procedure was recognized in Stewart v. Donges, 915 F.2d 572 (10th Cir.
1990). Specifically, “When an interlocutory appeal is taken, the district court [only] retains
jurisdiction to proceed with matters not involved in that appeal.” Stewart, 915 F.2d at 576
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(emphasis in original). “(T)he divestiture of jurisdiction brought about by the defendant’s filing of
a notice of appeal is virtually complete, leaving the district court with jurisdiction only over
peripheral matters unrelated to the disputed right not to have defend the prosecution or action at
trial.” Stewart, 915 F.2d at 576.
But, merely disagreeing with the defendant’s position, is insufficient to render the appeal
frivolous. “(I)t is the district court’s certification of the defendant’s appeal as frivolous…rather
than merely the fact that the appeal is frivolous which allows the district court to retain jurisdiction
to conduct a trial.” Stewart, 915 F.2d at 577 (emphasis in original). “(A)n appeal on a matter of
law is frivolous where ‘[none] of the legal points [are] arguable on their merits.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (brackets in original), (quoting Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738, 744 (1967)).
In Howard v. Reichle, No. 06-cv-01964-CMA-CBS, 2009 WL 2338086 (D. Colo. July 28,
2009), the United States District Court for the District of Colorado discussed the high burden faced
by a Plaintiff seeking to have an appeal certified as frivolous:
To win his Motion, Plaintiff must show more than the mere fact that
he is right, he must show that Defendants’ appeals are “frivolous.”
That is, Plaintiff must establish that Defendants’ appeals are not just
uncertain or questionable, he must show they utterly lack legal
support.
Howard, 2009 WL 2338086 at *4.
The determination of qualified immunity is difficult, and one which this Court has
recognized is a decision which can be routinely reversed. Sanchez v. Hartley, 13-cv-1945-WJM-
CBS, ECF 104 at 3, referring to Hernandez v. Story, 459 F.App’x 697, 700 (10th Cir. 2012);
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Eaton v. Menely, 379 F.3d 949, 956 (10th Cir. 2004), and; Butler v. City of Norman, 992 F.2d
1053, 1056 (10th Cir. 1993).
Here, Officer Klamser argued he was entitled to summary judgment on the basis of
qualified immunity, given Plaintiff’s conviction for resisting arrest and obstruction, C.R.S. §§ 18-
8-103(1) and 18-8-104(1)(a), respectively, the Supreme Court’s rulings in Heck, and the notion
there was no clearly established law within these parameters, which might put him on notice his
actions were unconstitutional. In particular, as this Court recognized in ruling on Defendants’
2019 Motion to Dismiss, “Heck nonetheless imposes a formidable burden on Surat, even before
taking the jury’s rejection of her self-defense argument into account” (ECF 84 at 14), as the statutes
under which Surat was convicted, contain elements of physical force, violence, and a substantial
risk of causing injury to the peace officer. See C.R.S. § 18-8-103(1), and §18-8-104(1)(a) and;
ECF 84 at 14-15. As recognized by this Court, it was imperative Plaintiff establish Officer
Klamser’s takedown was objectively unreasonable, while taking as a given that he was “attempting
to effect an arrest and, in the process, the arrestee’s actions were subjecting him to, or threatening
him with, physical force or violence, or putting him at substantial risk of bodily injury.” (ECF 84
at 14-15) (comparing Martinez v. City of Albuquerque, 184 F.3d 1123, 1127 (10th Cir. 1999)
(“the [district] court [on remand] must instruct the jury that Martinez’ state arrest was lawful per
se”)). This Court also concluded that, “(m)oreover, if one accounts for the failure of the self-
defense argument, Surat must prove that Klamser’s takedown was objectively unreasonable while
taking as given all of the foregoing and the fact that Klamser had first attempted to subdue Surat
through lawful lesser force.” (ECF 84 at 14-15 (emphases in original)).
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Taking the Court’s previous rulings into account, which are the law of the case, Officer
Klamser argued no clearly established law existed which, as of April 6, 2017, made it a
constitutional violation to use a rowing arm takedown on a belligerent, uncooperative, and
intoxicated arrestee who interfered with an officer’s interview of a suspect, refused his directions
to stay away, struck him multiple times, subjected him to physical force or violence and put him
at substantial risk of bodily injury. (See ECF 84 at 15 (“Finally, if Klamser ever asserts qualified
immunity … then Surat’s burden is even more formidable. She must prove that it was clearly
established as of April 6, 2017, that a police officer attempting to effect an arrest and being
subjected to or threatened with physical force or violence, or facing a substantial risk of bodily
injury, and who has already tried lawful lesser force to subdue the arrestee, cannot use a takedown
maneuver used in this case to eliminate that actual or threatened force or risk of injury.”)).
In her Motion to Certify, Plaintiff argues any appeal by Officer Klamser “will inherently
[be] premised on disputed issues of fact given the clearly established law that exists governing the
claim at issue” (ECF 161 at 2). Plaintiff’s conclusory statement is without basis and simply
incorrect, as Officer Klamser’s appeal rests on the notion there is no clearly established law, given
the legal parameters present in this matter as already determined by this Court. Plaintiff’s
erroneous argument is evident by her reliance on case law she ostensibly claims establish the
unconstitutional nature of Officer Klamser’s rowing arm takedown, but which are factually
dissimilar.
For example, Plaintiff cites to Long v. Fulmer, 545 F.App’x 757 (10th Cir. 2013) (ECF
161 at 5). In Long, however, Plaintiff’s charge for misdemeanor theft, was subsequently
dismissed, Long, 545 F.App’x at 759, and therefore no conviction existed conclusively
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establishing the plaintiff used violence or the threat of bodily injury against the defendant officer
unlike here.
Plaintiff’s citation to Roe v. City of Cushing, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 31404 (10th Cir.
1993), fares no better. As with Long, supra, Roe does not address a rowing arm takedown and
instead notes the defendant “grabbed Roe's right arm, and put him on the hood of the police car.
He handcuffed Mr. Roe's right hand, then grabbed his shoulder and took him to the ground. When
they landed, Officer Brannon had one knee in the lower part of Mr. Roe's back and one knee in his
upper back or neck, causing Roe's head to strike the concrete and cutting his eye.” Roe, 1993 U.S.
App. LEXIS 31404 at *5 (citations to the record omitted). In denying qualified immunity, Roe
focused on the defendant’s use of his knees as the proximate cause of plaintiff striking the ground.
“Given Roe's version of the facts, we are unable to say that the officer's actions of throwing him
down and landing on him with both knees, causing his head to strike the concrete, was
objectively reasonable.” Roe, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 31404 at *8 (emphasis added).
Morris v. Noe, 672 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2012) is also inapplicable, as the decedent was
essentially tackled by the defendant officer. Morris, 672 F.3d at 1190 (“(T)he police officers
lunge[d] towards [Morris] and put their hands on his shoulders, twisted him around and ran him
into the bushes . . . throwing him to the ground."). Again, no rowing arm takedown. Additionally,
the decedent pled guilty to “public intoxication”, a crime for which no element of physical force
or violence is factually present in the opinion. See Morris, 672 F.3d at 1190 (“Plaintiff appeared
in court for him and paid the fine, although she could not remember whether she entered a guilty
plea. The court records reflect a guilty plea being entered on Morris's behalf.”)
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In Shannon v. Koehler, 616 F.3d 855 (8th Cir. 2010) (ECF 161 at 5), the defendant used
a “leg sweep” as the take-down maneuver, again making the matter factually distinguishable from
this incident. Shannon, 616 F.3d at 859 (“With respect to the initial confrontation, which
culminated in Officer Koehler using a so-called ‘leg sweep’ to take Shannon to the ground, the
court identified genuine issues of fact ‘concerning whether Shannon made contact with Koehler
prior to the takedown, whether the takedown was appropriate and administered in accordance with
police procedures, and the extent of Shannon's injuries resulting from the takedown.’”) In
rendering its opinion, Shannon recognized established law addressing the defendant’s use of force
in effectuating an arrest “is least justified against nonviolent misdemeanants who do not flee or
actively resist arrest and pose little or no threat to the security of the officers or the public.”
Shannon, 616 F.3d at 859 (emphasis added) (quoting Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d
491 (8th Cir. 2009)). Here, again, Plaintiff was convicted of a crime involving the use of physical
force and violence against Officer Klamser. But no such elements exist for the crime which
Shannon was ultimately convicted of. Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit states in a footnote,
Shannon was convicted of a misdemeanor offense entitled “interfering with official acts.”
Shannon, 616 F.3d at 863, n. 4, referring to Iowa Code, § 719.1. The pertinent section of the Iowa
Code, however, does not contain the elements of violence and physical injury, except if there was
a conviction for a “serious misdemeanor” or an “aggravated misdemeanor” (Iowa Code, §
791.1(c)-(e) (referring to bodily or serious injury)). The Eighth Circuit in Shannon noted Plaintiff
was convicted for a “misdemeanor” not a “serious” or “aggravated” misdemeanor. The
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implication is no determination was made as to whether Shannon used violence or physically
injured the defendant officer, thereby making the matter inapplicable to this lawsuit 1.
In Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463 (9th Cir. 2007) (ECF 161 at 5), the issues
surrounding the preclusive effect of a conviction do not exist as the charges were dismissed without
any substantive determination respecting the plaintiff’s guilt. Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 467
(“After Blankenhorn had spent three months in jail, all charges were dropped and he was
released.”) In addition, Blakenhorn is not “clearly established law” as it is factually distinct. In
particular, the arresting officers punched plaintiff in the head three-times, punched him two-times
in his side, including blows while plaintiff was on the ground. Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 469-70
(“Blankenhorn claims that, during the struggle, Nguyen punched him several times, and another
officer or officers placed a knee behind his neck and pressed his face to the ground. The video
clearly shows Nguyen punch Blankenhorn in the head and twice more in the side. Nguyen landed
at least one punch to Blankenhorn's body after Blankenhorn was already on the ground.”)
In Smith v. City of Troy, Ohio, 874 F.3d 938 (6th Cir. 2017) (ECF 161 at 5), the defendant
officer utilized a leg sweep to take Plaintiff to the ground, deployed a taser eight times, and
ultimately did not charge Plaintiff with a crime. Smith, 874 F.3d at 942. None of these actions
are present in this matter, and none of the cited matters involve a rowing arm takedown on a
belligerent, uncooperative, and intoxicated arrestee who interfered with an officer’s interview of a
suspect, refused his lawful directions to stay away, struck him multiple times, subjected him to
1 Shannon also noted the lower court could not give preclusive effect to plaintiff’s claims
based on his conviction, as the argument was not made by the defendant. Shannon, 616 F.3d at
863, n. 4.) Here, Officer Klamser has clearly argued Plaintiff’s claim is precluded pursuant to
Heck.
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physical force or violence and put him at substantial risk of bodily injury. Furthermore, none of
the cited matters address the notion where an Officer attempts to make an arrest, while first using
lawful lesser force, (See ECF 84 at 14-15), and therefore, none of these matters are clearly
established law rendering Officer Klamser’s actions unconstitutional.
For the law to be “clearly established,” generally there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth
Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts must
have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains. Medina v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 960 F.2d
1493, 1498 (10th Cir. 1992). “Because the focus is on whether the officer had fair notice that her
conduct was unlawful, reasonableness is judged against the backdrop of the law at the time of the
conduct.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U. S. 194, 198, (2004) (per curiam). Although the Supreme
Court does not require a case directly on point, existing precedent must have placed the
constitutional question beyond debate. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). “In other
words, immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”
White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The Supreme Court has repeatedly told courts not to define clearly established law at a
high level of generality. Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (per curiam) (citations
omitted). “The dispositive question is whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly
established,” in light of the specific context of the case, and not as a broad general proposition.
Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam) (citations and internal quotations
omitted) (emphasis in original). “Such specificity is especially important in the Fourth Amendment
context, where the Court has recognized that it is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine
how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual situation the officer
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confronts.” Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308. (citations and internal quotations omitted). “Use of
excessive force is an area of the law ‘in which the result depends very much on the facts of each
case,’ and thus police officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless existing precedent
‘squarely governs’ the specific facts at issue.” Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1153, (quoting Mullenix, 136
S. Ct. at 309). “Precedent involving similar facts can help move a case beyond the otherwise ‘hazy
border between excessive and acceptable force’ and thereby provide an officer notice that a
specific use of force is unlawful.” Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1153, (quoting Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 312).
Given the Supreme Court’s ruling in Heck, coupled with Plaintiff’s convictions and failure
of her self-defense argument at her criminal trial, all of the aforementioned matters relied on by
Plaintiff fail to support the notion of “clearly established law” sufficient to put Officer Klamser on
notice and deprive him of qualified immunity. All of these points are arguable on their merits,
given Heck and Plaintiff’s criminal convictions and are therefore not frivolous. Neitzke, 490 U.S.
at 325 (1989). Furthermore, these points may very well provide the basis for a reversal. See
Sanchez, 13-cv-1945-WJM-CBS, ECF 104 at 3, referring to Hernandez, 459 F.App’x at 700 (10th
Cir. 2012); Eaton, 379 F.3d at 956 (10th Cir. 2004), and; Butler, 992 F.2d at 1056 (10th Cir.
1993). And ultimately, the issue of frivolous is not determined based on whether this Court rejects
Officer Klamser’s arguments or analysis, or even if this Court believes the Tenth Circuit is likely
to reject them. Instead, this Court must determine there is not even any potentially arguably
legitimacy to Officer Klamser’s position. Applicable law does not support any such conclusion
here.
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C. Plaintiff’s Policy Arguments Are Misplaced
Plaintiff provides “public policy” arguments, as a basis to convince the Court her Motion
should be granted. Such an approach, however, assumes Officer Klamser’s appeal is frivolous. If
the Plaintiff fails to overcome her significant burden, the Motion should be denied on that basis
alone. Plaintiff’s approach is therefore improper.
One of the reasons posited by Plaintiff, is the notion an “interlocutory appeal can make it
more difficult for trial judges to do their basic job…” (ECF 161 at 6) (quoting Johnson v. Jones,
515 U.S. 304, 309 (1995)). While this may or may not be true, Plaintiff ignores providing for an
interlocutory appeal on the very issues presented here. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530.
Plaintiff also relies on the generalized notion that pursuit of an appeal may increase costs
and be inconvenient to the Court (ECF 161 at 6). But again, Plaintiff’s argument ignores that such
an outcome will still result in an increase in costs, should trial proceed and the Tenth Circuit
reverses this Court’s decision.
Officer Klamser’s approach is far from the type of “litigation strategy” which is meant to
do nothing more than delay the process of this matter (ECF 161 at 7). As argued above, all of the
matters relied on by Plaintiff are dissimilar, inapplicable, and fail to account for Heck, and the
Plaintiff’s convictions which determined a series of central issues related to the Plaintiff’s claims
as a matter of law foreclosing Plaintiff from relitigating them in this case. These factors in Officer
Klamser’s view have a dispositive impact on the qualified immunity analysis which is a matter for
consideration by the Tenth Circuit on appeal, not this Court in the context of the Plaintiff’s Motion.
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III. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, for all of the foregoing reasons, Defendant Randall Klamser respectfully
requests this Court deny Plaintiff’s Motion, and enter all such additional relief as this Court deems
proper.
Dated: August 19, 2021
Respectfully submitted,
s/ Mark S. Ratner
Mark S. Ratner, Esq.
Gina M. Rossi, Esq.
Hall & Evans, L.L.C.
1001 17th Street, Suite 300, Denver, CO 80202
303-628-3300 /Fax: 303-628-3368
ratnerm@hallevans.com
rossig@hallevans.com
Attorneys for Defendants
s/ John R. Duval
John R. Duval, Esq.
Deputy City Attorney
City of Fort Collins
P.O. Box 580
Fort Collins, CO 80522
(970) 221-6520
jduval@fcgov.com
Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE (CM/ECF)
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 19th of August, 2021, I electronically filed the foregoing
with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to
the following e-mail addresses:
David Lane, Esq.
Andrew McNulty, Esq.
Killmer, Lane & Newman, LLP
1543 Champa St, Suite 400
Denver, CO 80202
303-571-1000 Phone
303-571-1001 Fax
dlane@kln-law.com
amcnulty@kln-law.com
hoh@kln-law.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Sarah M. Stefanick, Legal Assistant to
Mark S. Ratner
Gina M. Rossi
Hall & Evans, L.L.C.
1001 Seventeenth St., Suite 300
Denver, CO 80202
Phone: 303-628-3300
Fax: 303-628-3368
ratnerm@hallevans.com
rossig@hallevans.com
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
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