HomeMy WebLinkAbout2021-1284 - Surat v. Klamser, et al - 010 - Response to Motion to Dismiss AppealUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
MICHAELA LYNN SURAT,
Plaintiff-Appellee/Appellee,
v.
RANDALL KLAMSER, in his
individual capacity,
Defendant-Appellant/Appellant,
and
CITY OF FORT COLLINS,
COLORADO, a municipality,
Defendant
Case No. 21-1284
On appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado
District Court No. 19-CV-00901
The Honorable William J. Martinez, United States District Judge
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT RANDALL KLAMSER’S RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE’S MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL
Defendant-Appellant RANDALL KLAMSER, in his individual capacity, by
and through his attorneys, Andrew D. Ringel, Esq. and Mark S. Ratner, Esq. of Hall
& Evans, L.L.C., and John R. Duval, Esq. of the Fort Collins City Attorney’s Office,
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hereby submit this Response in Opposition to Plaintiff-Appellee’s Motion To
Dismiss Appeal as follows:
INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff-Appellee Michaela Lynn Surat (“Plaintiff” or “Ms. Surat”) filed this
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Defendant-Appellant Randall Klamser
violated her constitutional rights. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Officer Klamser
violated her Fourth Amendment rights for using a rowing arm take-down maneuver
during her arrest on April 6, 2017. Ms. Surat was found guilty after a criminal jury
trial of violating C.R.S. § 18-8-103 (1) (using or threatening to use physical force or
violence against a peace officer or using any other means which creates a substantial
risk of causing bodily injury to the peace officer or another) and C.R.S. § 18-8-
104(1)(a) (using or threatening to use violence, force, physical interference or an
obstacle to knowingly obstruct, impair, or hinder the enforcement of the penal law
or the preservation of the peace by a peace officer acting under color of his or her
official authority). In addition, the criminal jury rejected Ms. Surat’s assertion of
self-defense which in this context was premised on Ms. Surat’s allegation Officer
Klamser used excessive force. See C.R.S. § 18-8-103(2).
On June 7, 2019, Officer Klamser filed a Motion to Dismiss [the “2019
Motion to Dismiss”] arguing Plaintiff-Appellee’s excessive force claim was barred
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by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), [ECF 23]1, based on Plaintiff’s
convictions for resisting arrest and obstruction. Officer Klamser’s entitlement to
qualified immunity was not argued in the 2019 Motion to Dismiss.
On February 24, 2020, following briefing on the 2019 Motion to Dismiss
[ECF 28 & 34], the District Court issued its Order granting in part and denying in
part the Motion. As is pertinent to the request for qualified immunity and this appeal,
the District Court held Plaintiff-Appellee’s claim of excessive force arising prior to
Officer Klamser’s takedown of Ms. Surat was barred by Heck, and as a result the
remaining claim was limited to the question of whether Officer Klamser used greater
force than reasonably necessary to overcome Plaintiff’s resistance during the
takedown [ECF 84, at 10-13 (“In this light, the Court deems Surat to confess
Defendant’s Heck argument as to everything before the takedown, and Defendants’
motion will be granted with prejudice as to any claim of excessive force based on
Klamser’s alleged pre-takedown actions”)]. In so holding, the District Court
cautioned Plaintiff she faced a “formidable burden” under Heck, which burden
would be even more formidable if Officer Klamser subsequently raised the defense
of qualified immunity. [ECF 84, at 15 (“Finally, if Klamser ever asserts qualified
1 References to the record before the District Court are made to the Electronic
Case File (“ECF”) document number in the District Court.
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immunity (he has not done so in the Motion to Dismiss), then Surat’s burden is even
more formidable. She must prove that it was clearly established as of April 6, 2017,
that a police officer attempting to effect a arrest and being subjected to or threatened
with physical force or violence, or facing a substantial risk of bodily injury, and who
has already tried lesser force to subdue the arrestee, cannot use the takedown
maneuver used in this case to eliminate that actual or threatened risk of injury.”).
Plaintiff subsequently filed a First Amended Complaint on August 24, 2020,
and on September 14, 2020, Officer Klamser [and Defendant, the City of Fort
Collins] filed a Motion to Dismiss [“2020 Motion to Dismiss”]. Discovery
concluded, and pursuant to the Scheduling Order, Officer Klamser filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment seeking qualified immunity, while the Motion to Dismiss
was still pending. Among the issues presented, Officer Klamser argued there was
no clearly established law making his actions unconstitutional, given the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Heck, and Plaintiff’s convictions for resisting arrest and
obstruction, both of which contained elements of violence and physical force aimed
at Officer Klamser as the arresting officer. Officer Klamser framed his qualified
immunity argument in the terms outlined by the District Court and quoted above.
On April 12, 2021, the District Court denied the 2020 Motion to Dismiss
without prejudice, as moot. The denial was based on the determination the Motion
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for Summary Judgment raised the same arguments as the 2020 Motion to Dismiss,
and therefore superseded the Motion [ECF 150].
On July 13, 2021, the District Court denied Officer Klamser’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, including his request for qualified immunity, without
addressing Appellant’s argument pursuant to Heck, or Appellee’s convictions [ECF
154].
ARGUMENT
I. Officer Klamser’s Entitlement to Qualified Immunity from
Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim is Immediately Appealable
Pursuant to the Collateral Order Doctrine
Initially, Plaintiff relies on the notion the District Court certified this appeal
as frivolous. It is well-established, however, a decision by a District Court to certify
an interlocutory appeal as frivolous does not impact an appellate court’s ability to
continue to consider the appeal. “Once a district court so certifies that the
Defendant’s appeal is frivolous and thus regains jurisdiction, that does not affect our
jurisdiction. ‘Rather, both the district court and court of appeals shall have
jurisdiction to proceed.’” Langley v. Adams Cty, 987 F.2d 1473, 1477 (10th Cir.
1993) [quoting United States v. Himes, 689 F.2d 934, 937 (10th Cir. 1982)]. “A
district court’s denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on
an issue of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’…notwithstanding the absence of a
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final judgment.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). “The filing of a
notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance-it confers jurisdiction on
the court of appeals and divests the district court of its control over those aspects of
the case involved in the appeal.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459
U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (referring to United States v. Hitchman, 587 F.2d 1357 (5th Cir.
1979)). Thus, the District Court’s determination is neither binding nor determinative
on the issue of this Court’s appellate jurisdiction. This Court, not the District Court,
decides its own appellate jurisdiction. Amazon, Inc. v. Dirt Camp, Inc., 273 F.3d
1271, 1274 (10th Cir. 2001); Garrett v. Stratman, 254 F.3d 946, 951 (10th Cir. 2001).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal of the District Court’s denial of
Officer Klamser’s Motion for Summary Judgment raising the issue of qualified
immunity because the appeal raises the legal issues of whether the undisputed facts
and the facts taken in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, are sufficient to state
a cognizable claim for a violation of her constitutional rights, and whether a clearly
established violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights occurred. Johnson v. Jones,
515 U.S. 304, 309-11 (1995); Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 300-305 (1996);
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 197 (2001).2
2 Plaintiff’s Motion fundamentally misframes the issue before this Court. The
issue is not whether the appeal is frivolous. [See Motion, at 5]. Rather, the issue is
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Merely disagreeing with Officer Klamser’s position is insufficient to render
this appeal frivolous and therefore subject to dismissal. “(A)n appeal on a matter of
law is frivolous where ‘[none] of the legal points [are] arguable on their merits.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (brackets in original), [quoting
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967)]. Here, Officer Klamser argued
before the District Court he was entitled to summary judgment on the basis of
qualified immunity given Plaintiff’s conviction for resisting arrest and obstruction
pursuant to C.R.S. §§ 18-8-103(1) and 18-8-104(1)(a), respectively, the Supreme
Court’s rulings in Heck, and the notion there was no clearly established law within
these parameters putting him on notice his actions were unconstitutional.
In particular, as recognized by the District Court in ruling on the 2019 Motion
to Dismiss, “Heck nonetheless imposes a formidable burden on Surat, even before
taking the jury’s rejection of her self-defense argument into account” [ECF 84 at
14], as the statutes under which Surat was convicted, contain elements of physical
force, violence, and a substantial risk of causing injury to the peace officer. [See
C.R.S. § 18-8-103(1), and §18-8-104(1)(a) and; [ECF 84 at 14-15]]. As recognized
by the District Court, it was imperative Ms. Surat establish Officer Klamser’s
whether this Court possesses appellate jurisdiction. This Response focuses on the
actual issue before this Court.
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takedown was objectively unreasonable, while taking as given he was “attempting
to effect an arrest and, in the process, the arrestee’s actions were subjecting him to,
or threatening him with, physical force or violence, or putting him at substantial risk
of bodily injury.” [ECF 84 at 14-15] [comparing Martinez v. City of Albuquerque,
184 F.3d 1123, 1127 (10th Cir. 1999) (“the [district] court [on remand] must instruct
the jury that Martinez’ state arrest was lawful per se”)]. The District Court also
concluded that, “(m)oreover, if one accounts for the failure of the self-defense
argument, Surat must prove that Klamser’s takedown was objectively unreasonable
while taking as given all of the foregoing and the fact that Klamser had first
attempted to subdue Surat through lawful lesser force.” [ECF 84 at 14-15 (emphases
in original)].
Taking the District Court’s previous rulings into account as the law of the
case, Officer Klamser argued no clearly established law existed which, as of April
6, 2017, made it a constitutional violation to use a rowing arm takedown on a
belligerent, uncooperative, and intoxicated arrestee, who attempts to interfere with
another officer’s interview of a suspect and refused Officer Klamser’s directions to
stay away, struck him multiple times, subjected him to physical force or violence,
and put him at substantial risk of bodily injury. [See ECF 84, at 15 (“Finally, if
Klamser ever asserts qualified immunity … then Surat’s burden is even more
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formidable. She must prove that it was clearly established as of April 6, 2017, that a
police officer attempting to effect an arrest and being subjected to or threatened with
physical force or violence, or facing a substantial risk of bodily injury, and who has
already tried lawful lesser force to subdue the arrestee, cannot use a takedown
maneuver used in this case to eliminate that actual or threatened force or risk of
injury.”)].
In her Motion to Dismiss this appeal, Plaintiff Appellee argues any appeal by
Officer Klamser “is inherently premised on disputed issues of fact given the clearly
established law that exists governing the claim at issue” [Plaintiff-Appellee’s
Motion, at 7]. Plaintiff’s conclusory statement is without basis and simply incorrect,
as Officer Klamser’s appeal rests on the notion there is no clearly established law,
given the legal parameters present in this matter as already determined by the
District Court based on the application of Heck as articulated in the District
Court’s Order granting in part the 2019 Motion to Dismiss.
Under applicable precedent, this Court possesses appellate jurisdiction to
review the District Court’s qualified immunity determination. Specifically, Officer
Klamser is arguing on appeal the following legal, not factual propositions. First,
Heck as determined by the District Court in its Order on the 2019 Motion to Dismiss
changes as a matter of law what Plaintiff’s evidence and arguments must be for her
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42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. Second, the remaining facts after the impact of Heck is
taken into consideration taken in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff do not
equate to a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. Third, after taking Heck into
account, the factual circumstances taken in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff
do not demonstrate the constitutional right at issue was clearly established for
qualified immunity when considered at the appropriate level of specificity required
by the Supreme Court of the United States’ qualified immunity precedent.
Plaintiff’s argument and the District Court’s conclusion Officer Klamser’s
appeal is of the District Court’s “evidence sufficiency” determination are
fundamentally incorrect. Instead, on appeal, Officer Klamser takes the facts in the
light most favorable to the Plaintiff—minus those facts that cannot be part of the
equation due to Heck—and based on those facts argues on appeal there is no
constitutional violation and no violation of clearly established law for qualified
immunity purposes. Both inquires present issues of law for which this Court
possesses appellate jurisdiction. See, e.g., Vette v. Sanders, 989 F.3d 1154, 1168
(10th Cir. 2021) (appellate jurisdiction based on assuming the facts in the light most
favorable to plaintiff); Walton v. Powell, 821 F.3d 1204, 1208-10 (10th Cir. 2016)
(same); Esparza v. Brown, 523 Fed. Appx. 530, 532-3 (10th Cir. 2013) (same);
Estate v. Ceballos v. Husk, 919 F.3d 1204, 1213 (10th Cir. 2019) (appellate
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jurisdiction over clearly established inquiry in excessive force claim on summary
judgment); Henderson v. Glanz, 813 F.3d 938, 947-48 (10th Cir. 2015) (same and
summarizing in detail the basis of this Court’s appellate jurisdiction over summary
judgment qualified immunity interlocutory appeals).
II. Plaintiff’s Argument Relies on Factually Dissimilar Precedent to Argue
the Law was Clearly Established on April 6, 20173
Plaintiff’s erroneous argument is evidenced by her reliance on case law also
cited by the District Court, in which she claims establishes the unconstitutional
nature of Defendant-Appellant’s rowing arm takedown, but which are factually
dissimilar, particularly because the precedent does not account for the impact of
Heck on the remaining facts available for Plaintiff to prove her excessive force claim
against Officer Klamser.
For example, Plaintiff cites to Long v. Fulmer, 545 F. App’x 757 (10th Cir.
2013). [See Motion, at 9]. In Long, the plaintiff’s charge for misdemeanor theft
was subsequently dismissed, Long, 545 F. App’x at 759, and therefore no
3 As a threshold matter, Plaintiff’s Motion does not recognize the important
distinct between this Court’s determination of its appellate jurisdiction and the
merits of Officer Klamser’s qualified immunity arguments. Whether this Court
ultimately agrees with Officer Klamser or the Plaintiff and the District Court as to
whether precedent exists clearly establishing the constitutional right at issue presents
an altogether different inquiry than whether this Court possesses appellate
jurisdiction to do so.
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conviction existed conclusively establishing the Plaintiff used violence or the threat
of bodily injury against the officer, unlike here.
Plaintiff’s citation to Roe v. City of Cushing, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 31404
(10th Cir. 1993). [See Motion, at 9], fares no better. As with Long, Roe does not
address a rowing arm takedown and instead notes the Defendant “grabbed Roe's
right arm, and put him on the hood of the police car. He handcuffed Mr. Roe's right
hand, then grabbed his shoulder and took him to the ground. When they landed,
Officer Brannon had one knee in the lower part of Mr. Roe's back and one knee in
his upper back or neck, causing Roe's head to strike the concrete and cutting his
eye.” Roe, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 31404 at *5 [citations to the record omitted]. In
denying qualified immunity, Roe focused on the officer’s use of his knees as the
proximate cause of the Plaintiff striking the ground. “Given Roe's version of the
facts, we are unable to say that the officer's actions of throwing him down and
landing on him with both knees, causing his head to strike the concrete, was
objectively reasonable.” Roe, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 31404 at *8 (emphasis added).
Morris v. Noe, 672 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2012) [see Motion, at 6], is also
inapplicable, as the decedent was essentially tackled by the officer. Morris, 672
F.3d at 1190 [“(T)he police officers lunge[d] towards [Morris] and put their hands
on his shoulders, twisted him around and ran him into the bushes . . . throwing him
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to the ground.”]. Again, no rowing arm takedown. Additionally, the decedent pled
guilty to “public intoxication,” a crime for which no element of physical force or
violence is factually present in the opinion. See Morris, 672 F.3d at 1190 [“Plaintiff-
Appellee appeared in court for him and paid the fine, although she could not
remember whether she entered a guilty plea. The court records reflect a guilty plea
being entered on Morris's behalf.”]
In Shannon v. Koehler, 616 F.3d 855 (8th Cir. 2010) [see Motion, at 9] the
officer used a “leg sweep” as the take-down maneuver, again making the matter
factually distinguishable from this incident. Shannon, 616 F.3d at 859 [“With
respect to the initial confrontation, which culminated in Officer Koehler using a so-
called ‘leg sweep’ to take Shannon to the ground, the court identified genuine issues
of fact ‘concerning whether Shannon made contact with Koehler prior to the
takedown, whether the takedown was appropriate and administered in accordance
with police procedures, and the extent of Shannon's injuries resulting from the
takedown.’”] Shannon recognized established law addressing the officer’s use of
force in effectuating an arrest “is least justified against nonviolent misdemeanants
who do not flee or actively resist arrest and pose little or no threat to the security of
the officers or the public.” Shannon, 616 F.3d at 859 (emphasis added) [quoting
Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491 (8th Cir. 2009)]. Here, again, Plaintiff
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was convicted of crimes involving the use of physical force and violence against
Officer Klamser. But no such elements exist for the crime for which Shannon was
ultimately convicted. Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit states in a footnote, Shannon
was convicted of a misdemeanor offense entitled “interfering with official acts.”
Shannon, 616 F.3d at 863, n. 4, referring to Iowa Code, § 719.1. The pertinent
section of the Iowa Code, however, does not contain the elements of violence and
physical injury, except if there was a conviction for a “serious misdemeanor” or an
“aggravated misdemeanor” [Iowa Code, § 791.1(c)-(e) (referring to bodily or serious
injury)]. The Eighth Circuit in Shannon noted the plaintiff there was convicted for
a “misdemeanor” not a “serious” or “aggravated” misdemeanor so no determination
was made in the criminal proceedings whether Shannon used violence or physically
injured the officer, thereby making the matter inapplicable to this lawsuit.4
In Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463 (9th Cir. 2007) [see Motion,
at 9], the issues surrounding the preclusive effect of a conviction do not exist, as the
charges were dismissed without any substantive determination respecting the
Plaintiff’s guilt. Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 467 [“After Blankenhorn had spent three
4 Shannon also noted the lower court could not give preclusive effect to the
plaintiff’s claims based on his conviction, as the argument was not made by the
defendant officer before the Eighth Circuit. Shannon, 616 F.3d at 863, n. 4. Here,
Officer Klamser is clearly arguing (and did argue in the Motion for Summary
Judgment) that Plaintiff’s claim is precluded based on the impact of Heck.
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months in jail, all charges were dropped and he was released.”] In addition,
Blakenhorn is not “clearly established law” as it is factually distinct. In particular,
the arresting officers punched the plaintiff in the head three-times, punched him two-
times in his side, including blows while he was on the ground. Blankenhorn, 485
F.3d at 469-70 [“Blankenhorn claims that, during the struggle, Nguyen punched him
several times, and another officer or officers placed a knee behind his neck and
pressed his face to the ground. The video clearly shows Nguyen punch Blankenhorn
in the head and twice more in the side. Nguyen landed at least one punch to
Blankenhorn's body after Blankenhorn was already on the ground.”]
In Smith v. City of Troy, Ohio, 874 F.3d 938 (6th Cir. 2017) [see Motion, at
9], the officer utilized a leg sweep to take the plaintiff to the ground, deployed a taser
eight times, and ultimately did not charge the plaintiff with a crime. Smith, 874 F.3d
at 942. None of these actions are present in this matter, and none of the cited matters
involve a rowing arm takedown on a belligerent, uncooperative, and intoxicated
arrestee who was attempting to interfere with an officer’s interview of a suspect and
refused another officer’s lawful directions to stay away, struck him multiple times,
subjected him to physical force or violence and put him at substantial risk of bodily
injury. Furthermore, none of the cited matters address the notion where an officer
attempts to make an arrest, while first using lawful lesser force, [See ECF 84 at 14-
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15], and therefore, none of these matters are clearly established law rendering
Officer Klamser’s actions unconstitutional.
For the law to be “clearly established,” generally there must be a Supreme
Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of
authority from other courts must have found the law to be as the Plaintiff maintains.
Medina v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir. 1992). “Because
the focus is on whether the officer had fair notice that her conduct was unlawful,
reasonableness is judged against the backdrop of the law at the time of the conduct.”
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U. S. 194, 198, (2004) (per curiam). Although the
Supreme Court does not require a case directly on point, existing precedent must
have placed the constitutional question beyond debate. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.
731, 741 (2011). “In other words, immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent
or those who knowingly violate the law.” White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017)
[citation and internal quotation marks omitted].
The Supreme Court has repeatedly told courts not to define clearly established
law at a high level of generality. Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018)
(per curiam) (citations omitted). “The dispositive question is whether the violative
nature of particular conduct is clearly established,” in light of the specific context
of the case, and not as a broad general proposition. Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct.
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305, 308 (2015) (per curiam) (citations and internal quotations omitted) (emphasis
in original). “Such specificity is especially important in the Fourth Amendment
context, where the Court has recognized that it is sometimes difficult for an officer
to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the
factual situation the officer confronts.” Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308. (citations and
internal quotations omitted). “Use of excessive force is an area of the law ‘in which
the result depends very much on the facts of each case,’ and thus police officers are
entitled to qualified immunity unless existing precedent ‘squarely governs’ the
specific facts at issue.” Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1153, (quoting Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at
309). “Precedent involving similar facts can help move a case beyond the otherwise
‘hazy border between excessive and acceptable force’ and thereby provide an officer
notice that a specific use of force is unlawful.” Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1153, (quoting
Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 312).
Given the impact of Heck due to Plaintiff’s criminal convictions and failure
of her self-defense argument at her criminal trial, all of the aforementioned precedent
relied on by Plaintiff and the District Court fail to support the notion of “clearly
established law” sufficient to put Officer Klamser on notice and deprive him of
qualified immunity. All of these points are arguable on their merits, given Heck and
Plaintiff’s criminal convictions. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325 (1989).
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Ultimately, once Officer Klamser’s argument is properly framed and
understood, this Court does possess appellate jurisdiction over his qualified
immunity interlocutory appeal. Neither the District Court nor Plaintiff engage with
Officer Klamser’s actual intended appellate arguments. When this Court does so, it
is clear Officer Klamser’s appeal lies within this Court’s appellate jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, for all of the foregoing reasons, Defendant-Appellant Randall
Klamser respectfully requests this Court deny Plaintiff-Appellee’s Motion.
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Dated: October 11, 2021.
Respectfully submitted,
s/ Andrew D. Ringel
Andrew D. Ringel, Esq.
Mark S. Ratner, Esq.
Hall & Evans, L.L.C.
1001 17th Street, Suite 300, Denver, CO 80202
303-628-3300 /Fax: 303-628-3368
ringela@hallevans.com
ratnerm@hallevans.com
s/ John R. Duval
John R. Duval, Esq.
Deputy City Attorney
City of Fort Collins
P.O. Box 580
Fort Collins, CO 80522
(970) 221-6520
jduval@fcgov.com
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant Randall
Klamser
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE (CM/ECF)
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 11th day of October 2021, I electronically
filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will
send notification of such filing to the following e-mail addresses:
David A. Lane, Esq.
dlane@kln-law.com
Andrew McNulty, Esq.
amcnulty@kln-law.com
s/ Nicole Marion .
Nicole Marion
Hall & Evans, L.L.C.
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