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HomeMy WebLinkAbout2021-cv-2306-RM-KLM - Perry v. State of Colorado, et al - 027.1 - CSU, Colorado, Vascon Motion to Dismiss{00111594 / ver 1 } IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO Civil Action No. 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM ROBERT-LAWRENCE: PERRY, Plaintiff, v. THE STATE OF COLORADO; et al., Defendants. THE STATE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS The State of Colorado, Board of Governors of the Colorado State University System, acting by and through Colorado State University, and Steven Vasconcellos (the “State Defendants”) hereby move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims and state as follows: RULE 7.1 CONFERRAL Pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(b)(2) no conferral is required because this motion is brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12. THE ALLEGATIONS On July 20, 2018 Colorado State University Police Officer Phil Morris issued Plaintiff a citation for trespassing and an order excluding Plaintiff from the campus. See Am. Pet., Doc. 24, ¶¶ 66 and 141. The citation for trespassing was not Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 27 Filed 10/01/21 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 16 {00111594 / ver 1 } 2 prosecuted. Id. at ¶ 139. Plaintiff proceeded through an administrative review process to appeal the exclusionary order, without success. Id. at ¶¶ 67-71, 143. On May 17, 2019, Plaintiff returned to campus despite the prior exclusionary order and Colorado State University Police Officer Derek Smith cited Plaintiff for trespassing. Id. at ¶ 73. Based on the May 17 citation, Plaintiff was convicted of trespass under Colorado Revised Statute § 18-4-504 on December 19, 2019, in the County Court for Larimer County, case 19M1142. Plaintiff appealed and his conviction was upheld. See Perry v. People, 2020CV122, p. 1 (Colo. Dis. Ct., Larimer Cnty., April 22, 2021), attached as Exhibit A. On July 12, 2019, Colorado State University Police Officer Derek Smith issued another citation for trespass to Plaintiff. Doc. 24, ¶ 144.1 Based on the July 12 citation, Plaintiff was convicted of trespass under Fort Collins Municipal Code § 17-40(a) on November 8, 2019, in the Municipal Court for the City of Fort Collins, case 2019-4695-MD. Plaintiff appealed, and the second conviction was also upheld. See Perry v. City of Fort Collins, 2019CV205 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Larimer Cnty., March 31, 2020), attached as Exhibit B. Plaintiff appealed both of his convictions to the Colorado District Court in Larimer County, cases 2019CV205 and 2020CV122. In both appeals, Plaintiff asserted the same arguments as in this case – with regard to the State Defendants 1 Plaintiff also alleges that Officer Smith “accessed the CCIS database and unilaterally entered an illegal report of permanent civil retraining order." It is unclear what Plaintiff is referring to. Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 27 Filed 10/01/21 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 16 {00111594 / ver 1 } 3 that the University exclusionary orders, accompanying process, and § 18-4-504(1) are all unconstitutional. See Doc. 24, ¶ 154. As noted by the State District Court, Plaintiff’s arguments are “couched in constitutionalist and sovereign citizen language.” Ex. A, p. 4. Sovereign citizens “believe that they are not subject to government authority and employ various tactics in an attempt to … derail criminal proceedings.” Gravatt v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 279, 282 (2011) (footnote and citations omitted). Their most common tactic is known as “paper terrorism,” which “involves the use of bogus legal documents and filings, or the misuse of legitimate ones, to intimidate, harass, threaten or retaliate against public officials, law enforcement officers, or private citizens.” Anti-Defamation League Special Rep., The Lawless Ones the Resurgence of the Sovereign Citizen Movement, p. 16 (2d ed. 2012) (last visited Sept. 28, 2021).2 By engaging in this tactic, a “simple traffic violation or pet-licensing case can end up provoking dozens of court filings containing hundreds of pages of pseudo-legal nonsense.” S. Poverty Law Ctr., Sovereign Citizens Movement, (last visited Sept. 17, 2021).3 As example, the record from Plaintiff’s proceedings before the Fort Collins Municipal Court is approximately 350 pages in length. 2 Available at: https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/assets/pdf/combating-hate/Lawless-Ones-2012-Edition-WEB-final.pdf 3 Available at: https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/sovereign-citizens-movement Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 27 Filed 10/01/21 USDC Colorado Page 3 of 16 {00111594 / ver 1 } 4 The State District Court characterized Mr. Perry’s fillings as “generally nonsensical and meaningless.” Ex. A, p. 4. n.1. And went on to state that the “Court of Appeals in Colorado has held that arguments generally made by individuals with similar mindsets as [Plaintiff] are ‘patently frivolous and without merit.’” Id. p. 4 (quoting People v. Drew, 250 P.3d 761 (Colo. App. 2010)). Even more bluntly, Plaintiff is “arguing constitutionalist/sovereign citizen nonsense.” Id. p. 5. Based on the same arguments presented below, Plaintiff now asks this Court to declare that Colorado Revised Statute § 18-4-504, Fort Collins Municipal Code § 17-40(a), and the University’s exclusionary orders all violate the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Similarly, Plaintiff asks the Court to declare that— because the exclusionary orders and cited laws are unlawful—his convictions in cases 19M1142 and 2019-4695-MD violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Based on the requested declaratory relief, Plaintiff requests an injunction prohibiting the enforcement of the exclusionary orders and cited laws. Finally, Plaintiff requests “just compensation” for his injuries. THIS COURT LACKS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION Under Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal is appropriate where the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff has the burden of establishing jurisdiction. Port City Props. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 518 F.3d 1186, 1189 (10th Cir. 2008). I. Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine. Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 27 Filed 10/01/21 USDC Colorado Page 4 of 16 {00111594 / ver 1 } 5 The United States District Courts have no authority to review final judgments of a State court in judicial proceedings. Dist. Of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). Review of State court judgments and decrees may be had only in the United States Supreme Court. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1257. This is true even where there are allegations that the State court’s action was unconstitutional, such as a deprivation of equal protection rights. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 485-86 (citation omitted). Where a constitutional issue could have been reviewed on direct appeal by the State appellate courts, a litigant may not seek to reverse or modify the State court judgment by bringing a constitutional challenge. Anderson v. Colorado, 793 F.2d 262 (10th Cir. 1986). Plaintiff asks this Court to overturn his criminal convictions for trespass based on the supposed illegality of the University’s exclusionary orders and the underlying trespass laws—issues previously decided by the State courts. Only the United States Supreme Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). II. The State Defendants have Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Eleventh Amendment bars suits in federal court for damages and injunctive relief against states, state agencies, and state officials in their official capacities, unless the state unequivocally waives its immunity or Congress expressly abrogates the state’s immunity in creating a statutory cause of action. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 97-102 (1984). A state’s Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 27 Filed 10/01/21 USDC Colorado Page 5 of 16 {00111594 / ver 1 } 6 waiver must be express and unequivocal. V-1 Oil Co. v. Utah State Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 131 F.3d 1415, 1421 (10th Cir. 2002). It is well established that the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (the “CGIA”) does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity for claims under § 1983. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-101 et. seq.; Greiss v. Colo., 841 F.2d 1042, 1044-45 (10th Cir. 1988). Here, Plaintiff sued the State of Colorado, the Board of Governors of the Colorado State University System and Steven Vasconcellos, a judicial administrator, in his official capacity. See Doc # 24. The Eleventh Amendment expressly bars Plaintiff’s claim against the State of Colorado. U.S. Const. amend. XI. It also bars his claims against the University and its Board. The University is a “state institution of higher education . . . subject to the control of the state.” See Colo. Const. art. VIII, § 5. Its Board members are either appointed by the Governor or elected or appointed by their respective campus governing bodies.. Colo. Rev. Stat. §23-30-101. The Board of Governors is an “arm-of-the-state” and, thus, immune. U.S. ex rel Ruotsinoja v. Bd. Of Governors of the Colo. State Univ. Sys., 43 F.Supp.3d 1190, 1196 (D. Colo. 2014). Finally, the Eleventh Amendment bars official capacity lawsuits against state employees like Mr. Vasconcellos. See Hill v. Kemp, 478 F.3d 1236, 1255-56 (10th Cir. 2007); U.S. Const. amend. XI. Plaintiff may argue that his claims survive based upon Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-156 (1908). However, the Ex Parte Young doctrine applies only when a lawsuit involves action against state officials, not against the state. Romero v. City & Cnty of Denver Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 57 F.App’x 835, 838 (10th Cir. 2003) Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 27 Filed 10/01/21 USDC Colorado Page 6 of 16 {00111594 / ver 1 } 7 (unpub’d); Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 155-156. To the extent Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief as to Mr. Vasconcellos, he seeks a declaration that Mr. Vasconcellos’ actions, which Plaintiff never describes, are void. See Doc # 24. Furthermore, the Ex Parte Young exception does not apply to relief styled as prospective relief, but which actually seeks compensation for a past injury by a state official. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 73 (1985). Because Plaintiff is seeking relief for past injury arising out of his trespass citations and convictions, Plaintiff’s case does not fall within the Ex Parte Young exception. III. Colorado State University is not an entity capable of being sued. Colorado State University is not an entity capable of being sued. Roberts v. Colo. State. Bd. Of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 827 (10th Cir. 1993). The Board of Governors is vested with “the general control and supervision” of the University. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 23-31.5-102. The Board is “a body corporate, capable in law of suing and being sued” and “of contracting and being contracted with.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 23-30- 102(1). Because there are no statutes or constitutional provisions that allow the University to be sued, it must be dismissed from this lawsuit. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 827; see also Colo. Const. art. VIII, §5(1); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 23-30-101 to 136. PLAINTIFF FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM A defendant may move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The complaint cannot survive a motion to dismiss without some factual context sufficient to state a claim to relief that is “plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556-557 Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 27 Filed 10/01/21 USDC Colorado Page 7 of 16 {00111594 / ver 1 } 8 (2007). To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555. To do so, “‘[t]he pleading must contain something more ... than ... a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.’” Id. (quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). A party must plead affirmative factual content, as opposed to a merely conclusory recitation that the elements of a claim have been satisfied, that “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The court is not obliged to take as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Id. at 678. Dismissal is proper “where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct. Id. at 679. Here, Plaintiff’s lawsuit fails to state a claim for several reasons. I. Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are time-barred. Although the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, a district court may grant a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal when it is clear from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff’s claim is time-barred. Sierra Club v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 816 F.3d 666, 671 (10th Cir. 2016); Aldrich v. McCulloch Props., Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1041 n.4 (10th Cir.1980). In Colorado, all actions against any public or governmental entity or any employee of a public or governmental entity must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues, and not thereafter. Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 27 Filed 10/01/21 USDC Colorado Page 8 of 16 {00111594 / ver 1 } 9 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(h). The two-year statute of limitations also applies to Section 1983 claims. Lyons v. Kyner, 367 F. App’x 878, 882 (10th Cir. 2010); Workman v. Jordan, 32 F.3d 475, 482 (10th Cir. 1994). Federal law governs the question of accrual in civil rights actions, and thus, dictates when the statute of limitations begins to run. Smith v. City of Enid, 149 F.3d 1151, 1154 (10th Cir. 1998). “A civil rights action accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” Id. “Discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges. Schuler v. Univ. of Denver, 2014 WL 4948113, *8 (D. Colo. October 1, 2014), quoting Natʹl R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 (2002). In this case, Plaintiff knew or had reason to know about his claimed injuries no later than July 12, 2019, when he received the third citation for trespass. See Doc. 24, ¶ 144. Yet Plaintiff waited more than two years, until August 26, 2021, to file his Complaint. See Doc. 24. Because Plaintiff delayed the filing of his lawsuit for more than two years, he cannot pursue claims arising out of the “exclusionary orders.” Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-80-102(a), (g), and (h). For these reasons, Plaintiff’s declaratory and injunctive relief claims are time-barred. II. The State Defendants are not “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 only applies to the actions of a “person.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The United States Supreme Court has held that neither the State nor its officials acting Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 27 Filed 10/01/21 USDC Colorado Page 9 of 16 {00111594 / ver 1 } 10 in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983. Will v. Mich. Depʹt. of State Police et al., 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973). Here, Plaintiff sues the State of Colorado, the University, its Board, and Mr. Vasconcellos in his official capacity. See Doc. # 24. Consequently, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for declaratory and injunctive relief must be dismissed. III. Plaintiff fails to allege the State Defendants participated in the alleged constitutional deprivations. “Individual liability under § 1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.” Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Depʹt, 717 F.3d 760, 768 (10th Cir. 2013) (citing Foote v. Speigel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1423 (10th Cir. 1997)). More specifically, “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to ... § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. The Iqbal standard has “greater bite” in the “context of a § 1983 claim against individual government actors, because ‘they typically include complex claims against multiple defendants.’” Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). Where several government actors are named as defendants, “it is particularly important … that the complaint make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each individual with fair notice as to the basis of the claims against him or her, as distinguished from collective allegations against the state.’” Robins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 27 Filed 10/01/21 USDC Colorado Page 10 of 16 {00111594 / ver 1 } 11 1250 (10th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original). “[I]t is incumbent upon a plaintiff to identify specific actions taken by particular defendants ….” Pahls v. Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210, 1225-26 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted, emphasis in original). Here, Plaintiff has not identified any allegation—whatsoever—regarding what Steven Vasconcellos did or failed to do. See Doc. # 24. Therefore, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim must be dismissed. IV. The Fifth and Eighth Amendments do not apply in this case. “The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies only to action by the federal government while the Due Process Clause of the Fourteen[th] Amendment applies to actions by state governments. Here, [Plaintiff] alleges conduct only done by state authorities, and thus there can be no Fifth Amendment claim.” Koessel v. Sublette Cnty. Sheriff’s Depʹt., 717 F.3d 736, n.2 (10th Cir. 2013). “Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions.... [T]he State does not acquire the power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned until after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.” Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671- 672, n.40 (1977); see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, n.16 (1979). In the instant matter, all of Plaintiff’s allegations concern his treatment leading up to his convictions and the Eighth Amendment does not apply. Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 27 Filed 10/01/21 USDC Colorado Page 11 of 16 {00111594 / ver 1 } 12 V. Plaintiff failed to state a cognizable equal protection claim. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The Equal Protection clause is triggered only when the government treats someone differently than another who is similarly situated. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). Here, Plaintiff does not base his equal protection claim on membership in a protected class. See Doc. # 24. Indeed, Plaintiff did not allege on what grounds an equal protection violation occurred. See id. He did not allege who or what similarly situated group of people received better treatment than him, or that he was intentionally treated differently than another who was similarly situated. See id. For these reasons, Plaintiff’s equal protection claim fails as a matter of law. VI. Plaintiff failed to state a cognizable due process claim. Plaintiff alleges both substantive and procedural due process violations arising from his exclusion from the University campus “solely on the basis of allegedly ‘feeding squirrels.’” Doc. 1, ¶ 74.4 But Plaintiff’s allegations do not state a legally cognizable claim. “[T]o prevail on either a procedural or substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must first establish that a defendant's actions deprived plaintiff of a 4 As the underlying State criminal cases demonstrate, Plaintiff was excluded from campus for harassing and confronting University employees—not because he was feeding squirrels. Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 27 Filed 10/01/21 USDC Colorado Page 12 of 16 {00111594 / ver 1 } 13 protectible property interest.” Teigen v. Renfrow, 511 F.3d 1072, 1078 (10th Cir. 2007) (footnote omitted, quoting Hyde Park Co. v. Santa Fe City Council, 226 F.3d 1207, 1210 (10th Cir.2000). “Such an interest arises not from the Due Process Clause of the Constitution itself, but is ‘created by independent sources such as a state or federal statute, a municipal charter or ordinance, or an implied or express contract.’” Id. at 1079 (quoting Carnes v. Parker, 922 F.2d 1506, 1509 (10th Cir.1991)). Here, the State court found Plaintiff does not have any such interest: Nothing in C.R.S. § 13-21-115(5)(a) or in the common law of the State of Colorado creates an absolute right for an invitee to remain or prohibits a landowner from revoking an invitation. In the common non-legal usage of the term invitee, [Plaintiff] was not an invitee as no one invited him to CSU. Under the statutory and common-law definitions, [Plaintiff] had no business with CSU and there is no representation that the public is requested, expected, or intended to enter an[d] remain on CSU campus for any conceivable purpose. Further, to the extent there is an invitation, [Plaintiff’s] invitation was revoked when he was served the exclusionary order. Ex. A pp. 11-12; Ex. B pp. 7-8 (same). Similarly, and assuming Plaintiff did have an interest in entering the campus, the State court already determined that he was provided full due process: While it is clear that [Plaintiff] does not agree with nor like the process provided by the University, his displeasure does not a constitutional challenge make. The Court finds that the process for a hearing an[d] appeal provides sufficient due process such that the exclusionary order and the University’s ability to exclude [Plaintiff] under C.R.S. 18-4- 504(1) is not unconstitutional as applied. Ex. A p. 8 Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 27 Filed 10/01/21 USDC Colorado Page 13 of 16 {00111594 / ver 1 } 14 Finally, Plaintiff fails to state a substantive due process claim. “The ‘ultimate standard’ for assessing an alleged violation of substantive due process is ‘whether the challenged government action shocks the conscience of federal judges.’” Ward v. Anderson, 494 F.3d 929, 937 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Moore v. Guthrie, 438 F.3d 1036, 1040 (10th Cir. 2006)). “Not surprisingly, little governmental action is held unconstitutional under th[is] formulation[].” Williams v. Berney, 519 F.3d 1216, 1221 (10th Cir. 2008) (alterations in original, quoting 1 Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983 Litigation § 3.05[D], at 3-116 (4th ed. 2006)). As an example, federal courts have found a substantive due process violation when school officials paddle a nine- year-old until the paddle breaks and blood soaks through her clothes, but not when school officials force a mentally disabled ten-year-old to clean out a clogged toilet with his bare hands. See Perry v. Taser Intʹl Corp., 07-cv-00901-REB-MJW, 2008 WL 961559, *2 (D. Colo. April 8, 2008). Plaintiff’s allegation that he was excluded from the campus for feeding squirrels does not arise to a substantive due process violation. CONCLUSION The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s lawsuit and Plaintiff failed to state a plausible claim under any theory of the law. For these reasons, Plaintiff’s lawsuit must be dismissed. Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 27 Filed 10/01/21 USDC Colorado Page 14 of 16 {00111594 / ver 1 } 15 WHEREFORE, the State Defendants respectfully request the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s claims and grant them any other relief deemed just and reasonable. DATED this 1st day of October, 2021. PHILIP J. WEISER Attorney General s/ Allison Ailer SKIPPERE SPEAR, No. 32061* ALLISON R. AILER, No. 33008* Senior Assistant Attorneys General Ralph L. Carr Colorado Judicial Center 1300 Broadway, 6th Floor Denver, CO 80203 (720) 508-6140; (720) 508-6617 skip.spear@coag.gov; allison.ailer@coag.gov *counsel of record Attorneys for Defendant Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 27 Filed 10/01/21 USDC Colorado Page 15 of 16 {00111594 / ver 1 } 16 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that I served the foregoing State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss upon all parties herein by filing copies of the same using the ECF System and/or U.S. Mail at Denver, Colorado, this 1st day of October, 2021 addressed as follows: Robert-Lawrence: Perry © 305 W. Magnolia Street, #131 Fort Collins, CO 80521 fort_scout@yahoo.com Plaintiff Pro Se Mark S. Ratner Katherine N. Hoffman Hall & Evans, LLC 1001 17th Street, Suite 300 Denver, CO 80202 ratnerm@hallevans.com hoffmank@hallevans.com Attorneys for City of Fort Collins /s/ Allison Ailer Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 27 Filed 10/01/21 USDC Colorado Page 16 of 16