HomeMy WebLinkAbout2020CV2192 - DONNA WALTER & MARK MILLIMAN V. GOVERNOR JARED POLIS, JEFFREY J. ZAYACH, TOM GONZALEZ, AND DARIN ATTEBERRY - 024 - DEFENDANT ATTEBERRY MOTION TO DISMISSIN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 20-cv-02192-RBJ
DONNA WALTER, and
MARK MILLIMAN,
Plaintiffs,
v.
GOVERNOR JARED POLIS, in his official capacity as Governor of Colorado,
JEFFREY J. ZAYACH, in his official capacity as Executive Director, Boulder County
Public Health, and
DARIN ATTEBERRY, in his official capacity as City Manager, City of Fort Collins,
Defendants.
_____________________________________________________________________
MOTION TO DISMISS FROM DEFENDANT DARIN ATTEBERRY
_____________________________________________________________________
Defendant Darin Atteberry, by and through his counsel, Andrew D. Ringel, Esq.,
of Hall & Evans, L.L.C. and John R. Duval, Esq., Deputy City Attorney, Fort Collins City
Attorney’s Office, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), hereby respectfully submits this
Motion to Dismiss, as follows:1
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs Donna Walters and Mark Milliman bring this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for
declaratory and injunctive relief against Jared Polis, Governor of the State of Colorado,
Jeffrey J. Zayach, Executive Director of Boulder County Public Health, and Darin
1 Counsel for Mr. Atteberry conferred with counsel for the Plaintiffs prior to filing
this Motion and submitted the letter required by this Court’s Practice Standards on
September 18, 2020. [ECF 18]. This Court authorized the filing of this Motion by Minute
Order dated October 15, 2020. [ECF 21].
Case 1:20-cv-02192-RBJ Document 24 Filed 10/29/20 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 16
2
Atteberry, City Manager, City of Fort Collins (all in their official capacity), challenging the
emergency public health regulations issued by the State of Colorado, Boulder County,
and the City of Fort Collins (the “City”) requiring wearing face coverings due to the COVID-
19 pandemic violates their First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional rights.
Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief raises the
following claims against Mr. Atteberry: (1) Claim Three—alleging Fort Collins’ Emergency
Regulation 2020-18 (the “Emergency Regulation”) violates the First Amendment free
speech protections against compelled speech; (2) Claim Six—alleging the Emergency
Regulation violates the First Amendment as a content-based restriction; and (3) Claim
Nine—alleging the Emergency Regulation violates the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments and the fundamental right to refuse healthcare.
Mr. Atteberry is entitled to dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims against him for multiple
reasons. The Emergency Regulation challenged by the Plaintiffs represents a reasonable
and appropriate exercise of the City’s police power to prevent the spread of COVID-19
within its community. More than a century ago, the Supreme Court of the United States
recognized the legitimacy and necessity of responses to public health emergencies.
Under the applicable law, Plaintiffs’ second-guessing of the validity and legitimacy of the
public health policy choices made by the City, and their political, social, or medical
disagreement with the public health measures put in place by the City, do not and cannot
create any legitimate claim. This Court is required to defer to the reasonable judgments
of the City’s policymakers about the appropriate response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Evaluated against the applicable law, all Plaintiff’s claims prove wanting.
Case 1:20-cv-02192-RBJ Document 24 Filed 10/29/20 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 16
3
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1. The City is a home-rule City under Colorado law.
2. The Fort Collins City Code creates an Emergency Management system.
[See Fort Collins City Code Chapter 2, Article IX, attached as Exh. A].
3. An Office of Emergency Management exists within the City organization.
The City Manager is the Director of the Office of Emergency Management. [See City
Code § 2-670, Exh. A].
4. Darin Atteberry is the City Manager of the City of Fort Collins and therefore
also the Director of the Office of Emergency Management.
5. The City Manager, as the Director of the Office of Emergency Management,
is authorized to declare a local emergency. [See City Code § 2-671(a)(1), Exh. A].
6. Any declaration of a local emergency by the City Manager as the Director
of the Office of Emergency Management only lasts for seven (7) days at which time it
must be consent to by the City Council in order to continue in effect. [See Art. IX, § 2-
671(a)(1), Exh. A].
7. On March 20, 2020, the Fort Collins City Council (the “City Council”)
adopted Resolution 2020-030 consenting to the City Manager’s March 13, 2020
declaration of local emergency due to life, health, safety and property risks from the
COVID-19 pandemic, which declaration remains in effect as of the date of this Motion.
8. Pursuant to the City’s declaration of a local emergency, the City Manager,
as Director of the Office of Emergency Management and pursuant to City Code,
promulgated various emergency rules and regulations reasonably related to the
Case 1:20-cv-02192-RBJ Document 24 Filed 10/29/20 USDC Colorado Page 3 of 16
4
protection of life, health, safety and property affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.
Plaintiffs challenge one such emergency rule and regulation related to the requirement of
face coverings, Fort Collins Emergency Regulation 2020-18, signed by the City Manager
on May 28, 2020. [See ECF 14].
9. Emergency Regulation 2020-18 provides the following requirements for
face coverings:
3. Definitions.
a. Face Covering shall mean a uniform piece of material
that securely covers a person’s nose and mouth and
remains affixed in place without the use of one’s hands.
Face Coverings include, but are not limited to,
bandanas, medical masks, cloth masks and gaiters.
4. Face Coverings required. All persons shall wear Face
Coverings when entering and while inside:
a. Any enclosed area, including retail and commercial
businesses or on-site service providers, to which the
public is invited or in which workers, including
volunteers, from more than one household are present;
b. Any City of Fort Collins building or indoor City facility;
c. Any public transportation, including City Tranfort buses
and bus shelters;
d. Any other public indoor place where persons are
unable to maintain safe social distancing (six feet or
more feet separation) from others not of their own
household;
e. Any outdoor seating or patio area of a place that falls
within Section 4(a), unless the person is seated for
dining or drinking as set forth in Section 6(g); or
f. Where otherwise required by State or County order.
Case 1:20-cv-02192-RBJ Document 24 Filed 10/29/20 USDC Colorado Page 4 of 16
5
These requirements shall be in effect within the City regardless of
any less restrictive County or State orders or guidance concerning
face coverings, including the May 19, 2020, Amended Seventh
Public Health Order from Larimer County.
5. Face Coverings for workers. All employers shall require, and
make reasonable efforts to provide, Face Coverings to employees,
volunteers and other workers in their places of employment that fall
within the scope of Section 4 of this Regulation.
6. Exceptions. Nothing herein shall require the wearing of face
coverings by the following persons or on the following properties:
a) Persons under the age of ten years or children within a
childcare facility, however, childcare facilities must
follow any applicable State or County guidance on face
coverings;
b) Persons for whom a face covering would cause
impairment due to an existing health condition and who
present a doctor’s note to that effect;
c) Persons working in a professional office or other
workspace who do not have any face-to-face
interactions with or share workspace with other
persons;
d) If the person is undergoing a medical or dental
procedure, or any other personal service, that requires
access to the person’s mouth or nose; and
e) Property owned or operated by the federal, state or
county governments.
f) Persons who are customers of banks, financial
institutions, and pawn shops, however, employees of
these places must still wear face coverings;
g) Persons who are eating or drinking at a restaurant
when seated for dining or drinking, however, facial
coverings must be worn when not seated for eating or
drinking, such as waiting for or picking up food or
drinks, walking past other tables or going to restroom
facilities; or
Case 1:20-cv-02192-RBJ Document 24 Filed 10/29/20 USDC Colorado Page 5 of 16
6
h) Individuals participating in indoor gyms, indoor training
services or other indoor recreational activities that are
complying with applicable State Orders, Larimer
County directives and a businesses’ policy on when to
wear a face covering within the business.
[See Emergency Regulation No. 2020-18, Exh. B].
10. On June 2, 2020, the City Council approved and adopted Emergency
Regulation No. 2020-18 as an Ordinance of the City Council. [See Emergency Ordinance
No. 08, 2020 of the Council of the City of Fort Collins Approving Emergency Rules and
Regulations Enacted by the City Manager Pursuant to the Local COVID-19 Emergency,
attached as Exh. C].
ARGUMENT
I. THE CITY OF FORT COLLINS’ BROAD POLICE POWER ALLOWS IT TO ISSUE
EMERGENCY REGULATIONS TO ADDRESS THE COVID-19 PANDEMNIC
Initially, the starting place for any analysis of Plaintiffs’ claims is the Supreme Court
of the United States’ decision in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905),
providing it was within the police power for government to enact a mandatory vacation
law to address the spread of smallpox. Id. at 24-39. Jacobson has been applied by the
federal courts to support public health measures to fight COVID-19. In Lawrence v.
Colorado, 20-cv-008622-DDD-SKC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92910 (D. Colo. Apr. 19,
2020), another judge of this Court described the applicable framework for evaluating the
propriety of emergency restrictions enacted in response to COVID-19 under Jacobson,
as follows:
States have broad powers to act during an emergency to secure
public health and safety. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29,
25 S.Ct. 358, 49 L.Ed. 643 (1905). “[T]he rights of the individual in respect
Case 1:20-cv-02192-RBJ Document 24 Filed 10/29/20 USDC Colorado Page 6 of 16
7
to his liberty may at times, under pressure of great dangers, be subjected
to such restraint, to be enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of
the general public may demand.” Id. Those powers are not unfettered,
however. A state may implement measures that curtail constitutional rights
during an emergency only “so long as the measures have at least some
‘real or substantial relation’ to the public health crisis and are not ‘beyond
all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental
law.’” In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772, 2020 WL 1685929, at *7 (5th Cir. 2020)
(quoting Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31).
Under this framework, courts may review whether a challenged
emergency measure implemented by a state is arbitrary or unreasonable,
and whether the measure “lack[s] basic exceptions for extreme cases.’” Id.;
see also Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 28, 38-39. But courts must take care not
to “second-guess the wisdom or efficacy of the measures.” Abbott, 954
F.3d 772, 2020 WL 1685929, at *7 (citing Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 28, 30).
“It is no part of the function of a court . . . to determine [what is] likely to be
the most effective for the protection of the public against disease.”
Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 30., It is, rather, the role of the people’s elected
representatives to determine, in light of the available information, the best
course to combat a public health threat, and courts must be careful not to
usurp that role. Id. at 28, 30; see also Phillips v. City of N.Y., 775 F.3d
538, 542 (2d Cir. 2015) (weighing scientific evidence as to societal costs
and benefits of public health measures “is a determination for the
legislature, not . . . individual objectors”); Hickox v. Christie, 205 F.Supp.3d
579, 592 (D.N.Y. 2016) (a public health official’s “better-safe-than-sorry
determination” is “entitled to deference, absent a ‘reliable showing of
error’”).
Id. at * 11-12. This Court’s analysis of the Plaintiffs’ claims must be undertaken in the
context of these basic legal principles.
II. FORT COLLINS’ EMERGENCY REGULATION DOES NOT
COMPEL SPEECH IN VIOLATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Plaintiffs’ Third Claim for Relief alleges Emergency Regulation 2020-18 violates
the First Amendment free speech protections against compelled speech. [ECF 14, at 17].
The Supreme Court has determined the First Amendment protects against compelled
speech. “Compelling individuals to mouth support for views they find objectionable
Case 1:20-cv-02192-RBJ Document 24 Filed 10/29/20 USDC Colorado Page 7 of 16
8
violates that cardinal constitutional command, and in most contexts, any such effort would
be universally condemned.” Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S.Ct. 2448, 2463
(2018). “We have sustained First Amendment challenges to allegedly compelled
expression in two categories of cases: true ‘compelled speech’ cases, in which an
individual is obligated personally to express a message he disagrees with, imposed by
the government; and ‘compelled-subsidy’ cases, in which an individual is required by the
government to subsidize a message he disagrees with, expressed by a private entity.”
Johnson v. Livestock Mktg., Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 557 (2005).
In the compelled speech context, the Supreme Court distinguishes between
government action compelling speech and proscribing conduct concluding the former is
protected by the First Amendment while the latter is not. In Rumsfeld v. Forum for
Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006), the Court addressed the
propriety of the Solomon Amendment which prohibited law schools, whose colleges and
universities received federal funds, from differentiating in their recruiting access to the
United States Military from any other campus recruiter. The law schools wanted to do so
because they disputed the Military’s policies concerning the service of homosexuals. Id.
at 51. Initially, the Court rejected the notion the requirement to provide equal access and
limited affirmative assistance to all recruiters including the Military was not compelled
speech. The Court reasoned the “Solomon Amendment neither limits what law schools
may say nor requires them to say anything.” Id. at 60. Further, the Court concluded the
required conduct was not “inherently expressive” and therefore was not protected by the
Case 1:20-cv-02192-RBJ Document 24 Filed 10/29/20 USDC Colorado Page 8 of 16
9
First Amendment. Id. at 65-55 (applying United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968),
and Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989)).
Here, the City’s face covering requirement cannot be considered compelled-
speech as a matter of law. Requiring citizens and residents of Fort Collins to wear masks
under the specific circumstances required by the Emergency Regulation is conduct not
speech. Moreover, characterizing a face covering requirement as “inherently expressive”
and therefore akin to flag burning is inappropriate. No particular political viewpoint is
created based on the fact of wearing face coverings publicly. Instead, “explanatory
speech is necessary” to evaluate any mask wearer’s political perspective. Rumsfeld,
547 U.S. at 66; compare Lighthouse Fellowship Church v. Northam, 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 80289 at *32-33 (E.D. Va. May 1, 2020) (no expressive element in conduct of
wanting to gather in groups larger than ten precluded by Virginia COVID-19 Order). In
reality, a face covering is nothing more than a public health requirement for individuals to
protect themselves and others from the global COVID-19 pandemic by decreasing the
spread of droplets of saliva and nasal discharge. Extrinsic information concerning the
reason why someone is wearing a mask is needed to give it any expressive or symbolic
content.
Indeed, the City’s face covering requirement does not proscribe any particular
message on the face covering itself, and Plaintiffs are free to include any message at all
on their masks including their political view the efficacy of Face Coverings to prevent the
spread of COVID-19 has not been scientifically established. A face covering emblazoned
with “Masks are Bogus” would be perfectly acceptable under the Emergency Regulation.
Case 1:20-cv-02192-RBJ Document 24 Filed 10/29/20 USDC Colorado Page 9 of 16
10
Further, the face covering requirement is justified by the City’s substantial public
health interest in stopping the spread of COVID-19 and therefore is constitutional even if
it has some impact on Plaintiffs’ freedom of expression. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403;
O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376. Under the Supreme Court’s analysis, “a government regulation
is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers
an important or substantial government interest; if the government interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”
Id. at 376-77. Under Jacobson, the City possesses the authority to issue emergency
regulations to address the COVID-19 pandemic and this Court cannot appropriately
second-guess the basis of the City’s decision requiring face coverings is both necessary
and appropriate to thwart increased COVID-19 transmission. This Court must reject
Plaintiffs’ invitation to become a super-public health authority evaluating the merits of
each and every public health decision to determine if governmental officials could have
done something differently or even better.
III. FORT COLLINS’ EMERGENCY REGULATION IS NOT
CONTENT-BASED BUT RATHER CONTENT-NEUTRAL
Plaintiffs’ Sixth Claim for Relief alleges the Emergency Regulation is a content-
based restriction violative of the First Amendment. [ECF 14, at 18]. Applicable precedent
holds otherwise. “As a general rule, laws that by their terms distinguish favored speech
from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content-based.”
Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994). “By contrast, laws that confer
benefits or impose burdens on speech without reference to the ideas or views expressed
Case 1:20-cv-02192-RBJ Document 24 Filed 10/29/20 USDC Colorado Page 10 of 16
11
are in most instances content-neutral.” Id. Nothing about the face covering requirement
in the Emergency Regulation is content-based. It requires everyone falling into the
parameters of the Emergency Regulation to wear a face covering, does not specify any
content at all, and requires conduct not speech. “A regulation that serves purposes
unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect
on some speakers or messages but not others.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
Federal courts addressing face covering requirements have concluded they are
content-neutral. In Robinson v. Murphy, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185070 (D.N.Y. Oct. 2,
2020, the District Court analyzed the State of New Jersey’s mask requirement as a
content-neutral regulation as follows:
Plaintiffs’ Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Assembly claims must
be reviewed under intermediate scrutiny because the challenged
regulations are content-neutral. See Nat’l Assoc. of Theatre Owners, et.
al., No. 20-8298, slip op. at 20. The Court finds that the challenged orders
are content-neutral because they do not “distinguish favored speech from
disfavored speech on the basis of ideas or views expressed.” See Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994). The indoor
gatherings restrictions and mask requirements satisfy intermediate scrutiny
review as they are narrowly tailored, serve a significant governmental
interest, and allow ample alternative means of communication. See
Startzell v. City of Phila., 533 F.3d 183, 201 (3d. Cir. 2008).
Id. at *22-23. Similarly, other COVID-19 era restrictions have been found to be content-
neutral. Compare McCarthy v. Cuomo, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107195 at *11-12
(E.D.N.Y. June 18, 2020) (restriction on large public gatherings content-neutral in face of
challenge by businesses involving alternative lifestyles or adult dancing); Talleywhacker,
Inc. v. Cooper, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99905 at *35-36 (E.D.N.C. June 8, 2020) (same
Case 1:20-cv-02192-RBJ Document 24 Filed 10/29/20 USDC Colorado Page 11 of 16
12
for adult dancing); Nat’l Ass’n of Theatre Owners v. Murphy, 2020 U.S. Dist. 148902
at *27-30 (D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2020) (closing indoor movie theater operations content-
neutral); Givens v. Newsom, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81760 at *12-19 (E.D. Cal. May 8,
2020) (stay-at-home order and elimination of protest permits at the California State
Capitol content-neutral).
Because the City’s face-covering requirement is content-neutral, it must be
narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest. The COVID-19 pandemic,
the associated requirement to protect public health, and the scientific and medical basis
for requiring face coverings easily meet this requirement. Plaintiffs’ political argument
concerning the efficacy of face masks is not sufficient to raise any actual issue to the
contrary. The Centers for Disease Control’s current public health guidance is to wear
masks.2 Under Lawrence, this fact alone ends the inquiry. See Lawrence, 2020 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 92910 at * 11-12.
IV. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO REFUSE HEALTH CARE IS NOT
IMPLICATED BY FORT COLLINS’ EMERGENCY REGULATION
Plaintiffs’ Ninth Claim for Relief contends the Emergency Regulation violates
Plaintiffs’ substantive due process fundamental right to refuse healthcare. [ECF 14, at
19].3 The fundamental right to refuse healthcare announced in Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri
2 See https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/about-
face-coverings.html (last visited October 21, 2020) (“CDC recommends that people wear
masks in public settings, like on public and mass transportation, at events and gatherings,
and anywhere they will be around other people.”).
3 Plaintiffs ground their due process claim in both the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. However, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies only to
the federal government and not a municipality like the City. Koessel v. Sublette County
Case 1:20-cv-02192-RBJ Document 24 Filed 10/29/20 USDC Colorado Page 12 of 16
13
Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), is grounded in the liberty interest individuals have
in their bodily integrity. However, the Supreme Court has only recognized this substantive
due process right to bodily integrity in narrow circumstances such as birth control,
abortion, end-of-life decisions, and instances where individuals are subjected to
dangerous or invasive medical procedures. Moore v. Guthrie, 438 U.S. 1036, 1040 (10th
Cir. 2006).
Here, Plaintiffs’ characterization of a face covering as a medical device is a
misnomer. Simply because the face covering requirement stems from a public health
rationale does not make it a medical device or a medical treatment. Indeed, masks
requirements are not simply to protect the wearer, but also for the benefit of others like
the vaccine in Jacobson. Moreover, even assuming arguendo Plaintiffs’ characterization
is appropriate, federal courts who have addressed analogous issues have concluded
basic public health requirements seeking to prevent the spread of infectious disease
simply do not fall within the parameters of the liberty interest of refusing healthcare.
Compare Casey v. Parker, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165665 at *7-8 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 10,
2020) (rejecting challenge by inmate to mandatory temperature check for COVID-19 in
prison based on Cruzan); Vincent v. Bysiewicz, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191941 at *28-
30 (D. Conn. Oct. 16, 2020) (rejecting right to privacy challenge to COVID-19 order
requiring medical documentation for exemption from face coverings requirement).
Finally, if Plaintiffs’ interpretation of Cruzan applies, the entire rationale underlying
Sheriff’s Dept., 717 F.3d 736, 738 n. 2 (10th Cir. 2013); Carrier v. Lundstedt, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 182569 at *12 (Dec. 22, 2014).
Case 1:20-cv-02192-RBJ Document 24 Filed 10/29/20 USDC Colorado Page 13 of 16
14
Jacobson evaporates. No court has narrowed or limited Jacobson based on the right
to refuse healthcare. This Court should decline Plaintiffs’ invitation to do so in this case.
V. INCORPORATION OF ARGUMENTS
To avoid as much duplication as possible and to meet this Court’s admonition to
make this Motion as short as possible [ECF 21], Mr. Atteberry, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 10(c), hereby incorporates by reference all applicable arguments and authorities raised
in the motions to dismiss to be filed by the other Defendants.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, for all the foregoing reasons, Defendant Darin Atteberry respectfully
requests this Court dismiss all Plaintiffs’ claims against him in their entirety with prejudice,
and for all other and further relief as this Court deems just and appropriate.
Case 1:20-cv-02192-RBJ Document 24 Filed 10/29/20 USDC Colorado Page 14 of 16
15
Dated this 29th day of October, 2020.
Respectfully submitted,
s/ Andrew D. Ringel .
Andrew D. Ringel, Esq.
of Hall & Evans, L.L.C.
1001 17th Street, Suite 300
Denver, CO 80202
Phone: 303-628-3453
Fax: 303-628-3368
ringela@hallevans.com
and
John R. Duval, Esq.
Deputy City Attorney
Fort Collins City Attorney’s Office
P.O. Box 580
Fort Collins, CO 80522
Phone: (970) 221-6520
jduval@fcgov.com
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
DARIN ATTEBERRY
Case 1:20-cv-02192-RBJ Document 24 Filed 10/29/20 USDC Colorado Page 15 of 16
16
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE (CM/ECF)
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 29th day of October, 2020, I electronically filed
the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification
of such filing to the following e-mail addresses:
Mark C. Patlan, Esq.
mpatlan@patlanlw.com
Grant T. Sullivan, Esq.
grant.sullivan@coag.gov
Peter G. Baumann, Esq.
peter.baumann@coag.gov
David E. Hughes, Esq.
dhughes@bouldercounty.org
Catherine R. Ruhland, Esq.
cruhland@bouldercounty.org
s/Nicole Marion, Legal Assistant of
Hall & Evans, L.L.C.
Case 1:20-cv-02192-RBJ Document 24 Filed 10/29/20 USDC Colorado Page 16 of 16