HomeMy WebLinkAbout2020CV30580 - City Of Fort Collins V. Board Of County Commissioners Of Larimer County, Colorado And Streetmediagroup, Llc - 045 - Defendant Street Media's Reply In Support Of Motion To DismissDISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF LARIMER,
STATE OF COLORADO
Larimer County Justice Center
201 Laporte Avenue, Suite 100
Fort Collins, CO 80521-2762
Telephone: (970) 498-6100
▲ COURT USE ONLY ▲
Plaintiff: THE CITY OF FORT COLLINS,
COLORADO, a municipal corporation,
v.
Defendants: BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS OF LARIMER COUNTY,
COLORADO; STREETMEDIAGROUP, LLC
Attorneys for Defendant, StreetMediaGroup, LLC:
Todd G. Messenger, Reg. No. 38783
Amanda C. Jokerst, Reg. No. 47241
FAIRFIELD AND WOODS, P.C.
1801 California Street, Suite 2600
Denver, CO 80202
Telephone: (303) 830-2400
Facsimile: (303) 830-1033
E-Mail: tmessenger@fwlaw.com;
ajokerst@fwlaw.com
Case Number: 2020CV030580
Division: 4B
DEFENDANT STREETMEDIAGROUP, LLC’S
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendant StreetMediaGroup, LLC (“StreetMedia”), through its undersigned counsel,
Fairfield and Woods, P.C., respectfully submits its Reply in Support of its Motion to Dismiss and
in support thereof states a follows:
I. Introduction
In Colorado, the law of the land is that an injunction cannot be issued unless it is requested.
Further, that in the absence of an injunction, the status quo can change as parties exercise their
unhindered legal rights in due course. Changed circumstances often render cases moot.
That is what happened here. The Board of County Commissioners’ (“BOCC’s”) decision
DATE FILED: March 24, 2021 10:21 PM
FILING ID: DABBA36746965
CASE NUMBER: 2020CV30580
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was step one in a three-step process. The second step was the administrative issuance of the
building permit (which is not reviewable under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) because it is not quasi-judicial).
The County issued the permit. The third step was construction of the sign (“Harmony Sign”) and
removal of the signs StreetMedia committed to remove during the process. The Harmony Sign was
constructed and turned on nearly four months ago pursuant to that permit, and the other signs were
removed. Vacating the BOCC decision cannot undo the building permit or the actions that
StreetMedia took pursuant to that permit. This case is moot and must be dismissed.
II. Argument
A. The Controlling Law.
A case is moot when “‘a judgment, if rendered, would have no practical legal effect upon
the existing controversy.’” Tesmer v. Colo. High Sch. Activities Ass’n, 140 P.3d 249, 252 (quoting
Van Schaack Holdings, Ltd. v. Fulenwider, 798 P.2d 424, 426 (Colo. 1990)). A change in
circumstances during the pendency of litigation can render a matter moot. See Zoning Bd. of
Adjustment of Garfield Cnty. v. DeVilbiss, 729 P.2d 353, 356 (Colo. 1986); In re Marriage of
Salby, 126 P.3d 291, 301 (Colo. App. 2005) (“An appellate court will not render an opinion on the
merits of an appeal when the issues presented become moot because of subsequent events.”). On
a motion to dismiss based on subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving
jurisdiction. See DiCocco v. Nat’l Gen. Ins. Co., 140 P.3d 314, 316 (Colo. App. 2006). Plaintiff
has not and cannot carry that burden. This case is controlled by DeVilbiss.
B. The Case Is Moot Because Plaintiff Stood By While Circumstances Changed,
and Certiorari Under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) Cannot Provide the Relief the
Plaintiff Demands.
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Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks certiorari review1 of the quasi-judicial decision of the BOCC’s
approval of StreetMedia’s appeal (“Sign Appeal”), invoking this Court’s jurisdiction under
C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4). (Pl.’s Compl. at 12 (Prayer for Relief), ¶¶ 54-57); see Westlund v. Carter, 193
Colo. 129, 130 (1977) (noting that C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) sets out the procedure for certiorari review).
Plaintiff’s Complaint does not seek injunctive relief, even though C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4)(V) would have
allowed Plaintiff to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief under C.R.C.P. 65 as part
of its Complaint. Under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) certiorari jurisdiction, the court has two options: (1) it
may affirm the decision below; or (2) it may quash the decision and remand the case. No other
relief is available. See State Civil Service Comm’n of Colo. v. Cummings, 83 Colo. 379, 385 (1928)
(Certiorari “is not a flexible writ. All that can be done under it is to quash or refuse to quash the
proceeding complained of.”).
Here, the Court cannot (as the City demands) “reverse” the BOCC. (Pl.’s Resp. at 10)
Moreover, the Court cannot order injunctive relief or mandate any other particular outcome. Since
a building permit has already been issued, the Harmony Sign has already been constructed, and
StreetMedia already honored its commitment to remove its other signs, an adjudication vacating
the Sign Appeal would have no effect.
The question urged by the City is academic. The case is moot and must be dismissed.
C. This Case is Controlled by Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Garfield Cnty. v.
DeVilbiss.
Based on the City’s pleadings, it appears that not only does the City want the Court to
1 C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4), is Colorado’s name for the writ of certiorari—a common law writ that has, substantively,
changed very little in nearly 1,000 years. See generally, Jenks. “The Prerogative Writes in English Law,” 32 YLJ 523,
529 (1923).
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rewrite the County’s Land Use Code, but also to unwind and rewrite the Colorado Rules of Civil
Procedure and expand the scope of this Court’s jurisdiction under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) to create
essentially plenary jurisdiction—all because it is offended that the BOCC approved a modest sign
that will be allowed to display “off-premises” content. (Pl.’s Resp. at 9; Pl.’s Compl. at ¶¶ 27, 29,
71, and 77).
Plaintiff’s Response desperately attempts to distinguish this case from DeVilbiss. It cites
subsequent cases (including decisions outside of Colorado that are not controlling and apply a
different body of law) that, unlike this case, are distinguishable from DeVilbiss.2 Further, it throws
six “distinguishing features” at the wall, none of which are legally operative, and several of which
are fallacies.3 The only meaningful distinguishing feature between this case and DeVilbiss is that
in DeVilbiss, the plaintiff actually sought a permanent injunction in its complaint. As such, unlike
this Court, the DeVilbiss Court was confronted with how to deal with the request for injunctive
relief after the facility at issue had been built. DeVilbiss, 729 P.2d at 356. Naturally, that involved
2 Russel v. City of Central, 892 P.2d 432 (Colo. App. 1995) and Save Cheyenne v. City of Colorado Springs, 425 P.3d
1174 (Colo. App. 2018) are both inapposite to this case. Russel involved a claim for declaratory relief “challenging
the validity of an amendment of general application to the zoning ordinance . . . .” 892 P.2d at 436 (emphasis added).
The Court of Appeals in Russel distinguished the case from DeVilbiss, noting that DeVilbiss was limited to certiorari
review and injunctive relief. Save Cheyenne involved the filing of a notice of lis pendens in a land exchange matter,
which the Colorado Court of Appeals found to provide sufficient notice “to any person thereafter acquiring, by,
through, or under any party named in such notice [that] an interest in the real property described in the notice . . .
[might] be affected by the action described in the notice.” Save Cheyenne, 425 P.3d at 1177.
3 Four of Plaintiff’s string of six “important reasons” for disregarding DeVilbiss (Pl.’s Resp. at 7-8) are not legally
operative: (1) the cost of the Harmony Sign; (2) StreetMedia’s notice of the C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) Complain t; (3) the
nature of Plaintiff’s C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) challenge; and (4) the BOCC’s position on the Motion to Dismiss (it is not up
to the BOCC to determine whether the case is moot, and the BOCC’s decision to sit out the motion practice on
mootness does not constitute either support or opposition). The other two “important reasons” are simply false claims:
(1) regarding the cost of removal of the Harmony Sign, while there was no reason to present evidence on the cost of
removal of the Harmony Sign, the record evidence shows that the cost to Colorado’s public schools (a public cost)
would be approximately $1,000,000, and since StreetMedia is a for -profit company, one should expect that the cost
of removal to StreetMedia would be well in excess of that); and (2) the claim StreetMedia’s position regarding
mootness would represent a “sea change in the law” of C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) is not supported.
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weighing certain equities. By contrast, this Court is only faced with the decision of whether to
quash a decision that has already been fully implemented.
Even if the holding in DeVilbiss is narrow with regard to whether a request for a permanent
injunction can be considered after construction of the facility that is the subject of a challenged
quasi-judicial approval, it certainly stands for the proposition that plaintiffs that invoke C.R.C.P.
106(a)(4) must also invoke C.R.C.P. 65 and seek a preliminary injunction to preserve the status
quo—that is, if preservation of the status quo is important to them.4 Id. at 357 (“A temporary or
preliminary injunction is a remedy specifically designed to maintain the status quo in order to
preserve the trial court’s power to decide the case on the merits.”). Time and again, the Plaintiff in
this case has failed to take steps to try to protect its alleged interests, and it cannot be afforded
retroactive relief.5 There is no vehicle for that. The case is now moot and must be dismissed.
D. C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4)(V) and C.R.C.P. 65 Cannot Be Disregarded.
Plaintiff states that StreetMedia’s argument “would require all litigants pursuing claims
under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) to also seek a preliminary injunction under C.R.C.P. 65 to prevent a
private party from mooting the C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) during its pendency by taking action pursuant
to the approved zoning decision being challenged.” Yes. However, the proposition is not argument,
it is the long embedded law in Colorado, codified in C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4)(V) (which allows a
plaintiff to seek an injunction with a C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) complaint), and C.R.C.P. 65 (which allows
4 A large number of C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) cases are brought by parties who are denied a quasi-judicial approval. In those
cases, there is generally no need to preserve the status quo because it will preserve itself.
5 It is not unreasonable to expect parties to diligently follow matters that are important to them. StreetMedia did not
conceal the fact that it was constructing the sign. Its building permit application is a public record, and the sign was
constructed out in the open along a major thoroughfare next to the City over a three-week period. The City had ample
opportunity to attempt to challenge that construction with a motion for temporary restraining order or preliminary
injunction, but never made such an attempt.
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a plaintiff to seek injunctive relief), and reinforced by the Colorado Supreme Court in DeVilbiss.
No party to this dispute is in a position to question that law. If Plaintiff wanted an injunction it was
obligated to ask for one. The time for that request has long since passed.
In Colorado, the risks that circumstances may change during the pendency of a C.R.C.P.
106(a)(4) petition is the Plaintiff’s risk. See DeVilbiss, 729 P.2d at 357 (“A party who seeks to
enjoin presumptively legal conduct of another but who refuses to submit his case for a preliminary
determination on the propriety of injunctive relief must bear some responsibility for a change in
circumstances between the commencement of the action and the ultimate resolution of the case on
the merits.”). In the absence of an injunction, defendants in such proceedings are free to—indeed
expected to—go about their business in due course:
We initially note that Snowmass Coal Company was not guilty of any legally
impermissible or culpable conduct in proceeding with the construction of the coal-
loading facility. The company sought and obtained from the Board of County
Commissioners of Garfield County a special use permit which was conditioned on
its obtaining a height variance from the Board of Adjustment. The Board of
Adjustment granted the height variance, and Snowmass Coal Company obtained in
due course various building permits from the Garfield County Building Official,
the Colorado Mined Land Reclamation Board, and the Colorado Air Pollution
Control Board. The fact that DeVilbiss elected to challenge the legal validity of the
height variance and sought to permanently enjoin the construction of the facility
did not somehow transform the company’s continued activities, all of which were
conducted under governmental permits, into legally impermissible and
blameworthy conduct.
Id. at 359. In the instant case, C.R.C.P. 65(c) would have allowed the Plaintiff to seek an injunction
without even providing security due to its status as a “municipal corporation,” yet the Plaintiff still
failed to do so. C.R.C.P. 65(c) (“[n]o such security shall be required of the state or of any county
or municipal corporation of this state . . . .”).
Parties—and courts—rely on the stability of these rules and the precedent set by DeVilbiss.
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Plaintiff’s apparent suggestion (at least for the purposes of this case) that these clear rules are either
impractical or unfair or both is not legally operative.6 The rules are simple to articulate, and they
are appropriately applied. By way of example (and not recitation of controlling precedent) the
Denver County District Court has held that a plaintiff’s claim was moot when “the action sought
to be prevented by the plaintiff has been accomplished.” Anderson v. Suthers, No. 2011CV7798,
2012 WL 12265582 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Sept. 28, 2012), aff’d on other grounds, Anderson v. Suthers,
338 P.3d 384, 387 (Colo. App. 2013) (still recognizing that “the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’
claims as moot and concluded, relying on Zoning Bd. Of Adjustment of Garfield County v.
DeVilbiss, 729 P.2d 353, 357 (Colo. 1986), that the public interest exception to mootness did not
apply because the plaintiffs did not seek a preliminary injunction before the transaction closed.”).
E. Plaintiff’s Attack on C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4)(V) and C.R.C.P. 65 Is Unwarranted
and Must Fail.
Plaintiff lodges an attack on C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4)(V) and C.R.C.P. 65 by demanding that this
Court find that the rules that all Colorado attorneys practice by do “not make sense.” Plaintiff’s
attack is unjustifiable and borders on the incoherent:
To obtain a preliminary injunction, a litigant is required to establish, among other
factors, a reasonable probability of success on the merits . . . . To do so at the outset
of a Rule 106 action would require a litigant to meet this requirement without the
certified record and to essentially prove in a preliminary proceeding the quasi-
judicial governmental body abused its discretion or exceeded its jurisdiction on
limited or incomplete facts. Moreover, because a C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) action is
limited to a review of the certified record before the quasi-judicial body, it would
be at least incongruous if not prohibited for the litigant to make its Rule 65 showing
with evidence extrinsic to the certified record. Holding a preliminary injunction
hearing, presenting evidence, and taking testimony outside the four corners of the
certified record would be inconsistent with the rules governing Rule 106(a)(4)
6 Since the Plaintiff is a municipal corporation in a dynamic region where quasi -judicial land use decisions are
commonplace, it is not hard to imagine the City being on the other side of a comparable case at some point and then
taking a position that it fundamentally at odds with the unsupportable position it takes here.
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actions. Then, if the injunction is denied, the challenged project approved by the
lower tribunal can be built to moot the Rule 106(a)(4) challenge thereby swallowing
the remedy Rule 106(a)(4) provides.
Plaintiff cannot avoid C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4)(V) and C.R.C.P. 65 by attacking them. Whether Plaintiff
likes it or not, they are the applicable rules. These are well-established, statewide rules of procedure
that reflect the wisdom, considered judgment, and long experience of the Colorado Supreme Court.
They do “make sense”—and they work. Attorneys are charged with knowing these rules, and
Plaintiff’s dissertation about how it fails to comprehend them is remarkable.
Plaintiff grumbles that under the applicable Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, it could
not possibly make its case for a preliminary injunction. While StreetMedia agrees with the Plaintiff
that Plaintiff’s case, on the merits, is exceedingly weak and as such, that a preliminary injunction
(or any injunction for that matter) would not be justified, the procedures Plaintiff is expected to
follow are not difficult. The excuse that Plaintiff does not understand the applicable rules is not a
legitimate excuse to raise in the context of a response to a motion to dismiss on mootness grounds.
Turning to how the rules work, first, Parties show up and participate in quasi-judicial
hearings when they believe that their interests are at stake. That way, they become familiar with
what is in the record, they can contribute to that record in real time, and they can even (if they
think it is important), bring a court reporter with them to take a transcript in real time if they believe
their position is at risk. It is a lot like being in trial court. Second, if the quasi-judicial hearing does
not go well, the diligent party will already be familiar with what is in the record. Third, a diligent
and well-prepared party that took steps one and two will have no problem making a case to the
Court (if there is a case to be made) on a motion for preliminary injunction under C.R.C.P. 65.
Plaintiff’s attack on the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure is a distraction.
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F. Plaintiff Failed to Disclose that Stor-N-Lock Partners Has “No Value As
Precedent.”
Plaintiff leans on Stor-N-Lock Partners #15, LLC v. City of Thornton, No. 17CA0696, 2018
WL 2054320 (Colo. App. May 3, 2018) but fails to disclose to this Court that that case was not
selected for publication. Cases that are not selected for publication “have no value as precedent.”
Welby Gardens v. Adams County Bd. of Equalization, 71 P.3d 992, 999 (Colo. 2003). In fact, if
this case were to reach the Court of Appeals, citation to Stor-N-Lock would be forbidden under the
court’s “Policy Concerning Citation of Unpublished Opinions.”7 At the trial court level, the court
may consider whether an unpublished decision provides any useful insight, but the court is also
“free to disregard [unpublished decisions] entirely if it so chooses.” Patterson v. James, 454 P.3d
345, 353 (2018).
As a matter of law, Plaintiff is wrong in suggesting that Stor-N-Lock (an unpublished
decision of the Colorado Court of Appeals) in any way qualifies DeVilbiss (a published Colorado
Supreme Court decision). Moreover, the persuasive value of Stor-N-Lock, if any, works against
the Plaintiff. In that case, Resolute (a co-defendant with the City of Thornton) argued that the
plaintiff (Stor-N-Lock) should be required to post a bond because “the mere filing of the [C.R.C.P.
106(a)(4)] action effectively enjoins the defendant from using its property.” Stor-N-Lock, 2018
WL 2054320 at ¶35. The Court disagreed, holding that the:
use of the property was not “enjoined or restrained” under Rule 65 because Stor–
N–Lock did not seek, and the district court did not enter, a preliminary injunction
or a temporary restraining order. Thus, there could be no occasion to determine
whether it had been “wrongfully” enjoined or restrained from using the property,
and no need for a remedy in the event of such a wrongful restraint.
7 See Policy Concerning Citation of Unpublished Opinions.
https://www.courts.state.co.us/Courts/Court_Of_Appeals/Forms_Policies.cfm
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Id. at ¶46. In other words, the court held that C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) does not create an implied
injunction—it does not enjoin or restrain a party from continuing to exercise its rights during the
pendency of the proceeding. All of the other discussion in the Stor-N-Lock case is dicta, and must
be disregarded to the extent it conflicts with DeVilbiss, which is controlling law.
The Harmony Sign was turned on more than four months ago, and has been operational
ever since. The signs that StreetMedia agreed to remove as part of the Sign Appeal have been
removed. There is nothing left for this Court to decide, and remaining questions, if any, are purely
academic, outside of the jurisdiction of this Court. Elliott v. City of Fort Collins, 135 Colo. 558,
560 (1957) (“it is necessary that there be a genuine and existing controversy and if the elements of
the controversy have been presented and before an adjudication of the acts of the parties involved
has disposed of the matter, it is the duty of the court, upon being shown such fact, to dismiss the
action.”); Hays v. Huskin, 539 P.2d 500, 500 (Colo. App. 1975) (Colorado Courts do not decide
academic questions). This case is moot.
G. There Is No “Mootness Exception” to Save Plaintiff’s Case.
1. “Capable of Repetition Yet Evading Review.”
Where, as in this case, the challenge concerns the application of a particular law, rather
than the law itself, the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to the mootness
doctrine is inapplicable. Freedom from Religion Found, Inc. v. Romer, 921 P.2d 84, 88 (Colo. App.
1996) (finding the mootness exception did not apply when the plaintiffs did “not seek a declaration
as to any general statute, ordinance, or regulation of the government entities that might be applied
in future situations.”); see also Anderson v. Suthers, No. 2011CV7798, 2012 WL 12265582 (Colo.
Dist. Ct. Sept. 28, 2012). Plaintiff admits that it does not challenge the LUC or any provision of it.
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As such, the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to mootness does not apply as a
matter of law.
Plaintiff boldly asserts that “No question exists Larimer County retains its existing Land
Use Code and unless this matter is reviewed by this Court, nothing will prevent future Boards of
County Commissioners of Larimer County from incorrectly interpreting and applying the Land
Use Code’s sign appeal provisions as they did in this case.” (Pl.’s Resp. at 13). In point of fact,
after a very public process, Larimer County adopted a new Land Use Code in December 2020
(“December 2020 LUC”). The December 2020 LUC becomes effective on March 31, 2021—seven
days from the date of this Reply.8
The sign appeal process that generated this dispute is not included in the December 2020
LUC. As such, even if there were a case for the application of the “capable of repetition yet evading
review” exception as a legal matter, such application could not be supported on these facts. Not
only has the Sign Appeal been fully carried out, but the LUC is new. Moreover, two-thirds of the
County Commissioners have been replaced since this case was filed. One of the new
commissioners is the former Mayor Pro Tem of Fort Collins, who was part of the Council that
voted to bring this case in the first place. In this context, it really pushes limits to for Plaintiff to
declare that this case is “capable of repetition yet evading review.”
2. “Great Public Importance.”
The mootness exception for issues of “great public importance” is inapplicable. Plaintiff’s
unsupported (and unsupportable) assertion that the continuation of this moot case is that important
8 The December 2020 LUC is published online at:
https://www.larimer.org/sites/default/files/uploads/2021/larimer_luc_adoptiondraft_final_1.pdf
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is simply wrong. The City’s displeasure with off-premises messaging is a censorial interest, not a
legitimate governmental interest, let alone a matter of “great public importance.” Ultimately, the
fact is that the City has presented a relatively unremarkable case involving laws that will be
replaced in a week.
It is, of course, true that “a court may decide a moot case involving issues of great public
importance or recurring constitutional violations.” Grossman v. Dean, 80 P.3d 952, 960 (Colo.
App. 2003) (finding the great public importance exception applied to a case that involved the
interpretation of a state constitutional amendment adopted by ballot initiative); see also Englewood
Police Ben. Ass’n v. City of Englewood, 811 P.2d 464 (Colo. App. 1990) (finding that whether a
special election can take place on the same day as a general election was a question of great public
concern). This case is very important to StreetMedia, but that does not bootstrap the case into the
category of “great public importance.” Neither does the fact that the case involves two local
governments.
It is not surprising that Plaintiff cites no authority for its novel proposition that this case
rises to the level of “great public importance.” Essentially, it simply applies the “because I said
so” logic that is ever-present its pleadings. This case is about a single quasi-judicial decision based
on a now-superseded process to allow for a modest sign that is well under half the size of a
traditional billboard. That is all. Again, it is very important to StreetMedia, but just because it
involves a spat between two local governments does not make it a matter of “great public
importance.”
III. CONCLUSION
The Harmony Sign is constructed. The signs that StreetMedia committed to remove are
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removed. The BOCC decision on the Sign Appeal is fully carried out. To analogize, the horses
have left the barn.
This Court should not reward Plaintiff by bending the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure
and ignoring DeVilbiss as Plaintiff suggests. Plaintiffs predicament is self-inflicted, caused by a
total failure of diligence in its examination of the facts of this case and the rules and the law that
apply to them. It is inappropriate for the Plaintiff to attack the well-established procedural rules as
cover for these obvious missteps—and it is worse to ask this Court to ignore those rules in order
to help Plaintiff resolve its resulting dilemma.
Plaintiff is a sophisticated home-rule municipality with able outside counsel. Plaintiff made
a strategic decision to not protect the status quo when it had the clear opportunity to do so—without
even providing security under C.R.C.P. 65(c) to protect StreetMedia’s significant free-speech and
financial interests.
DeVilbiss controls, the Defendants proceeded properly, the Sign Appeal is carried out, and
the case must be dismissed as moot.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, Defendant StreetMedia respectfully requests this
Court to dismiss the Complaint with prejudice and grant any other relief this Court deems fair and
just.
Respectfully submitted this 24th day of March, 2021.
FAIRFIELD AND WOODS, P.C.
s/ Todd G. Messenger
Todd G. Messenger, Reg. No. 38783
Amanda C. Jokerst, Reg. No. 47541
Attorneys for Defendant StreetMediaGroup, LLC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 24th day of March, 2021, I filed the foregoing with the Clerk
of the Court using Colorado Courts E-Filing. I further certify that a copy of the foregoing was
sent via Colorado Courts E-Filing to the following:
Andrew D. Ringel, #24762
Hall & Evans, LLC
1001 Seventeenth St., Suite 300
Denver, CO 80202
Telephone: (303) 628-3300
Email: ringela@hallevans.com
John R. Duval, #10185
Deputy City Attorney
Claire Havelda, #36831
Assistant City Attorney
300 Laporte Ave.
P.O. Box 500
Fort Collins, CO 80522
Telephone: (970) 221-6652
Email: jduval@fcgov.com chavelda@fcgov.com
Jeannine S. Haag, #11995
Frank N. Haug, #41427
Larimer County Attorney’s Office
P.O. Box 1606
Fort Collins, CO 80522
Telephone (970) 498-7450
Email: fhaug@larimer.org; jeanninehaag@larimer.org
s/ Sharon Y. Meyer
Sharon Y. Meyer