HomeMy WebLinkAbout2020CV30580 - City Of Fort Collins V. Board Of County Commissioners Of Larimer County, Colorado And Streetmediagroup, Llc - 040 - Street Media Answer BriefDISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF LARIMER,
STATE OF COLORADO
Larimer County Justice Center
201 Laporte Avenue, Suite 100
Fort Collins, CO 80521-2762
Telephone: (970) 498-6100
▲ COURT USE ONLY ▲
Plaintiff: THE CITY OF FORT COLLINS,
COLORADO, a municipal corporation,
v.
Defendants: BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS OF LARIMER COUNTY,
COLORADO; STREETMEDIAGROUP, LLC
Attorneys for Defendant, StreetMediaGroup, LLC:
Todd G. Messenger, Reg. No. 38783
Amanda C. Jokerst, Reg. No. 47241
FAIRFIELD AND WOODS, P.C.
1801 California Street, Suite 2600
Denver, CO 80202
Telephone: (303) 830-2400
Facsimile: (303) 830-1033
E-Mail: tmessenger@fwlaw.com;
ajokerst@fwlaw.com
Case Number: 2020CV030580
Division: 4B
DEFENDANT STREETMEDIAGROUP, LLC’S ANSWER BRIEF
Defendant StreetMediaGroup, LLC (“StreetMedia”), through its undersigned counsel,
Fairfield and Woods, P.C., respectfully submits this Answer Brief, as follows:
I. INTRODUCTION
This Court should deny the relief requested by the City of Fort Collins (“City”) or dismiss
the case for want of subject matter jurisdiction. First, the City’s allegations and summary of what
this record contains are, at best, woefully incomplete. Indeed, there is competent evidence in this
record to support the decision of the Larimer County (“County”) Board of County Commissioners
(“BOCC”), and that the BOCC correctly applied the correct law. Second, the City has the burden
DATE FILED: March 2, 2021 6:28 PM
FILING ID: 4B9198E7CF0A7
CASE NUMBER: 2020CV30580
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to clear three other hurdles before its prayer for relief could be answered in any event: (1) the case
is moot; (2) the City’s Complaint is time-barred; and (3) the Court cannot mandate the application
of unconstitutional regulations.
II. SUMMARY OF FACTS
Larimer County Land Use Code (“LUC”) § 22.2.1.A.3. establishes an appeal process that
offers the opportunity for applicants to seek relief from the strict application of LUC § 10 (“Sign
Code”). (R. Vol. V., LUC §§ 22.2.1.A.3. and 10). On March 24, 2020, StreetMedia filed an appeal
(“Sign Appeal”) with the County pursuant to LUC § 22.2.1.A.3. (Def. StreetMedia Ans. and Cross
Claims ¶ 27). The purpose of the Sign Appeal was to seek relief from several specific provisions
of the Sign Code, in order to allow for the construction of a single new sign at the northwest
quadrant of I-25 and Harmony Road (“Harmony Sign”). (R. Vol. I at 18). Specifically, the Sign
Appeal requested relief from: (1) the ban on off-premises sign content (R. Vol. V, LUC § 10.5.E.);
(2) setback requirements (R. Vol. V, LUC § 10.11.B.); (3) maximum sign area (R. Vol. V, LUC §
10.11.B.2.); and (4) minimum “dwell time”1 (R. Vol. V, LUC § 10.5.B.; Vol. I at 18). In its Staff
Report, County Staff identified that an appeal from the sign height limitations in LUC § 10.11 was
also required. (R. Vol. I at 9).
With very few exceptions, the City’s Complaint for Review Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4)
(“106 Complaint”) and Opening Brief (“Pl.’s Opening Br.”) recite only materials submitted by the
City and testimony and recommendations by County Staff that appear to be based on that material.
The City’s citations are a thin slice of the record. The rest of the record includes StreetMedia’s
1 “Dwell time” is the minimum amount of time a static message must appear on an electronic display before it can be
replaced with a new static message.
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extensive application materials and exhibits (collectively, “Application”), and its testimony and
dialog with the BOCC at the June 1, 2020 appeal hearing (collectively, “Hearing Testimony”).
The Application included detailed, pertinent, and focused documentary evidence and
technical and legal analysis in support of the Sign Appeal, including:
1. The transmittal letter and application form that, inter alia, detail how the
Harmony Sign will generate approximately $1 million in revenues for public schools over
the term of StreetMedia’s lease with the State Land Board. (R. Vol. I at 106-108).
2. Technical materials, including a site plan showing proposed dimensions and
setbacks of the Harmony Sign, superimposed over aerial photography (R. Vol. I at 54); a
conceptual drawing of the Harmony Sign in elevation view (R. Vol. I at 58); five
photosimulations of the proposed Harmony Sign in context (from street-level views) (R.
Vol. I at 56-60); a map and pictures of five other existing signs (eight total sign faces) that
were proposed for removal after the Harmony Sign was constructed (R. Vol. I at 52-53);
and a photometric plan for the proposed Harmony Sign (R. Vol. I at 61).
3. A TECHNICAL AND LEGAL JUSTIFICATION FOR THE REQUESTED APPEALS
(“Technical Report”), which set out a comprehensive narrative regarding the context of the
application, along with competent evidence and analysis supporting each and every
component of the appeal. (R. Vol. I at 16-50).2, 3
2 The Technical Report was accompanied by a 371-page case law attachment that was not included in the official
record of this case. That attachment provided full copies of each of the 14 cases cited in the Technical Report.
3 The record includes some redundant material. The Technical Report included at R. Vol. I at 16-50 is the same as the
one included at R. Vol. I at 118-149. Similarly, the one-page summary at R51 is the same as the one-page summary
at R. Vol. I at 112. Herein, StreetMedia cites only to the first instance of the Technical Report, and to the second
instance of the one-page summary (because it is larger format and easier to read).
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4. A one-page “Executive Summary” of the Technical Report that sets out in
tabular fashion how each component of the appeal complied with the applicable appeal
standards. (R. Vol. I at 112).
5. Two empirical studies, one on the economic impacts of billboards, and the
other on the safety of billboards:
a. A report prepared by Econsult Corporation, dated April 2012, titled
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF BILLBOARD LOCATIONS ON PROPERTY VALUES IN
PHILADELPHIA (R. Vol. I at 62-77); and
b. An executive summary of a peer-reviewed report titled CEVMS
AND DRIVER VISUAL BEHAVIOR STUDY, which was downloaded from the Federal
Highway Administration’s web site. (R. Vol. I at 78-80).
In addition to the documentary evidence and analysis, the extensive Hearing Testimony
also addressed and supported all of the components of the Sign Appeal (R. Vol. II at 36-68)—
including the Staff-identified issue of the sign height limitation (a restriction that is set o ut in the
same table as sign setbacks). (R. Vol. II. at 24-27; 59-61). During Hearing Testimony, StreetMedia
also pointed out in detail how the City’s written materials were irrelevant to the Sign Appeal, how
the City’s arguments (in its correspondence and as advanced by County Staff) were logically and
legally flawed, and why the City’s input should thus be disregarded. (e.g., R. Vol. II at 35-36, 40-
47, 49-50, 56-57, 59-61).
StreetMedia’s Hearing Testimony occupies 35 pages of this record. (R. Vol. II at 33 to
68). The City had written notice of that hearing, which was held just a few blocks down the street
from City Hall (R. Vol. I at 187). Yet there is no testimony from the City on this record. (R. Vol.
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II.A., passim). That is because no one from the City showed up to present the City’s arguments to
the BOCC. (Def. County Ans. Br. at 7).
III. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This is not a close case. This Court should deny the relief requested by the City. Relief
under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) must be denied if there is any competent evidence in the record to support
the quasi-judicial decision at issue, and if the decision-maker applied the correct law. The record
is replete with competent evidence in support of the BOCC decision, and it demonstrates that the
BOCC applied the correct law. There are also three threshold issues that remain, each of which is
cause to dismiss or deny relief to the City.
A. The Record Includes Ample Competent Evidence.
In a C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) proceeding, the reviewing Court is not the fact-finder, and the
Court may not re-weigh the evidence. Under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4), the only evidence that matters
is the evidence that supports the challenged decision. The record is full of competent evidence
that supports the BOCC’s decision. The Application lays it out. The Hearing Testimony lays it
out. The BOCC’s decision was unanimous.
B. The BOCC Applied the Correct Law and Did Not Abuse Its Discretion.
All parties agree that the BOCC applied the three sign appeal standards set out in LUC §
22.2.5. Those standards are the correct law. The BOCC applied that correct law correctly.
The City cites the correct law and then quickly presses this Court to rewrite it. (Pl.’s
Opening Br. at 3, 6-7). Specifically, the City demands that this Court write in more than a half-
dozen entirely new and totally self-serving “criteria” to the LUC—criteria that have not been
adopted by ordinance—including: (1) the City’s Harmony Gateway Plan; (2) the City’s standards
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for off-premises billboards; (3) the City’s draft Harmony Corridor Standards and Guidelines for
the Harmony Gateway Area; (4) an “intent” in the LUC to “not allow off-premises signs”; (5) an
“intent” in the LUC to “have sign regulations consistent with the regulations adopted by the City
of Fort Collins and the City of Loveland”; (6) an intent “to reduce the potential for nonconformities
should signs permitted in unincorporated Larimer County [be] annexed to one of those cities”; and
(7) a requirement that the BOCC make a specific finding to justify allowing an off-premise
message on a sign “when no off-premises signs have been allowed since June 15, 1992.” (Pl.’s
Opening Br at 6, 7, 19). The text of the LUC § 22.2.5. is plain, and it is the exclusive domain of
the BOCC to adopt or amend such provisions (within constitutional boundaries) using established
legislative procedures as it sees appropriate. Courts neither write nor rewrite county ordinances.
The BOCC declined to adulterate its LUC with ad hoc standards. That may have
disappointed the City, but it was the proper thing to do. In no way does the BOCC’s application
of the plain, unadulterated text of LUC § 22.2.5. constitute an abuse of discretion.
C. Threshold Issues Remain.
There are three threshold issues that remain in this case.
1. The case is moot. This Court’s order dated February 26, 2021, granting the
County’s Motion to Dismiss StreetMedia’s Cross-Claims (“Feb. 26, 2021 Order”), acknowledges
that the Harmony Sign is constructed and operational. The resulting mootness of the 106
Complaint is the subject of a Motion to Dismiss filed by StreetMedia on February 24, 2021, which
is pending.
2. The City’s Complaint is untimely. To establish jurisdiction under C.R.C.P. 106, the
Court must construe the relationship between the general written resolution requirement for land
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use approvals set out in LUC § 12.2.7.A. and the specific sign appeal process set out in LUC §
22.2.2.B.3.4 The Court’s construction of that relationship must be a constitutional one. See People
v. Hickman, 988 P.2d 628, 636 (Colo. 1999); Kruse v. Town of Castle Rock, 192 P.3d 591, 597
(Colo. App. 2008).
Because First Amendment rights are at stake, a “specified, brief” time period between
application and “final decision” is constitutionally mandated. See Mahaney v. City of Englewood,
226 P.3d 1214, 1220 (Colo. App. 2009). Unlike LUC § 22.2.2.B.3., which specifies that a final
decision of the BOCC will occur at a hearing within 60 days after a sign appeal is filed, LUC §
12.2.7.A. does not include a “specified, brief” time for the written resolution to be approved. (R.
Vol. V at LUC §§ 12.2.7 and 22.2.2.B.). No party has questioned the constitutionality of LUC §
22.2.2.B.3.5 But LUC § 12.2.7.A., if applied here, unconstitutionally increases the time-frame for
the BOCC’s “final decision” (in this case, as a practical matter, the time frame nearly doubled),
stripping StreetMedia of its constitutional right to a prompt “final decision.” The only
4 StreetMedia recognizes that the Court denied its first motion to dismiss that raised this issue. However, in its Order
on that motion, the Court deferred this question, noting that these “concerns are more properly addressed after briefing
on the merits.” Order Denying Def. StreetMediaGroup, LLC’s Mot. to Dismiss Pl.’s Compl. (Nov. 29, 2020) (“11-29
Order”) at 3. As such, StreetMedia renews and clarifies the issue here.
5 In this Court’s February 26, 2021 Order dismissing StreetMedia’s cross-claims, this Court observed, “If StreetMedia
is indeed correct that the whole sign approval process is constitutionally defective, perhaps the proper relief would be
to grant the City’s appeal and take down the sign. Arguably, if the procedure is defective than its appr ovals would be
defective as well. However, it is clear that StreetMedia does not actually want that remedy.” Feb. 26, 2021 Order at
2. StreetMedia respectfully agrees with the Court that it does not want that remedy. No party has questioned the
constitutionality of LUC § 22.2.2.B.3., so the approval process itself is not under attack. At issue is only whether the
addition to that process of the extra step of LUC § 12.2.7.A. is constitutionally appropriate.
StreetMedia brought the cross-claims to establish the Court’s plenary jurisdiction over this question pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, C.R.S. § 13-51-101, et seq., and C.R.C.P. 57, to allow for evidence to be taken on the question, and to
provide an opportunity for (if the Court determined it appropriate) inj unctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
C.R.C.P. 65. This Court dismissed the cross claims, but held, “StreetMedia still has standing to defend the C.R.C.P.
106 appeal as it would be injured if the appeal overturned the sign approval.” StreetMedia raises this constitutional
question again not to nag about it, but only to assert a complete defense. Based on this Court’s February 26, 2021
Order, StreetMedia assumes the Court retained jurisdiction over the threshold constitutional questions, even though
the City argues that the Court cannot consider constitutional arguments. (Pl.’s Opening Br. at 27 -28).
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constitutional construction of the sign appeal process—allowing LUC § 22.2.2.B.3. to stand alone,
establishes a “final decision” of the BOCC on June 1, 2020. The 106 Complaint should be
dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction.
3. At a minimum, LUC § 10.5.E. is unconstitutional and cannot be applied in any
event. Based on competent evidence, the BOCC correctly decided to not apply LUC § 10.5.E. But
even in the absence of evidence, the BOCC does not have the constitutional authority to apply
LUC § 10.5.E. LUC § 10.5.E. is content-based because it “applies to particular speech because of
the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.” Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 576 U.S.
155, 171 (2015). It is therefore “presumptively unconstitutional,” and the burden shifts to the
proponent of the standard to defend it. Id.
Neither the City nor the County can overcome the presumption of unconstitutionality.6
Unconstitutional regulations are void ab initio—they cannot even be recognized, let alone
enforced. See LaFleur v. Pyfer, 2021 CO 3, ¶33, reh’g denied. LUC § 10.5.E. should therefore be
disregarded.7
6 After Reed v. Town of Gilbert clarified the First Amendment landscape with regard to signs, content -based
regulations like LUC § 10.5.E. are falling with increasing frequency because there is no viable defense to save them.
See, e.g., Thomas v. Schroer, 248 F. Supp. 3d 868 (W.D. Tenn. 2017), aff’d, Thomas v. Bright, 937 F.3d. 721 (6th Cir.
2020), cert. den., Bright v. Thomas, 141 S. Ct. 194 (2020); Reagan Nat’l Adver. of Austin v. City of Austin, 972 F.3d
696 (5th Cir. 2020); GEFT Outdoor, L.L.C. v. City of Westfield, et al., No. 1:17-cv-04063-TWP-TAB, 2020 WL
5814875 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2020); and Boyer v. City of Simi Valley, 978 F.3d. 618 (9th Cir. 2020); L.D. Management
Co. v. Thomas, 456 F. Supp. 3d 873 (W.D. Ky. 2020), aff’d, L.D. Management Co. v. Gray, No. 20-5547, 2021 WL
567817 (6th Cir. Feb. 16, 2021).
7 In light of Reed and its progeny, it is striking that the City urges this Court to find that C ounty Staff is correct that
all parts of the County’s sign code have the purpose of disallowing “off -premises” content. (Pl.’s Opening Br. at 8).
If the City is right, then under Reed, this Court is obligated to strike down the entirety of LUC § 10.0, and dismiss the
City’s case as moot because there would be no regulations left to apply to the Harmony Sign at all. See Reed, 576
U.S. at 166 (“strict scrutiny applies either when a law is content based on its face or when the purpose and justification
for the law are content based.” (emphasis added)).
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IV. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
In reviewing a quasi-judicial decision under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4), the Court’s role is quite
limited. First, it does not weigh evidence. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Routt Cnty. v. O’Dell, 920
P.2d 48, 50 (Colo. 1996); Bentley v. Valco, Inc., 741 P.2d 1266, 1267-68 (Colo. App. 1987). The
Court cannot “substitute its own judgment” for that of the quasi-judicial decision-maker. O’Dell,
920 P.2d at 50. Instead, it reviews the record only for the presence of competent evidence8 in
support of the quasi-judicial decision, effectively disregarding all other information. See Valco,
741 P.2d at 1268; Colorado Mun. League v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 759 P.2d 40, 44
(Colo. 1988). If it finds evidence that “‘a reasonable mind might accept as adequate’” to support
the decision, the inquiry ends and the decision is affirmed. Mountain States, 759 P.2d at 44
(quoting NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., Inc. 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939) (internal
quotations omitted)).
Second, “findings of fact may be express or implied,” and “the absence of findings . . . is
not fatal to a decision if there is evidence in the record” that supports the decision. Burns v. Bd. of
Assessment Appeals of State of Colo., 820 P.2d 1175, 1177 (Colo. App. 1991). As such, the written
resolution under review by the Court does not have to be perfect, or even comprehensive. See id.
In fact, a written resolution is not even a prerequisite to C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) review. See, e.g., 3 Bar
J Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. McMurry, 967 P.2d 633, 634 (Colo. App. 1998). All that matters is
that competent evidence in the record supports the decision of the BOCC to grant the Sign Appeal.
8 Courts variously call the required evidence “competent evidence,” “substantial evidence,” or some combination of
the two. For clarity, “competent evidence is the same as substantial evidence.” Colorado Mun. League v. Mountain
States Tel. & Tel. Co., 759 P.2d 40, 44 (Colo. 1988). This Brief will use the phrase “competent evidence” to describe
the required standard.
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Third, the reviewing court cannot interfere with a quasi-judicial decision-maker’s
application of its own standards absent “a clear abuse of discretion.” O’Dell, 920 P.2d at 50. To
County regulations, the Court must apply “the general canons of statutory interpretation.” Sierra
Club v. Billingsley, 166 P.3d 309, 312 (Colo. App. 2007) (quoting City of Colorado Springs v.
Securcare Self Storage, Inc. 10 P.3d 1244, 1248-49 (Colo. 2000)). Among those canons are: (1)
courts must “give effect to the intent of the legislative body,” looking to “the plain language of the
ordinance;” (2) regulatory “language should not be subjected to a strained or forced interpretation;”
and (3) if there is ambiguity, the agency’s “interpretation will be accepted if it has a reasonable
basis in law and is warranted by the record.” Id. Additionally:
“statutory terms should be construed in a manner that avoids constitutional
infirmities. Thus, if a statute is capable of alternative constructions, one of which
is constitutional, then the constitutional interpretation must be adopted.”
People v. Iannicelli, 2019 CO 80 ¶ 22 (quoting People v. Zapotocky, 869 P.2d 1234, 1240 (Colo.
1994)).
V. ARGUMENT
A. The BOCC’s Decision is Supported by Competent Evidence in the Record.
The record is full of competent evidence that supports the BOCC’s decision. The
Application and Hearing Testimony lay it all out. Every single County Commissioner accepted the
evidence as adequate. The Hearing Testimony shows that the County Commissioners have, as the
law requires, “reasonable minds.” The BOCC was well-prepared, thoughtful, and deliberative, and
on this record, its unanimous decision cannot be overturned.
A sampling of the record, showing how each applicable standard was satisfied with
competent evidence, follows--
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1. “Approval of the appeal is consistent with the purpose and intent of this code.”
(LUC § 22.2.5.A.) The Application and Hearing Testimony showed that the Harmony Sign is
consistent with the purposes expressed in LUC § 10.1. First, the record shows that the Harmony
Sign is consistent with the purpose to protect “the health, safety and welfare of the public” because
granting the appeal: (a) protects constitutional rights (a first-order priority for government); (b)
optimizes the safety and visibility of sign when viewed from the adjacent street; (c) provides
approximately $1,000,000 for public schools; (d) creates opportunities for local businesses and
nonprofits; and (e) and allows for the display of public service announcements and emergency
alerts. (e.g., R. Vol. I at 112). Any one of those reasons would have met the legal standard for
“competent evidence” in its own right, but StreetMedia took it even further and submitted an
executive summary of a peer-reviewed empirical study to support the proposition that the sign will
not have a negative impact on public safety. (R. Vol. I at 78-80).
The record shows further that the Harmony Sign is consistent with the Sign Code’s purpose
to “provide the public and property owners with an opportunity for safe and effective identification
of uses and locations within county.” (R. Vol. V, LUC § 10.1). StreetMedia’s narrative explains
that one purpose of the Harmony Sign is to “create a space for local businesses and noncommercial
entities to advertise their presence and location . . .” in an “evenhanded way.” (R. Vol. I at 25, 28).
It also explains that the proposed setbacks, dimensions, and height of the Harmony Sign improve
its safety and effectiveness (R. Vol. I at 37; Vol. II at 60 -61) and that they “strike a reasonable
balance among considerations of safety, esthetic, and legibility along a major regional
thoroughfare . . . .” (R. Vol. II at 57).
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Finally, the record shows that the Sign Code’s purpose to “avoid clutter and protect and
maintain the visual appearance and property values of the agricultural, residential, business,
commercial and industrial areas of the county” is also advanced by the Sign Appeal. Competent
evidence and testimony were presented as to how approval of the Sign Appeal would reduce sign
clutter directly by resulting in the removal of five existing signs (eight sign faces total) in exchange
for the Harmony Sign, and, further, how the Harmony Sign would be constructed with high quality
materials and state-of-the-art technology. (R. Vol. I. at 9, 23-25, 29-30, 32, 34, 36-39, 45-46, 52-
61, 112; Vol. II at 3-4, 61, 72-74). This led Commissioner Donnelly to specifically point out:
. . . this proposal will actually do more to bring the Code into the reality that we would like
to see for the future than almost anything you can do. And so, this is a very positive -- this
is very positive event for beautifying Larimer County roadways, for still giving opportunity
for small business to be able to communicate with the potential customers, especially a
time like this, when we’re struggling with worldwide pandemic that’s keeping people in
their homes.
(R. Vol. II. at 73). The evidence is competent and plentiful. The BOCC’s decision as to LUC §
22.2.5.A. is fully supported in the record.
2. “There are extraordinary or exceptional circumstances on the site which would
result in a peculiar or undue hardship on the property owner if section 10 of this code is strictly
enforced.” (LUC § 22.2.5.B.) The Application and Hearing Testimony show that: (a) granting the
appeal would protect First Amendment rights (a First Amendment violation would be a “hardship,”
as “loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes
irreparable injury.” Pacific Frontier v. Pleasant Grove City, 414 F.3d 1221, 1235 (10th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976))) (R. Vol. I at 27); and (b) the “elevation of
Harmony Road increases from West to East as the road crosses over Interstate 25,” such that
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“views to the site are limited,” and that Harmony Road is “approximately 150 feet wid e” at this
location. (R. Vol. I at 22, 35). StreetMedia testified to the BOCC about how those facts
demonstrated that its proposal met the applicable standard:
This site is located in a bowl, as the Commission pointed out, next to an elevated roadway
[and] an interstate. The adjacent street is a regional thoroughfare. So the physical situation
is the classic case, in fact, for a variance, or an appeal.
(R. Vol. II at 46). The evidence is competent and plentiful. The BOCC’s decision as to LUC §
22.2.5.B. is also fully supported in the record.
3. “Approval of the appeal would not result in an economic or marketing advantage
over other businesses which have signs which comply with section 10 of this code.” (LUC §
22.2.5.C.) The Application and Hearing Testimony show that: (a) the presence of a billboard in
this location tends to “level the playing field” among local businesses, nonprofits, and others who
may otherwise have a locational disadvantage with respect to signage (R. Vol. I at 28, 35, 43, 50,
112; Vol. II at 61); (b) LUC § 22.2.5.C. should be applied to enhance competition in outdoor
advertising, rather than to preserve the market hegemony of the major outdoor advertising
company that controls the vast majority of billboard advertising in Larimer County (R. Vol. I at
28; Vol. II at 47); (c) StreetMedia’s proposal actually shrinks StreetMedia’s sign inventory in
Larimer County (R. Vol. I at 29); and (d) the variations in height, setback, and sign area provide
for visibility that is comparable to signs that comply with LUC § 10, but are installed in other
locations that have fewer contextual challenges (R. Vol. II at 61). Based on that competent
evidence, each member of the BOCC accepted that this standard was met (R. Vol. II at 70, 73; 77;
79-80).
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The evidence is competent and plentiful. The BOCC’s decision as to LUC § 22.2.5.C. is
fully supported in the record. Since there is competent evidence in the record to support every
standard the BOCC applied to grant the Sign Appeal, the BOCC’s decision must be upheld.
B. The BOCC correctly applied the correct law, and therefore did not abuse its discretion.
The City asks this Court to rewrite the applicable standards so that it can argue that the
BOCC misapplied them and abused its discretion. The BOCC correctly applied the correct law.
StreetMedia addresses each criterion in turn:
1. “Approval of the appeal is consistent with the purpose and intent of this code.”
(LUC § 22.2.5.A.) The City acknowledges that the purpose and intent of the Sign Code is set out
in LUC § 10.1. (Pl.’s Opening Br. at 2). It also admits that LUC § 10.1 is “applicable.” Id. The
plain text of LUC § 10.1 is in this record. (R. Vol. V, LUC § 10.1).
Yet in spite of its own admission and record citation, the City dismisses the plain text of
the LUC and urges the Court that “the only statement contained in the Record concerning the
purposes and standards of the LUC to apply this criterion is what County Staff provided as the
intent and purpose of Larimer County’s sign regulations.” (Pl.’s Opening Br. at 18). According to
the City, this Court should also disregard the plain language of the LUC and find that the intent is
of the Sign Code is “to not allow off-premise signs.” Id. That is a strained (and unconstitutional)
interpretation of LUC § 10.1. The BOCC appropriately refused to apply that interpretation, and
this Court should do the same.
The City’s Opening Brief does not stop there. Instead, it proceeds to “jump the shark.” It
argues that this Court should write at least a half-dozen more entirely new (and entirely self-
serving) “criteria” into LUC § 22.2.5, including: (1) the City’s Harmony Gateway Plan; (2) the
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City’s standards for off-premises billboards; (3) the City’s draft Harmony Corridor Standards and
Guidelines for the Harmony Gateway Area (which had not even been adopted by the City yet); (4)
an “intent” in the LUC to “have sign regulations consistent with the regulations adopted by the
City of Fort Collins and the City of Loveland”; (5) an intent “to reduce the potential for
nonconformities should signs permitted in unincorporated Larimer County [be] annexed to one of
those cities”; and (6) a requirement that the BOCC make a specific finding to justify allowing an
off-premise message on a sign “when no off-premises signs have been allowed since June 15,
1992.” (Pl.’s Opening Br. at 6, 19). The Opening Brief does not (and cannot) recite any principle
of law that would allow the Court to rewrite the plain text of the County’s LUC in this manner.
In Hearing Testimony, StreetMedia advised the BOCC that the purpose statements that are
actually in the LUC control the application of LUC § 22.2.5., and that the County cannot legally
tack on additional criteria on an ad hoc basis. (R. Vol. II at 42, citing City of Lakewood v. Plain
Dealer Pub. Co. 486 U.S. 750, 758 (1988) (“express standards” are required, and “post hoc
rationalizations” are not allowed.)). The BOCC then appropriately declined County Staff’s
invitation to apply criteria that were not specifically set out in the LUC. The BOCC appli ed the
plain text of the LUC, and despite the City’s unsupportable objection on this point (Pl.’s Opening
Br. at 18), the BOCC has no obligation to make a specific finding that its code means what it says.
The BOCC considered extensive competent evidence that detailed how every component
of the Sign Appeal is, in fact, consistent with the purpose and intent of the code—according to the
formally adopted plain text of the code itself. (e.g., R. Vol. I at 25-27, 29-35, 36-42, 44-49; R.
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Vol. II. at 37-40, 43-44, 46, 55-59, 60-61).9 As such, the BOCC correctly applied the correct law
and did not abuse its discretion.
2. “There are extraordinary or exceptional circumstances on the site which would
result in a peculiar or undue hardship on the property owner if section 10 of this code is strictly
enforced.” (LUC § 22.2.5.B.) The City urges the Court again rewrite the LUC by accepting the
County Staff’s position that “compelling evidence” is required in order to demonstrate compliance
with LUC § 22.2.5.B. (Pl.’s Opening Br. at 9, 12). The actual standard of proof as to LUC §
22.2.5.B. is set out unambiguously in the LUC. It is “preponderance of the evidence.” (R. Vol. V,
LUC § 22.2.2.B.6.).
The City also urges the Court to pretend that there are legal differences between interests
of the State Land Board (property owner) and the interests of StreetMedia (its lessee) that are
pertinent to this case. (Pl.’s Opening Br. at 23). The record shows that the State Land Board has a
constitutionally mandated “duty to ‘produce reasonable and consistent income over time’ from
school lands it controls, for the benefit of public schools.” (R. Vol. I at 22). The State Land Board’s
lease with StreetMedia advances that singular (and critical) purpose by generating approximately
$1,000,000 for Colorado’s public schools over its term. (R. Vol. I at 107). The lease itself is simply
a legal document by which the State Land Board assigns a portion of its property rights to
StreetMedia during a specified term, in order to advance the State Land Board’s critical mission.
9 In an abundance of caution, StreetMedia also submitted substantial competent evidence regarding how the Sign
Appeal was consistent with the stated purposes of County’s LUC in general, as expressed in LUC § 2.3. (R. Vol. I at
26-27, 31-35, 37-42, and 45-49).
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It should go without saying that the hardships as to the use of the subject property affect its
owners and its tenant in the same way. It is intuitive. The BOCC is at liberty to reasonably construe
its regulations to recognize that. Yet the record supports the BOCC decision in any event.
There is no question that State Land Board would suffer “hardship” if the physical context
of its property prevented it from being used for outdoor advertising. The record shows that the
State Land Board leased out a portion of the property for outdoor advertising. (R. Vol. I at 107).
The record shows that the loss to the State Land Board if the lease could not be carried out due to
the “hardship” created by the “extraordinary or exceptional circumstances on the site” would be
approximately $1,000,000.
As to the “extraordinary or exceptional circumstances on the site,” StreetMedia submits
that such circumstances simply cannot be identified without reference to context in any event. The
City’s argument to the contrary (Pl.’s Opening Br. at 22) is either desperate or profoundly
uninformed. Context is everything.
Put simply, if the subject property were an island, that would be an “extraordinary or
exceptional circumstance on the site.” Yet an island cannot be defined without reference to its
context—the surrounding water. In this case, the record shows that the property is “in a bowl,” and
situated adjacent to a sloped, 150 foot wide roadway. (R. Vol. I at 35, 39, 42-43, 112; R. Vol. II at
46). This context creates the requisite “extraordinary or exceptional circumstances on the site.”
That is, unlike other sites that do not have these circumstances, a code-compliant sign installed on
the subject property would not be visible to passersby. (R. Vol. II at 25, 55, 60 (an “[e]ighteen-
foot tall sign is insufficient to overcome the visual obstruction” of the sixteen foot drop in elevation
between Harmony Road and the grade of the subject property)).
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The City’s allegation that “The Board’s application of this criterion stands in sharp contrast
to the analysis and conclusion of County Staff,” and that “The Board’s Findings and Resolution
offered no basis to depart from the reasoned and supported County Staff decision based on an
actual application of the relevant standard” (Pl.’s Opening Br. at 23) mischaracterizes the BOCC’s
authority, and amounts to a request that this Court weigh the evidence. First, it is the BOCC, not
the County Staff, that is charged with the “decision” here.10 Second, C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) does not
allow the Court to weigh evidence.
The BOCC considered the competent evidence as to LUC § 22.2.5.B. The BOCC correctly
applied the correct law as it is written. It did not abuse its discretion.
3. “Approval of the appeal would not result in an economic or marketing advantage
over other businesses which have signs which comply with section 10 of this code.” (LUC §
22.2.5.C.) LUC § 22.2.5.C. is fraught with potential constitutional problems because it could easily
be applied to improperly favor some speakers over others. See Reed, 576 U.S. at 157. StreetMedia
explained those problems to the BOCC in its Technical Report and during the public hearing. (R.
Vol. I at 27-29, 35-36, 43, 50, 112; Vol. II at 46-47, 61) The BOCC properly decided that LUC §
22.2.5.C. does not compel the BOCC to fortify the market hegemony of dominant outdoor
advertising companies. The BOCC correctly applied LUC 22.2.5.C. to the Sign Appeal.
The City argues that this court should find—based on zero competent record evidence—
that, “the result essentially gives the Billboard monopoly-type power given the long-standing
preclusion of off-premises signs and the lack of competition from other electronic billboards in the
10 To be fair, the City actually takes more than one position on this issue. Later on in its Opening Brief, the City
reverses the position referred to here. (Pl.’s Opening Br. at 27 (stating, “Larimer County’s Land Use Code allows the
Board to review and disagree with County Staff on decisions like StreetMediaGroup’s appeal.”)).
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area.” (Pl.’s Opening Br. at 25). Yet, competent record evidence shows the opposite—that the
long-standing ban on off-premise content has been to the substantial advantage of StreetMedia’s
“major competitor” that controls approximately 25 billboards in Larimer County. (R. Vol. II at
47). Ultimately, the BOCC properly relied upon that competent evidence. It is not the role of this
Court to second-guess the BOCC’s reasonable and supported determination on that point.
The City complains that “one is hard pressed to conceive of how the Board could reject
any future appeal for a billboard if this same rationale is applied to all future circumstances.” (Pl.’s
Opening Br. at 25). That may be true, but it is not at all relevant to this case. As the City ultimately
acknowledges (Pl.’s Opening Br. at 27), it is up to the BOCC to make those determinations as they
come up. As a legal point, StreetMedia submits that the County should stop regulating signs based
on content because such content-based regulations are presumptively unconstitutional. See Section
V.C.3., infra.
The BOCC appropriately found that the Sign Appeal satisfied the standard set out in LUC
§ 22.2.5.C. Its interpretation of that standard was reasonable, constitutional, and supported by the
record. The BOCC’s decision on the Sign Appeal was supported by competent evidence in the
record in all respects. Its application of the standard to the competent evidence in the record was
proper. As such, the BOCC correctly applied the correct law. There was no abuse its discretion.
As such, the BOCC’s decision must stand, and this Court should deny the relief sought by the City.
C. Threshold Issues.
On the basis of the arguments set forth in Sections V.A. and V.B., above, and the related
arguments raised by the County in its Answer Brief, the Court should deny the City’s requested
relief. There are three additional issues that have been raised in the wake of the 106 Complaint:
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(1) the 106 Complaint is moot; (2) the 106 Complaint is untimely; and (3) the 106 Complaint
demands that the Court require the County to violate StreetMedia’s First Amendment rights. As
StreetMedia understands the procedural posture of this case, these issues are still properly
presented for review. See Section III.C., supra, at 7, n. 4 and 5.
The first two issues are jurisdictional. The third requires the Court to consider (at least) the
content-based billboard ban in LUC § 10.5.E. as “void ab initio,” which means that: (1) it cannot
be applied to restrict the messages on the Harmony Sign, and (2) that any arguments about
compliance with LUC § 10.5.E. are moot.
1. The 106 Complaint is moot. As a threshold matter, this Court need not review the
record at all because the case is moot. On February 24, 2021, StreetMedia filed “Defendant
StreetMediaGroup, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint” (“Feb. 24, 2021 Motion”) on
this basis. That motion is pending. The City has the burden to prove that this Court still has
jurisdiction. See DiCocco v. Nat’l Gen. Ins. Co., 140 P.3d 314, 316 (Colo. App. 2006). On the
facts of this case, the City cannot carry its burden.
The Feb. 24, 2021 Motion details the recent history of the Harmony Sign. (Feb. 24, 2021
Motion at 2-3). The County issued a building permit for the Harmony Sign. See id. at 2. The
Harmony Sign was constructed. See id. at 2-3. StreetMedia honored its commitment to the County
to remove the other five signs (eight faces in total) that are depicted in the record. See id. at 3; (R.
Vol. I at 52 and 53). The County signed off on the final inspection of the Harmony Sign. (Feb. 24,
2021 Motion at 3). The Harmony Sign was turned on. See id. It has now been operational for
approximately three months. See id. This Court ordered dismissal of StreetMedia’s cross-claims,
at least in part, on the basis of these same facts. See Feb. 26, 2021 Order at 2.
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The questions the City raises in its 106 Complaint, and the demands it makes that the Court
declare that the County made a wrong decision, are moot. See Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Garfield
Cnty. v. DeVilbiss, 729 P.2d 353, 359-60 (Colo. 1986). It follows that the case must be dismissed
for want of subject matter jurisdiction. See C.R.C.P. 12(h)(3) (“Whenever it appears by suggestion
of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall
dismiss the action.”).
2. The 106 Complaint is untimely under C.R.C.P. 106(b). In Larimer County, sign
owners are not allowed to display “off-premises” messages unless they first successfully appeal to
the BOCC. (R. Vol. V, LUC § 10.5.E.; LUC § 22.2.2.B.). That makes the sign appeal process a
prior restraint on free speech. Mahaney v. City of Englewood, 226 P.3d 1214, 1219 (Colo. App.
2009).
Prior restraints are not unconstitutional “per se.” Id. Indeed, they are permissible if (and
only if) they include adequate procedural safeguards, including “a brief, specified time period” for
decision-making. Id. at 1220; FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 228 (1990). In this
context, “specified” means what it says—the time frame for decision-making must be specifically
set out in the regulations. If the “time is not limited,” then the prior restraint is “impermissible.”
See Mahaney, 226 P.3d at 1220.
It is well-settled that “if a statute is capable of alternative constructions, one of which is
constitutional, then the constitutional interpretation must be adopted.” People v. Iannicelli, 2019
CO 80 ¶ 22 (quoting People v. Zapotocky, 869 P.2d 1234, 1240 (Colo. 1994)); see also People v.
Hickman, 988 P.2d 628, 636 (Colo. 1999). StreetMedia has never challenged the constitutionality
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of LUC § 22.2.2.B.3., which sets out the sign appeal process that underpins StreetMedia’s approval
in this case. StreetMedia submits that LUC § 22.2.2..B.3., by itself, passes constitutional muster.
However, when LUC § 12.2.7.A. (the more generalized written resolution requirement) is
tacked onto LUC § 22.2.2.B.3., the end-product is an impermissible prior restraint. As such, either
LUC § 12.2.7.A. must be severed as-applied (as provided in the severability clause of Larimer
County Code of Ordinances § 1-12), or the Court must find that LUC § 12.2.7.A. is not a part of
the sign appeal process at all. The question is not academic, it is jurisdictional.
This Court’s jurisdiction under C.R.C.P. 106(b) turns on the selection of one of two
conflicting interpretations of the plain text of the LUC, only one of which is constitutional. The
constitutional interpretation establishes the date of “final decision” of the BOCC at June 1, 2020.
(R. Vol. I at 1). That date renders the 106 Complaint untimely. See C.R.C.P. 106(b).
3. LUC § 10.5.E. is unconstitutional (and if the City is correct that the intent of the
Sign Code is to ban off-premises signs, then the entire Sign Code is also unconstitutional). The
City’s central demand is that this Court “reverse” the BOCC decision on the Sign Appeal (Pl.’s
Opening Br. at 2), and declare that an unconstitutional, content-based regulation be strictly
applied.11 Under the LUC, “off-premises signs” and “billboards” are the same thing. (R. Vol. V,
LUC § 10.15 (“Billboard” and “Off-premise sign”)). An off-premise sign is defined as:
A sign which is used or intended for use to advertise, identify, direct or attract the
attention to a business, institution, product, organization, event or location offered
or existing elsewhere than upon the same property where such sign is displayed.
11 The City misapprehends the nature of the available relief under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4). Relief under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4)
is in the nature of certiorari. See Westlund v. Carter, 193 Colo. 129, 130 (1977); see also, Sherman v. City of Colo.
Springs Planning Comm’n, 763 P.2d 292, 297 (Colo 1988) (acknowledging that “certiorari review was available . . .
pursuant to C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4)”). If a quasi-judicial decision does not stand up to C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) certiorari review,
“all that can be done . . . is to quash or refuse to quash the proceeding complained of.” State Civil Svc. Comm’n of
Colo. v. Cummings, 83 Colo. 379, 385 (1942).
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(R. Vol. V, LUC § 10.15 (“off-premises sign”)). These signs are not defined by their physical
structure, but instead only by reference to the content of the messages they display. As such, as
Opening Brief hounds the Court to overturn the BOCC’s decision to allow an “off-premises” sign,
the Court should be aware that what is at stake is not the sign, but instead its content.
Content-based regulations are “presumptively unconstitutional.” Reed, 576 U.S. at 163. A
regulation is “content-based” when it targets speech “based on its communicative content,”
National Inst. of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 (2018) (internal
quotations omitted), that is, “the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.” Reed, 576 U.S.
at 163. Content-based regulations are subject to strict-scrutiny review, which means they must be
“narrowly tailored” to serve a “compelling governmental interest.” Id. at 171.
LUC 10.5.E. cannot survive that level of scrutiny. Strict scrutiny review has appropriately
been described as “nearly always a death knell for the [challenged] restriction.” Gresham v.
Rutledge, 198 F. Supp. 3d 965, 969 (E.D. Ark. 2016). The strict scrutiny analysis proceeds as
follows:
First, neither highway safety nor aesthetics are considered “compelling governmental
interests” for First Amendment purposes. Thomas v. Bright, 937 F.3d 721, 733 (6th Cir. 2019), reh’g
denied, en banc, cert. denied, Bright v. Thomas, 141 S. Ct. 194 (U.S. 2020); Neighborhood
Enterprises, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 644 F.3d 728, 736 (8th Cir. 2011) (“‘interests in traffic safety and
aesthetics, while significant, have never been held to be compelling.’” (quoting Witton v. City of
Gladstone, 54 F.3d 1400, 1408 (8th Cir. 1995)); Solantic, LLC v. City of Neptune Beach, 410 F.3d
1250, 1267 (11th Cir. 2005). Second, there is no relationship at all between the content of the Harmony
Sign and any legitimate purpose of the Sign Code as articulated in LUC § 10.1, let alone a “narrowly
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tailored” one.
On this record, StreetMedia provided the County with a litany of case citations and rigorous
analysis making the point that LUC § 10.5.E. is unconstitutional. (R. Vol. I at 18-20). Among the
cases cited for that proposition were Reed; Thomas; Contest Promotions, LLC v. City & Cnty. of
San Francisco, 874 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2017); Browne v. City of Grand Junction, 136 F. Supp. 1276
(D. Colo. 2015); Mainstream Mktg. Servs. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004); and City of
Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994). During the pendency of the Sign Appeal, two more cases
were decided that reinforced the proposition. See, e.g., L.D. Mgmt. Co. v. Thomas, 456 F. Supp.
3d 873 (W.D. Ky. 2020); and Aptive Env’tl, LLC v. Town of Castle Rock, Colorado, 959 F.3d 961
(10th Cir. 2020). No one provided a counter-analysis on this record. Consequently, LUC § 10.5.E.
cannot be applied, and the BOCC was right to relieve StreetMedia of its burden, even if for reasons
that do not invoke the First Amendment.
StreetMedia would leave it there, but the City’s Opening Brief mushrooms the
constitutional problem. The Opening Brief removes all doubt that this case is not about a sign. It
is about the content of the sign. LUC § 10.5.E. is the centerpiece of the City’s argument, and the
City’s pleadings do not leave the question of its censorial intent open to guesswork--
Notably absent from the Board’s Findings and Resolution is any effort to make any
findings as to why this billboard appeal should be approved when no new off-
premises signs have been allowed since June 15, 1992. The absence of any findings
by the Board on this central issue is dispositive of the Board’s failure to faithfully
interpret and apply the actual intent of the LUC’s sign regulations.
* * *
Importantly, however, nothing in the Board’s Findings and Resolution offers at all
how the existence of an off-premises billboard, given the LUC’s prohibition on
them since 1992, is consistent with the intent and purpose of the LUC.
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(Pl.’s Opening Br. at 19). The Opening Brief lays out a winding and thorny path to deprive
StreetMedia of its free speech rights and then concludes by urging that “First Amendment issue is
irrelevant to this Court’s review . . . .” Id. at 28.
The Opening Brief puts the County’s entire sign code at risk. It touts, three times, that the
County’s Staff planner testified, “The intent of the Regulations is to not allow off-premises signs.”
(Pl.’s Opening Br. at 8, 11, 18; R. Vol. II at 7). The Opening Brief then presses this Court to find
that the Staff testimony is conclusive as to the purpose of LUC § 10. (Pl.’s Opening Br. at 18
(arguing that “the only statement contained in the Record concerning the purposes and standards
of the LUC to apply this criterion is what County Staff provided as the intent and purpose of
Larimer County’s sign regulations”)).
Ironically, if the Court accepts the City’s proposition, then the Court must subject the
entirety of the LUC § 10 (“Sign Code”) to strict scrutiny review. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert,
Arizona, 576 U.S. 155, 166 (2015) (“strict scrutiny applies either when a law is content based on
its face or when the purpose and justification for the law are content based.” (emphasis added)).
LUC § 10 would fail survive strict scrutiny review because there are no compelling governmental
interests stated, and even if there were, no part of the LUC § 10 is “narrowly tailored” from a First
Amendment perspective.
Unconstitutional regulations cannot be applied by the BOCC or this Court. The BOCC
could not abuse its discretion or exceed its jurisdiction by refusing to hold StreetMedia to
regulations that are unconstitutional. In the absence of LUC § 10, StreetMedia’s rights to construct
a new sign would be limited only by the County’s adopted building and life safety codes.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, authority, and circumstances, as well as the ample
competent evidence in the record to support the unanimous decision of the BOCC on the Sign
Appeal, StreetMedia respectfully requests, in the alternative, that this Court:
1. REFUSE the relief requested by the City; or
2. DISMISS the 106 Complaint as moot; or
3. DECLARE that LUC § 12.2.7.A. is severed from the County’s sign appeal process
and DISMISS the 106 Complaint as untimely; or
4. DECLARE that LUC § 10.5.E. is facially unconstitutional and void ab initio, and
further, REFUSE the relief requested by the City on the other aspects of the Sign Appeal because
the BOCC decision is supported by competent evidence and the BOCC did not abuse its discretion
in granting the Sign Appeal; or
5. DECLARE that based on the record testimony of County Staff, the intent of LUC
§ 10 in its entirety is content-based, that LUC § 10 does not survive the resulting strict scrutiny,
and that consequently, LUC §10 cannot be applied; and Award StreetMediaGroup LLC its
attorneys’ fees and costs as may be permitted by law, and award StreetMediaGroup any other relief
this Court deems just and proper.
DATED this 2nd day of March, 2021.
FAIRFIELD AND WOODS, P.C.
s/ Todd G. Messenger
Todd G. Messenger, Reg. No. 38783
Amanda C. Jokerst, Reg. No. 47541
Attorneys for Defendant StreetMediaGroup, LLC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 2nd day of March, 2021, I filed the foregoing with the Clerk of
the Court using Colorado Courts E-Filing. I further certify that a copy of the foregoing was sent
via Colorado Courts E-Filing to the following:
Andrew D. Ringel, #24762
Hall & Evans, LLC
1001 Seventeenth St., Suite 300
Denver, CO 80202
Telephone: (303) 628-3300
Email: ringela@hallevans.com
John R. Duval, #10185
Deputy City Attorney
Claire Havelda, #36831
Assistant City Attorney
300 Laporte Ave.
P.O. Box 500
Fort Collins, CO 80522
Telephone: (970) 221-6652
Email: jduval@fcgov.com chavelda@fcgov.com
Jeannine S. Haag, #11995
Frank N. Haug, #41427
Larimer County Attorney’s Office
P.O. Box 1606
Fort Collins, CO 80522
Telephone (970) 498-7450
Email: fhaug@larimer.org; jeanninehaag@larimer.org
s/ Sharon Y. Meyer
Sharon Y. Meyer