HomeMy WebLinkAbout2017CV884 - Chayce Anderson V. Fcps Officer Jason Shutters - 172B - Exhibit BIN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Christine M. Arguello
Civil Action No. 17-cv-00884-CMA-STV
CHAYCE AARON ANDERSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
JASON SHUTTERS,
Defendant.
ORDER AFFIRMING AND ADOPTING THE NOVEMBER 19, 2019
RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE AND GRANTING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter is before the Court upon the November 19, 2019 Recommendation
(Doc. # 152) by United States Magistrate Judge Scott T. Varholak that this Court grant
Defendant Jason Shutters’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 128). Plaintiff filed an
Objection to the Recommendation (Doc. # 156), which, for the reasons described
herein, the Court overrules. The Court affirms and adopts Magistrate Judge Varholak’s
Recommendation and grants Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
The Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation (Doc. # 152) provides a recitation of
the factual and procedural background of this dispute and is incorporated herein by
reference. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Accordingly, this Order
will reiterate only what is necessary to address Plaintiff’s Objection.
Case 1:17-cv-00884-CMA-STV Document 172-2 Filed 04/28/20 USDC Colorado Page 1 of
15
2
As a result of this Court’s ruling (Doc. # 93) on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss,
only one claim remains in this case. In the remaining claim, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant, a detective for the Fort Collins Police Department, violated Plaintiff’s Fourth
Amendment rights by excessively tightening Plaintiff’s handcuffs and causing
subsequent injury. (Doc. # 61 at 23–24.) On August 28, 2015, Defendant initiated an
investigation regarding Plaintiff’s alleged involvement in a sexual assault incident. (Doc.
# 128 at 3.) Based on the investigation, a Colorado state court issued a warrant for
Plaintiff’s arrest. (Id. at 4.) Defendant arrived at Plaintiff’s location, arrested him, and
placed him in handcuffs. (Id.) A recording device in Defendant’s pocket documented his
entire interaction with Plaintiff. See (Doc. # 129).
After placing Plaintiff in handcuffs, Defendant asked if the handcuffs were too
tight. (Doc. # 152 at 22.) Plaintiff responded, “[n]o, that’s fine, completely fine.” (Id.)
Defendant then checked the handcuffs, found one to be too loose, and tightened it.
(Doc. # 133-4 at 11.)
Next, Defendant double locked the handcuffs. Defendant explained to Plaintiff
that the purpose of double locking was to prevent the handcuffs from tightening further.
(Id. at 12.) Then, Defendant checked the handcuffs “by inserting [his] index finger
between the side of [Plaintiff’s] wrist and the handcuff.” (Doc. # 128-1 at 10.) Plaintiff did
not resist arrest, and there is no evidence of conflict between Plaintiff and Defendant
during the handcuffing. (Doc. # 128 at 4.) Subsequently, Defendant placed Plaintiff in
Officer Andrew Edmonds’ (“Officer Edmonds”) patrol car. (Doc. # 152 at 4.)
Case 1:17-cv-00884-CMA-STV Document 172-2 Filed 04/28/20 USDC Colorado Page 2 of
15
3
The interaction between Plaintiff and Defendant, as heard in the audio recording,
lasted approximately three minutes. See (Doc. # 129). In his Recommendation,
Magistrate Judge Varholak correctly observed that “[d]uring the several minute
interaction between Defendant and Plaintiff, Plaintiff never once complained about tight
handcuffs or wrist pain.” (Doc. # 152 at 12.)
Officer Edmonds took Plaintiff to the Fort Collins Police Station. (Id. at 14.)
Plaintiff first complained of wrist pain and tight handcuffs in the car with Officer
Edmonds. (Id.) Defendant was not with Plaintiff at that time. (Id.)
After Plaintiff arrived at the police station, officers called an ambulance for
Plaintiff due to his complaints of wrist pain. (Doc. # 133 at 4–5.) The ambulance took
Plaintiff to Poudre Valley Hospital, where he was examined by Physician’s Assistant
Erin Carnahan. (Id.) Mr. Carnahan noted no trauma, swelling, or redness upon
examining Plaintiff. (Doc. # 128-1 at 36–37.) Instead, Mr. Carnahan’s assessment was
that Plaintiff did not suffer any injury to his wrists. (Id.)
Based on the aforementioned facts, Defendant moved for summary judgment on
July 5, 2019. (Doc. # 128.) Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s remaining claim for use of
excessive force fails as a matter of law for three reasons: (1) the force used by
Defendant was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, (2) Plaintiff has
failed to demonstrate that his injuries were more than de minimis, and (3) Defendant is
entitled to qualified immunity for his actions pertaining to the Plaintiff. (Id.) Defendant’s
Case 1:17-cv-00884-CMA-STV Document 172-2 Filed 04/28/20 USDC Colorado Page 3 of
15
4
Motion for Summary Judgment has been fully briefed. See (Doc. ## 133, 136, 137-1,
147).1
On November 19, 2019, Magistrate Judge Varholak issued his Recommendation
that the Court grant Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. # 152.) Plaintiff
subsequently filed his Objection on December 3, 2019, asserting that “whether
Defendant knew or was made aware that [Plaintiff’s] handcuffs were too tight remains a
disputed material fact precluding summary judgment.” (Doc. # 153 at 6.) Defendant filed
a Response to Plaintiff’s Objection (Doc. # 157) on December 19, 2019, and Plaintiff
filed a Reply (Doc. # 158) on December 31, 2019.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. REVIEW OF A RECOMMENDATION
When a magistrate judge issues a recommendation on a dispositive matter,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(3) requires that the district judge “determine de
novo any part of the magistrate judge’s [recommended] disposition that has been
properly objected to.” An objection is properly made if it is both timely and specific.
United States v. One Parcel of Real Property Known As 2121 East 30th Street, 73 F.3d
1057, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996). In conducting its review, “[t]he district judge may accept,
reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the
matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
1 Both Plaintiff’s Surreply to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant’s
Surresponse in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Surreply were filed with the permission of the Court.
(Doc. # 146); CMA Civ. Practice Standard 7.1A(d)(4).
Case 1:17-cv-00884-CMA-STV Document 172-2 Filed 04/28/20 USDC Colorado Page 4 of
15
5
In the absence of a timely objection, however, “the district court may review a
magistrate [judge’s] report under any standard it deems appropriate.” Summers v. Utah,
927 F.2d 1165, 1167 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985)
(stating that “[i]t does not appear that Congress intended to require district court review
of a magistrate’s factual or legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other standard,
when neither party objects to those findings.”)).
B. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment is warranted when “the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it is essential to the proper
disposition of the claim under the relevant substantive law. Wright v. Abbot Labs., Inc.,
259 F.3d 1226, 1231–32 (10th Cir. 2001). A dispute is “genuine” if the evidence is such
that it might lead a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Allen v.
Muskogee, Okl., 118 F.3d 837, 839 (10th Cir. 1997). When reviewing motions for
summary judgment, a court may not resolve issues of credibility, and must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party—including all reasonable
inferences from that evidence. Id. However, conclusory statements based merely on
conjecture, speculation, or subjective belief do not constitute competent summary
judgment evidence. Bones v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 366 F.3d 869, 875 (10th Cir. 2004).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating an absence of a
genuine dispute of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Id. In
attempting to meet this standard, a movant who does not bear the ultimate burden of
Case 1:17-cv-00884-CMA-STV Document 172-2 Filed 04/28/20 USDC Colorado Page 5 of
15
6
persuasion at trial does not need to disprove the other party’s claims; rather, the movant
need simply point the court to a lack of evidence for the other party on an essential
element of that party’s claim. Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 644, 671 (10th
Cir. 1998) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)).
Once the movant meets its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving
party to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). The nonmoving party may not simply
rest upon its pleadings to satisfy this burden. Id. Rather, the nonmoving party must “set
forth specific facts that would be admissible in evidence from which a rational trier of
fact could find for the nonmoving party.” Adler, 144 F.3d at 671. “To accomplish this, the
facts must be identified by reference to affidavits, deposition transcripts, or specific
exhibits incorporated therein.” Id. Ultimately, the Court’s inquiry on summary judgment
is whether the facts and evidence identified by the parties present “a sufficient
disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party
must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52.
III. DISCUSSION
In his Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Varholak found that “[b]ecause
Plaintiff did not inform Defendant that his handcuffs were too tight, or that his wrists
were in pain, and has not set forth specific facts or evidence to demonstrate Defendant
should have otherwise been aware of any problems with the handcuffs, Defendant
cannot be liable for ignoring Plaintiff’s complaints and Plaintiff’s excessive force claim
fails.” (Doc. # 152 at 14–5.)
Case 1:17-cv-00884-CMA-STV Document 172-2 Filed 04/28/20 USDC Colorado Page 6 of
15
7
Plaintiff objects to the Recommendation’s conclusion that Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment should be granted as to Plaintiff’s excessive force claim.
Specifically, Plaintiff argues that a dispute of material fact exists as to whether
Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. See (Doc. # 156). Plaintiff contends that,
because a reasonable juror could infer Defendant was made aware that the handcuffs
he placed on Plaintiff were too tight, Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity.2
See (Doc. # 153). The Court disagrees.
1. Qualified Immunity Legal Standard
“[Q]ualified immunity . . . is both a defense to liability and a limited ‘entitlement
not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
672 (2009) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). Public officials are
entitled to qualified immunity “in civil actions that are brought against them in their
individual capacities and that arise out of the performance of their duties.” Big Cats of
Serenity Springs, Inc. v. Rhodes, 843 F.3d 853, 864 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting Pahls v.
Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210, 1227 (10th Cir. 2013)). Once an official has raised qualified
immunity as a defense, the plaintiff must show that: “(1) the public official violated the
plaintiff's constitutional rights; and (2) these rights were clearly established at the time of
the alleged violation.” Id. (citation omitted). Courts may consider each factor in the
2 The Court’s review is limited to the issues raised in Plaintiff’s Objection. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
Case 1:17-cv-00884-CMA-STV Document 172-2 Filed 04/28/20 USDC Colorado Page 7 of
15
8
“sequence [the court] deems best in light of the circumstances of the particular case.”
Mink v. Knox, 613 F.3d 995, 1000 n.4 (10th Cir. 2010).
The Court’s review will address only the first element of the qualified immunity
defense. Because the Court determines there was no violation of Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights, it is not necessary for the Court to address the second element.
2. Application
As to the first element of qualified immunity, Plaintiff argues that Defendant
violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by use of excessive force when handcuffing
Plaintiff. However, no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Defendant
used excessive force when handcuffing Plaintiff because Plaintiff introduced no
evidence that Defendant was, or should have been, aware of Plaintiff’s discomfort.
In his Objection, Plaintiff correctly asserts that “[i]n excessive force cases, the
Tenth Circuit precludes a finding of qualified immunity where either the officer ignored
timely complaints or was otherwise made aware that the handcuffs were too tight.”
(Doc. # 156 at 4) (citing Vondrak v. City of Las Cruces, 535 F.3d 1198, 1209 (10th Cir.
2012)). Plaintiff argues that “a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant was
aware that the handcuffs . . . were too tight because (1) Defendant further tightened the
handcuffs on [Plaintiff] after asking [him] if the handcuffs were too tight; [and] (2)
[Plaintiff] complained of wrist pain within mere minutes of the over-tightening . . . .” (Doc.
# 156 at 2.)3
3 The Court notes that Plaintiff also argues that “Defendant was kept away from [Plaintiff]
following the arrest.” (Doc. # 156 at 2.) However, Plaintiff offers neither factual evidence to
support his claim nor legal authority indicating that the evidence would be relevant.
Case 1:17-cv-00884-CMA-STV Document 172-2 Filed 04/28/20 USDC Colorado Page 8 of
15
9
As to Plaintiff’s first argument, the fact that Defendant tightened the handcuffs is
not evidence that the handcuffs were excessively tightened.
Plaintiff argues the fact that Defendant asked whether the handcuffs were too
tight is evidence that Defendant should have known the handcuffs were excessively
tight. However, Defendant’s inquiry regarding the tightness of the handcuffs only
demonstrates that Plaintiff had the opportunity to inform Defendant if the handcuffs were
unduly tight. Additionally, Defendant’s question illustrates that Defendant was mindful of
the potential risk for discomfort. Therefore, Defendant’s inquiry does not support a
finding of excessive force.
As to Plaintiff’s second argument, it is undisputed that Plaintiff complained of
wrist pain once he was in the patrol car. However, there is no evidence that Defendant
was aware of those complaints. Therefore, the subsequent complaints made to Officer
Edmonds do not support a claim for use of excessive force against Defendant. As
Magistrate Judge Varholak correctly observed, “. . . the audio recording, and other
undisputed evidence, plainly demonstrate that Plaintiff never informed Defendant of any
discomfort from the additional tightening, nor is there any other evidence suggesting
that Defendant should have been aware that the handcuffs were too tight.” (Doc. # 152
at 12.)
Because Plaintiff failed to produce any substantial evidence in support of his
assertions, Plaintiff’s excessive force claim fails. Therefore, Defendant is entitled to
qualified immunity.
Case 1:17-cv-00884-CMA-STV Document 172-2 Filed 04/28/20 USDC Colorado Page 9 of
15
10
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS that Magistrate Judge Varholak’s
November 19, 2019 Recommendation (Doc. # 152) is AFFIRMED and ADOPTED as an
Order of the Court. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Objection (Doc. # 156) is OVERRULED. It
is
FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #
128) is GRANTED.
The Clerk of the Court respectfully is directed to enter judgment in favor of
Defendant and against Plaintiff.
DATED: February 25, 2020
BY THE COURT:
_____________________________
CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO
United States District Judge
Case 1:17-cv-00884-CMA-STV Document 172-2 Filed 04/28/20 USDC Colorado Page 10 of
15
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 17-cv-00884-CMA-STV
CHAYCE AARON ANDERSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
JASON SHUTTERS,
Defendant.
FINAL JUDGMENT
In accordance with the orders filed during the pendency of this case, and
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a), the following Final Judgment is hereby entered.
Pursuant to the Order Affirming and Adopting the November 19, 2019
Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge and Granting Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 163), entered by Judge Christine M. Arguello on
February 25, 2020, it is
ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Varholak’s November 19, 2019
Recommendation (Doc. # 152) is AFFIRMED and ADOPTED. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #
128) is GRANTED. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that judgment is entered in favor of Defendant Jason
Shutters and against Plaintiff Chayce Aaron Anderson.
Case 1:17-cv-00884-CMA-STV Document 172-2 Filed 04/28/20 USDC Colorado Page 11 of
15
2
Dated: February 25, 2020.
FOR THE COURT:
JEFFREY P. COLWELL, CLERK
By:
s/ S. West
S. West, Deputy Clerk
Case 1:17-cv-00884-CMA-STV Document 172-2 Filed 04/28/20 USDC Colorado Page 12 of
15
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 1:17-CV-00884-CMA-STV
CHAYCE AARON ANDERSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JASON SHUTTERS,
Defendant.
PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF APPEAL
Notice is hereby given pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 that Plaintiff
Chayce Aaron Anderson (“Plaintiff”), by and through undersigned counsel, hereby appeals to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit from the Clerk’s Final Judgment (Dkt. No.
164) entered on February 25, 2020, which is based on the Court’s Order Affirming and Adopting
the November 19, 2019 Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge and Granting
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 163) dated February 25, 2020. This Notice
is timely pursuant to the Court’s Order granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time entered
on March 30, 2020.
Respectfully submitted this 27
th
day of April, 2020.
Case 1:17-cv-00884-CMA-STV Document 172-2 Filed 04/28/20 USDC Colorado Page 13 of
15
2
/s/ Alexandra L. Lakshmanan
Alexandra L. Lakshmanan
Christopher J. Casolaro
Travis Jordan
Heather Campbell Burgess
Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP
1144 Fifteenth Street, Suite 3400
Denver, CO 80202
Telephone: (303) 607-3500
Facsimile: (303) 607-3600
allie.lakshmanan@faegredrinker.com
christopher.casolaro@faegredrinker.com
travis.jordan@faegredrinker.com
heather.burgess@faegredrinker.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Case 1:17-cv-00884-CMA-STV Document 172-2 Filed 04/28/20 USDC Colorado Page 14 of
15
3
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 27
th
day of April, 2020, I electronically filed a copy of the
foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which
will send notification of the filing to all counsel of record:
s/Michelle R. Soule
Michelle R. Soule, Paralegal
Case 1:17-cv-00884-CMA-STV Document 172-2 Filed 04/28/20 USDC Colorado Page 15 of
15