HomeMy WebLinkAbout2018CV3112 - Sean Slatton V. Fort Collins Police Department, Todd Hopkins, Brandon Barnes And John Hutto - 098 - City Defendants' Motion To Dismiss Plaintiff's Fourth Amended ComplaintIN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 18-cv-03112-RBJ-STV
SEAN SLATTON,
Plaintiff
v.
TODD HOPKINS, in his individual capacity,
DEFENDANT BARNES, in his individual capacity,
JOHN HUTTO, in his individual capacity, and
CITY OF FORT COLLINS, A MUNICIPALITY,
Defendants.
DEFENDANT BRANDON BARNES, JOHN HUTTO AND CITY OF FORT COLLINS’
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT (ECF No. 94)
PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)
Defendants Brandon Barnes, John Hutto, and the City of Fort Collins, through their
Attorneys, Mark S. Ratner, Esq., and Hall & Evans, L.L.C., hereby submit the following as their
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint (ECF No. 94) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6):
Certificate of Conferral
Undersigned Counsel conferred with Counsel for the Plaintiff, and pursuant to the Court’s
Practice Standards, submitted a letter outlining the parties’ efforts. Furthermore, the Court granted
leave to file this Motion to Dismiss on January 7, 2020 (ECF No. 95). Counsel for the Plaintiff objects
to the requested relief. Undersigned Counsel also attempted to confer via email on January 15, 2020,
but did not receive a response. Based on previous representations, and the filing of a Fourth
Amended Complaint, it is assumed the Plaintiff still objects to the requested relief.
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I. INTRODUCTION1
Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint attempts to allege a claim against Defendant Barnes
for violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, pursuant to an “unlawful seizure” (ECF No. 94 at 15,
(“First Claim for Relief”), and in particular for a failure to intervene. The Plaintiff also attempts
claims pursuant to both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, against former City of Fort Collins
Police Chief John Hutto and the City of Fort Collins, delineated as “excessive force” (ECF No. 94 at
18 (“Second Claim for Relief”); ECF No. 94 at 21 (“Third Claim for Relief”), respectively. All of
these claims purportedly arise from an incident which occurred on December 3, 2016 (ECF No. 94,
¶ 1).
Plaintiff’s Complaint is deficient in multiple respects. In particular, the allegations on the
face of Plaintiff’s Complaint establish he was not “seized” and therefore cannot maintain a Fourth
Amendment excessive force claim. Therefore, the Plaintiff fails to comply with Federal pleading
standards established pursuant to Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). Additionally, as
to Defendants Barnes and Hutto, the doctrine of qualified immunity precludes Plaintiff’s claims
against them. Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1262 (10th Cir. 1976).
The claims against the City of Fort Collins also fail, as there are no specific allegations
identifying any custom, practice, policy, or procedure which was the moving force behind any
alleged Constitutional violation, or how any actions were purportedly taken as a result of a custom,
practice, policy, or procedure. Additionally, the Plaintiff does not provide any proper allegations
establishing that Defendants Hutto or the City acted under the Fourteenth Amendment Substantive
1 To avoid duplicative arguments as directed in the Court’s Order (ECF No. 95), these
Defendants incorporate Defendant Hopkins’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 96), including the body-
cam footage, by reference and to the extent possible.
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Due Process clause, which might “shock the conscience.”
These Defendants incorporate the “timeline of events” as set forth in Defendant Hopkins’
Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 95 at 1-2).
II. STANDARD
These Defendants incorporate by reference the Standard of Review as set forth in
Defendant Hopkins’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 96 at 2-3).
III. INCORPORATION OF OUTSIDE EVIDENCE INTO A MOTION TO DISMISS
These Defendants incorporate by reference the statement with respect to submission of the
body-cam footage and the transcript concerning the probable cause determination, as set forth in
Defendant Hopkins’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 96 at 3-5).
IV. ARGUMENT
A. Plaintiff’s First Claim For Relief Against Defendant Barnes Fails, As There Was No
“Seizure” Pursuant To The Fourth Amendment
Plaintiff’s First Claim for Relief against Defendant Barnes is predicated as an “unlawful
seizure” pursuant to the Fourth Amendment (ECF No. 94 at 15). As it pertains to Defendant Barnes,
Plaintiff seeks liability on the purported failure to intervene and prevent alleged unconstitutional
conduct in the form of preventing an unlawful restraint, (ECF No. 94 at ¶ 88) and an alleged failure
to intervene as a result of a purported lack of probable cause (ECF No. 94 at 98). (See also, ECF No.
94 at ¶ 91-95)2
. With respect to both aspects of a “seizure” as alleged in the First Claim for Relief,
2 In the Second Claim for Relief, the Plaintiff also alleges excessive force pursuant to the
Fourth Amendment, which requires a “seizure” in order to be a valid cause of action. The lack of
any seizure, however, negates Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, and any notion
Officer Barnes somehow failed to intervene even with respect to any extent the Plaintiff intends on
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Defendant Barnes incorporates those arguments set forth by Defendant Hopkins in his Motion to
Dismiss (ECF No. 96 at 5-11).
Additionally, with respect to the seizure of Plaintiff in the form of precluding an unlawful
restraint, Plaintiff was never seized as required under a proper Fourth Amendment analysis. Brooks
v. Gaenzle, 614 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2010). In Brooks, the district court “relied on the Supreme
Court's decision in Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 595-96 (1989) for the proposition a
seizure only occurs if the government's actions ‘restrain the movement of the suspect.’ Brooks, 614
F.3d at 1216. For a seizure to occur, “ (t)he government must have substantially precluded the
suspect's ability to loose himself from the government's control.” Brooks, 614 F.3d at 1216-17.
There is no seizure during the course of a foot chase because the government’s “show of authority”
did not “produce his stop.” Brooks, 614 F.3d at 1217. Here, Plaintiff alleges he fled from Defendant
Hopkins (ECF No. 94 at 7, ¶ 39) and was ultimately apprehended by “other officers” (ECF No. 94
at ¶ 42). There was no seizure and therefore no proper claim against Defendant Barnes pursuant to
the Fourth Amendment. These Defendants incorporate by reference the remaining arguments made
by Defendant Hopkins (ECF No. 96 at 5-6).
1. The Existence of Probable Cause Also Precludes Plaintiff’s First Claim for Relief
Against Defendant Barnes.
Plaintiff also bases his First Claim for Relief against Defendant Barnes on the notion probable
cause to seize Plaintiff without a warrant, was lacking. (See ECF No. 94, ¶ 85 (“There was no
probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr. Slatton had committed…any violation of
law…prior to…Barnes’ seizing Mr. Slatton and /or causing him to be seized.”); ECF No. 94, ¶ 87
(“Neither …Defendant Barnes had a reasonable belief that there was probable cause…to believe that
arguing as much. See Brooks v. Gaenzle, 614 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir. 2010) and ECF No. 96 at
2). Officer Barnes, however, is not named as a Defendant in the Second Claim for Relief.
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Mr. Slatton had committed or was about to commit any violation of law prior to …Barnes’ seizing
Mr. Slatton and/or causing him to be seized.”). Plaintiff also attempts to allege that Defendant
Barnes “made no attempt to correct the information provided to Defendant Harres in order to prevent
Mr. Slatton from being arrested…” (ECF No. 94 at 8, ¶ 47). The probable cause determination with
respect to Plaintiff’s criminal trespassing charge, negates the notion that the Officers lacked probable
cause in a manner to support a failure to intervene claim against Defendant Barnes. Generally, a law
enforcement officer has an affirmative duty to intercede on behalf of a citizen whose constitutional
rights are being violated. Mick v. Brewer, 76 F.3d 1127, 1136 (10th Cir. 1996) referring to O'Neill
v. Krzeminski, 839 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1988). In this matter, however, as argued above, there is no
Constitutional violation properly alleged, and therefore no duty exists to intercede on Plaintiff’s
behalf. In addition, Defendant Barnes incorporates by reference those arguments made by Defendant
Hopkins pertaining to the existence of probable cause and issue preclusion (ECF No. 96 at 7-11).
2. Defendant Barnes Is Entitled To Qualified Immunity.
To any extent Defendant Barnes could ever be liable for any Constitutional claim respecting
alleged individual behavior violating any right of Plaintiff, qualified immunity doctrine shields him
from any damages claimed. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982). Defendant Barnes
incorporates those arguments made by Defendant Hopkins with respect to qualified immunity (ECF
No. 96 at 11).
The only claim levied against Defendant Barnes is for a purported Fourth Amendment
violation titled as an “unlawful seizure.” “The Fourth Amendment protects ‘[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons…against unreasonable…seizures.’” Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S.
Ct. 911, 917 (2017). “A person is seized whenever officials ‘restrain his freedom of movement’ such
that he is ‘not free to leave’” Manuel, 137 S. Ct at 917.
Here, the allegations in the Complaint are devoid of any notion Defendant Barnes somehow
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restrained Plaintiff’s freedom of movement, or effectuated a seizure. As argued by Defendant
Hopkins, “(t)he relevant footage confirms Slatton never stopped moving once the officers told him
he was being detained” (ECF No. 96 at 5), and, “Slatton broke into a sprint to flee from police”
(ECF No. 96 at 4, referring to Exhibit A, and ECF No. 94, ¶ 39). There are no allegations respecting
any seizure by Defendant Barnes, and therefore his only participation was being present at the time
of the brief incident. On this basis alone, the Plaintiff has not alleged a violation of a clearly
established Constitutional right by Defendant Barnes and therefore he is entitled to qualified
immunity.
Furthermore, in order for Plaintiff to establish a separate claim for “failure to intervene”, he
must show an existing underlying Constitutional violation. Duncan v. Quinlin, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 48159 at *13 (D. Colo. April 13, 2015) citing Harper v. Albert, 400 F.3d 1052, 1064 (7th
Cir. 2005). Here, Plaintiff’s allegations fail as he does not allege, in anything other than a conclusory
fashion, an underlying Constitutional violation by Defendant Barnes. Therefore, Defendant Barnes
is entitled to qualified immunity on this basis as well.
3. Plaintiff’s Complaint Fails to Satisfy Federal Pleading Standards As To
Defendant Barnes
To state a claim for relief, a Federal complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), “that will give the
defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). At the pleading stage, it is not the defendant’s or the court’s
responsibility to guess at plaintiff’s claims. Conley, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). Robbins v. State of
Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248–49 (10th Cir. 2008). The court may not “assume that a plaintiff
can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the laws in ways
that the plaintiff has not alleged. Although the plaintiffs' pleadings are to be liberally construed, mere
conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments will not suffice.” Baumeister v. N.M.
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Comm'n for the Blind, 425 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1257 (D. N.M. 2006). Plaintiff must explain what
each defendant did to him, when the defendant did it, how the defendant’s action harmed him, and
what specific legal right the defendant violated. Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492
F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). Additionally, Federal pleading standards require Plaintiff to also
establish personal participation in conduct in which he alleges is a violation of his Constitutional
rights. See Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1162 (10th Cir. 2008).
Plaintiff offers nothing more than conclusory allegations respecting any purported action by
Defendant Barnes, which might otherwise result in a violation of Constitutional or statutory law. See
for example ECF No. 94, ¶ 87 (“Neither…Defendant Barnes had a reasonable belief that there was
probable cause…); ECF No. 94, ¶ 92 (“Defendants (sic) Barnes knew that Defendant Hopkins’
conduct toward Mr. Slatton constituted unreasonable seizures…”). See also ECF No. 94, ¶ 93-97.
Plaintiff’s inability to comply with Federal pleading standards should result in dismissal of the First
Claim for Relief against Defendant Barnes.
B. Plaintiff’s Second Claim For Relief Fails To Properly Allege Claims Against John
Hutto Or The City Of Fort Collins
Plaintiffs Second Claim for Relief attempts to allege a claim for excessive force, pursuant to
the Fourth Amendment, against both former Fort Collins Police Chief John Hutto and the City of
Fort Collins (ECF No. 94 at 18).
1. Plaintiff Fails To Comply With Federal Pleading Standards As To His Claim
Against John Hutto.
To establish liability pursuant to § 1983 against Defendant Hutto, the Plaintiff must assert
that: (i) any named individual personally participated in the conduct; (ii) exercised control or
direction over it; (iii) failed to supervise; (iv) failed to train; or (v) tacitly authorized the conduct that
resulted in a constitutional deprivation. See Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1162 (10th Cir.
2008). Plaintiff must also allege that the individual Defendant’s conduct violated a clearly
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established Constitutional or federal statutory right that would have been known by a reasonable
government official.
The allegations against Defendant Hutto are nothing more than conclusory with respect to
any participation in any conduct alleged to be a violation of Plaintiff’s Constitutional rights. The
Complaint does not properly allege anything, other than in a conclusory fashion, that Defendant
Hutto personally participated in pertinent conduct or that he exercised control or direction over any
relevant activity. For example, “…Defendant Hutto failed to properly train, supervise, and/or
discipline their employees regarding the proper use of physical restraint and force, resulting in the
use of excessive force. (ECF No. 94, ¶ 111); “Defenant (sic) Hutto’s inadequate training,
supervision, and/or discipline resulted from a conscious or deliberate choice to follow a course of
action from among various alternatives available…” (ECF No. 94 at ¶ 112); “Such failure to properly
train, supervise, and/or discipline constitutes an unconstitutional policy, procedure, custom, and/or
practice…” (ECF No. 94 at ¶ 114). There are no allegations identifying any training, supervision or
discipline that was not properly provided or inadequate, nor are there any proper allegations
identifying personal participation of Defendant Hutto. The conclusory allegations are improper, and
the Second Claim for Relief against Defendant Hutto should be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007) and Fogarty v, 523 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2008).
2. Defendant Hutto Is Entitled To Qualified Immunity
To any extent Plaintiff’s Complaint can be considered to have properly set forth allegations
against Defendant Hutto, he is entitled to qualified immunity. As with Defendant Barnes, the
Complaint is devoid of any underlying violation of a Constitutional right establishing a seizure for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Defendant Hutto incorporates those arguments made above,
and the arguments with respect to qualified immunity made by Defendant Hopkins.
3. There Are No Proper Allegations Against The City of Fort Collins
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A local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its
employees or agents. Waller v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 932 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2019) (affirming
Rule 12 dismissal); Mocek v. City of Alb., 813 F.3d 912, 934 (10th Cir. 2015). Instead, to adequately
allege municipal liability, a plaintiff must state sufficient nonconclusory facts on: “(1) official policy
or custom, (2) causation, and (3) state of mind.” Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep’t,
717 F.3d 760, 769 (10th Cir. 2013). A custom, practice, policy, or procedure must take one of five
forms: (1) a formal regulation or policy statement; (2) an informal custom amounting to a widespread
practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent
and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law; (3) the decisions of
employees with final policymaking authority; (4) the ratification by such final policymakers of the
decisions—and the basis for them—of subordinates to whom authority was delegated subject to these
policymakers’ review and approval; or (5) the failure to adequately train or supervise employees, so
long as that failure results from deliberate indifference to the injuries that may be caused. Waller,
932 F.3d at 1283. Municipal liability attaches only where “a deliberate choice to follow a course of
action is made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing
final policy” as to the subject. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986). When the
asserted policy is a failure to act, the plaintiff must show the inaction was the result of “deliberate
indifference” to citizens’ rights. Gaylor v. Does, 105 F.3d 572, 577 (10th Cir. 1997). An alleged policy
or custom must consist of much more than what allegedly happened to the plaintiff. E.g., Griego v.
City of Albuquerque, 100 F. Supp. 3d 1192, 1215 (D.N.M. 2015) (“[A]t the pleading stage, the
existence of a Monell policy is a ‘conclusion’ to be built up to, rather than a ‘fact’ to be baldly
asserted.”).
The entity, via “deliberate” conduct, must have been the “moving force” behind the alleged
injury, requiring both an action “taken with the requisite degree of culpability” and a “direct causal
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link” between the action and the alleged deprivation of rights. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520
U.S. 397, 404 (1997). But an underlying constitutional violation must exist to hold a public entity
liable. See City of L.A. v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (per curiam); Martinez v. Beggs, 563
F.3d 1082, 1091 (10th Cir. 2009). And even if a constitutional violation occurred, no municipal
liability can be pure respondeat superior. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694
(1978).
Furthermore, to impose liability, the alleged failure to train itself must amount to “deliberate
indifference” to the rights of persons with whom allegedly untrained employees interact. Connick
v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011), citing City of Canton Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388
(1989). “Deliberate indifference” is a “stringent standard” of fault, requiring proof an entity
“disregarded a known or obvious consequence of [its] action.” Id. citing Brown, 520 U.S. at 409.
In an attempt to support a claim against the City, the Plaintiff relies on conclusory allegations.
For example, “it was the custom, an actual practice of FCPS…to ratify and condone the use of
excessive force by FCPS officers.” (ECF No. 94 at 9, ¶ 52); “Defendant Fort Collins…thus knew or
had constructive knowledge, based on FCPS’s history and widespread practice of its officers using
excessive force…” (ECF No. 94 at 11, ¶ 61); Because Defendant Fort Collins…created and tolerated
a custom of deliberate indifference and continuously failed…to adequately train and supervise FCPS
officers in these areas, citizens including Mr. Slatton, were repeatedly been (sic) subjected to
violations of their constitutional rights.” (ECF No. 94 at 11, ¶ 63); “Defendant Fort Collins…fostered
‘a policy of inaction’ in the face of knowledge that FCPS officers were routinely violating specific
constitutional rights…”(ECF No. 94 at ¶ 64). Nowhere in Plaintiff’s Complaint is a specific custom,
practice, policy or procedure identified, nor is there any indication respecting a causal link between
any such custom, practice or policy and the alleged unconstitutional conduct. Furthermore, the
Complaint is devoid of a proper allegation regarding a purported violation of Plaintiff’s
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Constitutional rights, as no seizure pursuant to the Fourth Amendment occurred.
C. Plaintiff’s Third Claim For Relief Fails To Properly Allege A Substantive Due
Process Claim Against John Hutto And The City of Fort Collins.
Defendant Hutto and the City of Fort Collins incorporate those arguments made by Defendant
Hopkins in his Motion to Dismiss pertaining to “Substantive Due Process” (ECF No. 96 at 13).
Additionally, as with the other claims for relief, the Plaintiff offers nothing more than a conclusory
statement with respect to any violation of his purported Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim.
For example, “Defendant Fort Collins and Defendant Hutto failed to properly train, supervise, and/or
discipline their employees regarding the proper use of physical restraint and force, resulting in
excessive force. Defendant Fort Collins and Defendant Hutto particularly failed to properly train,
supervise, and/or discipline its employees regarding the constitutional limits on use of force.” (ECF
No. 96 at ¶ 132); cf. ¶¶ 72, 74, 111, 113 and 114; See also ECF No. 96, ¶ 135. As argued above, the
Plaintiff does not offer any specific action by Defendant Hutto, or any specific custom, practice or
policy that might support action which “shocked the conscience.” The Plaintiff does not comply
with federal pleading standards, and his claim should be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
In addition, the Third Claim for Relief is not pled in the alternative. To any extent the Plaintiff
intends to pursue both a Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claim, he is precluded from
doing so. “This case requires us to decide what constitutional standard governs a free citizen’s claim
that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making an arrest, investigatory
stop, or other ‘seizure’ of his person. We hold that such claims are properly analyzed under the
Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ standard rather than under a substantive due process
standard.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). “Where, as here, the excessive force
claim arises in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a free citizen, it is most properly
characterized as one invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees citizens
the right ‘to be secure in their persons…against unreasonable…seizures’ of the person.” Graham,
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490 U.S. at 394 (ellipses in original) referring to Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 at 7-22 (1985).
“Because the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection
against this sort of physically intrusive governmental conduct, that Amendment, not the more
generalized notion of ‘substantive due process’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims.”
Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. Plaintiff’s Third Claim for Relief must be dismissed on this basis as well.
Furthermore, to any extent Plaintiff’s Third Claim for Relief might be sufficient to state a
claim, Defendant Hutto is entitled to qualified immunity. There are no allegations with respect to
any specific conduct which violates clearly established statutory or Constitutional right. See
Tonkovich v. Kansas Bd. Of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 516 (10th Cir. 1998) citing Ramirez v.
Oklahoma Dep’t of Mental Health, 41 F.3d 584, 592 (10th Cir. 1994).
V. CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, Defendants Barnes, John Hutto, and the City of Fort Collins, respectfully
requests the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint with prejudice, and for entry of
any other relief deemed just and appropriate by this Court.
Respectfully submitted this 16th
day of January 2020.
/s/ Mark S. Ratner
Mark S. Ratner
Hall & Evans, L.L.C.
1001 17th
Street, Suite 300
Denver, CO 80202
Phone: 303-628-3300
Fax: 303-628-3368
ratnerm@hallevans.com
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
DEFENDANT BARNES, JOHN
HUTTO, AND THE CITY OF FORT
COLLINS
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE (CM/ECF)
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 16th
day of January, 2020, I electronically filed the
foregoing DEFENDANT BRANDON BARNES, JOHN HUTTO AND CITY OF FORT
COLLINS’ MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT
(ECF No. 94) PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) with the Clerk of Court using the
CM/ECF system and mailed a copy to the following:
David A. Lane, Esq.
Hellen Oh, Esq.
Killmer, Lane & Newman, LLP
1543 Champa Street, Suite 400
Denver, CO 80202
Phone: (303) 571-1000
Facsimile: (303) 571-1001
dlane@kln-law.com
hoh@kln-law.com
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
Marni Nathan Kloster, Esq.
Nathan, Dumm & Mayer P.C.
7900 E. Union Ave., Suite 600
Denver, CO 80237
Phone: (303) 691-3737
Facsimile: (303) 757-5106
mkloster@ndm-law.com
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
TODD HOPKINS
s/ Annah Hillary, Legal Assistant to
Mark S. Ratner
Hall & Evans, L.L.C.
1001 17th
Street, Suite 300
Denver, CO 80202
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