HomeMy WebLinkAbout2018CV3112 - Sean Slatton V. Fort Collins Police Department, Todd Hopkins, Brandon Barnes And John Hutto - 081 - Third Amended Complaint And Jury Demand1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 1:18-cv-03112-RBJ-STV
SEAN SLATTON,
Plaintiff,
v.
TODD HOPKINS, in his individual capacity,
BRANDON BARNES, in his individual capacity,
JOHN HUTTO, in his individual capacity,
FORT COLLINS POLICE DEPARTMENT, a municipality,
Defendants.
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THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND
______________________________________________________________________________
Plaintiff Sean Slatton, by and through his attorney David A. Lane of KILLMER, LANE &
NEWMAN, LLP, respectfully alleges for his Complaint and Jury Demand as follows:
INTRODUCTION
1. On December 3, 2016, Plaintiff Sean Slatton was attending a sorority formal
event at a private venue in Fort Collins with his girlfriend. After he was falsely accused of
having a flask and told to leave by two off-duty Fort Collins Police officers, Defendants Hopkins
and Barnes, Mr. Slatton immediately and peacefully exited the building.
2. Defendants Hopkins and Barnes followed Mr. Slatton and told him he needed to
leave the property in its entirety. Less than thirty seconds later, as Mr. Slatton was walking away
and off the property, Defendant Hopkins, for no legitimate reason, struck Mr. Slatton hard in the
lower leg with his baton. Then, less than five seconds after that, as Mr. Slatton was backing away
from the officers, Defendant Hopkins sprayed Mr. Slatton in the eyes with pepper spray. At no
point during the encounter did Mr. Slatton act aggressively toward either officer, and he posed
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no risk to their safety or to the safety of any other individual.
3. Completely afraid for his own safety, Mr. Slatton justifiably believed he had no
choice but to flee from Defendant Hopkins because the only alternative was to risk Defendant
Hopkins’ continuing use of unlawful force physical force against him, which reasonably
appeared imminent. Shortly thereafter, other Fort Collins Police officers apprehended Mr.
Slatton without any incident or resistance. The Fort Collins Police Department investigated
Officer Hopkins’ use of force against Mr. Slatton and found no wrongdoing.
4. To justify their illegal conduct, the Fort Collins Police Department—relying
solely on information provided by Officer Hopkins—charged Mr. Slatton with third-degree
trespassing, resisting arrest, and obstruction. All charges were ultimately dismissed.
5. This act of brutalization and cover-up by Fort Collins police officers follows a
disturbing pattern by officers of the Fort Collins Police Department, under the leadership of
Chief Hutto, using excessive force. Over the past few years, Fort Collins police officers have
customarily utilized objectively unreasonable force engaged in at most minor misconduct (e.g.,
third-degree trespassing, a petty offense), often injuring them. In these cases, to justify the
excessive use of force, Fort Collins police officers charge their victims with crimes lacking
probable cause. Fort Collins then finds no wrongdoing by the officers, and the cycle continues.
6. Mr. Slatton seeks to hold Fort Collins and its police officers accountable for their
unconstitutional actions. He brings this Complaint and Jury Demand to vindicate his Fourth
Amendment rights to be free from unlawful seizure and excessive force.
PARTIES
7. At all times relevant to this complaint, Plaintiff Sean Slatton was a resident of the
State of Colorado.
8. Defendant City of Fort Collins, Colorado (“Fort Collins”), is a Colorado
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municipal corporation, and enforces local and state law through its law enforcement agencies,
including the Fort Collins Police Services (“FCPS”).
9. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendant Officer Todd Hopkins was a
resident of the State of Colorado. At all relevant times, Defendant Hopkins was acting within the
scope of his official duties and employment and under color of state law in his capacity as a
police officer for the Fort Collins Police Services.
10. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendant Officer Brandon Barnes was a
resident of the State of Colorado. At all relevant times, Defendant Barnes was acting within the
scope of his official duties and employment and under color of state law in his capacity as a
police officer for the Fort Collins Police Services.
11. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendant Chief John Hutto was a resident
of the State of Colorado. At all relevant times, Defendant Hutto was acting within the scope of
his official duties and employment and under color of state law in his capacity as the chief of
police for the Fort Collins Police Services.
12. At all relevant times, Defendant Hutto was in charge of the FCPS and the
supervision of all FCPS officers.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
13. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
14. This action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States and is brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
15. Jurisdiction supporting Plaintiff’s claim for attorney fees and costs is conferred by
42 U.S.C. § 1988.
16. Venue is proper in the District of Colorado pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). All
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of the events alleged herein occurred within the State of Colorado, and all of the parties were
residents of the State at the time of the events giving rise to this Complaint.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Defendant FCPS officers unjustifiably and unreasonably seized Mr. Slatton.
17. On December 3, 2016, Plaintiff Sean Slatton was attending his girlfriend’s
sorority event at a private venue in Fort Collins.
18. Defendants Hopkins and Barnes were working off-duty at the event, but in full
uniform.
19. A woman who was working the event had heard from an attendee, falsely, that
Mr. Slatton had brought a flask into the event. The employee confronted Mr. Slatton, who told
her that he did not have a flask.
20. Either because the employee signaled Defendant Hopkins and indicated for him to
remove Mr. Slatton or because of Defendant Hopkins’ own observations of Mr. Slatton’s
discussion with the employee, Defendant Hopkins decided that Mr. Slatton needed to leave the
event.
21. Defendants Hopkins and Barnes approached Mr. Slatton, and Defendant Hopkins
instructed him to leave.
22. Mr. Slatton calmly and immediately complied with Defendants’ request.
23. As Mr. Slatton was walking toward the exit of the building, Defendants Hopkins
and Barnes followed Mr. Slatton through the venue.
24. Mr. Slatton exited the building and began ordering a car service to drive him back
to the hotel where he was staying.
25. Defendant Hopkins and Defendant Barnes followed Mr. Slatton when he exited
the building. Defendant Hopkins immediately asked Mr. Slatton “what was the property part you
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didn’t understand,” referring to the instruction to leave the property. Mr. Slatton responded that
he was “waiting for his ride.”
26. Defendant Hopkins told Mr. Slatton he needed to leave the property in its entirety,
and Mr. Slatton responded, “ok, I will.” But before giving Mr. Slatton a chance to do so,
Defendant Hopkins immediately, without legal authorization to do so, demanded to see Mr.
Slatton’s identification. When Mr. Slatton asked why Defendant Hopkins was demanding his
identification, Defendant Hopkins informed Mr. Slatton that he was “detaining [him].”
27. When Mr. Slatton asked Defendant Hopkins for what he was being detained,
Defendant Hopkins responded, “[f]or trespassing,” even though Defendant Hopkins did not have
probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr. Slatton was trespassing.
28. Mr. Slatton replied, “I’m not trespassing, I’m leaving right now,” and turned away
from Defendants Barnes and Hopkins and started walking. Defendant Hopkins then informed
Mr. Slatton, “stop, you’re under arrest.”
29. During this brief encounter—which lasted no longer than thirty seconds—
Defendant Hopkins repeatedly demanded to see Mr. Slatton’s identification.
30. Despite the lack of reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that Mr.
Slatton had committed or was about to commit a criminal offense, at no point during this
encounter did Defendant Barnes make any attempt to stop Defendant Hopkins from unlawfully
asserting authority over Mr. Slatton in order to unjustifiably restrain Mr. Slatton’s liberty.
Defendant Hopkins used violent, unjustified, and excessive force against Mr. Slatton.
31. As Mr. Slatton was walking away from Defendants Barnes and Hopkins—less
than thirty seconds after Defendant Hopkins told him he needed to leave the property in its
entirety—completely unprovoked, Defendant Hopkins attacked Mr. Slatton.
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32. Defendant Hopkins’ violent actions occurred within a minute of Mr. Slatton being
told to exit the building.
33. Approximately five seconds after Defendant Hopkins told Mr. Slatton to “stop”
walking away because he was “under arrest,” a command which confusingly was issued
approximately twenty seconds after the command to “leave” the property, which Mr. Slatton was
in the process of doing, Defendant Hopkins pulled out his baton and struck Mr. Slatton hard in
the lower leg.
34. Mr. Slatton posed absolutely no threat to the safety of Defendant Hopkins,
Defendant Barnes, or any other individual when Defendant Hopkins delivered the baton strike.
35. Clearly confused about Defendant Hopkins’ completely unjustified use of force
against him, Mr. Slatton asked Defendant Hopkins what he “[was] doing.”
36. Reasonably believing that excessive force had been used against him and that
Defendant Hopkins would continue to use excessive force against him, and in fear for his safety,
Mr. Slatton attempted to move away from Defendant Hopkins.
37. Mr. Slatton started slowly backing away from Defendant Hopkins. Without any
warning, and approximately five seconds after striking him with a baton, Defendant Hopkins
sprayed Mr. Slatton in the eyes with pepper spray.
38. Contrary to the implication raised by the warrantless arrest affidavit, which was
completed by FCPS Officer Harres based solely on information provided by Defendant Hopkins,
that Mr. Slatton acted aggressively toward either Defendant Hopkins or Defendant Barnes before
Defendant Hopkins pepper sprayed him, Mr. Slatton in fact was hobbling and backing away
from them at that time. At no point during the entire encounter with Defendants Barnes and
Hopkins did Mr. Slatton pose any risk of causing bodily harm to either officer or any other
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individual.
39. Now completely afraid for his safety, Mr. Slatton justifiably believed he had no
choice but to flee from Defendant Hopkins because the only alternative was to risk Defendant
Hopkins’ continuing use of unlawful force physical force against him, which reasonably
appeared imminent.
40. Defendant Hopkins radioed for assistance in apprehending Mr. Slatton. Defendant
Hopkins’ description of Mr. Slatton included the statement that Mr. Slatton had “OC on his face”
(OC is an abbreviation for the scientific name of pepper spray). Another FCPS officer later told
Defendant Hopkins that his description of Mr. Slatton “was fucking classic.”
41. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Slatton was contacted by other FCPS officers, who
detained him without any issues. He was compliant with their orders, although clearly in pain
and struggling to breathe because of the pepper spray. After being put into restraints, Mr. Slatton
was taken to the hospital by an ambulance.
42. Predictably, Fort Collins concluded that Defendant Hopkins had engaged in no
wrongdoing, and did not discipline him for his use of excessive force.
43. Fort Collins provided no additional training to any Defendant, or other FCPS
officers, related to the incident with Mr. Slatton.
FCPS had no probable cause to believe that Mr. Slatton committed the criminal
violations with which it charged him.
44. Later that night, Mr. Slatton was taken from the hospital to the Larimer County
Jail.
45. In complete and sole reliance on the information Defendant Hopkins provided,
Mr. Slatton was booked into Larimer County Jail on charges of 3rd Degree Criminal
Trespassing, Obstructing a Peace Officer, and Resisting Arrest. The information Defendant
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Hopkins provided Defendant Harres, who completed the warrantless arrest affidavit, did not
provide a sufficient factual basis for probable cause to support any of these charges. The
information also included several falsehoods; likewise, there are several statements in Defendant
Hopkins’ report that are clearly contradicted by the facts of the incident, such as Defendant
Hopkins’ statement that after he struck Mr. Slatton with the baton, Mr. Slatton reacted by taking
an “aggressive stance.”
46. Defendant Barnes made no attempt to correct the information provided to
Defendant Harres in order to prevent Mr. Slatton from being arrested on charges for which no
probable cause existed.
47. Mr. Slatton was released from jail in the early morning hours of December 4,
2016, on a personal recognizance bond with payment of $750. The bond conditions required Mr.
Slatton to undergo regular drug tests, for which he was required to pay.
48. All charges against Mr. Slatton were dismissed on September 14, 2017.
49. The actions of Defendants on the night of December 3, 2016, were extremely
excessive, unwarranted, and violated Mr. Slatton’s clearly established constitutional rights.
Defendant Fort Collins’ and Defendant Hutto’s policies, customs, practices, and/or
failure to adequately train and supervise FCPS officers, caused the violations of Mr.
Slatton’s constitutional rights.
50. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendant Hutto was responsible for
overseeing, training, and supervising Defendant Hopkins, Defendant Barnes, and all other FCPS
officers. Defendant Hutto was in charge of the overall management of the police department,
setting FCPS policy and practices, and ensuring all FCPS officers complied with the law and the
Constitution.
51. At all times relevant to this Complaint, it was the custom and actual practice of
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FCPS and Defendant Hutto to ratify and condone the use of excessive force by FCPS officers.
As a result, it was customary among FCPS officers to use unjustified and excessive force
because FCPS and Defendant Hutto communicated to FCPS officers that such force was
authorized and, indeed, expected, and when used would be defended or covered up by the
supervisory and municipal apparatus of the City.
52. FCPS officers have repeatedly used excessive force against individuals like Mr.
Slatton who did not threaten or resist officers. For instance, in December of 2013, FCPS officers
similarly brutalized Stanley Cropp, a sixty-one year-old man with Alzheimer’s disease and
dementia. Mr. Cropp was aggressively, unjustifiably, and unreasonably tackled by FCPS officers
while taking a walk in his neighborhood. The excessive force claims against the City of Fort
Collins and FCPS settled for $113,000.
53. In another case, on or about October 20, 2016, FCPS officers seized Dakota
McGrath, who was suspected of third-degree assault, a misdemeanor. Mr. McGrath, who had
gotten out of his car and was walking in an alleyway, had earbuds in and did not hear the officer
approach. The officer caught up to Mr. McGrath and struck him in the head or neck with a steel
baton, causing Mr. McGrath to fall to the ground, unconscious. Mr. McGrath regained
consciousness but remained on the ground, dazed, when the officer struck Mr. McGrath’s leg
multiple times with the baton, fracturing his leg in several places. The excessive force case based
on the incident settled for an undisclosed amount.
54. In July of 2016, FCPS were called to Joe Heneghan’s house for a noise complaint.
Mr. Heneghan turned down the music. The officer proceeded to search Mr. Heneghan’s home
without a warrant and without his consent, and unjustifiably and unreasonably pepper sprayed
him in the face when he refused to show officers his ID. The City of Fort Collins settled Mr.
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Heneghan’s case for $150,000.
55. As further evidence that FCPS and Defendant Hutto had a custom, practice, or
policy of tolerating and encouraging excessive force at the time of the events giving rise to this
case, incidents that occurred after Mr. Slatton was victimized in December 2016 show that such
custom, practice, or policy has continued, unabated.
56. On April 6, 2017, Michaella Surat was outside a bar in Fort Collins celebrating
her twenty-second birthday when FCPS officers were called regarding an altercation inside the
bar. When Ms. Surat approached officers who were speaking with her boyfriend, one officer told
her to “back off” and pushed her shoulder. Ms. Surat told the officer not to touch her. The officer
then grabbed and held on to Ms. Surat’s wrist and put her in a rear wristlock hold. Ms. Surat
repeatedly asked the officer why he was touching her and what she did wrong. The officer
responded by slamming Ms. Surat face-first to the ground – clearly an excessive use of force on
someone who posed no danger to the officer. Ms. Surat’s chin slammed into the sidewalk,
causing a concussion, cervical strain, and a large and painful contusion on her chin.
57. After video footage of Ms. Surat’s encounter with FCPS surfaced, FCPS
spokesperson Kate Kimble told the media that the officer used “standard arrest control.” This
statement makes explicit Fort Collins’ custom and practice of unconstitutional use of force.
58. Soon after the incident with Ms. Surat, on October 6, 2017, Kimberly Chancellor
was driving when a man on motorcycle followed her as she pulled into the parking lot of her
apartment complex. She hurried toward the building to get away from him. When the man yelled
that she was a cop and she was going to be arrested, she hesitated and stopped even though he
still had not proven that he was an officer. After Ms. Chancellor handed the officer her
identification, he put his hand on her and she flinched. He slammed Ms. Chancellor to the
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ground, put his knee in her back, and held her head to the ground, clearly an excessive use of
force on someone who posed no danger to the officer.
59. Last but not least, FCPS officers—including Defendant Hopkins—used excessive
force in an egregious incident against Natasha Patnode, a woman accused of shoplifting at a
Target store on March 29, 2018. Defendant Hopkins struck Ms. Patnode more than sixty times
with his fist or baton while she was already on the ground and restrained. Another FCPS officer
arrived and the officers tased Ms. Patnode multiple times, again while she was already restrained
on the ground. The FCPS officers’ use of force blatantly exceeded the Fourth Amendment’s
scope of reasonableness.
60. Defendant Fort Collins and Defendant Hutto thus knew or had constructive
knowledge, based on FCPS’s history and widespread practice of its officers using excessive
force and FCPS’s and Defendant Hutto’s condoning of those actions, that FCPS officers would
utilize excessive and unnecessary force against people like Mr. Slatton.
61. Defendant Hutto either (1) promulgated, created, implemented, or possessed
responsibility for the persistent and widespread practice of FCPS officers’ use of excessive force
and/or (2) made a deliberate choice to not adequately train FCPS officers in not using excessive
force when, given FCPS’s history of excessive force, he knew of the need to provide additional
or better training in this respect.
62. Because Defendant Fort Collins and Defendant Hutto created and tolerated a
custom of deliberate indifference and continuously failed, despite the obvious need to do so, to
adequately train and supervise FCPS officers in these areas, citizens, including Mr. Slatton, were
repeatedly been subjected to violations of their constitutional rights.
63. Defendant Fort Collins and Defendant Hutto fostered “a policy of inaction” in the
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face of knowledge that FCPS officers were routinely violating specific constitutional rights,
which constitutes the functional equivalent of a decision by Fort Collins and Defendant Hutto
themselves to violate the Constitution.
64. Moreover, FCPS’ and Defendant Hutto’s persistent failure to meaningfully
investigate and discipline numerous FCPS officers for their similar uses of excessive force
reflects a custom, policy, or practice of encouraging, tolerating, and/or ratifying blatantly illegal
and improper conduct. These encouragements, toleration of, and ratifications demonstrate that
such police misconduct is carried out pursuant to the policies of and regimen of training provided
by FCPS and Defendant Hutto, and that such conduct is customary within FCPS.
65. Indeed, FCPS Sergeant Moore, a supervisor who reviewed Defendant Hopkins
conduct toward Mr. Slatton, concluded that Defendant Hopkins’ use of force was within the law
and FCPS’s policy, explicitly demonstrating that the excessive force Defendant Hopkins used
against Mr. Slatton was consistent with FCPS’s policies.
66. Likewise, FCPS’s and Defendant Hutto’s deliberate and conscious failure to
correct prior constitutional violations based on similar conduct constituted an affirmative choice
to ratify the conduct, and to send a clear message in doing so to its law enforcement officers that
such misconduct is acceptable and approved. It was Defendant Fort Collins’ and Defendant
Hutto’s responsibility to properly train its officers to ensure they perform their duties correctly
and to discipline, rather than ratify and encourage, their improper conduct, so that officers can
learn from their mistakes and perform their jobs correctly moving forward, and be deterred from
engaging in misconduct that violates the constitutional rights of people with whom the police
interact. Fort Collins’ and Defendant Hutto’s failure to do so clearly communicated to FCPS’s
officers, including Defendant Hopkins, that excessive force is authorized and tacitly (or
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explicitly) encouraged.
67. Fort Collins’ and Defendant Hutto’s past ratification and toleration of similar
illegal conduct thus caused and was the moving force behind the Defendant Hopkins’s use of
excessive force against Mr. Slatton.
Defendant Fort Collins and Defendant Hutto are liable for Defendant Hopkins’s
violation of Mr. Slatton’s rights.
68. The unlawful conduct of FCPS officers amounts to a custom and widespread
practice so pervasive and well-established as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of
law.
69. Given FCPS’s history and widespread practice of officers using excessive force,
Defendant Fort Collins and Defendant Hutto knew of the need to provide additional or better
training and supervision in this respect and made a deliberate choice to not adequately train and
supervise FCPS officers in avoiding excessive force.
70. Defendant Fort Collins and Defendant Hutto knew or should have known that
their acts or omissions in this regard were substantially certain to cause FCPS officers to violate
individuals’ constitutional rights, and they consciously or deliberately chose to disregard this
obvious risk of harm in adhering to the policy and custom of failing to provide additional or
better training and supervision to FCPS officers regarding how to avoid excessive force.
71. Defendant Fort Collins and Defendant Hutto acted recklessly, intentionally, and
with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s constitutional rights because they knew that individuals
in Mr. Slatton’s position would be at a substantial risk of suffering dangerous consequences from
their failure to properly train and supervise FCPS employees.
72. Defendant Fort Collins and Defendant Hutto could have and should have pursued
reasonable methods for the training and supervising of such employees, or disciplining them if
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they engaged in misconduct, but intentionally chose not to do so.
73. Defendant Fort Collins’ and Defendant Hutto’s custom, practice, and policy of
encouraging, condoning, and ratifying excessive force, failing to act in the face of a history of
excessive force against people, and their custom, policy, and practice of failing to properly train
and supervise FCPS employees despite such history and knowledge or constructive knowledge
of such history, were the moving force and proximate cause of Defendant Hopkins’s violation of
Mr. Slatton’s constitutional rights.
74. Defendant Fort Collin’s and Defendant Hutto’s acts or omissions caused Mr.
Slatton damages in that he suffered physical and mental pain, humiliation, fear, anxiety, loss of
enjoyment of life and sense of security and individual dignity, among other injuries, damages,
and losses.
75. Defendant Fort Collin’s and Defendant Hutto’s actions, as described herein,
deprived Mr. Slatton of the rights, privileges, liberties, and immunities secured by the
Constitution of the United States of America, and caused her other damages.
Defendants’ unlawful actions against Mr. Slatton caused him significant damages.
76. Among other injuries, damages, and losses, Defendants’ unlawful actions against
Mr. Slatton caused him physical pain. In addition to the pain he experienced immediately after
the use of excessive force against him, Mr. Slatton had a large bruise on his leg from the baton
strike that took days to fade.
77. The pain and discomfort the pepper spray caused Mr. Slatton also took a few days
to fade, but his eyes remained red and irritated-looking for approximately one year, causing Mr.
Slatton to feel extremely self-conscious about his appearance.
78. In addition to Defendants’ excessive force and unlawful seizure of Mr. Slatton
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necessitating a trip to the hospital, such unlawful actions also caused Mr. Slatton to spend a night
in jail.
79. Defendants’ unlawful actions also caused Mr. Slatton significant emotional stress
and anxiety, leading him to lose weight, have problems sleeping and issues in his relationships
with his family and fiancée, and ultimately stop attending his college classes.
80. Mr. Slatton further suffered financial losses due to Defendants’ unlawful actions,
including, but not limited to, the money he was required to spend for drug testing approximately
three times per week for months and to retain a criminal defense attorney.
81. All of the acts described herein were done by Defendants Hopkins, Barnes, and
Hutto intentionally, knowingly, willfully, wantonly, maliciously and/or recklessly in disregard
for Mr. Slatton’s federally protected rights, and were done pursuant to the preexisting,
deliberately indifferent official custom, policy, practice, training, and supervision.
STATEMENT OF CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Fourth Amendment Violation – Unlawful Seizure
(Against Defendant Hopkins and Defendant Barnes)
82. Plaintiff hereby incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set
forth herein.
83. At all times relevant to the subject matter of this Complaint, Defendants Barnes
and Hopkins were acting under color of state law in their capacities as officers with FCPS and
within the scope of their employment.
84. Mr. Slatton has a constitutionally protected right to be secure in his person against
unreasonable seizures.
85. There was no probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr. Slatton
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had committed or was about to commit any violation of the law prior to Defendant Hopkins’ and
Barnes’ seizing Mr. Slatton and/or causing him to be seized.
86. Neither Defendant Hopkins nor Defendant Barnes had a reasonable belief that
there was probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr. Slatton had committed or
was about to commit any violation of law prior to Defendant Hopkins’ and Barnes’ seizing Mr.
Slatton and/or causing him to be seized.
87. By means of physical force or show of authority, Defendant Hopkins restrained
Mr. Slatton’s liberty and thereby seized Mr. Slatton.
88. Moreover, Defendant Hopkins caused Mr. Slatton to be seized by knowingly or
recklessly communicating false information to other FCPS officers who completed an
unreasonable warrantless arrest based entirely on the information provided by Defendant
Hopkins.
89. Defendant Hopkins’ actions were objectively unreasonable in light of the
circumstances confronting him.
90. As a FCPS officer, Defendant Barnes had a duty to intervene when another officer
was in the process of committing a constitutional violation against a citizen.
91. Defendants Barnes knew that Defendant Hopkins’ conduct toward Mr. Slatton
constituted unreasonable seizures, and Defendant Barnes had an opportunity to intervene to stop
the unreasonable seizures.
92. Despite his knowledge that Defendant Hopkins’ conduct toward Mr. Slatton
constituted unreasonable seizures, Defendant Barnes made a conscious and deliberate decision
not to take any action to protect Mr. Slatton from unreasonable seizure.
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93. Defendant Barnes’ conscious and deliberate decisions not to take any action to
protect Mr. Slatton from unreasonable seizures by Defendant Hopkins put Mr. Slatton at
substantial risk of suffering such seizures.
94. Defendant Barnes’ conscious and deliberate decision not to protect Mr. Slatton
from this risk was objectively unreasonable in light of the circumstances confronting him, and
caused Mr. Slatton to be subject to unreasonable seizures, resulting in substantial damages to Mr.
Slatton.
95. Defendants Hopkins and Barnes engaged in the above-described actions
recklessly, intentionally, willfully and wantonly.
96. The acts and omissions of Defendants Hopkins and Barnes were the moving force
behind and the proximate cause of Mr. Slatton’s seizures and injuries therefrom.
97. Existing law at the time of the seizures clearly established that a peace officer
violates an individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure if the
officer caused the individual to be seized without a warrant and without reasonable suspicion or
probable cause. Defendant Hopkins and Barnes knew or reasonably should have known that their
actions in seizing Mr. Slatton and/or causing Mr. Slatton to be seized, taken within the scope of
their official duties and employment, violated this clearly established constitutional right.
98. As a legal and proximate result of Defendants Hopkins’ and Barnes’ actions or
omissions described herein, Mr. Slatton has suffered and continues to suffer humiliation, lost
earnings, emotional distress, loss of enjoyment of life, and other significant injuries, damages
and losses.
99. In addition to compensatory, economic, consequential and special damages,
Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages because the actions of Defendants Hopkins’ and Barnes’
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were taken maliciously, willfully or with a reckless or wanton disregard of the clearly established
constitutional rights of Plaintiff.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Fourth Amendment – Excessive Force
(Against Defendant Hopkins, Defendant Hutto, and Defendant Fort Collins)
100. Plaintiff hereby incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set
forth herein.
101. At all relevant times hereto, the Individual Defendants were acting under the color
of state law in their capacities as FCPS law enforcement officers.
102. Mr. Slatton had a protected Fourth Amendment (incorporated against the states
via the Fourteenth Amendment) interest against being unreasonably seized and victimized by the
use of excessive force at the hands of law enforcement personnel.
103. Defendant Hopkins used more force than was reasonably necessary to arrest or
gain control of Plaintiff.
104. At no time did Defendant Hopkins have a legally valid basis to seize Mr. Slatton’s
person under the circumstances and in the manner described herein.
105. Defendant Hopkins unlawfully seized Mr. Slatton by means of excessive physical
force.
106. Defendant Hopkins had no warrant authorizing any seizure of Mr. Slatton’s body.
107. Defendant Hopkins’ actions were objectively unreasonable in light of the
circumstances confronting him.
108. Mr. Slatton had committed no crime (nor could Defendants Hopkins have
reasonably believed he had committed any such crime) that would legally justify the use of such
force, he gave the officers no reason to fear for their safety, he was obviously unarmed, and he
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was not resisting arrest or fleeing at the time of the use of force.
109. Defendant Hopkins’ acts of striking Mr. Slatton’s leg with a baton and spraying
Mr. Slatton in the eyes with pepper spray constituted excessive force.
110. Defendant Fort Collins and Defendant Hutto failed to properly train, supervise,
and/or discipline their employees regarding the proper use of physical restraint and force,
resulting in the use of excessive force. Defendant Fort Collins and Defendant Hutto particularly
failed to properly train, supervise, and/or discipline its employees regarding the constitutional
limits on use of force.
111. Defendant Fort Collins’ and Defenant Hutto’s inadequate training, supervision,
and/or discipline resulted from a conscious or deliberate choice to follow a course of action from
among various alternatives available to Defendant Fort Collins and Defendant Hutto.
112. In light of the duties and responsibilities of Defendant Fort Collins and Defendant
Hutto—who were responsible for making decisions regarding when forcible restraint and use of
physical force is appropriate—the need for specialized training, supervision and discipline
regarding such decisions was so obvious, and the inadequacy of appropriate training and/or
supervision was so likely to result in a violation of constitutional rights, such as those described
herein, that Defendant Fort Collins and Defendant Hutton are liable for their failure to properly
train, supervise, and/or discipline their subordinate employees and agents.
113. Such failure to properly train, supervise, and/or discipline constitutes an
unconstitutional policy, procedure, custom, and/or practice. It was a moving force behind and
proximate cause of Defendant Hopkins’ use of excessive force against Mr. Slatton.
114. Each Defendant’s acts or omissions described herein, including the
unconstitutional policy, procedure, custom and/or practice described herein, were the legal and
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proximate cause of Mr. Slatton’s damages.
115. At the time when Defendant Hopkins used excessive force against Mr. Slatton
and Defendant Hutto’s conduct set in motion a series of events that he knew would cause an
individual in a similar situation as Mr. Slatton to be the victim of excessive force, Mr. Slatton
had a clearly established constitutional right under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution to be secure in his person from unreasonable seizure through excessive force.
Defendant Hopkins knew or reasonably should have known that his actions in seizing Mr.
Slatton via excessive force, taken within the scope of his official duties and employment,
violated this clearly established constitutional right, and Defendant Hutto knew or reasonably
should have known that his actions setting in motion a series of events that he knew would cause
an individual in a similar situation as Mr. Slatton to be the victim of excessive force, taken
within the scope of his official duties and employment, violated Mr. Slatton’s clearly established
constitutional right to be free from excessive force.
116. The Individual Defendants’ actions, as described above, were motivated by intent
to harm Mr. Slatton.
117. The Individual Defendants’ actions, as described herein, were undertaken
intentionally, maliciously, willfully, wantonly, and/or in reckless disregard of, or with deliberate
indifference to, of Mr. Slatton’s clearly established constitutional rights.
118. As a legal and proximate result of Defendants’ actions or omissions described
herein, Mr. Slatton has suffered and continues to suffer pain and suffering, emotional distress,
and other significant injuries, damages and losses.
119. In addition to compensatory, economic, consequential and special damages,
Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages because the actions of Defendants were taken
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maliciously, willfully or with a reckless or wanton disregard of Mr. Slatton’s clearly established
constitutional rights.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court enter judgment in his favor
and against Defendants, and award him all relief as allowed by law and equity, including, but not
limited to the following:
a. Declaratory relief and injunctive relief, as appropriate;
b. Actual economic damages as established at trial;
c. Compensatory damages, including, but not limited to those for past and future
pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses, physical and mental pain, humiliation, fear,
anxiety, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of liberty, privacy, and sense of security
and individual dignity, and other non-pecuniary losses;
d. Punitive damages for all claims as allowed by law in an amount to be determined
at trial;
e. Issuance of an Order mandating appropriate equitable relief, including but not
limited to:
i. Issuance of a formal written apology from each Defendant to Plaintiff;
ii. The imposition of appropriate policy changes designed to avoid future
similar misconduct by Defendants;
iii. Mandatory training designed to avoid future similar misconduct by
Defendants;
f. Pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at the highest lawful rate;
g. Attorney’s fees and costs; and
h. Such further relief as justice requires.
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PLAINTIFF DEMANDS A JURY TRIAL ON ALL ISSUES SO TRIABLE.
DATED this 30th day of October 2019.
KILLMER, LANE & NEWMAN, LLP
s/ David A. Lane
___________________________
David A. Lane
1543 Champa Street, Suite 400
Denver, Colorado 80202
Phone: (303) 571-1000
Facsimile: (303) 571-1001
dlane@kln-law.com
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
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