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Home My WebLink About2023-cv-1343 - Elias v. City of Fort Collins, et al. - 119 - Order1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO Judge Gordon P. Gallagher Civil Action No. 23-cv-01343-GPG-KAS HARRIS ELIAS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF FORT COLLINS, JASON HAFERMAN, and SERGEANT ALLEN HEATON, Defendants. ORDER Before the Court is Defendants City of Fort Collins and Sergeant Allen Heaton’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint [ECF 88] Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and Request for Qualified Immunity (Motion) (D. 98). For the reasons set forth below, GRANTS- IN-PART and DENIES-IN-PART the Motion. This lawsuit is among several civil rights lawsuits filed in this District related to the alleged wrongful driving under the influence (DUI) arrests made by defendant and former Fort Collins Police Officer Jason Haferman (see D. 88). Defendant Sergent Allen Heaton was allegedly Haferman’s supervisor during the period the arrests took place (id. at ¶ 11). Plaintiff Harris Elias alleges numerous DUI arrests were made by Haferman without probable cause and that Heaton was aware that Haferman was making arrests without probable cause (id.). Plaintiff alleges that he was wrongfully arrested for DUI by Haferman and, thereafter, Haferman conspired with Heaton Case No. 1:23-cv-01343-GPG-KAS Document 119 filed 12/09/24 USDC Colorado pg 1 of 6 2 to require Plaintiff to submit to a blood test and to prolong his confinement (id. at ¶¶ 102–09, 147– 54). Plaintiff brings claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983 and for violations of the Colorado state law and the Colorado Constitution.1 The Motion requests only partial dismissal of Plaintiff’s operative Second Amended Complaint (Complaint) (D. 88), requesting dismissal of the claims against Defendant City of Fort Collins (the City) brought pursuant to Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and the claims against Heaton (D. 98 at 16). Movants argue that Plaintiff has not stated a Monell claim against the City (id. at 13–15) and that Heaton is entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to clearly show that Heaton has personally violated Plaintiff’s rights (id. at 4–13). Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true and interpreted in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Additionally, the complaint must sufficiently allege facts supporting all the elements necessary to establish an entitlement to relief under the legal theory proposed; however, a complaint may be dismissed because it asserts a legal theory not cognizable as a matter of law. Forest Guardians v. Forsgren, 478 F.3d 1149, 1160 (10th Cir. 2007); Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1217 (D. Colo. 2004). A claim is not plausible on its face “if [the allegations] are so general that they encompass 1 Plaintiff notes in his Response that “Plaintiff’s subheading for [his fifth] claim in error stated that the claim was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985; this was meant to say pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983” (D. 103 at 14). Case No. 1:23-cv-01343-GPG-KAS Document 119 filed 12/09/24 USDC Colorado pg 2 of 6 3 a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent,” and the plaintiff has failed to “nudge[ the] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). In assessing a claim’s plausibility, legal conclusions contained in the complaint are not entitled to the assumption of truth. See Kansas Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 2011). The standard, however, remains a liberal pleading standard, and “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Dias v. City & Cty. of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169, 1178 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Regarding the Monell claims against the City, local governing bodies and local officials sued in their official capacities can be sued directly under § 1983 where “the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. However, a “local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.” Id. at 694. To state a claim for municipal liability under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege: “(1) that a municipal employee committed a constitutional violation; and (2) that a municipal policy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional deprivation.” Jiron v. City of Lakewood, 392 F.3d 410, 419 (10th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Other judges in this District have already found that almost identical claims regarding the same alleged circumstances were sufficient to state claims for Monell liability. Cunningham v. City of Fort Collins, No. 23-cv-01342-CNS-SBP, 2024 WL 1281514, at *6 (D. Colo. Mar. 26, 2024) (“A clear pattern or history of a single officer's DUI charges being dismissed for lack of Case No. 1:23-cv-01343-GPG-KAS Document 119 filed 12/09/24 USDC Colorado pg 3 of 6 4 probable cause may demonstrate a high likelihood of similar future unconstitutional DUI arrests unless that officer is supervised differently.”); Erbacher v. City of Fort Collins, No. 23-cv-01341- CNS-NRN, 2024 WL 1701762, at *6 (D. Colo. Apr. 19, 2024) (“deliberate indifference to the need for supervision may be inferred by a pattern of tortious conduct or where complaints or other clear warning signs are followed by no meaningful attempt on the part of the municipality to investigate or to forestall future incidents” (cleaned up)); Sever v. City of Fort Collins, No. 23-cv-01344- NYW-NRN, 2024 WL 3345285, at *6 (D. Colo. July 9, 2024) (“Here, the sheer volume of DUI charges originating from Officer Haferman that were allegedly dismissed after chemical testing came back negative for any drugs or alcohol alone suggests the need for review of his performance during DUI arrests and implementation of any necessary corrective measures.”). The Court finds these decisions persuasive and, for the same reasons, finds that Plaintiff’s Monell claims also pass muster by alleging sufficient factual matter to believe that a municipal policy or custom of the City caused the alleged constitutional violations by its employee Haferman. Regarding the claims against Heaton, the Court will address his qualified immunity defense because it is dispositive. Qualified immunity is immunity from suit and not a mere defense to liability. Estate of Reat v. Rodriguez, 824 F.3d 960, 964 (10th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). Thus, at this stage of the litigation, the plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of a constitutional right and (2) the right must be clearly established at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct. Keith v. Koerner, 707 F.3d 1185, 1188 (10th Cir. 2013). “The factual allegations must be specific and non-conclusory, and sufficient for a district court to determine that those facts, if proved, demonstrate the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity.” Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 912 (10th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotations omitted). Asserting qualified immunity via Case No. 1:23-cv-01343-GPG-KAS Document 119 filed 12/09/24 USDC Colorado pg 4 of 6 5 a motion to dismiss “subjects a defendant to a more challenging standard of review than would apply on summary judgment.” Peterson v. Jensen, 371 F.3d 1199, 1201 (10th Cir. 2004). Binding authority “place[s] the burden on the plaintiffs to negate a qualified-immunity defense.” Sanchez v. Guzman, 105 F.4th 1285, 1294 (10th Cir. 2024) (citations omitted). The Court turns to the second, “clearly established” prong of the qualified immunity inquiry first. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (“The judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.”). Plaintiff argues generally that the right to be free of unreasonable seizure, the right to not be maliciously prosecuted, and the right to be free of unreasonable search are clearly established, but he does not cite authority involving analogous circumstances from this Circuit or the Supreme Court (D. 103 at 16–18). Such general arguments are insufficient to carry Plaintiff’s burden. Sanchez, 105 F.4th at 1296 (“the clearly established law inquiry is fact-intensive because it ordinarily focuses on determining whether there is caselaw with materially similar facts to the facts of the case before the court”).2 The cited general authority establishing these rights, which the Court has reviewed, does not contain “materially similar facts” to “make the precedent sufficiently particularized” that it “applies with obvious clarity” to Heaton’s alleged conduct. Shepherd v. Robbins, 55 F.4th 810, 815 (10th Cir. 2022) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff has not shown that “Tenth Circuit or Supreme Court precedent particularized to the case at issue 2 Plaintiff does not argue that the unconstitutional nature of Heaton’s alleged conduct was so apparent that he had fair warning despite a lack of analogous authority. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002). Case No. 1:23-cv-01343-GPG-KAS Document 119 filed 12/09/24 USDC Colorado pg 5 of 6 6 exists.” Id. (citing Apodaca v. Raemisch, 864 F.3d 1071, 1076 (10th Cir. 2017)). Because Plaintiff has not overcome the defense of qualified immunity, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s federal claims against Heaton. Accordingly, this Court GRANTS-IN-PART and DENIES-IN-PART Defendants City of Fort Collins and Sergeant Allen Heaton’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint [ECF 88] Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(B)(6) and Request for Qualified Immunity (Motion) (D. 98). It is FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Claims are DISMISSED without prejudice as to Defendant Sergeant Allen Heaton. DATED December 9, 2024. BY THE COURT: Gordon P. Gallagher United States District Judge Case No. 1:23-cv-01343-GPG-KAS Document 119 filed 12/09/24 USDC Colorado pg 6 of 6