HomeMy WebLinkAbout2023CV228 - Lynne V. Yonce - 18 - Order
District Court, Larimer County, State of Colorado
201 LaPorte Avenue, Suite 100
Fort Collins, CO 80521-2761
(970) 494-3500
COURT USE ONLY
STACY LYNNE,
Plaintiff,
v.
JEREMY YONCE, in his official capacity as Internal Affairs
records custodian for Fort Collins Police Services,
Defendant.
Case No.: 2023 CV 228
Courtroom: 3B
ORDER
The Court held a show-cause hearing under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-72-305(7) of the
Colorado Criminal Justice Records Act (“CCJRA”).1 Plaintiff Stacy Lynne appeared in person and
pro se. Defendant Jeremy Yonce, the Internal Affairs records custodian of the Fort Collins Police
Services (“FCPS”), appeared in person and with counsel. Based upon the evidence presented at
the hearing, Ms. Lynne’s application, other briefing, and argument of the parties, the Court makes
the following findings of fact by a preponderance of the evidence and concludes that the Order to
Show Cause shall be discharged.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FINDINGS OF FACT.
The records dispute arose when Ms. Lynne submitted a request for release of the entire
internal investigations file of then “Assistant Chief of Police John Feyen’s Internal Affairs
1 While the Court initially construed Ms. Lynne’s application “as proceeding under § 24-72-
303(4)(f) of the CCJRA,” that’s incorrect. That provision applies to requests for inspection of
records of official action. As explained below, and with the benefit of the parties’ briefing and
evidence received at the hearing, because the records sought dealt with a criminal justice record,
involving conduct by Mr. Feyen that occurred off duty and not in uniform, the request must be
analyzed under subsections 24-72-304(1) and 24-72-305(5).
DATE FILED: December 11, 2023 9:51 AM
CASE NUMBER: 2023CV228
2
Investigation that was conducted in part by Karen Cochran and Adam McCambridge in 2022.” Ex.
1. That investigation came about when Mr. Feyen was running for sheriff. Mr. Feyen made
allegedly defamatory statements about Ms. Lynne during a Facebook Live campaign event. It’s
undisputed that when he made those statements, Mr. Feyen wasn’t in uniform and was off duty.
(The statements and circumstances under which Mr. Feyen made the ostensible defamatory
statements are detailed in an Order Regarding Defendant John Feyen’s Motion to Dismiss
Complaint Pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-20-1101, in Lynne. v. Feyen, No. 2022CV30685.)
That Order was attached to Ms. Lynne’s CCJRA request and was available for the FCPS custodian
to review. Ex. 1.
Feeling aggrieved by Mr. Feyen’s statements, Ms. Lynne filed a complaint against him with
FCPS, which caused the police to initiate an internal affairs (“IA”) investigation. In April 2022,
FCPS informed Ms. Lynne that it had completed the IA investigation into Mr. Feyen, concluding
apparently that he hadn’t “violated applicable FCPS policy.” Exs. 3 and 8.
Separately, in October 2022, Ms. Lynne sued Mr. Feyen, asserting, as relevant here, a
claim for defamation per se for statements that “[Mr. Feyen] made on February 2, 2022, at a
candidate forum for election of Larimer County Sheriff in front of a live audience in addition to
being live-streamed … in the capacity as a candidate for sheriff; and for a Facebook post … posted
on June 10, 2022, … on the John Feyen for Larimer Sheriff Facebook page.” Ex. 1, Ord. at 1–2.
In that Order, Judge Findley concluded, after conducting an evidentiary hearing under the
Colorado Anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute, that Ms. Lynne had
“shown a reasonable likelihood of success established by clear and convincing evidence that [Mr.
Feyen]’s statements were defamatory per se and made with actual malice.” Id. at 9. The action is
presently set for a jury trial in March 2024 but Mr. Feyen has moved for summary judgment on the
defamation claim. The motion is pending adjudication.
3
On March 6, 2023, Ms. Lynne submitted a written CCJRA request for production of the
internal affairs’ investigation file that she had triggered to FCPS. Ex. 1. Nearly three weeks later, Lt.
Jeremy Yonce, the custodian of the CCJRA records, sent her a written response denying her
request to produce the records. In his letter, Lt. Yonce initially found that FCPS is a “criminal
justice agency” and that the internal affairs’ investigation file Ms. Lynne requested is a “criminal
justice record,” both under the CCJRA. Ex. 3 at 1. He denied, however, that the file sought is a
public record under the Colorado Open Records Act (“CORA”) and didn’t conduct any analysis
under that statute.2 Id.
Lt. Yonce also construed Ms. Lynne’s request under §§ 24-72-304(1) and 24-72-305(5) of
the CCJRA because Mr. Feyen wasn’t in uniform and wasn’t on duty when the conduct occurred.
He disagreed that the request could proceed under § 24-72-303(4)(a) because that provision
applies to requests when the peace officer is acting in uniform and on duty. Ex. 3 at 1. Lt. Yonce
then set forth the applicable factors that he must consider in considering a request under the
applicable statute. Id. at 2. Specifically, he stated he must “deny such a request if public disclosure
of it would be ‘contrary to the public interest’ and, in so deciding, the custodian is to ‘engage in
balancing the public and private interest in the inspection request’” and by considering other
additional factors. Id. Lt. Yonce’s rationale for denying the request is reproduced here verbatim:
Having considered these factors in evaluating your records request, I have
determined that the private interest in not releasing the IA file for public inspection
outweigh the public interest in making it publicly available. I conclude this based
primarily on consideration of factors 1, 2 and four above, and the additional
pertinent factors that Chief Feyen’s conduct examined in the IA file involved the
exercise of his First Amendment rights in a political campaign and he is no longer a
city employee.
First, since the conduct examined in the IA file did not occur while Chief Feyen
was in uniform or on duty, he has a strong personal privacy interest as a former city
employee in keeping this IA file private. This privacy interest is clearly recognized
2 Ms. Lynne didn’t challenge that decision.
4
in section 24-72-303(4)(a) by excluding from required disclosure those internal
investigations of officer conduct that occurred while an officer was not in uniform
and not on duty.
Second, the city and FCPS have an interest in keeping confidential the internal
investigations of the conduct of its police officers while they are off duty and out of
uniform. While the off-duty and out-of-uniform conduct of their officers can have
an adverse effect on the City and FCPS, if the conduct investigated involves an
officer’s exercise of their constitutional rights or other legal rights protected by law,
it is important that the City, as the officer’s employer, can protect those rights from
being chilled or adversely affected by the prospect of an internal investigation being
made public.
Third, you have not identified a public purpose or interest supporting the public
release of the IA file. Instead, as the court order included with your records request
reflects, you are seeking the IA file in support of the lawsuit against Chief Feyen, a
private interest, not a public interest.
Fourth, since the IA file documents the investigation of Chief Feyen’s conduct
occurring while he was exercising his First Amendment rights in a political
campaign, releasing the IA file weighs in favor of Chief Feyen’s privacy interest of
not having his former employer, the City, releasing it. The consideration of this
factor and weighing it in favor of non-disclosure is also important because it lessens
the likelihood that the City’s other employees will be chilled in the future. Probe
exercising these important rights in similar circumstances.
And finally, since Chief Feyen is no longer a city employee, there is a reduced need
for the public to be informed about his off-duty and out-of-uniform conduct
wireless city employee.
Therefore, based on the consideration of these and other factors, I have
determined that it would be contrary to the public interest to release to you the CIA
file, since the private interests involved in your records request outweigh any public
interests.
Id. at 2–3.
Several months later, in October 2023, Ms. Lynne submitted a new and broader request
for any IA investigation records for Mr. Feyen since April 2019 and for other public records of
Mr. Feyen’s while he was a FCPS employee. Ex. 4. As to the CCJRA portion of the request, Ms.
Lynne sought responsive records under both § 24-72-303(4)(a), which cover records of official
action, and § 24-72-305(5), which cover criminal justice records. Id. at 2–3.
5
In an unsigned letter dated October 18, 2023, FCPS denied her CCJRA request. Ex. 5. (At
the hearing, Lt. Yonce confirmed that exhibit 5 reflected his decision and that he authorized
sending that letter to Ms. Lynne.) As to the request for records of official action, FCPS indicated
that there were no responsive records: “In response to Part 2 and Part 3 regarding policy
violations, training violations, procedural violations, there are no internal affairs investigation files
or related documents involving John Feyen that fall under House Bill 19-1119.”3 Id. at 2. The
letter, like the previous one, construed Ms. Lynne’s request under § 24-72-305(5), articulated the
applicable legal standards, and concluded thus:
Having considered these factors in evaluating your Records Request, I have
determined that the private interests in not releasing IA File(s) for public inspection
outweigh the public interests in making it publicly available. Therefore, based on
my consideration of this and other factors, I have determined that it would be
contrary to the public interest to release your requested items since the private
interests involved in your Records Request outweigh any public interests.
Id.
Lt. Yonce testified that his October 2023 letter was briefer than the April 2023 letter
because he had already explained the bases for his denial of Ms. Lynne’s request in the prior letter.
Dissatisfied with FCPS’s responses, Ms. Lynne took the matter to Court. She filed a
complaint under CORA and CCJRA, seeking judicial review of the custodian’s decision. The
Court issued an Order to Show Cause directed to the FCPS custodian and set the matter for a
hearing, which occurred as scheduled. At the show-cause hearing, Lt. Yonce testified and the
Court finds him to be a credible witness, given his demeanor on the stand and his careful and
3 The letter also indicated that in “response to Part 3 regarding records pertaining to
untruthfulness, dishonesty, false statements about material facts, and/or omissions of material facts
including all instances in testimony, under oath, and in written narratives and in audio/video from
agency reports, there are no records responsive to this request.” Ex. 5.
6
thoughtful answers to the many questions posed by Ms. Lynne, his counsel, and the Court. Any
relevant testimony will be noted below.
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
“As one of Colorado’s open government laws, the CCJRA governs the public’s access to
criminal justice records.” Madrigal v. City of Aurora, 349 P.3d 297, 299 (Colo. App. 2014).
“Criminal justice records” are those “that are made, maintained, or kept by any criminal justice
agency in the state for use in the exercise of functions required or authorized by law or
administrative rule. . . .” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-72-302(4). The definition of “criminal justice
agencies” is found in § 24-72-302(3). There’s no dispute that FCPS is a criminal justice agency, and
that the requested IA investigation records are criminal justice records under the CCJRA. But this
is solely the beginning of the analysis.
“The CCJRA differentiates between two categories of records: (1) records of ‘official
action,’ and (2) all other criminal justice records, each possessing its own ‘regimens of public access
to those records.’” Freedom Colo. Info., Inc. v. El Paso Cnty. Sheriff's Dep’t, 196 P.3d 892, 898
(Colo. 2008). A record of “official action” includes an arrest, indictment, disposition, or “any
decision to formally discipline, reclassify, or relocate any person under criminal sentence.” Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 24-72-302(7). Generally, records of official action “shall be open to inspection.” § 24-
72-301(2).
One way to determine whether the IA record at issue is a record of official action or a
criminal justice record centers on the nature of the peace officer’s conduct. If the peace officer’s
misconduct involving a member of the public occurred while he was in-uniform and on-duty, the
entire investigation file may be released to the public upon completion of the investigation:
Upon completion of an internal investigation, including any appeals process, that
examines the in-uniform or on-duty conduct of a peace officer, as described in part
1 of article 2.5 of title 16, related to an incident of alleged misconduct involving a
7
member of the public, the entire investigation file, including the witness interviews,
video and audio recordings, transcripts, documentary evidence, investigative notes,
and final departmental decision is open for public inspection upon request.
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-72-303(4)(a).4
All other records that aren’t records of official action are criminal justice records, Madrigal,
349 P.3d at 299, and requests to release such records must be analyzed under subsections 24-72-
304(1) and 24-72-305(5). Under subsection 24-72-305(5), a custodian may deny access to “any
criminal justice investigatory files compiled for any other law enforcement purpose” if, in his
discretion, disclosure would be contrary to the public interest. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-72-
305(5). When “the records requested are criminal justice records but are not records of official
actions . . . the decision whether to grant inspection of the records [is] ‘consigned to the exercise of
the custodian’s sound discretion under sections 24-72-304 and -305.’” Madrigal, 349 P.3d at 300
(quoting Freedom Colo. Info., Inc., 196 P.3d at 897). See also Gazette v. Bourgerie, 533 P.3d 597,
603 (Colo. App. 2023) (“By contrast, all other criminal justice records ‘may be open for
inspection’ at the custodian’s discretion (save for some exceptions barring disclosure).’”).
The Supreme Court has ruled that a custodian must consider multiple factors when
determining whether to release criminal justice records, which include:
the privacy interests of individuals who may be impacted by a decision to allow
inspection;
the agency’s interest in keeping confidential information confidential;
4 This provision also allows the custodian initially to release to a requester “a summary of the
investigation file and if, after reviewing the summary, the requester requests access to the
investigation file, the custodian shall provide access to the entire investigation file subject to the
provisions of subsections (4)(b), (4)(c), and (4)(d) of this section.” § 24-72-303(4)(a). But the option
to obtain a summary of the investigation file isn’t available for requests to obtain a criminal justice
record.
8
the agency’s interest in pursuing ongoing investigations without compromising
them; the public purpose to be served in allowing inspection; and
any other pertinent consideration relevant to the circumstances of the particular
request.
Freedom Colo. Info., 196 P.3d at 899.
This Court must “review the custodian’s decision for an abuse of discretion.” Madrigal, 349
P.3d at 300. “The custodian’s determination constitutes an abuse of discretion when it is manifestly
arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair; it reflects a misapplication of the law; or it is not reasonably
supported by competent evidence in the record.” Id. Critically, this Court can’t “reweigh the
custodian’s balancing of the interests.” Id. at 302 (citing Freedom Colo. Info., 196 P.3d at 900).
Instead, the Court’s review “primarily entails the court holding the custodian to its balancing role,
which includes adequately explaining the reasons for the custodian’s inspection determination.”
Freedom Colo. Info., 196 P.3d at 901.
The Court concludes that Lt. Yonce didn’t abuse his discretion in denying Ms. Lynne’s
CCJRA request.5 Initially, the custodian correctly concluded that the requested records—Mr.
Feyen’s IA investigation file—is a criminal justice record and not a record of official action. As
such, Lt. Yonce correctly analyzed Ms. Lynne’s request under subsections 24-72-304(1) and 24-72-
305(5) and applicable case law. Further, Lt. Yonce articulated the correct balancing test and
“adequately explained the rationale for denying release of the records” to Ms. Lynne. Madrigal,
349 P.3d at 302. Each is addressed below.
5 Lt. Yonce explained that factor 3 above was inapplicable. Ms. Lynne didn’t challenge that finding.
9
A. Privacy Interests.
As to the first factor, Lt. Yonce found that Mr. Feyen’s “privacy interest outweigh[ed] the
public’s interest in making [the record] publicly available.” Ex. 3. In his view, a peace officer enjoys
a heightened privacy interest when acting off-duty and not in-uniform because § 24-72-303(4)(a)
excludes from required disclosure “those internal investigations of officer conduct that occurred
while an officer was not in uniform and not on duty.” While the custodian’s statutory interpretation
of that provision of the CCJRA misapplied the law, the error is harmless.
Under well-established precedent, “[s]tatutes should be applied as written, and [courts] do
not add or subtract words.” People v. Brown, 442 P.3d 428, 432 (Colo. 2019) (quoting State v.
Medved, 2019 CO 1, ¶ 19, 433 P.3d 33, 37 (“[I]n interpreting a statute, we must accept the
General Assembly's choice of language and not add or imply words that simply are not there.”)).
It’s clear that subdivision 24-72-303(4)(a) doesn’t mention the words “privacy interest” or create a
“strong personal privacy interest” for certain peace officers. Nothing in the text of the provision
purports to effect that purpose, let alone create a hierarchy of privacy interests.
Indeed, the purpose of the CCJRA isn’t to create any privacy interests. It’s to prescribe
statewide standards for “the maintenance, access and dissemination, completeness, accuracy, and
sealing of criminal justice records.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-72-301(1). And to that end, the General
Assembly created two types of CCRJA records—records of official action and criminal justice
records; it mandated release of the former, while allowing permissive release of the latter on a case-
by-case basis, subject to the custodian’s discretion. §§ 24-72-301(2) and 24-72-304(1). So, when the
custodian interpreted the CCJRA by injecting words into the statute that aren’t there and that aren’t
consistent with the statute’s purpose, the custodian misapplied the law and abused his discretion.
Madrigal, 349 P.3d at 300.
10
Nevertheless, the custodian’s legal error is harmless because it doesn’t affect the outcome
of his decision and because he still articulated and weighed the required factors in making his
decision. No Laporte Gravel Corp. v. Bd. of Cnty. Commr’s of Larimer Cnty., 507 P.3d 1053,
1071 (Colo. App. 2022) (“[w]here the agency’s mistake did not affect the outcome of the
proceedings, ‘it would be senseless to vacate and remand for reconsideration”). The custodian
considered Mr. Feyen’s privacy interest as required under Freedom Colorado, leading him to find
that, irrespective of the statute, Mr. Feyen had such an interest in keeping the IA file private
because the conduct that led to the IA complaint and investigation didn’t occur while he was on-
duty or in-uniform.6
While this Court “may have balanced the respective interests differently on these facts, it is
not the role of any court to do so.” Romero v. City of Fountain, 307 P.3d 120, 125 (Colo. App.
2011). The Court stresses that it can’t “reweigh the custodian’s balancing of the interests.”
Freedom Colo. Info., 196 P.3d at 302. And here, the Court can’t conclude that the custodian
abused his discretion.
B. Law Enforcement Agency’s Interests.
As to the second factor, the custodian didn’t abuse his discretion to weigh FCPS’s interest
in keeping the requested file confidential. Lt. Yonce acknowledged that a peace officer’s “off-duty
and out-of-uniform conduct of their officers can have an adverse effect on the City and FCPS.” Ex.
3 at 2. But he qualified that statement with the following clause: “if the conduct investigated
involves an officer’s exercise of their constitutional rights or other legal rights protected by law, it is
6 The situation is a bit more nuanced as Lt. Yonce acknowledged at the hearing: while Mr. Feyen
was off-duty and not in-uniform when he allegedly engaged in misconduct during his campaign
event, the substance of his statements dealt with his past conduct while he was on-duty and in-
uniform while employed as a deputy at the Larimer County Sheriff’s Office. This added nuance,
however, doesn’t result in an abuse of discretion.
11
important that the City, as the officer’s employer, can protect those rights from being chilled or
adversely affected by the prospect of an internal investigation being made public.” Id. Later, he
explained that not releasing the IA file “is also important because it lessens the likelihood that the
City’s other employees will be chilled in the future from exercising thee same important rights in
similar circumstances.” Id. at 3.
At the hearing, Lt. Yonce clarified his rationale further: he noted that under FCPS policy, a
police officer must cooperate and give statements during an IA investigation and that failure to do
so will result in termination. So, seen in that light, compelling a peace officer to give statements as
part of an IA investigation about his personal conduct outside and having such statements
potentially being publicly disseminated would have a chilling effect on the willingness of police
officers to fully cooperate in an IA investigation.
Lt. Yonce also testified that Mr. Feyen was at a political campaign event, after work, off-
duty, and not in-unform. Further, the substance of Mr. Feyen’s comments at the campaign event,
which triggered the IA investigation, dealt with conduct while he wasn’t an FCPS employee. And
he emphasized that Mr. Feyen’s statements are publicly available, including in Ms. Lynne’s
Facebook page. He testified that Mr. Feyen was running for Larimer County Sheriff and was
exercising his First Amendment rights.
But Lt. Yonce admitted on cross examination that he didn’t closely review the Order Ms.
Lynne attached as part of her request in which the judge had ruled—in an interlocutory order in
her civil action against Mr. Feyen—that Mr. Feyen’s statements were defamatory per se, made with
actual malice.7 And, because Lt. Yonce isn’t a lawyer, he didn’t know that defamatory statements
aren’t entitled to First Amendment protection. Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66, 73 (2023)
7 As noted above, the defamation action is still pending and there’s no final judgment in Ms.
Lynne’s favor.
12
(“From 1791 to the present, the First Amendment has permitted restrictions upon the content of
speech in a few limited areas…. Another is defamation—false statements of fact harming another’s
reputation.”).
While, in the Court’s view, those two shortcomings undercut the weighing of FCPS’s
interests, the Court is not the custodian and may not “reweigh the custodian’s balancing of the
interests.” Madrigal, 349 P.3d at 302. Besides, the custodian “articulated an additional pertinent
consideration relevant to the particular circumstances of the request,” Freedom Colo. Info., 196
P.3d at 899—that is, he looked beyond FCPS’s interests, opting to consider all Fort Collins’
employees who may be affected by the decision and who may find themselves running for office
and being investigated for misconduct by the municipality. Those are appropriate matters for the
custodian’s consideration, and while this Court “may have balanced the respective interests
differently on these facts,” that’s not the Court’s role. Romero, 307 P.3d at 125. Reviewing the
decision under the deferential standard, the Court concludes that the custodian “adequately
explain[ed] the reasons for [his] inspection determination.” Freedom Colo. Info., 196 P.3d at 901.
C. The Public Purpose.
The custodian found that Ms. Lynne hadn’t articulated a public purpose. Exercising his
discretion, he construed the court order attached to Ms. Lynne’s request as showing that her
request was solely filed “in support of [her] lawsuit against Chief Feyen—a private interest, not a
public interest.” Ex. 3.
Ms. Lynne strongly took issue with the custodian’s characterization of her request. In her
pre-hearing brief (and during argument), she pointed out the public purpose of her request:
“transparency and accountability … because John Feyen, as the Assistant Chief of Police at [FCPS],
was campaigning for the elected office of sheriff, was ultimately elected … and is now currently the
sheriff. That alone is justification for access to John Feyen’s internal affairs investigation records.”
13
Pl.’s Pre-Hearing Brief at 6. She also explained the public nature of her lawsuit against Mr. Feyen:
he “is being used for per se actual malice defamatory comments that he made when he introduced
himself as the Assistant Chief of Police at [FCPS].” Id. at 7. (Notably, however, she didn’t provide
any of this information when she made her request.)
Undoubtedly, Ms. Lynne’s arguments carry persuasive force and suggest that the custodian
took a myopic approach in considering this factor. Indeed, the custodian could’ve agreed with Ms.
Lynne’s assertions and relied on them in carrying out the required balancing. But he didn’t,
choosing instead to determine that Ms. Lynne’s request was solely for obtaining the IA
investigation file to use it in the civil action. (Ms. Lynne didn’t entirely dispute that at the hearing.)
That was the custodian’s prerogative and the Court can’t “reweigh the custodian’s balancing of the
interests.” Madrigal, 349 P.3d at 302.
D. Other Pertinent Considerations.
Lastly, the custodian thought that because Mr. Feyen was no longer a city employee, there
was “a reduced need for the public to be informed about his off-duty and out-of-uniform conduct
while a City employee.” Ex. 3 at 3. This analysis presents a close call, but in the end, the Court
can’t conclude that the custodian’s rationale is manifestly arbitrary or unreasonable.
While it’s true that Mr. Feyen is no longer a Fort Collins employee and the custodian
believed that such status lessened the public’s need to know about his off-duty conduct while
employed by FCPS, the custodian seemingly ignored a critical fact: Mr. Feyen was elected as the
Larimer County Sheriff. He left the number two position at FCPS for the top law enforcement
position in the county. Mr. Feyen didn’t leave FCPS and faded into obscurity; he took a position
with higher visibility and subject to greater scrutiny as an elected official. Still, Lt. Yonce explained
that the substance of Mr. Feyen’s statements during the campaign event didn’t occur while he was
employed by FCPS: they happened while he was a sheriff’s deputy more than 10 years ago.
14
In the end, it’d be an abuse of discretion for the Court to “independently engage[ ] in
balancing the public and private interests involved in [an] inspection request.” Freedom Colo.
Info., 196 P.3d at 901. The custodian already did so and he “adequately explain[ed] the reasons
for [his] inspection determination.” Id. While Ms. Lynne argued that the custodian should’ve
provided more reasons for his decision, the reasons he proffered are sufficient to comply with the
law and to allow for meaningful judicial review.
III. CONCLUSION.
In sum, for the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that the FCPS custodian
didn’t abuse his discretion when he denied Ms. Lynne’s request for the IA investigation file for Mr.
Feyen. Accordingly, the Order to Show Cause is discharged and this case shall be closed. Each
party shall pay their respective costs.
SO ORDERED on December 11, 2023.
BY THE COURT:
JUAN G. VILLASEÑOR
District Court Judge