HomeMy WebLinkAbout2023-cv-1341 - Erbacher v. City Of Fort Collins, et al. - 040 - City Motion To DismissIN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-1341-CNS-NRN
Cody Erbacher,
Plaintiff.
v.
City of Fort Collins;
Jason Haferman;
Sergeant Allen Heaton; and
Corporal Jason Bogosian.
Defendants.
DEFENDANTS CITY OF FORT COLLINS, SERGEANT ALLEN HEATON, AND
“CORPORAL” JASON BOGOSIAN’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S
AMENDED COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) AND REQUEST
FOR QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Defendants City of Fort Collins, Sergeant Allen Heaton, and Sergeant Jason Bogosian,
sued as “Corporal Jason Bogosian,”1 through their undersigned counsel, Hall & Evans, LLC,
submit the following as their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6):
CERTIFICATE OF CONFERRAL
Undersigned Counsel conferred with Counsel for the Plaintiff. Plaintiff objects to the relief
requested herein.
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter arises out of Plaintiff’s arrest on June 11, 2021, by former Fort Collins Police
Officer, Jason Haferman, and the subsequent investigation and prosecution for the crime of
1 Jason Bogosian is a Sergeant with the City of Fort Collins Police Department. For consistency, he will be
referred to Corporal Bogosian in this Motion.
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Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”). Plaintiff claims Defendant Haferman’s actions somehow
implicate the City of Fort Collins (“City”), as well as Sergeant Heaton, and Corporal Bogosian, as
Defendant Haferman’s supervisors. The Complaint attempts to set forth claims against the City,
Sergeant Heaton and Corporal Bogosian, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for an unconstitutional
pattern and practice, failure to train and supervise, and violation of “due process” under the Fourth
Amendment. (See Pltfs. Cmp., ECF 33, Second Claim for Relief, at ¶¶ 163 to 189).
For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s claims against the City, Sergeant Heaton, and
Corporal Bogosian, should be dismissed. In particular, the claims rely on conclusory allegations
while at the same time fail to allege facts sufficient to satisfy minimal federal pleading standards
established pursuant to Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). Additionally, the
doctrine of qualified immunity and the lack of allegations respecting any particularized behavior
or personal participation also preclude Plaintiff’s claims against Sergeant Heaton and Corporal
Bogosian. See Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1262 (10th Cir.1976) (personal participation is
an essential allegation in a section 1983 claim…”); See also Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416 (10th
Cir.1986).
With respect to the claims against the City, Hinton v. City of Elwood, Kan., 997 F.2d 774,
783 (10th Cir.1993) precludes any claim against a public entity pursuant to a respondeat superior
theory. Instead, to establish liability against a municipality, a plaintiff must show a public entity’s
policy or custom existed, and a direct causal link between the policy or custom and the injury
alleged. City of Canton Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989); Myers v. Oklahoma County
Bd., 11 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir.1998). Plaintiff identifies no such policy or custom.
II. STANDARD
To state a claim for relief, a federal complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), “that will give the
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defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff ’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). At the pleading stage, it is not the defendant’s or the court’s
responsibility to guess at plaintiff’s claims. Conley, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). A § 1983 complaint
must, under Rule 12, “make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide
each individual with fair notice as to the basis of the claims against him or her.” Robbins v.
Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original). Thus, “[w]hen various
officials have taken different actions with respect to a plaintiff, the plaintiff’s facile, passive-voice
showing his rights ‘were violated’ will not suffice. Likewise insufficient, is a plaintiff’s more
active-voice yet undifferentiated contention ‘defendants’ infringed his rights.” Pahls v. Thomas,
718 F.3d 1210, 1225-26 (10th Cir. 2013). “Rather, it is incumbent upon a plaintiff to identify
specific actions taken by particular defendants in order to make out a viable § 1983” claim. Pahls,
718 F.3d at 1225-26. The mere metaphysical possibility some plaintiff could prove some set of
facts for the claims is insufficient; the complaint must give reason to believe this plaintiff has a
reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for these claims. Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v.
Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007). All well-pleaded factual allegations are viewed
favorably to plaintiff. Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1162 (10th Cir. 2011). All conclusory
statements of law are set aside. Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th
Cir. 2011). Rule 8, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, forbids “labels and conclusions or a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d
1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2012).
To any extent Sergeant Heaton or Corporal Bogosian are alleged to have violated Plaintiff’s
Constitutional rights based on their individualized behavior, the doctrine of qualified immunity
shields them from any damages claimed. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982).
Qualified immunity affords public officials immunity from suit and exists to “protect them from
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undue interference with their duties, and from potentially disabling threats of liability.” Elder v.
Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 514 (1994), citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 806 (1982). Qualified immunity
protects all governmental officials performing discretionary functions from civil liability as long
as their conduct does not violate clearly established Constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
Qualified immunity is not only a defense to liability, it provides immunity from suit.
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). “One of the purposes of immunity, absolute or
qualified, is to spare a defendant not only unwarranted liability, but unwarranted demands
customarily imposed upon those defending a long drawn-out lawsuit.” Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S.
226, 232 (1991). “These burdens include distraction of officials from their governmental
responsibilities, the inhibition of discretionary decision making, the deterrence of able people from
public service, and the disruptive effects of discovery on governmental operations.” Hannula v.
City of Lakewood, 907 F.2d 129, 130 (10th Cir. 1990). Courts should, therefore, resolve the purely
legal question raised by a qualified immunity defense at the earliest possible state in the litigation.
Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1127-28 (10th Cir. 2001).
When a defendant pleads the defense of qualified immunity, a plaintiff bears a heavy two-
part burden of proving that: (1) the defendants’ actions violated a constitutional right, and (2) the
right was clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue. Mick v. Brewer, 76 F.3d 1127,
1134 (10th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). To survive dismissal, the plaintiff must show that the
right was “clearly established” in a “particularized” sense. Wilson v. Meeks, 52 F.3d 1547, 1552
(10th Cir. 1995), citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). “[F]or a right to be
‘particularized,’ there must ordinarily be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or
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‘clearly established weight of authority’ from other courts.” Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 citing
Medina v. City & County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir. 1992).
III. ARGUMENT
A. Plaintiff fails to set forth any specific allegations against Sergeant Heaton
or Corporal Bogosian establishing their personal participation in the
alleged constitutional violation.
Plaintiff ’s claims against Sergeant Heaton and Corporal Bogosian, are based on alleged
supervisory positions over Defendant Haferman. (See ECF 33, ¶¶ 170, 176). Premising claims
merely as a result of a “respondeat superior” relationship, however, is improper. “Under § 1983,
government officials are not vicariously liable for the misconduct of their subordinates. ‘There is
no concept of strict supervisor liability under § 1983.’” Serna v. Colo. Dept. of Corrections, 455
F.3d 1146, 1151 (10th Cir. 2006), citing Jenkins v. Wood, 81 F.3d 988, 994 (10th Cir. 1996); see
also Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1048 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Liability . . . must be based upon
more than a mere right to control employees.”). Liability against a supervisor, therefore, must be
premised on some direct action by the supervisor. Serna, 455 F.3d at 1151, citing Scull v. New
Mexico, 236 F.3d 588, 600 (10th Cir. 2000). “Supervisors are only liable under §1983 for their
own culpable involvement in the violation of a person's constitutional rights. To establish
supervisor liability under § 1983, ‘it is not enough for a plaintiff merely to show a defendant was
in charge of other state actors who actually committed the violation. Instead, . . . the plaintiff must
establish ‘a deliberate, intentional act by the supervisor to violate constitutional rights.’’” Serna,
455 F.3d at 1151, citing Jenkins, 81 F.3d at 994-95, citing Woodward v. City of Worland, 977 F.2d
1392, 1399 (10th Cir. 1992). “In short, the supervisor must be personally ‘involved in the
constitutional violation,’ and a ‘sufficient causal connection’ must exist between the supervisor
and the constitutional violation.” Serna, 455 F.3d at 1151 (emphasis added) citing Rios v. City of
Del Rio, 444 F.3d 417, 425 (5th Cir. 2006). An affirmative link means Plaintiff must properly
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allege not only that the subordinate violated the Constitution, but also the “active participation or
acquiescence of the supervisor in the constitutional violation by the subordinates.” Serna, 455 F.3d
at 1151, citing Holland v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2001), and Green v.
Branson, 108 F.3d 1296, 1302 (10th Cir. 1997). “(T)he supervisor’s state of mind is a critical
bridge between the conduct of a subordinate and his own behavior. Because ‘mere negligence’ is
not enough to hold a supervisor liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish the supervisor acted
knowingly or with ‘deliberate indifference’ that a constitutional violation would occur.” Serna,
455 F.3d at 1151, citing Green,108 F.3d at 1302.
In addition to a culpable state of mind, Plaintiff must also establish some sort of personal
participation in the alleged Constitutional violation. “Personal participation by a defendant is an
essential element of a civil rights action.” Weiss v. Vasquez, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183467, at
*10 (D. Colo. Oct. 6, 2022), referring to Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1262-63 (10th Cir.
1976). “There must be an affirmative link between the alleged constitutional violation and each
defendant's participation, control or direction, or failure to supervise.” Weiss , 2022 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 183467, at * 10, referring to Butler v. City of Norman, 992 F.2d 1053, 1055 (10th Cir.
1993). To establish supervisor liability pursuant to § 1983, Plaintiff must assert that any named
individual: (i) personally participated in the conduct; (ii) exercised control or direction over it; (iii)
failed to supervise; (iv) failed to train; or (v) tacitly authorized the conduct that resulted in a
constitutional deprivation. See Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1162 (10th Cir. 2008); Currier
v. Doran, 242 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001).
Here, Plaintiff recounts his arrest on June 11, 2021, but nowhere in his Complaint does he
identify any specific involvement of either Sergeant Heaton or Corporal Bogosian, implicating a
violation of any constitutional rights. In particular, Plaintiff alleges he was stopped because
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Defendant Haferman believed Mr. Erbacher’s truck accelerated too quickly (ECF 33, ¶ 51). After
questioning by Defendant Haferman, Plaintiff admitted to consuming one beer, earlier in the day
(ECF 33, ¶ 52). Mr. Erbacher was asked by Defendant Haferman to engage in road-side tests to
prove he was safe to drive (ECF 33, ¶ 54). After performing the road-side tests, Defendant
Haferman arrested Mr. Erbacher and asked him to select either a blood or breath test. (ECF 33, ¶
62). Based on his questioning of Plaintiff, Defendant Haferman made the decision a blood draw
would be the more appropriate test (ECF 33, ¶ 64). The blood draw was performed, and on
November 10, 2021, Defendant Haferman received Mr. Erbacher’s blood results which were
negative for alcohol and all drugs (ECF 33, ¶ 79).2
Nowhere in the recitation of Defendant Haferman’s interaction with Plaintiff on June 11,
2021, is either Sergeant Heaton or Corporal Bogosian mentioned. Plaintiff criticizes the roadside
tests and conclusions of Defendant Haferman as the basis for the wrongful arrest and violation of
his constitutional rights. There are no allegations, however, identifying Sergeant Heaton or
Corporal Bogosian’s participation in the roadside tests, involvement in the conclusions of
Defendant Haferman, or any other actions which might be construed as a violation of Plaintiff’s
Constitutional rights. According to Plaintiff’s own allegations, it was Defendant Haferman who
allegedly: (i) failed to activate his body-worn camera during the encounter with Mr. Erbacher (ECF
33, ¶¶ 50 & 68), and lied about it (ECF 33, ¶ 69); (ii) deliberately omitted from the arrest report
that Mr. Erbacher suffered from multiple traumatic brain and back injuries (ECF 33, ¶¶ 55-56);
(iii) made false statements and exaggerations of impairment (ECF 33, ¶ 57); (iv) failed to properly
administer the road-side tests “in the standardized manner he was trained” (ECF 33, ¶ 58); (v) lied
2 The Defendants reserve the right to contest the validity of these facts in any subsequent
proceedings.
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elsewhere in his arrest report about Mr. Erbacher showing clues/signs of impairment where there
were none (ECF 33, ¶ 61); (vi) made the determination a breath test could not be performed
because Mr. Erbacher was taking antibiotics (ECF 33, ¶¶ 64-65); and (vii) had the preference of
obtaining blood specimens over administration of a breath test from the people he arrested for
DUI, because he knew the method would cast the widest net, capture any and all drugs, and when
combined with the exaggerated arrest reports and missing body-camera videos could make his
wrongful DUI arrests appear more justified on paper. (ECF 33, ¶ 66).
There are no non-conclusory allegations establishing an affirmative link between
Defendant Haferman’s actions, the alleged constitutional violations, and involvement by Sergeant
Heaton or Corporal Bogosian. Weiss , 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183467, at * 10, referring to Butler
v. City of Norman, 992 F.2d 1053, 1055 (10th Cir. 1993). There are also no non-conclusory
allegations Sergeant Heaton or Corporal Bogosian exercised control or direction over Defendant
Haferman’s determinations, failed to supervise the specific stop of Mr. Erbacher, or tacitly
authorized Defendant Haferman’s conduct resulting in a constitutional deprivation. See Fogarty,
523 F.3d at 1162 and Currier, 242 F.3d 925.
The allegations in the Complaint identifying Sergeant Heaton fail to describe any specific
action taken which might have possibly violated Mr. Erbacher’s constitutional rights. For example,
the Complaint states, “(a)s of March 20, 2021…Sergeant Heaton…personally, again had notice
that Haferman was wrongfully arresting innocent people.” (ECF 33, ¶¶ 31(g)-32). But this
allegation refers to the arrest of “C.B.” and not Plaintiff (ECF 33, ¶ 31). This allegation has
nothing to do with Plaintiff, and it is also conclusory and insufficient to state a claim for relief
against Sergeant Heaton. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78. There is no
information to suggest Sergeant Heaton had any sort of “notice,” especially regarding the specific
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arrest of Plaintiff. Any claim against Sergeant Heaton should be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to meet federal pleading standards.
Likewise, the allegations in the Complaint with respect to Corporal Bogosian, also fail to
describe any specific action which violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. For example, Plaintiff
refers to an interaction where Corporal Bogosian noted a purported mistake made by Mr.
Haferman, which consisted of noting a clue of impairment on a standardized roadside test, which
was “not a clue of impairment at all.” (ECF 33, at ¶ 30). Plaintiff alleges Corporal Bogosian
“confronted Haferman about his repeated misrepresentation of impairment evidence,” and in
nothing other than a conclusory assertion, states “(t)his was the first of many red flags…” (ECF
33, at ¶ 30(c) and (e)). These conclusory allegations do not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation, and therefore any claim against Corporal Bogosian should be dismissed pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to meet federal pleading standards.
B. Sergeant Heaton and Corporal Bogosian are entitled to qualified
immunity.
As discussed above, Plaintiff bears a heavy, two-part burden of overcoming the defense of
qualified immunity. In particular, Plaintiff must properly allege that: (1) the defendants’ actions
violated a constitutional right, and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the conduct
at issue. Mick, 76 F.3d at 1134.
1. Plaintiff fails to establish a constitutional violation.
As argued above, there are no allegations identifying specific action taken by either
Sergeant Heaton or Corporal Bogosian, which might have possibly violated Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights. (See § III (A), supra). Plaintiff’s inability to comply with federal pleading
standards, and to identify a constitutional violation, is likewise detrimental to his burden with
respect to the defense of qualified immunity.
2. Plaintiff fails to identify a clearly established right.
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To survive dismissal, the plaintiff must show that the right was “clearly established” in a
“particularized” sense. Wilson, 52 F.3d at 1552. “[F]or a right to be ‘particularized,’ there must
ordinarily be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or ‘clearly established weight
of authority’ from other courts.” Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 citing Medina, 960 F.2d 1498.
Here, Plaintiff alleges Sergeant Heaton and Corporal Bogosian violated Plaintiff’s Fourth
Amendment rights by failing to supervise and/or train Defendant Haferman with respect to his
DUI arrest. Plaintiff’s allegations rest on the notion Sergeant Heaton purportedly failed to review
other DUI arrests thereby precipitating Haferman’s actions with respect to Plaintiff (ECF 33, ¶¶
171-175), and Corporal Bogosian somehow did not fulfill his duty to intermittently review
Haferman’s work (ECF 33, ¶¶ 176-180). Besides being improperly speculative, a search of Tenth
Circuit jurisprudence fails to reveal any particularized case allowing for the imposition of
Constitutional liability on these theories, including a failure to review previous DUI arrests
unrelated to a plaintiff’s arrest. Without any clearly established authority, Plaintiff can state no
claim for a Constitutional violation, and both Sergeant Heaton and Corporal Bogosian are entitled
to qualified immunity.
C. Plaintiff fails to properly set forth any proper allegations to maintain a
claim against the City of Fort Collins.
Plaintiff’s claims against the City of Fort Collins (“City”) fare no better than those against
Sergeant Heaton or Corporal Bogosian. To establish liability of a public entity under 42 U.S.C.
§1983, “a plaintiff must show (1) the existence of a municipal custom or policy and (2) a direct
and causal link between the custom or policy and the violation alleged.” Jenkins v. Wood, 81 F.3d
988, 993 (10th Cir. 1996), citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). The Supreme
Court described the requirements a plaintiff must meet to impose public entity liability as follows:
“It is not enough for a §1983 plaintiff merely to identify conduct properly attributable to the
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municipality. The plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the
municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged. That is, a plaintiff must show that
the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a
direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.” Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1998) (emphasis added).
Under these standards, municipal liability may arise only out of official customs or policies,
or for the actions of a final policymaker to any extent that such policies, customs, or policymakers
can be shown to be responsible for a constitutional violation. See Brown, 520 U.S. at 403-404.
Establishing deliberate conduct and the “requisite degree of culpability,” means municipal liability
attaches only where “a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various
alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the
subject matter in question.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986); Myers v.
Oklahoma Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 151 F.3d 1313, 1319 (10th Cir. 1998).
“Where a plaintiff claims that the municipality has not directly inflicted an injury, but
nonetheless has caused an employee to do so, rigorous standards of culpability and causation must
be applied to ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of its
employee.” Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep’t, 717 F.3d 760, 770 (10th Cir.
2013), citing Brown, 520 U.S. at 405. “The causation element is applied with especial rigor when
the municipal policy or practice is itself not unconstitutional, for example, when
the municipal liability claim is based upon inadequate training, supervision, and deficiencies in
hiring.” Schneider, 717 F.3d at 770, citing Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983Litigation Claims &
Defenses, § 7.12.
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“[A] plaintiff seeking to establish municipal liability on the theory that a facially
lawful municipal action has led an employee to violate a plaintiff's rights must demonstrate that
the municipal action was taken with ‘deliberate indifference’ as to its known or obvious
consequences.” Schneider 717 F.3d at 770 (10th Cir. 2013) citing Brown, 520 U.S. at 407; see
also City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989). “The deliberate indifference standard may be
satisfied when the municipality has actual or constructive notice that its action or failure to act is
substantially certain to result in a constitutional violation, and it consciously or deliberately
chooses to disregard the risk of harm.” Schneider, 717 F.3d at 771, citing Barney v. Pulsipher,
143 F.3d 1299, 1307 (10th Cir. 1998).
Plaintiff supports his claim against the City on generalized allegations it had a duty to train
and supervise Defendant Haferman, it and was somehow aware of his propensity for wrongfully
arresting citizens to increase his DUI arrest numbers by falsifying his reports, and it deliberately
chose not to remedy the situation. (ECF 33, ¶ 184). The Complaint alleges the City’s “failure to
supervise and train Haferman” was the moving force behind Plaintiff’s wrongful arrest (ECF 33,
¶ 185), and those actions “violated plaintiff’s federal constitutional rights.” (ECF 33, ¶ 186). Those
allegations, however, are factually unsupported in the Complaint, conclusory, and improper under
federal pleading standards. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78.
There are simply no allegations in the Complaint establishing deliberate indifference by
the City with respect to any specific policy or custom, nor are there any allegations the City’s
actions (or failure to act) was substantially certain to result in a violation of Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights, and that the City consciously or deliberately chose to disregard any such
harm. Schneider, 717 F.3d at 771, citing Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1307 (10th Cir.
1998). Any claim against the City should be dismissed.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Wherefore, Defendants, City of Fort Collins, Sergeant Allen Heaton, and Sergeant Jason
Bogosian, respectfully request the Court grant their Motion, order both Sergeant Heaton and
Sergeant Bogosian are entitled to qualified immunity, dismiss all claims against them with
prejudice, and for entry of any other relief deemed just.
Respectfully submitted this 9th day of October, 2023.
s/ Mark S. Ratner
Mark S. Ratner, Esq.
Robert A. Weiner, Esq.
Katherine N. Hoffman, Esq.
Hall & Evans, L.L.C.
1001 17th Street, Suite 300, Denver, CO 80202
303-628-3300 /Fax: 303-628-3368
ratnerm@hallevans.com
weinerr@hallevans.com
hoffmank@hallevans.com
ATTORNEYS FOR THE CITY OF FORT
COLLINS, ALLEN HEATON, AND JASON
BOGOSIAN
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE (CM/ECF)
I hereby certify that on the 9th day of October 2023, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
DEFENDANTS CITY OF FORT COLLINS, SERGEANT ALLEN HEATON AND
“CORPORAL” JASON BOGOSIAN’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED
COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) AND REQUEST FOR
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY was filed with the Court via CM/ECF and served on the below-listed
party by email:
Sarah Schielke, Esq.
sarah@lifeandlibertylaw.com
Jonathan M. Abramson, Esq.
jonathan@kandf.com
Yulia Nikolaevskaya, Esq.
julie@kandf.com
s/ Sarah Stefanick
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