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HomeMy WebLinkAbout2021CV30425 - Save The Poudre And No Pipe Dream Coporation V. Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District, Northern Integrated Supply Project Water Activity Enterprise, The City Of Fort Collins - 052 - Order Regarding Defendants' Motions1 District Court, Larimer County, State of Colorado 201 LaPorte Avenue, Suite 100 Fort Collins, CO 80521-2761 (970) 494-3500 ▲ COURT USE ONLY ▲ Plaintiffs: Save the Poudre, et. al. v. Defendants: City of Fort Collins, et. al. Case Number: 2021CV30425 Courtroom: 5B ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS This matter is before the Court because of Defendants Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District and Northern Integrated Supply Project Water Enterprise’s filing of a Motion to Approve Stipulation on January 6, 2021 and a Motion to Dismiss on January 7. The Court has reviewed Motions, Response, Reply, and finds and orders as follows: Defendant’s Motion to Approve Stipulation is granted. The Motion to Dismiss is denied in part and granted in part. I. Background This case concerns the development of a river diversion plan impacting the Cache la Poudre river in Larimer County, Colorado. Plaintiffs are community organizations that enjoy the river and the natural spaces it touches. Defendant Northern Integrated Supply Project Water Activity Enterprise (the “Enterprise”) is a water enterprise in northern Colorado. Water enterprises are government entities that manage water-related projects in Colorado. Defendant Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District (the “District”) is a water district that oversees the Enterprise. Both organizations are organized according to Colorado Law. See C.R.S. § 37-45.1-103. The river diversion plan would create pipelines of water to new reservoirs. Pls. Am. Compl. ¶17. Those reservoirs would bring additional water to several communities in DATE FILED: February 4, 2022 7:58 AM CASE NUMBER: 2021CV30425 2 and surrounding Larimer county. Id. ¶21. Plaintiffs assert that the river diversion would hurt their enjoyment of the river’s banks, reduce property values, and reduce biodiversity in the area. Id. ¶8-9. To build the pipelines, Defendants must have their plans reviewed by federal, state, and local entities. This matter concerns the local review of the Defendants’ plan by the City. The City calls this review the “Site Plan Advisory Review” or “SPAR.” The SPAR inquires into whether a proposed plan meets the standards of the Fort Collins Land Use Code, among other things. The City denied Defendants SPAR application on June 30, 2021, effectively putting Defendants plans to build the river diversion on hold. Id. ¶38. However, the District overruled the City’s SPAR decision on August 12, allowing the project to continue. Id. ¶39. The District adopted Resolution D-1367-08-21 (the “Resolution”) confirming this. See Def.’s Ex. #A. Defendants previously moved this Court to dismiss several of Plaintiff’s claims. See “Order Granting Def.’s Partial Mot. to Dismiss”. Subsequently, the City, District, and the Enterprise stipulated to a dismissal of the City’s crossclaim. See Def.’s Ex. A. The District and the Enterprise now move the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s remaining claims. Plaintiffs oppose the other parties’ stipulation to dismiss the crossclaim. II. Applicable Law A. Motions to Approve Stipulations “Stipulations are a form of judicial admission which are binding on the party who makes them and may constitute the basis for a judgment.” Durbin v. Bonanza Corp., 716 P.2d 1124, 1128 (Colo. App. 1986). “A party may stipulate away valuable rights provided it is not in violation of public policy.” Id. (citing Kempter v. Hurd, 713 P.2d 1274 (Colo. 1986)). B. Motions to Dismiss An argument that a case is moot is an argument that a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Robertson v. Westminster Mall Co., 43 P.3d 622, 628 (Colo. App. 2001). “A court has no jurisdiction to render an advisory opinion on a controversy that is not yet ripe or to decide a case on a speculative, hypothetical, or contingent set of facts.” Id. (citing Bickel v. City of Boulder, 885 P.2d 215 (Colo. 1994)). Even when declaratory relief is sought, there must be an actual controversy. Id. (citing Constitution Access v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 930 P.2d 556 (Colo. 1996). “[A]ny potential resolution by the court of such an action must relieve the parties of uncertainty and insecurity with respect to their rights, status, and legal relations.” Id. (citing Buckley Powder Co. v. State, 924 P.2d 1133 (Colo. App. 1996)). 3 A case is moot when the relief requested of the Court would not affect the rights of the parties. See Gray v. Univ. of Colorado Hosp. Auth., 284 P.3d 191, 196 (Colo. App. 2012) (citing Rudnick v. Ferguson, 179 P.3d 26, 29 (Colo. App. 2007). A motion to dismiss alleging that an issue is moot is considered a motion to dismiss under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1). Id. Under Rule 12(b)(1), a court is “free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.” Trinity Broadcasting v. City of Westminster, 848 P.2 916, 925 (Colo. 1993) (quoting Boyle v. Governor’s Veterans Outreach & Assistance Center, 925 F.2d 71, 74 (3rd Cir. 1991)). III. Application of Law A. The Motion to Approve Stipulation The City, the District, and the Enterprise have agreed to a proposed stipulation that the August 12 “overturn” proceeding did not create a vested right in the subject property. See Def.’s Ex. #B. Plaintiffs oppose this stipulation, arguing that it is an attempt to “manufacture” a mootness defense. Pl.’s Resp. 3. The Court finds that the intent behind the proposed stipulation is irrelevant. Plaintiff does not proffer a reason why the stipulation is contrary to public policy, nor do Plaintiffs cite any legal authority to support their opposition. Accordingly, the Motion to Approve Stipulation is granted. The stipulation is adopted as a Court order. The City’s crossclaim is dismissed. B. The Motion to Dismiss Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s remaining claims, which are premised on violations of the Vested Rights Act, C.R.S. § 24-68-101 et. seq. Def.’s Mot. 4. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s remaining claims are moot, considering the stipulation between the City and Defendants. Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims are moot because the relief requested by Plaintiffs would not affect the rights of the parties. Id. at 7-8. To Defendants, Plaintiffs have received the “ultimate object of their action” which requires a finding that this matter is moot. Def.’s Reply 4 (citing S-1 v. Spangler, 832 F.2d 294, 296 (4th Cir. 1987)). Defendants also argue that an injunction vacating the Resolution would be improper relief for the vested rights claims. Def.’s Reply 5. Plaintiffs argue that their vested rights claims, if proven, entitle them to a complete rescission of the August 12 resolution. Pl.’s Resp. 4. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that if the District did not have the power to authorize a “site specific plan” for a vested right, then the entire resolution may be null. Id. Plaintiffs aver that if the Resolution is vacated, the City’s denial stands. Id. To Plaintiffs, this relief would have a tangible 4 effect on the rights of the parties because it would halt all potential construction concerning the subject property. Id. at 4-5. While Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory relief regarding the Vested Rights Act are certainly mooted, their injunctive relief requesting the resolution to be vacated could afford Plaintiffs meaningful relief. If the Court vacated the Resolution, the City’s denial of the SPAR application would be the only decision made by a governmental body on the matter. The Resolution authorizes construction, but the City’s decision does not. See Def.’s Ex. #B. Accordingly, vacating the Resolution would make a meaningful difference in the rights of the parties. The issue of mootness is much less clear when applying the substance of Plaintiff’s claims to the relief requested, however. Specifically, it is unclear to what extent the vested right claims are severable from the entire Resolution. It could be true that the vested right that the parties agree does not exist is ancillary to the Resolution. In that case, injunctive relief vacating the entire Resolution would be improper, and this matter would be moot. Conversely, it could be true that the vested right is inextricably tied to the site-specific development plan and the rest of the Resolution. In the latter circumstance, this matter would not be moot because an injunction vacating the Resolution would be available as relief. The Parties have presented insufficient argument and authority as to whether the section of the August 12 Resolution that refers to the establishment of a vested right is severable to the rest of the Resolution. Accordingly, the Court orders the parties to set a hearing in this matter. See Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443, 451 (Colo. 2001) (Holding that “Rule 12(b)(1) permits a trial court to make its own factual findings in determining its subject-matter jurisdiction, it necessarily permits the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing. . . .”) At that hearing, the parties should present evidence to flesh out the factual background of the authority that the Resolution relies upon to authorize construction. The parties should also be prepared to present legal argument regarding: 1) the severability of the vested rights issues from the overturning of the City Planning and Zoning Commission’s decision; and 2) whether a third party has standing to assert a claim that another has been improperly granted a vested right. The parties’ arguments on these matters should be direct and should not just re-state the positions held in the written briefing before the Court. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is granted in part. Plaintiff’s claims seeking declaratory relief under the Vested Rights Act are dismissed as moot. 5 IV. Order Defendant’s Motion to Approve Stipulation is granted. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is granted as to Plaintiff’s remaining claims for declaratory relief. Defendant should file a notice to set hearing. Settings may be scheduled any Tuesday or Wednesday at 1:15 p.m. The Division Clerk will initiate the call to the Parties/Attorneys. If you have any questions regarding setting procedures, please call Alyson Asher, Division Clerk, at (970) 494-3810. The Notice must be filed no later than February 16, 2022. Dated: February 3, 2022 BY THE COURT: __________________________ Gregory M. Lammons District Court Judge