HomeMy WebLinkAbout2021-cv-2306-RM-KLM - Perry V. State Of Colorado, Et Al - 050 - Pl's Proposed Amended PetitionV.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT UNITEOSTATESOIST=OURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO DENVER. COLO
Civil Action No. 1 :21-cv-02306-RM-KLM
Robert-Lawrence: Perry, Plaintiff
FtB 23 2022
JEFFREY P. COLWELLK CLER
Each 'STATE OF COLORADO' Individual employee,
executive officer, and/or administrative official acting
personally, individually, and/or in combination namely,
Alita King, Thomas Lynch, and Daniel McDonald, and
each 'doe' administrator, agent, and/or executive, and
Steven Vasconcellos, and 'doe' judicial administrators;
The 'CITY OF FORT COLLINS', et. al., including each
Individual administrative official, agent, employee and
or executive officer, acting personally, individually, and
or together, including each individual member of the city
council and Mayor, the City Attorney, the City Manager,
Darin Atteberry, Ross Cunniff, Gerry Horak, Ray Martinez,
Kristin Stephens, Ken Summers, Wade Troxell, including
'doe' agents, administrators, executives, officers and / or
each 'doe' appointee administrator, agent, police officer,
official, and 'City' employees, namely, Brandi Lynn Neita,
Dan Callahan, Jill Hueser, and Ryan Westlind;
CSU BOARD OF GOVERNORS, for 'CSU', and each
individual member of the 'CSU Board of Governors', for
'COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY' and each 'doe' and
or named administrators, agents, employees or officials
acting personally, individually, and or together, namely,
Scott Harris, Jeff Goetz, Jesse Ihnen, Michael Lohman,
Phil Morris, Derek Smith, Lynn Johnson, Mark Gill, and
Nie Olsen, and each heir appointee and/or official; each
Individual Jointly and Severally Liable as Co-Defendants.
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
1
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MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, 28 U.S.C. § 2201
Plaintiff, Robert-Lawrence: Perry, a Man dwelling in Colorado, one state of the
Union of States in America, respectfully files this Amended Petition for Relief, under 42
U.S.C. § 1981 et. seq., and Request for Declaratory Judgment of Unconstitutional, as
written and applied, statutes and ordinances pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, § 2202.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1. This action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States under 42
U.S. Code§ 1983. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S. Code
§§ 1331 and 1343. This Court has jurisdiction to issue the declaratory relief requested
pursuant to the Declaratory Relief Act, Title 28 U.S. Code§§ 2201, 2202.
2. Plaintiff requests a three-judge panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284.
3. Venue is proper in the District of Colorado pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b). The
Corporate and Individual Defendants and the Plaintiff reside in the District of Colorado,
and the events described in this Petition occurred within the District of Colorado.
PARTIES
Plaintiff:
4. Plaintiff, Robert-Lawrence: Perry, has lived in Fort Collins Colorado continuously
since 1990; he is 68 years old; currently he is 'indigent' and/or 'homeless'. He subsists
on state food assistance and social security disability benefits.
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PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
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5. Defendant, 'City of Fort Collins', is a Municipal Corporation, listed on Dun and
Bradstreet, with their office in the State of Colorado. It has adopted and enforces the
camping and trespass Ordinances challenged in this case. It is the policy and practice
of the 'City of Fort Collins', through the actions of its police officers, its city prosecutor,
and municipal court judge who interpret and enforce the ordinances against 'camping'
and 'trespass' in the unconstitutional manner that is described and challenged in this
Complaint. The intentional acts and omissions of Defendants, the City of Fort Collins,
(City) and Colorado State University (CSU), and the County of Larimer, by and through
their administrators, appointed or elected officials, or employed officers, complained of
herein as unconstitutional, are carried out under color of state law.
6. Defendant, Colorado State University (CSU), a public educational institution, is
located in Fort Collins, Colorado; both CSU and 'CSU BOARD OF GOVERNORS' are
listed as businesses on Dun and Bradstreet, with offices in the State of Colorado.
7. Defendant, Colorado Judicial Administrator, Steven Vasconcellos, resides in the
State of Colorado, and is responsible for judicial administration in Colorado.
8. Defendant, 'STATE OF COLORADO', is the legal business name of the 'Division
of Homeland Security and Emergency Management'; the Legal business name of the
Colorado Department of Public Safety, Division of Homeland Security; the businesses
are listed on Dun and Bradstreet, with principal offices in Colorado. The omissions and
Intentional acts by Defendant complained of as unconstitutional are carried out under
color of state law by its employed agents, officers, and appointed or elected officials.
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PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
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SUMMARY STATEMENT OF CAUSES
9. Plaintiff seeks declaratory judgment and injunctive relief due to unlawful actions
by Defendants, who through their employed agents, officers, and appointed or elected
officials denied Plaintiff lawful access and use of Colorado State University.
10. Colorado State University (hereinafter CSU) police issued 'exclusionary orders'
against Plaintiff for allegedly 'feeding squirrels', and issued citations for trespass when
Plaintiff disregarded such 'orders' as unconstitutional, which was determined by the
Colorado Supreme Court and the United States District Court over 50 years ago.
11. At trial, Plaintiff was found 'guilty' of 'trespass' under the Fort Collins Municipal
Code (F.C.M.C.) Sec. 40(a), which is broadly interpreted and enforced by local police
officers to discriminatorily verbally ban anyone from public property without reason.
12. Also, Plaintiff was found 'guilty' of 'trespass' under C.R.S. § 18-4-504, which is
interpreted and applied to presume that CSU 'exclusionary orders' are lawful; though
this was never proved, and C.R.S. § 18-9-109(1) prohibits anyone from denying lawful
access and use of educational facilities. The judge and prosecutor conspired to deny
Plaintiff due process by excluding any evidence, legal argument or testimony to prove
CSU 'exclusionary orders' are unlawful. The judge and prosecutor even committed jury
tampering by seating a clerk from the prosecutor's office on the jury. (A felony)
14. The City of Fort Collins prosecuted Plaintiff seven (7) times for 'camping', which
is vaguely and broadly defined as: "to spend the night, reside or dwell temporarily,
or to conduct activities of daily living such as eating or sleeping."
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PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
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SUMMARY STATEMENT OF CLAIMS
15. Plaintiff asserts that CSU campus police officers and administrative officials did
violate Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, §§ 1985, and sec. 1986 by knowingly and intentionally
denying Plaintiff access and use of Colorado State University premises and facilities
open to the public, in violation of His Fifth, Eighth and 14th Amendment Rights.
16. 'Exclusionary orders' as was issued by CSU campus police were determined to
be unconstitutional in Watson v. Board of Regents of University of Colorado 512 P.2d
1162, in the Colorado Supreme Court, and Dunkel v. Elkins, 325 F. Supp. 1235, by
the United States District Court. CSU 'exclusionary orders' are also unconstitutional
as 'bills of pains and penalties' or 'Bills of Attainder, since they impose punishment of
'exclusion' without benefit of a judicial trial. Further, 'exclusion' or 'banishment' is not
provided for as punishment by any federal or state law, and was determined to be
unconstitutional. Also, CSU police 'exclusionary orders' are permanent unless lifted,
which constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiff has been denied substantive
due process and equal protection of the law.
17. Plaintiff asserts CSU campus police officers, and 'City' and 'County' judges and
prosecutors did violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 1985, and section 1986 by knowingly and
intentionally denying Plaintiffs Right to substantive due process and refused to advise
the jury of the definition of "unlawfully enters or remains" under C.R.S. § 18-4-201,
which states that: "A person who, ... , enters or remains in or upon premises that
are ... open to the public does so with license and privilege ... ". End quote.
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PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
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18. Plaintiff asserts that the City trespass ordinance (F.C.M.C.) 17-40(a) cannot be
legally applicable to public property, like CSU since the Fort Collins Municipal Code
definition of "enter or remain unlawfully" is specifically limited to private property, and
C.R.S. § 18-4-201, states: "A person who, ... , enters or remains in or upon premises
that are ... open to the public does so with license and privilege ... ". In addition,
Plaintiff is a "public invitee"· defined under Restatement (2nd) of Torts § 332(2) ( 1965).
Therefore, the Municipal Court conviction for 'trespass' was unlawful.
19. Plaintiff asserts that the City of Fort Collins ordinance definition of 'trespass' is
intentionally and unconstitutionally over-broad and vague so as to allow police officers
to discriminatorily deny access and use of public places, such as CSU campus for any
reason, or no reason whatsoever, and in this case, deny Plaintiff His Eighth, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendment Rights to due process and equal protection of the law.
20. Plaintiff asserts that employed officers, and appointed or elected officials of the
City of Fort Collins, violated Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 1985, and § 1986 by knowingly
and intentionally denying Plaintiff His substantive due process rights in violation of the
Fifth, and 14th Amendments, by enforcing an over-broad and vague ordinance against
'camping', defined as: 'eating, sleeping or conducting activities of daily living'.
21. Plaintiff asserts that the City of Fort Collins ordinance definition of 'camping' is
intentionally and unconstitutionally over-broad and vague so as to allow police officers
to discriminatorily deny access and use of public places, in this case denying Plaintiffs
Eighth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights to equal protection of the law.
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PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
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THE CIVIL RIGHTS CONSPIRACY
22. The City of Fort Collins, by and through agents, employed officers, and elected
officials are engaged in a campaign against 'homeless' people. The City Council has
enacted ordinances against 'camping' and 'trespass' that are selectively enforced just
against people in the community that are assumed to be 'homeless' or 'indigent'. The
campaign includes police officers issuing verbal orders permanently banning anyone,
suspected as 'homeless', from public property, such as CSU campus, using the vague
and over-broad powers granted by the City 'camping' and 'trespass' ordinances.
23. For their part, CSU administrative and executive officials adopted and enforced
the 'exclusionary order' policy challenged as unconstitutional. CSU police enforce the
'exclusionary orders' with trespass citations exercising the broad discretion afforded by
the 'trespass' ordinance, and state statute, by erroneously presuming that 'exclusionary
orders' are enforceable with 'trespass' citations for being on public property.
24. CSU 'exclusionary order' policy immediately denies access to CSU campus to
the identified 'subject' issued an 'exclusionary order' form, that functions as a personal
'no trespass' notice, subject to enforcement with criminal citations of 'trespass'.
25. V.P. for University Operations, Lynn Johnson, implemented CSU 'exclusionary
order' policy that allows CSU campus police to, prejudicially, deny access and use of
CSU campus to whoever they want; in this case, permanently excluding Plaintiff from
CSU campus for allegedly 'feeding squirrels'. Notably, CSU does not have a policy
against 'feeding squirrels', nor is there any such local or state prohibition.
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PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
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26. CSU campus police are enforcing CSU 'exclusionary order' policy, which was
authorized by Lynn Johnson, V.P. for University Operations, further supported by CSU
then-acting Chief of Police, Scott Harris and then-acting CSU Chief of Staff, Mark Gill,
who appointed a CSU employee, Nie Olsen to unilaterally affirm the 'exclusionary order'
CSU campus police issued against Plaintiff. Nie Olsen acted as a judge and hearsay
witness during the 'administrative appeal' of the permanent 'exclusionary order'.
27. Plaintiff was issued the first "exclusionary order" by CSU campus police officer,
Jesse Ihnen on May 18, 2016, for allegedly 'feeding squirrels'. Lynn Johnson, CSU VP
for University Operations, lifted the 'exclusionary order' after Plaintiff submitted a written
appeal challenging CSU "exclusionary order" policy as unconstitutional and cited other
criminal and civil statutory citations which conflict with CSU "exclusionary order" policy.
C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (1 ), prohibits denying access and use of university property, unless
such person is interfering with the functions of the university, either through the use of
force or violence, or the threat of force or violence. [See: C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (2)]
28. Then, in response, CSU Vice President for University Operations, Lynn Johnson,
amended CSU 'exclusionary order' policy to remove reference to C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (2)
after Plaintiff objected to the first 'exclusionary order' issued against him based solely
upon him 'feeding squirrels'. On July 21, 2016, CSU 'exclusionary order' policy was
amended to redefine the purpose of the policy for: "maintenance of its public buildings
and property, including the prohibition of activities or conduct within public buildings or
on public property". Then, this was applied in Plaintiff's 2019 'trespass' cases.
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PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
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29. By such amendment to CSU 'exclusionary order' policy removing any reference
to C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (2), and such statutory limitations provided for by law, it allowed
CSU campus police to discriminate against Plaintiff to apply "exclusionary order" policy
to such conduct as: 'feeding squirrels'. Curiously, CSU 'exclusionary order' policy was
amended after Plaintiff filed this petition for relief; CSU 'exclusionary order' policy once
again cites C.R.S. § 18-9-109 as statutory authority, with conditional application.
30. CSU campus police cited Plaintiff with 'trespass' under C.R.S. § 18-4-504, and
Fort Collins Municipal Code (F.C.M.C.) section 17-40(a), that applies the definition of
"Enter or remain unlawfully" defined by F.C.M.C. Sec. 17-1. However, neither the state
trespass statute nor city trespass ordinance applies to public property. like CSU.
31. C.R.S. § 18-4-201 defines what conduct would constitute "enters unlawfully" or
"remains unlawfully", and provides exception for public property; thus, Plaintiff should
not have been cited for 'trespass on CSU campus. In fact, C.R.S. § 18-9-109 prohibits
denying access and use of educational facilities, such as CSU.
32. Plaintiff was convicted twice of trespass; once in county and once in municipal
court since each judge refused to allow his jury instructions, nor even allow Plaintiff to
cite C.R.S. § 18-4-201 or C.R.S. § 18-9-109. Defendants named herein denied Plaintiff
due process of a fair trial, and denied Him equal protection of the law.
33. CSU campus police officers named herein testified at Plaintiff's 'trespass' trials
that they issued Plaintiff 'exclusionary order' forms and cited Plaintiff for 'trespass' when
he disregarded such forms as unconstitutional and unlawful.
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PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
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34. The testimony of CSU campus police officers sworn under oath at Plaintiffs trials
constitutes a confession that they intentionally denied Plaintiff access and use of CSU
campus in violation of C.R.S. § 18-9-109(1). CSU campus police officers have admitted
to their participation in the conspiracy to deny Plaintiffs civil, constitutional and statutory
rights in violation of 42 U.S. Code§ 1983, § 1985, and section 1986.
35. CSU campus police officers acted under color of law, in their official capacities,
and upon authority of CSU administrative officials to deny Plaintiffs constitutional right
and equal protection of the law, i.e. C.R.S. § 18-9-109(1) and C.R.S. § 18-4-201 that
would have otherwise prevented them from denying Him access to CSU campus and
prohibited them from enforcing CSU 'exclusionary order' policy with 'trespass' citations
that would not otherwise be applied to public property. like CSU campus.
36. In coordination with CSU administrative officials to enforce 'exclusionary orders,
CSU professor and then-mayor, Wade Troxel and City of Fort Collins council members,
two of whom were also CSU professors, amended the 'trespass' ordinance to remove
reference to public property from the definition of trespass in F.C.M.C. Sec. 17-1.
37. The intentional amendment and deletion of reference to public property and the
acknowledged right of the public with license and privilege to enter or remain on public
property, coincided with other acts by the City to violate Plaintiffs constitutional rights.
Contemporaneous with Plaintiff being issued a trespass citation; the City amended the
City Charter, to allow them to hire private attorneys to act as judge and prosecutor in
Plaintiffs trespass case, thus facilitating their § 1985 civil rights conspiracy.
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PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
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38. The amendment of CSU 'exclusionary order' policy to allow CSU campus police
to cite Plaintiff with 'trespass', and amendment of the definition of trespass in F.C.M.C.
Sec. 17-1 to delete reference to public property and the right of the public with license
and privilege to enter or remain on public property. was still not enough to insure that
the jury would convict Plaintiff of 'trespass' under C.R.S. § 18-4-504, which has never
been applied to public property; the Larimer co~nty district court prosecutor, Alita King
and county court judge Thomas Lynch refused to allow jury instructions, nor even allow
Plaintiff to cite C.R.S. § 18-4-201, that defines what constitutes trespass and exempts
public property: nor would they permit jury instruction on C.R.S. § 18-9-109(1), which
prohibits denying access and use of educational facilities, like CSU.
39. In order to insure that Plaintiff would be 'convicted' of 'trespass', Larimer county
district court prosecutor, Alita King conspired with county court judge Thomas Lynch to
tamper with the jury by seating a clerk from the prosecutor's office on the jury.
40. Though, to insure that Plaintiff's 'trespass' convictions would be affirmed by the
Larimer District Court, the State of Colorado also appointed then Larimer Chief Deputy
District Attorney Daniel McDonald to be the Larimer District Court Judge, assigned by
Judicial Administration to preside over the appeal of each of Plaintiff's trespass cases.
However, to insure that Plaintiff's trespass convictions were affirmed, some unidentified
person within Larimer County Judicial Administration used a PDF image of the judge's
signature to issue an "Order affirming Conviction' of each of Plaintiff's 'trespass' cases,
thereby denying Plaintiff due process and equal protection of the law.
11
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
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SUMMARY ARGUMENT
41. Plaintiff asserts that CSU 'exclusionary orders' are unlawful because they allow
CSU police to commit a crime; denying lawful access and use of CSU premises in
violation of C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (1). CSU 'exclusionary orders' are unconstitutional as
supported by precedent, in Watson v. Board of Regents of University of Colorado 512
P.2d 1162, in the Colorado Supreme Court, and Dunkel v. Elkins, 325 F. Supp. 1235,
by the United States District Court. Permanent CSU 'exclusionary orders' are also
unconstitutional as 'bills of pains and penalties', and cruel and unusual punishment.
42. Plaintiff asserts that CSU 'exclusionary order' policy, as written and enforced is
unconstitutional because it allows CSU campus police to violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by
immediately and permanently denying all lawful access and use of CSU premises for
unlawful reasons, such as for Plaintiff allegedly 'feeding squirrels'. CSU 'exclusionary
order' policy cites C.R.S. § 18-9-109 as legal authority; yet, Plaintiff was not charged
with refusing to leave, nor accused of committing an act which would 'disrupt, impair,
interfere with, or obstruct the lawful missions, processes, procedures, or functions of the
institution.' See also: (Colo. 2005) People v. In the interest of C.A.J. 05-CA-2413
43. CSU police 'exclusionary order' policy and administrative "appeal process" fails
to allow substantive or procedural due process; CSU police 'exclusionary order' policy
allows an employee from the Office of CSU President to affirm an 'exclusionary order'
without evidentiary standard; no evidence or witnesses are necessary and hearsay is
allowed; this resulted in violation of Plaintiff's Fifth and 14th Amendment Rights.
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PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
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44. Plaintiff asserts that the City trespass ordinance (F.C.M.C.) 17-40(a) cannot be
legally applicable to public property since the Fort Collins Municipal Code definition of
"enter or remain unlawfully" excepts those licensed, invited, or privileged. § 18-4-201
C.R.S. states: "A person who, regardless of his or her intent, enters or remains in or
upon premises that are ... open to the public does so with license and privilege ... ".
45. Plaintiff asserts that the City trespass ordinance (F.C.M.C.) 17-40(a) cannot be
legally enforced by CSU police because CSU 'exclusionary orders' are unconstitutional
and violate C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (1 ), which prohibits denying lawful access and use.
46. The City and County unlawfully convicted Plaintiff of 'trespass' because the jury
was not advised of C.R.S. § 18-4-201 and C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (1), which prohibits CSU
campus police from denying access and use of CSU campus.
47. The County illegally 'convicted' Plaintiff of 'trespass' because the prosecutor and
judge conspired by seating a clerk from the prosecutors office on the jury.
48. The City of Fort Collins ordinances prohibiting 'camping' are Unconstitutionally
over-broad and vague, which results in discriminatory interpretation and enforcement
against people subjectively considered by police officers, as 'homeless', like Plaintiff.
The ordinances against 'camping' are so extremely over-broad and vague, as written,
that they fail to provide adequate notice to enable someone of ordinary intelligence to
understand what conduct is prohibited. Even then, as written, the ordinances against
'camping' are so vague and over-broad that any 'activity of daily living' is prohibited,
thereby eliminating any alternative other than to disregard these ordinances.
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PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
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ARGUMENT
The City trespass ordinance is unconstitutional.
49. Plaintiff asserts that the City trespass ordinance (F.C.M.C.) 17-40(a) cannot be
legally applicable to public property since C.R.S. § 18-4-201 C.R.S. states: "A person
who, regardless of his or her intent, enters or remains in or upon premises that are ...
open to the public does so with license and privilege ... ".
50. Fort Collins Municipal Code (F.C.M.C.) section 17-40(a) for trespass applies the
definition of "Enter or remain unlawfully" defined by F.C.M.C. Section 17-1. In 2018,
City officials intentionally deleted the reference to public property from F.C.M.C. Sec.
17-1. Before July 2018, the City code definition of "enter or remain unlawfully" read:
F.C.M.C. Section 17-1 "Enter or remain unlawfully" shall mean:
(1) To enter or remain in or upon public or privately owned property when not
licensed, invited, privileged or otherwise authorized to do so;
Since July 2018, the City code definition of "enter or remain unlawfully" reads:
F.C.M.C. Section 17-1 "Enter or remain unlawfully" shall mean:
(1) To enter or remain in or upon privately owned property when not licensed,
invited, privileged or otherwise authorized to do so;
51. The intentional amendment and deletion of reference to public property and the
acknowledged right of the public with license and privilege to enter or remain on public
property coincided with other acts by the City to violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights.
Contemporaneous with Plaintiff being issued a trespass citation, the City amended the
City charter and 'trespass' ordinance, and hired private attorneys to act as judge and
prosecutor in Plaintiff's trespass case, thereby aiding the § 1985 conspiracy.
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PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
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52. Plaintiff asserts that the City trespass ordinance cannot lawfully apply to public
property, like CSU campus because it unconstitutionally denies Plaintiff's right to equal
protection of the law (C.R.S. § 18-4-201) which provides that the public have license
and privilege of access and use of public property, and that the trespass ordinance is
unconstitutionally over-broad and vague by granting police unlimited dictatorial power
and discretion to seize control over public property to permanently deny anyone access
and use of public property for any reason or for no reason whatsoever. F.C.M.C. Sec.
17-1 (3) allows anyone in 'lawful control' over public property to exclude anyone; except,
what constitutes 'lawful control', is not defined thus it is over-broad and vague. To the
extent that the City 'trespass' ordinance grants police 'lawful control' over all public
property, Plaintiff asserts that such control constitutes a taking under Article II Section
15 of the Colorado Constitution, which entitles Plaintiff to compensation.
53. The definition of "enters or remains unlawfully" used in F.C.M.C. Sec. 17-1 (3) is
unconstitutionally over-broad and vague on its face; it intentionally omits reference to
the public right of access and use of places of public accommodation, allowing officers
to discriminate against individuals whoever the officer chooses completely disregarding
the public right of access and use of public property contained in C.R.S. § 18-4-201 (3).
The definition of "enters or remains unlawfully" provided by F.C.M.C. Sec. 17-1(3) is
blatantly unlawful, especially as applied in Plaintiff's case because it allowed CSU police
officers to violate the law, specifically, C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (1), that prohibits anyone from
denying assess and use of educational institutions.
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PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
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54. Plaintiff alleges facts that then CSU Police Chief, Scott Harris, acting under color
of law, and in his official capacity, permanently denied Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment
right of equal access and use of CSU campus, and that Vice President for University
Operations and CFO, Lynn Johnson, who adopted and amended CSU 'exclusionary
order' policy to abandon the previous reference to state law, and appointed Nie Olsen
I
then CSU employee, to unilaterally affirm the 'exclusionary order' against Plaintiff, and
that then CSU Chief of Staff, Mark Gill, acted individually, and in coordination with the
Chief of Police, in his official capacity when he denied Plaintiff's appeal to enforce CSU
'exclusionary order' policy, and willfully, permanently denied Plaintiff access and use of
CSU property and all facilities thereon, including the Fort Collins public transportation
central bus terminal located on campus.
55. Plaintiff alleges facts that Larimer County prosecutor, Alita King, Larimer County
Judge Thomas L. Lynch, acting in their official capacities violated Plaintiff's Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process and equal protection of the law, by tampering with the
jury by seating a clerk from the prosecutor's office on the jury. thus, deprived him of
liberty and privileges by unlawfully enforcing the trespass statute C.R.S. § 18-4-504 in
not advising the jury that, by definition, pursuant to C.R.S. § 18-4-201 the public have
license and privilege to enter and remain on public property, and unidentified individual
Defendant's in the office of judicial administration, who wrote the 'Judgment Affirming
Conviction' and forged the judge's signature with a PDF copy: thus, Plaintiff was denied
substantive due process and lawful appeal of his 'trespass' conviction.
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PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
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The City ordinances prohibiting 'camping' in the City are unconstitutional.
56. Plaintiff asserts claims that the City ordinances prohibiting 'camping' on public or
private property are both unconstitutionally vague and over-broad on their face, and as
applied in this case, since they generally prohibit living in Fort Collins. Also, Plaintiff
asserts that the City ordinances prohibiting 'camping' are discriminatory because they
are only enforced upon 'homeless' people, like Plaintiff, as part of a City policy to rid
Fort Collins of 'homeless' people. Plaintiff asserts that the City ordinances prohibiting
'camping' are unconstitutional because they impose cruel and unusual punishment of
excessive fines or (6) six months in jail for conducting activities of daily living.
57. Plaintiff was charged (7) seven times with 'camping'; most recently, Plaintiff was
cited with 'camping'; Municipal Court Case: FC-20-4935-MD, which was dismissed on
September 17, 2020; therefore, the statute of limitation has not expired.
58. The City of Fort Collins ordinance prohibiting "camping" is over-broad and vague
due the lack of guidance in the enforcement that grants police unlimited discretion to
use it to discriminate against 'homeless' people, such as Plaintiff. The Fort Collins city
ordinances against 'camping' on public or private property effectively renders everyone
subject to criminal penalties for living in Fort Collins. Yet, the City ordinance against
'camping' is applied exclusively against indigent, 'homeless' people, such as Plaintiff.
Since Plaintiff intends to continue to live in Fort Collins, he is subjected to continual
threat of being jailed for exercising his equal and fundamental right to live and be in
public places. Plaintiff has 'standing' to assert his 14th Amendment rights.
17
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 17 of 80
ABBREVIATED CITATIONS OF LAW
Fort Collins Municipal Code (F.C.M.C.) 17-40(a) states in pertinent part:
"No person shall enter or, remain unlawfully in or upon property, whether publicly or
privately owned."
F.C.M.C. Section 17-1 states in part: "Enter or remain unlawfully" shall mean:
(1) To enter or remain in or upon public or privately owned property when not
licensed, invited, privileged or otherwise authorized to do so; ... "
C.R.S. § 18-4-201 defines what misconduct would constitute "enters unlawfully"
or "remains unlawfully", and states: "A person who, regardless of his or her intent,
enters or remains in or upon premises that are at the time open to the public does so
with license and privilege unless the person defies a lawful order not to enter or
remain, ... "
C.R.S. § 18-1-901 (3)(n) defines "Public place" and states:
"Public place" means "a place to which the public or a substantial number of the
public has access, and includes but is not limited to highways, transportation facilities,
schools, places of amusement, parks, playgrounds, and the common areas of public
and private buildings and facilities."
C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (1) states:
(1) "No person shall, on or near the premises or facilities of any educational institution,
willfully deny to students, school officials, employees, and invitees:
(a) Lawful freedom of movement on the premises;
(b) Lawful use of the property or facilities of the institution;
(c) The right of lawful ingress and egress to the institution's physical facilities."
SUPPORTING CITATIONS OF CASE PRECEDENT
In Dunkel v. Elkins, 325 F. Supp. 1235, the U.S. District Court stated that:
"Defendants urge that plaintiff's use of public land and property is a "privilege
withdrawable by the State at any time for any reason." "We do not agree."
In the case of Watson v. Board of Regents of University of Colorado 512 P.2d
1162, the Colorado Supreme Court issued the opinion that:
"The University of Colorado opened its doors to the public. Accordingly, on this
basis, we hold that a non-student's right to access to University functions and
facilities, which are open to the public at-large, cannot be permanently denied
without due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. .. "
18
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 18 of 80
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW STANDARD
59. The United States Constitution Amendment XIV, Section 1 states:
"No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or-immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
60. The Mathews balancing test requires balancing the Right, Liberty or Interest in
property, and the probability of erroneous deprivation of that interest, compared with a
legitimate public interest that government seeks to serve by such action or policy that
deprives the Liberty, Rights or property Interests of such individuals by such action or
policy. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US 319, 332, 96 S Ct 893, 47 L Ed 2d 18 (1976).
61. Plaintiff submits these issues, including whether CSU 'exclusionary order' policy,
Fort Collins 'trespass' and 'camping' ordinances, as written and applied, are lawful:
62. Whether an administrative regulation, ordinance or statute as written or applied
denies, substantially prohibits, or unreasonably interferes with Plaintiff in the practical
exercise of his rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
63. Whether an administrative regulation, ordinance or statute as written or applied
is not reasonably related to achieving a legitimate public interest, or disproportionately
severe in relation to the affect of denying or impairing Plaintiffs constitutional rights.
64. Whether the administrative policy, regulation, ordinance or statute as written or
applied denies, impairs or fundamentally infringes upon Plaintiffs constitutional rights or
His Inalienable Personal Interests in 'conducting activities of daily living', and whether
such infringement of His Constitutional and Inalienable Rights constitutes a 'Taking'.
19
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 19 of 80
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
65. Colorado State University (hereinafter CSU) has adopted and enforced a policy,
which allows CSU campus police to issue an "exclusionary order", which denies access
and use of CSU campus to, Plaintiff, the identified subject of the "exclusionary order".
66. CSU "exclusionary orders" function as a written personal "no trespass" notice to
persons identified as the subject of the "exclusionary order", in this case, Plaintiff.
67. CSU is a publicly-funded, land-grant state public university; not private property.
68. CSU is not a private university; CSU is open to the general public for use of the
campus library, Fort Collins Transfort bus station, CSU stadiums for events, and hosts
events in the student union, with public access roads and parking facilities.
69. The legal definition of "Public place" provided by C.R.S. § 18-1-901(3)(n) would
include Colorado State University, as a public school.
70. C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (1) states:
"No person shall, on or near the premises or facilities of any educational
institution, willfully deny to students, school officials, employees, and invitees:
(a) Lawful freedom of movement on the premises;
(b) Lawful use of the property or facilities of the institution;
(c) The right of lawful ingress and egress to the institution's physical facilities."
71. CSU police "exclusionary order" policy cites C.R.S. 18-9-109 as legal authority
that presumably 'authorizes' them to issue an 'exclusionary order' form to Plaintiff.
72. Plaintiff is a "public invitee", defined under Restatement (2nd) of Torts § 332(2)
(1965); so, Plaintiff should also be an "invitee" as used in C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (1).
20
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 20 of 80
73. Plaintiff is an "invitee" for the purposes of C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (1).
74. Plaintiff is a 67 year-old alumnus of Colorado State University.
75. Plaintiff did use the CSU library and Fort Collins public bus terminal located on
campus until he was permanently banned for allegedly 'feeding squirrels',
76. CSU campus police issued Plaintiff several "exclusionary orders", exclusively for
allegedly 'feeding squirrels' on campus; no evidence was offered to prove Plaintiff fed
squirrels, and no witnesses ever testified that Plaintiff had fed squirrels.
77. CSU campus police website contains university policies and regulations; except,
there is no CSU policy or regulation against 'feeding squirrels' that was posted on the
CSU police website, nor is 'feeding squirrels' a city or county ordinance or state law.
78. C.R.S. § 18-4-201, states in part: "A person who, ... , enters or remains in or
upon premises that are ... open to the public does so with license and privilege ... ".
79. F.C.M.C. Section 17-1 did state: "Enter or remain unlawfully" shall mean:
(1) To enter or remain in or upon public or privately owned property when not
licensed, invited, privileged or otherwise authorized to do so; ...
80. CSU police exclusionary order policy provides an administrative appeal process;
however, there is NO evidentiary standard, hearsay statements are permitted, and NO
evidence and NO witnesses are reguired.
81. CSU "exclusionary order" policy provides for immediate exclusion or banishment
by CSU campus police, which were enforced by citations of trespass under Fort Collins
Municipal Code Section 17-40(a), and C.R.S. § 18-4-504 issued against Plaintiff.
21
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 21 of 80
82. CSU police 'exclusionary order' policy cites C.R.S. 18-9-109 as legal authority
that 'authorizes' police to issue an 'exclusionary order' form, that were issued against
Plai.ntiff solely on the basis of allegedly 'feeding squirrels'. C.R.S. 18-9-109(2),(3) set
expressly conditional and limited authority to remove someone from campus only for
committing acts, which 'disrupt, impair, interfere with, or obstruct the lawful missions,
processes, procedures, or functions of the institution'.
83. CSU 'exclusionary order' policy allows CSU campus police to exclude anyone
immediately and permanently, for any reason whatsoever, and deny due process and
equal protection of the law.
84. Plaintiff repeated notified CSU attorneys and CSU Office of General Counsel by
email, that CSU campus police CSU 'Exclusionary orders' and the policy that provides
for their use violated His Constitutional Rights of due process because it immediately
deprived Him of access and use of public property without access to court review.
85. Plaintiff repeated notified CSU attorneys and CSU Office of General Counsel by
email, that CSU campus police CSU 'Exclusionary orders' and the policy that provides
for their use violated His Constitutional Rights and equal protection of the law because
C.R.S. 18-9-109(1) prohibits denying access and use of educational institutions; thus,
Plaintiff argued that CSU police committed a crime by issuing him 'exclusionary orders'
banning Him from university property.
86. Plaintiff notified CSU Board of Governors that CSU campus police 'exclusionary
order' policy violated His Rights, and requested action; however they did not reply.
22
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 22 of 80
.87. CSU website page of Office of Policy and Compliance contains a graphic chart,
that lists the hierarchy of legal authority; demonstrating that CSU 'exclusionary order'
policy is superseded by levels of legal authority, which are all superseded by the U.S
Constitution, Federal Laws and Regulations, that then supersedes State Constitution,
Laws and Regulations, which supersedes Colorado State University System I Board of
Governors Policies, which supersedes Colorado State University Policies, which also
supersedes College Policies; all of which supersedes individual Department Policies,
such as CSU campus police and their 'exclusionary order' policy.
See: http://opc.prep.colostate.edu/policy-hierarchy/
88. CSU Office of Policy and Compliance (OPC) is part of the Department of Policy,
Risk and Environmental Programs (PREP) in the Division of University Operations that
is administered by Lynn Johnson, Vice President for University Operations.
89. The Office of Policy and Compliance submits proposed policies to stakeholders,
including administrative professional council, namely, Lynn Johnson, Vice President for
University Operations and CSU Chief of Staff, and CSU police command staff, namely
CSU Chief of Police, who is also part of the public safety team; all of whom approved
the CSU campus police 'exclusionary order' policy. https://opc.prep.colostate.edu/wp-
contenVuploads/sites/2/2019/09/Policy-Development-slide-show-rev-9. 9 .19. pdf.
90. CSU campus police 'exclusionary order' policy was reviewed by the CSU Office
of General Counsel, who must research applicable legal authority for compliance, then
the 'exclusionary order' policy was adopted and signed by CSU president.
23
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 23 of 80
91. CSU 'exclusionary order' policy was promoted by Vice President for University
Operations, Lynn Johnson, and adopted on August 12, 2016; Policy ID#: 6-6023-005.
92. CSU campus police 'exclusionary order' form policy states that after one year,
the excluded person may request the CSU Chief of Police terminate the exclusionary
order; when the CSU Chief of Police declines, then the excluded person may appeal to
CSU Chief of Staff; when the Chief of Staff declines, then 'exclusionary order' form is
presumed to be enforceable and permanent, effective for a persons life-time.
93. CSU campus police have issued Plaintiff several 'exclusionary order' forms for
allegedly 'feeding squirrels'; notably, CSU does not have a campus policy or regulation
against feeding squirrels, nor is there any local or state prohibition.
94. CSU campus police 'exclusionary orders' are deemed enforceable with citations
for 'trespass'. http://policylibrary.colostate.edu/policy.aspx?id=562
95. CSU campus police charged Plaintiff with 'trespass' under C.R.S § 18-4-504, for
disregarding a CSU campus police 'exclusionary order'.
96. CSU campus police charged Plaintiff with 'trespass' under Fort Collins Municipal
code 17-40(a) for disregarding a CSU campus police 'exclusionary order'.
97. Plaintiff asserts that the City trespass ordinance (F.C.M.C.) 17-40(a) cannot be
legally applicable to public property, like CSU since the Fort Collins Municipal Code
definition of "enter or remain unlawfully" is specifically limited to private property
98. At no time during or after Plaintiffs 'trespass' trials was any evidence submitted
nor did any witness testify that CSU is private property.
24
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 24 of 80
99. CSU "exclusionary orders" are unconstitutional as bills of pains and penalties as
are bills of attainder prohibited by the U. S. Constitution Article I Section 10 Clause 1,
because they impose immediate punishment (exclusion) without judicial trial.
100. CSU "exclusionary orders" are unconstitutional because they deprive persons of
substantive due process, and equal protection of the law, including, but not limited to:
sections of law allowing for public access to public property such as: C.R.S. § 18-4-201,
and C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (1) that prohibits denying access and use of public educational
institutions and public accommodations and facilities.
101. CSU "exclusionary orders" are unconstitutional because they impose permanent
exclusion or banishment, which constitutes cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by
the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
102. Banishment is not provided for as punishment under any federal or state law.
103. Plaintiff was issued the first "exclusionary order" by CSU campus police officer
Jesse Ihnen on May 18, 2016, that was lifted without the necessity of an exclusionary
order appeal 'hearing', by CSU Vice President for University Operations, Lynn Johnson,
after Plaintiff submitted a written appeal citing the constitutional and other criminal and
civil statutory citations that conflict with CSU "exclusionary order" policy.
104. Contemporaneously with the "exclusionary order" issued on May 18, 2016, CSU
campus police issued Plaintiff a citation for trespass under C.R.S. § 18-4-504, which
was later voluntarily dismissed by the Larimer county prosecutor; he informed Plaintiff
that being on public property does not constitute a crime.
25
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 25 of 80
105. Prior to July 21, 2016, CSU policy on issuing exclusionary orders stated the
purpose and intent was, in part:
"This policy applies to all persons whose actions are deemed to be harmful
and/or disruptive to the university and/or to members of the campus community,
or who pose a substantial threat of causing such harm or disruption if permitted
to enter upon university property, as determined by any university official who has
been delegated with authority to issue an Exclusionary Order under this Policy."
106. Prior to July 21, 2016, CSU policy on issuing exclusionary orders cited as the
statutory authority C.R.S. § 18-9-109, citing or referencing sections (2) and (3).
107. CSU policy on 'exclusionary orders' was amended after Plaintiff objected to the
first exclusionary order issued against him based solely upon him 'feeding squirrels'.
108. At all times relevant to this Petition all the 'exclusionary orders' issued against
Plaintiff, CSU policy on issuing and enforcement of exclusionary orders stated that the
intent and purpose as follows: "This policy provides direction to responsible university
personnel for the issuance of orders excluding a person from entry upon university
property. This policy is adopted pursuant to the inherent authority of the University to
protect the safety of persons and property within its supervision and control and the
specific authority vested in the university by law to adopt orders, rules, and regulations
necessary for the administration, protection, and maintenance of public buildings and
property. including the prohibition of activities or conduct within public buildings
or on public property." End quote.
26
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 26 of 80
109. Colorado State University officials amended the stated purpose of the policy on
exclusionary orders to include general language and undefined provisions, particularly
regarding regulations for: "maintenance of its public buildings and property, including
the prohibition of activities or conduct within public buildings or on public property"; by
such July 21, 2016 amendment, it allowed CSU police to discriminate against Plaintiff
and to apply "exclusionary order" policy to such conduct as: 'feeding squirrels'.
110. Colorado State University officials intentionally deleted the reference to harmful
and disruptive conduct from the exclusionary order policy to eliminate the burden upon
them to provide reasonable grounds to explain why people, like Plaintiff, were banned
or identify what or how conduct, such as, feeding squirrels is harmful or disruptive.
111. CSU campus police issued Plaintiff several "exclusionary orders" applying CSU
"exclusionary order" policy with the amended statement of intent and purpose allowing
CSU campus police to exclude or ban Plaintiff for 'feeding squirrels'.
112. CSU campus police enforced "exclusionary order" policy with the amended text
quoted in paragraph 48 that excluded any reference to C.R.S. § 18-9-109, specifically
sections (2) and (3) in each case that Plaintiff was tried and convicted of 'trespass.
113. CSU campus police enforced "exclusionary order" policy by issuing Plaintiff (2)
citations for trespass on CSU property. One trespass citation was issued pursuant to
C.R.S. § 18-4-504, and another trespass citation was issued pursuant to Fort Collins
Municipal Code Section 17-40(a) in applying CSU "exclusionary order" policy statement
using the intent and purpose as it was amended AFTER July 21, 2016.
27
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 27 of 80
114. Recently, CSU administrative officials again amended CSU "exclusionary order"
policy AFTER Plaintiff notified CSU and CSU Board of Governors of his intent to sue.
NOW, CSU "exclusionary order" policy amended statement of intent and purpose once
again cites the statutory authority of C.R.S. § 18-9-109, sections (2) and (3).
115. CSU exclusionary order policy assumes authority from C.R.S. §18-9-109 (3).
116. C.R.S. §18-9-109, (3) states: "No person shall willfully refuse or fail to leave the
property of or any building or other facility used by any educational institution upon
being requested to do so by the chief administrative officer, his designee charged with
maintaining order on the school premises and in its facilities, or a dean of such
educational institution, if such person is committing, threatens to commit, or incites
others to commit any act which would disrupt, impair, interfere with, or obstruct
the lawful missions, processes, procedures, or functions of the institution."
117. No CSU administrative official ever alleged that 'feeding squirrels' constituted an
act of disruption, interference or obstruction described in C.R.S. §18-9-109 (3).
118. Colorado State University Policy ID#: 6-0160-001 defines 'disruptive activity' as:
"Any act that unreasonably interferes with the rights of others to peaceably
assemble or to exercise the right of free speech, disrupts the normal functioning
of the University, damages property, or endangers health or safety is specifically
prohibited. No person may attempt to, nor actually interfere with, impair or impede the
institution's regularly scheduled classes, events, ceremonies, or normal and essential
operations." End quote.
28
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 28 of 80
119. No CSU administrative official ever alleged that 'feeding squirrels' constituted an
offense in violation of CSU Policy ID#: 6-0160-001 that defines 'disruptive activity'.
120. CSU exclusionary order policy assumes authority from C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (2).
121. C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (2) states:
"No person shall, on the premises of any educational institution or at or in any
building or other facility being used by any educational institution, willfully impede the
staff or faculty of such institution in the lawful performance of their duties or willfully
impede a student of the institution in the lawful pursuit of his educational activities
through the use of restraint, abduction, coercion, or intimidation or when force
and violence are present or threatened." (Emphasis added)
122. No CSU administrative official ever alleged that 'feeding squirrels' constituted an
offense in violation of C.R.S. §18-9-109 (2).
123. I repeatedly requested for CSU General Counsel attorneys to state CSU policy
regarding the feeding squirrels, and interpret the application of the 'exclusionary order'
policy to 'feeding squirrels'.
124. CSU General Counsel attorneys refused to reply or interpret 'exclusionary order'
policy as applied and enforced against Plaintiff solely for 'feeding squirrels'.
125. I repeatedly asked that CSU administrative officials provide me a statement on
CSU policy regarding feeding squirrels; however, no university official has responded;
therefore, I reasonably assumed that since there is no law, ordinance, CSU regulation,
or policy against feeding squirrels that they took no official position on the issue.
29
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 29 of 80
126. Plaintiff notified Defendants of his intent to sue on January 31, 2018. Recipients
of this e-mail Notice of Intent to Sue included, CSU General Counsel, Jason Johnson,
Chief Financial Officer, Lynn Johnson, Chief of Police, Scott Harris, and Captain, Frank
Johnson. Petitioner recited violations of his Inalienable, Constitutional, and Civil Rights
under Statutory Law, and notified Defendants of his per diem claim for damages. Yet,
Defendants were not deterred and issued two more 'exclusionary orders'.
127. On July 20, 2018 CSU police officer Phil Morris issued Plaintiff a citation for
trespass under C.R.S. § 18-4-504, and issued an CSU 'exclusionary order' form.
128. CSU exclusionary order policy provides for immediate exclusion upon issuance
of an exclusionary order, providing only an administrative "appeal" to CSU employees
from the office of the President, and appointed by the Chief Administrative Assistant.
129. On August 7, 2018, a administrative exclusionary order 'appeal' was conducted
by telephone by Nie Olsen, an employee in the Office of CSU President. During the
telephone 'hearing', although there was no evidence or witness testimony presented,
Nie Olsen stated he witnessed a man matching Plaintiffs physical description feeding
squirrels on campus and unilaterally upheld the permanent CSU 'exclusionary order'.
130. Plaintiff submitted a written appeal to the exclusionary order review committee
decision to uphold the exclusionary order against him to CSU President Chief of Staff,
Mark Gill on August 10, 2018. This 'appeal' included a July 24, 2018 Objection and
Response to the exclusionary order issued July 20, 2018, as well as, two affidavits in
support of the Objection and Response and letter of appeal.
30
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 30 of 80
131. On August 24, 2018, Defendant, Mark Gill, Chief of Staff for the CSU President,
notified Petitioner, by e-mail, that his decision was to uphold and affirm the exclusionary
order 'appeal'; stating only: "The Exclusionary Order remains in effect."
132. Mark Gill was senior staff assistant responsible for a broad range of support for
the Office of the President, including oversight of operations and ensuring effective
implementation of initiatives on behalf of the President. Mark Gill personally endorsed
the exclusionary order against Plaintiff, on behalf of CSU President, when he affirmed
and upheld the decision of Nie Olsen after the exclusionary order review.
133. On November 20, 2018, I sent an e-mail letter and faxed both CSU Board of
Governors and Jason Johnson, CSU General Counsel to request that they respond to
my questions regarding 'exclusionary order' policy, and asked for an interpretation of
that policy, particularly supported by legal citations of any Colorado statutory authority,
which would authorize CSU issuing 'exclusionary order', and to respond within 10 days,
or I would disregard any 'exclusionary order' and return to CSU; I received no response
from any CSU official within 15 days, so I returned to CSU.
134. On May 17, 2019 CSU police officer Derek Smith issued me an 'exclusionary
order'. Further, Officer Derek Smith issued me a citation for 'trespass' under C.R.S. §
18-4-504. Later that day, Derek Smith accessed the CCIC database and unilaterally
entered an report of permanent criminal restraining order.
135. There was no 'permanent restraining order' issued by any judge as reported and
entered into CCIC by CSU campus police officer Derek Smith on May 17, 2019.
31
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 31 of 80
136. On May 17, 2019 CSU campus police officer, Derek Smith accessed the CCIC
database, then entered a false report of a permanent criminal protective order against
Plaintiff; however, there was no court ordered restraining order prohibiting Plaintiff from
entering CSU property, thereby CSU officer, Derek Smith committed numerous crimes
against Plaintiff, including federal crimes regulating computer and internet use.
137. The Colorado Bureau of Investigation (CBI) is designated by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI), Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division, as the CJIS
Systems Agency for the state of Colorado.
138. Further, the responsibility of the Crime Information Management Unit (CIMU) is
to manage all the policies and business practices followed by Colorado criminal justice
agencies regarding numerous criminal justice computer systems, including the National
Crime Information Center (NCIC), the Colorado Crime Information Center (CCIC) and
the International Public Safety and Justice Network (Nlets) computer databases.
139. All CSU police officers are commissioned through Fort Collins Police Services
and the Larimer County Sheriffs Office. Officers have full law enforcement authority on
all university and state-owned property, as well as the city of Fort Collins and Larimer
County. See C.R.S. 16-2.5-148.
140. All CSU police officers are state certified through the Colorado Peace Officers
Standards and Training (POST) board and are commissioned by the CSU Board of
Governors. Officers must successfully complete or challenge an POST-approved basic
law enforcement academy prior to being appointed.
32
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 32 of 80
141. CSU campus police violated state law, C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (1) when they willfully
denied Plaintiff access and use of CSU facilities.
142. Defendant, Colorado State University police officers: Jeff Goetz, Jesse Ihnen,
Michael Lohman, Phil Morris, and Derek Smith unlawfully denied Plaintiff access and
use of CSU campus in issuing unconstitutional 'exclusionary orders' then individually
and in combination these officers conspired to unlawfully arrest and convict Plaintiff of
allegedly trespassing on CSU campus. Individually, and in combination, administrators,
employees and executives Lynn Johnson, and Nie Olsen, Chief of Police, Scott Harris,
and CSU Chief of Staff, Mark Gill participated in the violation of Plaintiffs rights.
143. C.R.S § 23-30-102 (1) identifies the CSU Board of Governors authority; stating:
"The board of governors of the Colorado state university system is a body corporate,
capable in law of suing and being sued; ... having duties and powers to control,
manage, and direct the fiscal and all other affairs of the Colorado state university
system and the entities it governs; and of causing to be done all things necessary to
carry out the provisions of this article."
144. C.R.S § 23-31-103 defines the control of the Board of Governors and states in
part: "The board of governors of the Colorado state university system has the general
control and supervision of the Colorado state university and lands and the use thereof,
The board has plenary power to adopt all such ordinances, bylaws, and regulations,
not in conflict with the law, as they may deem necessary to secure the successful
operation of the university and promote the designed objects."
33
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 33 of 80
145. Defendants, Colorado State University (CSU) and CSU Board of Governors are
each liable under Colorado and federal law for the actions of employees.
146. Defendant, CSU Board of Governors, is liable under United States and Colorado
law for Plaintiffs claims relating to violation of His Civil and Constitutional Rights as is
provided for by Article 11, Section 15 of the Colorado Constitution, and as provided by
C.R.S. 38-1-101 et. seq., C.R.S § 13-21-131, and by (2nd) Restatement of Contracts,
and civilly liable for depriving Plaintiff of His civil rights in violation of Title 42 U.S.C. §
1981, §1983, §1985, and §1986, and liable under Title 18 U.S.C. §241, §242. Further,
non-government Defendant Individuals, including Administrative officials at Colorado
State University are liable because they participated in denying Plaintiff equal access
and use of CSU campus by adopting the CSU 'exclusionary order' policy and enforcing
such policy in coordination with campus police, in violation of Plaintiffs Rights.
147. C.R.S § 23-31-106 states the duties of CSU President:
"The president shall be chief executive officer of the Colorado state university, and it is
his or her duty to see that the rules and regulations of the board of governors of the
Colorado state university system and the faculty are observed and executed."
148. Defendants, City of Fort Collins and Colorado State University employee police
officers violated Plaintiffs civil, constitutional, inalienable and statutory right of access
and use of public places by denying Him access and use of public places and places
open to the public, specifically CSU campus and all public accommodations, including
the library, parking and transportation facilities, and other public places.
34
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 34 of 80
149. CSU police issued a Fort Collins 'camping' ordinance citation against Petitioner
on August 20, 2017 simply because Petitioner parked on CSU property; the case was
subsequently dismissed.
150. CSU exclusionary order policy is over-broad and vague in violation of Plaintiff's
Constitutional Right to due process, which promotes an subjective interpretation and
discriminatory enforcement by campus police in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
151. The CSU policy on exclusionary orders is intentionally vague and over-broad so
as to permit interpretation and enforcement to be conducted in discriminatory fashion.
152. CSU exclusionary order policy provides for, and permits, campus police to ban
people, like Petitioner, for any activity, even if not expressly prohibited by university
policy or regulation, such as in this case, for allegedly feeding squirrels.
153. CSU policy on exclusionary orders provides for permanent exclusion from CSU
unless either the CSU police chief or senior staff assistant to CSU President approves
lifting the exclusionary order against Plaintiff', which they refused.
154. In Colorado, Plaintiff would be granted mandatory parole in one year if he were
convicted of a class 6 felony; yet, the exclusionary order policy allows CSU Chief of
police to decide IF exclusionary orders will ever be lifted, otherwise, the exclusionary
order is permanent; a life sentence, for allegedly 'feeding squirrels'.
155. The discriminatory and disproportionately harsh treatment of Plaintiff by CSU is
unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment barred by the Eighth Amendment of
the United States Constitution.
35
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 35 of 80
156. CSU 'exclusionary order' policy authorized and granted CSU campus police the
permission to discriminate against Plaintiff by denying him access and use of CSU.
157. Colorado State University Office of Equal Opportunity website page provides the
mission statement and guiding principles, which include integrity, inclusion, respect and
social justice, and states: "We create and nurture inclusive environments and welcome,
value and affirm all members of our community, including their various identities, skills,
ideas, talents and contributions. We honor the inherent dignity of all people within an
environment where we are committed to freedom of expression, critical discourse, and
the advancement of knowledge." The CSU statement on Equal Opportunity also states:
"We have the right to be treated and the responsibility to treat others with fairness
and equity, the duty to challenge prejudice, and to uphold the laws, policies and
procedures that promote justice in all respects... We are accountable for our
actions and will act ethically and honestly in all our interactions."
158. Petitioner accepted the offer, pledge and binding commitment for CSU to uphold
the laws, honor the dignity of people, and treat them with fairness and equity, and be
responsible and held accountable for their actions, just as in this case.
159. Colorado State University Policy ID#: 6-0160-001 on Discrimination states:
"Discrimination is defined as: conduct that (a) excludes an individual from participation
in, (b) denies the individual the benefits of, (c) treats the individual differently from
others in, or (d) otherwise adversely affects a term or condition of an individual's
employment, education, living environment or University program or activity."
36
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 36 of 80
160. Defendants converted Petitioner's Constitutional, Civil and Statutory Rights into
their claim of authority to grant access to CSU that they can arbitrarily revoke for any
reason, such as: for feeding squirrels. This constitutes a Taking of Plaintiff's property
right of access; the interference by Defendant in denying Petitioner his property rights
and his constitutional Right of Equal Access to public facilities can be described as the
deprivation of his Rights in Property .. This exclusionary order constitutes the absolute
conversion of Petitioner's property interests in his Rights to Due Process and Right of
equal Access into Defendant's property claim of right to discriminate against him; this
deprivation constitutes a Taking that Entitles Plaintiff to Just Compensation.
161. Defendants have assumed Private Control of Colorado State University without
proper statutory authority, or by deliberate misconstruction and abuse of authorization,
provided by C.R.S. §18-9-109 (3). Defendants' abuse of authority to discriminate and
deny Petitioner his Constitutional, Civil, and Statutory Rights of Equal Access and Right
to Due Process is in direct violation of United States and Colorado statutes providing
Civil Rights, as well as, violation of the Colorado and United States Constitution. Their
conduct can only be described as an intentional and flagrant usurpation of authority to
convert public property into private property for their own interests and agendas.
162. Defendant, CSU has assumed authority in excess of that granted by state and
federal law to enact regulatory provisions such as the CSU exclusionary order policy
with inadequate appeal procedures to unlawfully discriminate against Plaintiff to deny
him his Constitutional and Civil Rights.
37
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 37 of 80
163. Plaintiff is injured by the loss of his Statutory Right of Equal access to campus
and other public facilities at CSU, as provided under C.R.S § 18-9-109(1); as a result of
the willful conduct by CSU administrative officials, and employees.
164. Petitioner has suffered the complete loss of his Constitutional, Civil and statutory
Rights to equal access to public facilities, due to Defendant's unauthorized assumption
of control and authority to discriminate against Petitioner; Defendants, unlawfully, have
seized Petitioner's Property Interests in his Constitutional, Civil and Statutory Rights to
Equal Access by denying him Due Process; Petitioner is entitled to repossess all of his
Private Property Rights, and entitled to Compensation as awarded by arbitration.
165. C.R.S. § 24-14-102 authorizes 'public entities' to purchase liability insurance
and "crime insurance" in lieu of a public official personal surety bonds that would
otherwise be required.
166. "Public entity" means the state of Colorado, principal departments listed in
section 24-1-110, public colleges and universities, state or local commissions, state
or local authorities, counties, cities, cities and counties, towns, municipalities, districts,
special districts, boards, and school districts." C.R.S. § 24-14-102(2)(c)(III). "Crime
insurance" means a form of insurance to protect public assets from loss due to
dishonesty, theft, or fraud by a public official. C.R.S. § 24-14-102(2)(c)(I).
167. The principal departments listed in C.R.S. § 24-1-110 includes all executive and
administrative offices, agencies, and instrumentalities of the executive department
of the state government and their respective functions, powers, and duties.
38
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 38 of 80
168. By enacting C.R.S. § 24-14-102, the Colorado General Assembly has granted
permission for all public entities, including each Defendant in this case, and even the
Members of the General Assembly themselves to purchase "CRIME INSURANCE" that
indemnifies them (immunity from prosecution) when they commit crimes.
169. Article VI of the United States Constitution states in pertinent part:
"This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the
judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws
of any State to the contrary notwithstanding ... and Congress and members of the
several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the
United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to
support this Constitution ... "
170. Despite the fact that article VI of the United States Constitution requires that all
Members of State Legislatures shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this
Constitution, members of the Colorado General Assembly have not taken an oath of
office to support the United States Constitution.
171. Article XI I, section 8 of the Colorado Constitution states:
"Every civil officer, except members of the general assembly and such inferior officers
as may be by law exempted, shall, before he enters upon the duties of his office, take
and subscribe an oath or affirmation to support the constitution of the United States and
of the state of Colorado, and to faithfully perform the duties of the office upon which he
shall be about to enter." End quote.
39
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 39 of 80
172. By exempting members of the General Assembly from taking an oath of office,
Article XII has granted all members of the General Assembly sovereign immunity from
charges of treason when they enact unconstitutional laws such as C.R.S. § 24-14-102,
which grants themselves and all public entities, including these Defendants, immunity
from prosecution when they commit crimes against the people.
173. Colorado law requires public officials to take oath of office.
C.R.S. § 24-12-101 (1) states: "When a person is required to take an oath or affirmation
before the person enters upon the discharge of a public office or position, the form of
the oath or affirmation is as follows: I [name], do [select swear, affirm, or swear by the
ever-living God) that I will support the constitution of the United States, the constitution
of the state of Colorado, and the laws of the state of Colorado, and will faithfully perform
the duties of the office of [name of office or position] upon which I am about to enter to
the best of my ability." End quote.
174. The Fort Collins Charter, Article IV, section IV states:
"Before entering upon the duties of the office, each member of Council, the City
Manager, the City Attorney, the City Clerk, the Judge of the Municipal Court, and each
director of a service area shall take, subscribe before, and file with the City Clerk an
oath or affirmation that he or she will support the Constitution of the United States, the
Constitution of the State of Colorado, this Charter, and the ordinances of the City of Fort
Collins, and that he or she will faithfully perform the duties of the office or position. The
City Clerk shall take and subscribe the oath before a notary public." End quote.
40
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 40 of 80
175. The United States Constitution establishes itself as the supreme law of the land
as stated in Article VI of the United States Constitution adding that: "and the judges in
every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any
State to the contrary notwithstanding ... "
176. Article XX, section 8 of the Colorado Constitution states:
"Anything in the constitution of this state in conflict or inconsistent with the provisions of
this amendment is hereby declared to be inapplicable to the matters and things by this
amendment covered and provided for." End quote.
177. The City of Fort Collins has consistently applied, asserted and interpreted Article
XX, section 8 of the Colorado Constitution to claim "home-rule status" and enforce the
challenged ordinances without regard to other provisions of the Colorado Constitution,
and without any recognition of the United States Constitution, or laws thereof.
178. The City of Fort Collins has consistently applied, asserted and interpreted Article
XX, section 8 of the Colorado Constitution to enforce local ordinances, holding the City
authority as above and unlimited by either the U.S. or Colorado Constitution; the City
has interpreted the "home-rule" statutes as autonomous authority to regulate.
179. The Enabling Act, § 4 of the Colorado Constitution provides: " ... said convention
is hereby authorized to form a constitution and state government for said territory;
provided, that the constitution shall be republican in form ... , and not be repugnant
to the constitution of the United States and the principles of the declaration of
independence". (See 18 stat. 474, the Colorado Enabling Act of March 3, 1875)
41
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 41 of 80
180. In enacting Article XX, § 8 of the Colorado Constitution, the General Assembly
has granted unconstitutional "home-rule" authority to the City of Fort Collins to enact
and enforce the challenged as unconstitutional "camping" and "trespass" ordinances in
violation of the 14th Amendment, and denied Plaintiff his constitutional and inalienable
right to use his private property (use of his vehicle to conduct activities of daily living),
with the "camping" ordinance, and to deny his right of access and use of public places
(CSU and the public right-of-way) with the "trespass" ordinance.
181. Members of the General Assembly lack any constitutional authority or legitimacy
to enact amendments to the original Colorado Constitution, which, are repugnant to the
United States Constitution, in accordance with the Colorado Enabling Act of March 3,
1875; therefore, Article XII, § 8 of the Colorado Constitution that exempts members of
the General Assembly from taking an oath of office is unconstitutional.
182. Members of the General Assembly lack any constitutional authority or legitimacy
to enact amendments to the original Colorado Constitution, which, are repugnant to the
United States Constitution, in accordance with the Colorado Enabling Act of March 3,
1875; therefore, Article XX, § 8 of the Colorado Constitution that grants the City of Fort
Collins autonon_,ous 'home-rule' authority to disregard the Colora90 and United States
Constitutions and to disregard Colorado or United States law, is without force or effect;
the General Assembly cannot grant autonomous authority (without regard to the United
States Constitution or laws enacted there-under) to either the City of Fort Collins or the
members of the General Assembly itself.
42
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 42 of 80
183. Members of the General Assembly cannot enact amendments to the constitution
of Colorado contrary to Article VI of the United States Constitution, which requires that
all members of the state legislatures take an oath of office.
184. Members of the General Assembly cannot enact amendments to the Colorado
constitution contrary to Article VI of the United States Constitution, which proclaims the
United States Constitution, and that the laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof; shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges
in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any
State to the contrary notwithstanding ... "
185. Members of the General Assembly cannot enact amendments to the constitution
of Colorado repugnant or contrary to Article VI of the United States Constitution, which
would allow the General Assembly to enact any law that abridges the privileges
and immunities of the citizens of the United States.
186. Article I of the Fourteenth Amendment states in part:
"No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
187. The State of Colorado cannot enact or enforce laws to "abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States ... nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
43
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 43 of 80
188. Members of the General Assembly cannot enact amendments to the constitution
of Colorado repugnant or contrary to Article VI of the United States Constitution, which
would grant (home-rule') authority under Amendment XX of the Colorado Constitution
granting the City of Fort Collins authority to enact or enforce any law that abridges the
privileges and immunities of the citizens of the United States.
189. Th~ City of Fort Collins cannot enact or enforce ordir:ian~es, which "abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States ... nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
190. The Fort Collins 'camping' and 'trespass' ordinances abridges or denies Plaintiff,
and others similarly situated, ('homeless') their constitutional privileges of equal access
and use of the public property (CSU) and property open to the public.
191. The Fort Collins 'camping' and 'trespass' ordinances denies Plaintiff, and others
similarly situated, ('homeless') equal protection of the law because of the discriminatory
enforcement in applying such ordinances only against 'homeless' people.
192. The Fort Collins 'camping' and 'trespass' ordinances constitute a 'taking' under
the Fifth Amendment due to the fact that they deny Plaintiff the constitutional right of
lawful access and use of private and public property, and property open to the public
without Just Compensation.
193. CSU 'exclusionary orders' and Fort Collins 'camping' and 'trespass' ordinances
constitutes an exercise of imminent domain and seizure of public property, rather than
an exercise of police power to regulate.
44
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 44 of 80
194. Defendants, City of Fort Collins and Colorado State University employee police
officers have taken an oath to uphold the laws and Colorado and U.S. Constitutions.
195. Defendants, City of Fort Collins and County of Larimer, prosecutors and judges
have taken an oath to uphold the laws and Colorado and U.S. Constitutions.
196. The signed or affirmed verbal oath of office of each public official constitutes a
"contract" defined in (2nd) Restatement of Contracts, as "A promise for the breach of
which the law gives a remedy, and the performance of which the law recognizes as a
duty." And, "A promise is a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a
specified way, so made to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has
been made." See (2nd) Restatement of Contracts, sections 1 and 2.
197. The Oath of Office for Colorado public officials requires that the official affirm or
swear to support the laws and the U.S. and Colorado Constitutions. An official affirms
or swears the oath of office before a notary public and the oath of office is filed in the
public record. An oath of office constitutes a promise and manifestation of intention to
act or refrain from acting contrary to a duty to support the law and the Colorado and
U.S. Constitutions, particularly with regard to the Colorado and U.S. 'Bill of Rights.' A
breach of the promise the law recognizes as a duty, and the breach of which the law
provides a remedy including arbitration or civil claims filed in U.S. District Court under
Title 42, Sec. 1983, and under Colorado law pursuant to C.R.S. § 13-21-131 (1).
198. An oath of office constitutes a 'contract' as defined by the (2nd) Restatement of
Contracts, sections 1 and 2.
45
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 45 of 80
199. In my 2016 'Verified Claim of Private Rights and Status', I accepted the oaths of
~ . .
office of public officials; in exchange, I pledged my loyalty and oath as consideration.
200. Plaintiff accepted the oaths of office of all public officials as consideration and
promise to uphold the law and Colorado and U.S. constitutions in exchange for official
authority and financial benefits in compensation; thus, forming a consolidated contract
when Plaintiff incorporated their oaths into His Claim of Private Rights and Status.
201. Defendants, City of Fort Collins and State of Colorado officials who are bound by
their oaths of office have breached their duty and promise to uphold the Constitutions of
the United States; thereby Plaintiff is entitled Relief and Compensation.
202. Defendants, City of Fort Collins and County of Larimer, prosecutors and judges
have unlawfully prosecuted, convicted, and imprisoned Plaintiff for an alleged 'trespass'
on public property by using the CSU library and public bus terminal at CSU.
203. Defendant, City of Fort Collins Municipal Judge, Brandi Lynn Neito, and City of
Fort Collins prosecutor, Jill Hueser, individually and in combination, conspired to deny
Plaintiffs right of equal access and use of CSU property and facilities.
204. Defendants, City of Fort Collins and State of Colorado are liable under Colorado
and federal law for the actions of administrators, agents, employees and officials.
205. Defendant, County of Larimer, Judge, Thomas L. Lynch, and county prosecutor,
Alita King and former Chief Larimer District Court prosecutor, now District Court Judge,
Daniel McDonald, individually and in combination, conspired to deny Plaintiffs right of
equal access and use of CSU property and facilities.
46
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 46 of 80
206. On December 3, 2019, acting as Fort Collins Municipal Court temporary judge,
Brandi Lynn Neito issued an "Order for Suspension of Penalty (Jail); Waiver of Rights
and Plea of Guilty or No Contest", that is fraudulent because Plaintiff did not sign the
alleged plea agreement, nor was he advised by the court, nor did he plead 'guilty', nor
did he agree to waive any of his civil, constitutional or statutory rights.
207. The "Order for Suspension of Penalty (Jail); Waiver of Rights and Plea of Guilty
or No Contest" contains an unlawful condition for suspension of jail sentence upon the
stipulation that Plaintiff would be denied access and use of Colorado State University
property for one year.
208. The "Order for Suspension of Penalty (Jail); Waiver of Rights and Plea of Guilty
or No Contest" is unconstitutional because it denied Plaintiff equal access and use of
Colorado State University; also, this Order is unconstitutional since it violated Plaintiff's
civil rights and equal protection of the law; Brandi Lynn Neito denied Plaintiff's civil and
statutory right to equal access and use of CSU property and all public accommodations,
including the Fort Collins public bus facility on campus.
209. On January 22, 2020, Larimer County Judge, Thomas Lynch issued an Order
sentencing Plaintiff to 66 days in Larimer County Jail, 60 days were suspended upon
condition that Plaintiff was denied access and use of Colorado State University for one
year; this condition of suspended sentence was unconstitutional and unlawful since it
denied Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment privileges and immunities, and Right of equal
protection of the law.
47
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 47 of 80
210. Larimer District Court Judge McDonald issued the Order Affirming Conviction in
Plaintiff's municipal court trespass case, which includes an order denying Plaintiff's right
of access and use of Colorado State University property for one year from December 3,
2019 until December 3, 2020.
211. Employees of Larimer County Court Judicial Administration have access and use
of a PDF copy of a judge's electronic signature; Plaintiff notified Judicial Administrator,
Steven Vasconcellos of the unauthorized use, but he did not reply.
212. Plaintiff's appeal of the trespass conviction and sentencing order was denied by
unidentified individuals in the office of judicial administration, who wrote the 'Judgment
Affirming Conviction' and forged the judge's signature with a PDF copy. Alternatively,
an attorney acting for the City of Fort Collins wrote the 'Judgment Affirming Conviction'
of 'trespass' in municipal court and forged the judge's signature with a PDF copy.
213. Larimer District Court Judge McDonald issued an Order Affirming Conviction in
Plaintiff's county trespass case, that includes an order denying Plaintiff's right of access
and use of CSU property for one year from January 22, 2020 to January 22, 2021.
214. Alternatively, an employee within Larimer County Court Judicial Administration
used the PDF copy of Larimer District Judge Daniel McDonald's electronic signature to
issue the Order Affirming Conviction in Plaintiff's Larimer County Court trespass case.
215. Alternatively, an attorney with the Larimer District Attorney wrote the 'Judgment
Affirming Conviction' in Plaintiff's county trespass case and forged the judge's signature
with a PDF copy.
48
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 48 of 80
STATEMENT OF CAUSES AND CLAIMS
CSU EXCLUSIONARY ORDERS ARE UNLAWFUL
216. Defendants, Colorado State University, (CSU), CSU BOARD OF GOVERNORS,
and CSU President adopted and enforce an unconstitutional, as written and applied,
policy to permanently exclude Plaintiff from CSU property. Plaintiff was permanently
banned from CSU property by campus police who issued several 'exclusionary order'
forms for allegedly 'feeding squirrels'. When Plaintiff disregarded these 'exclusionary
order' forms, campus police issued three citations for 'trespass'. The first citation was
summarily dismissed by a Larimer County Prosecutor because he stated that CSU is
public property, and that just being on public property does not constitute an offense.
However, CSU campus police were not deterred and subsequently issued Plaintiff (2)
two more 'trespass' citations for him disregarding CSU 'exclusionary order' forms.
217. One 'trespass' case was prosecuted under Fort Collins Municipal Code section
17-40(a); the second 'trespass' case was prosecuted under C. R.S. 18-4-504. Notably,
the state trespass statute and the City trespass ordinance differ in that the ordinance
does not require the alleged offender to defy a lawful order, whereas the state statute
requires the alleged offender to defy a lawful order. However, neither judge decided
whether CSU 'exclusionary order' forms are either Constitutional or Lawful orders. In
each case Plaintiff was found guilty, and sentenced to 66 days in Larimer County jail,
despite the fact that C.R.S. 18-9-109(1) states that it is unlawful for anyone to deny
access and use of educational facilities, yet CSU campus police do.
49
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 49 of 80
·i
218. On July 20, 2018 CSU police officer Jesse Ihnen wrote a County Court citation
for trespass, Plaintiff was immediately ejected, without an administrative hearing. CSU
'exclusionary order' policy does not provide for an administrative review of CSU police
'exclusionary orders' before Plaintiff is permanently deprived access and use of CSU
campus. Further, CSU 'exclusionary orders' are unconstitutional as 'bills of attainder',
because they impose punishment without benefit of a judicial trial.
219. CSU police exclusionary order policy and administrative appeal process fails to
provide substantive or procedural due process; hearsay statements are permitted, NO
evidence and NO witnesses are required, and there is NO evidentiary standard.
220. On August 7, 2018, a administrative exclusionary order 'appeal' was conducted
by telephone by Nik Olsen, an employee in the Office of CSU President. During the
telephone 'hearing', although there was no evidence or witness testimony presented,
Nie Olsen stated he witnessed a man matching Plaintiffs physical description feeding
squirrels on campus and unilaterally upheld the permanent CSU 'exclusionary order'.
221. On May 17, 2019 CSU campus police officer Derek Smith issued Plaintiff an
'exclusionary order'. Later that day, Derek Smith accessed the CCIC database and
unilaterally entered an illegal report of permanent civil restraining order; thereby,
Plaintiff was deprived of His Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment Rights.
222. On May 17, 2019 CSU police Officer Derek Smith issued Plaintiff a citation for
'trespass' under C.R.S. § 18-4-504. On July 12, 2019, Derek Smith issued Plaintiff a
'trespass' citation, except under the Fort Collins Municipal Code section 17-40(a).
50
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 50 of 80
223. CSU campus police website contains university policies and regulations; there is
no CSU ~olicy or regulation a~ainst 'feeding squirrels', nor is it even a city ordina_nce.
224. CSU police 'exclusionary order' policy cites C.R.S. 18-9-109 as legal authority
that 'authorizes' them to issue an 'exclusionary order' form, that were issued against
Plaintiff solely on the basis of allegedly 'feeding squirrels'. However,
C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (3) states: "No person shall willfully refuse or fail to leave the
property of or any building or other facility used by any educational institution upon
being requested to do so by the chief administrative officer, his designee charged with
maintaining order on the school premises and in its facilities, or a dean of such
educational institution, if such person is committing, threatens to commit, or incites
others to commit any act which would disrupt, impair, interfere with, or obstruct
the lawful missions, processes, procedures, or functions of the institution."
225. At no time before or during the trespass trials did any CSU police officer testify
that Plaintiff committed any act that would disrupt, impair, interfere with, or obstruct the
lawful missions, processes, procedures, or functions of the institution.
226. C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (2) states:
No person shall, on the premises of any educational institution or at or in any
building or other facility being used by any educational institution, willfully impede the
staff or faculty of such institution in the lawful performance of their duties or willfully
impede a student of the institution in the lawful pursuit of his educational activities
through the use of restraint, abduction, coercion, or intimidation or when force
and violence are present or threatened." (Emphasis added)
227. At no time before or during the trespass trials did any CSU police officer testify
that Plaintiff committed any act that might impede the staff or faculty of such institution
in the lawful performance of their duties or willfully impede a CSU student in the lawful
pursuit of his educational activities through the use of restraint, abduction, coercion,
or intimidation, or threatened use of force or violence.
51
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 51 of 80
228. In both trespass cases, Plaintiff cited several Colorado statutes as evidence to
establish that he had constitutional and legal right to be present on CSU property as a
' -~ • + ·•
'member of the public'. In both trespass cases, Plaintiff cited C.R.S. § 18-1-901 (3)(n)
that defines "Public place", which includes such places where the public has access
including schools and transportation facilities; CSU is a public school, with a library the
public is invited; Plaintiff has a CSU library card. CSU has public bus transportation
facilities on campus, and Plaintiff has a senior Fort Collins bus pass. Plaintiff is an
alumnus of Colorado State University: he used the bus and library each day before
CSU police permanently banned him by issuing an 'exclusionary order' form.
NOTE: C.R.S. § 18-1-901 (3)(n) defines "Public place" and states:
"Public place" means "a place to which the public or a substantial number of the
public has access, and includes but is not limited to highways, transportation facilities,
schools, places of amusement, parks, playgrounds, and the common areas of public
and private buildings and facilities."
C.R.S. § 18-4-201 defines what misconduct would constitute "enters unlawfully"
or "remains unlawfully", and states: "A person who, regardless of his or her intent,
enters or remains in or upon premises that are at the time open to the public does
so with license and privilege unless the person defies a lawful order not to enter
or remain, personally communicated to him or her by the owner of the premises or
some other authorized person."
229. Plaintiff cited C.R.S. § 18-4-201 as statutory authority to prove he is an 'invitee'
and C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (1) proves that CSU police 'exclusionary orders' are unlawful.
NOTE: C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (1) states:
(1) "No person shall, on or near the premises or facilities of any educational institution,
willfully deny to students, school officials, employees, and invitees:
(a) Lawful freedom of movement on the premises;
(b) Lawful use of the property or facilities of the institution;
(c) The right of lawful ingress and egress to the institution's physical facilities."
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
52
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 52 of 80
230. CSU police presume that access and use of CSU campus is a privilege, which
can be withdrawn for any reason whatsoever, simply by issuing an 'exclusionary order'
even for allegedly 'feeding squirrels'. In each trespass case, Plaintiff even cited two
superior court decisions that ruled unconstitutional the previous attempts by university
officials to permanently 'exclude' or deprive members of the public from lawful access
and use of university facilities. In Dunkel v. Elkins, 325 F. Supp. 1235, the U.S. District
Court addressed this exact issue in 1971, and stated the opinion that:
"Defendants urge that plaintiffs use of public land and property is a "privilege
withdrawable by the State at any time for any reason." "We do not agree."
231. In other words, a United States District Court said that the use of public land is
not a privilege, which the State may withdraw 'at any time for any reason'; such as for
allegedly 'feeding squirrels', which is not an offense or even a CSU regulation. Note:
In the case of Watson v. Board of Regents of University of Colorado 512 P.2d
1162, the Colorado Supreme Court issued the opinion that:
"The University of Colorado opened its doors to the public. Accordingly, on this
basis, we hold that a non-student's right to access to University functions and
facilities, which are open to the public at-large, cannot be permanently denied
without due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment ... "
232. In each trespass case, Plaintiff moved to dismiss the case relying upon the law
and superior court decisions; however, each judge disregarded the presented citations
of statutory authority and legally-binding case precedent. In fact, the judges refused to
include these in jury instructions, and prevented Plaintiff from asserting an affirmative
defense of mistake of law, and even prohibited Plaintiff from mentioning these citations
of legal authority before the jury; thereby assuring an unlawful 'guilty' verdict.
53
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
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233. CSU 'exclusionary orders' are 1:1nconstitutional as 'bills of pains or penalties', as
are 'bills of attainder' since they impose immediate punishment of 'exclusion' without
benefit of a judicial trial. CSU 'exclusionary orders' impose immediate 'exclusion' or
banishment, which has been held unconstitutional in numerous court decisions; also,
banishment or 'exclusion' is not provided for as punishment under any federal or state
law, and such 'exclusion' denies Plaintiff the right of equal protection of the law.
234. In 1946, the United States Supreme Court specifically defined what constitutes
'Bills of Attainder' or 'bill of pains and penalties'; the United States Supreme Court stated
that a bill of pains and penalties, or bill of attainder: 1) specifically identified the people
to be punished; 2) imposed punishment; and 3) did so without benefit of judicial trial.
See: United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
235. CSU campus police 'exclusionary orders' are unlawful as 'Bills of Pains and
Penalties', or 'Bills of Attainder' prohibited by the U. S. Constitution Article I Section 10
Clause 1, because they impose immediate punishment without judicial trial. Rather
than provide substantive and procedural due process, CSU 'exclusionary order' policy
substitutes an administrative 'hearing' conducted over the phone by a CSU employee,
who issues summary judgment without any evidentiary standard, without any evidence
or witnesses necessary. Also, permanent banishment constitutes imposition of cruel
and unusual punishment, which is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. CSU 'exclusionary orders' are unconstitutional; therefore, Plaintiff
was unlawfully arrested, prosecuted, convicted, and imprisoned for 'trespass'.
54
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 54 of 80
CITY OF FORT COLLINS 'TRESPASS' ORDINANCE
236. Plaintiff was prosecuted under the Fort Collins Municipal Code, Section 17-40(a),
which awkwardly combines public and private property into one 'trespass' ordinance.
NOTE: Fort Collins Municipal Code (F.C.M.C.) 17-40(a) states:
"No person shall enter or remain unlawfully in or upon property, whether publicly or
privately owned. For the purposes of this Section, the term property shall include, but
not be limited to, any land, dwelling, building, conveyance, vehicle or other temporary or
permanent structure."
237. Plaintiff asserts that the City trespass ordinance (F.C.M.C.) 17-40(a) cannot be
legally applicable to public property since the Fort Collins Municipal Code definition of
"enter or remain unlawfully" excepts those licensed, invited, or privileged.
F.C.M.C. Section 17-1 stated: "Enter or remain unlawfully" shall mean:
(1) To enter or remain in or upon public or privately owned property when not
licensed, invited, privileged or otherwise authorized to do so;
(2) To enter or remain in or upon publicly owned property that is not open to the public;
(3) To fail to leave property, whether privately or publicly owned, after being directed to
do so by a person lawfully in control of the property; or
(4) To conduct oneself in a public place in violation of any rule or regulation issued by
any officer or agency having the power of control, management, or supervision thereof,
which limits or prohibits the use, activities or conduct in such public place, provided that
the rule or regulation is: (i) prominently posted at all public entrances to the property; (ii)
posted in such a way as to be clearly visible from the site of the infraction; or (iii)
actually known to the offender.
C.R.S. § 18-4-201 defines what misconduct would constitute "enters unlawfully"
or "remains unlawfully", and states: "A person who, regardless of his or her intent,
enters or remains in or upon premises that are at the time open to the public does
so with license and privilege unless the person defies a lawful order not to enter
or remain, personally communicated to him or her by the owner of the premises or
some other authorized person." (Emphasis added)
238. F.C.M.C. Section 17-1 is not applicable to public property as it also conflicts
with C.R.S. § 18-1-901(3)(n) that defines "Public place" where the public has access.
55
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 55 of 80
NOTE: C.R.S. § 18-1-901(3)(n) defines "Public place" and states:
"Public place" means "a place to which the public or a substantial number of the
public has access, and includes but is not limited to highways, transportation facilities,
schools;places of amusement, parks, playgrounds, and the common areas of public
and private buildings and facilities."
239. Since C.R.S. § 18-1-901(3)(n) defines "Public place" as "a place to which the
public has access", including schools, such as CSU; and, since F.C.M.C. Sec. 17-1
defines "Enter or remain unlawfully" and states: "To enter or remain in or upon public
or privately owned property when not licensed, invited, privileged"; this allows for an
exemption; and, since C.R.S. § 18-4-201 states that: "A person who, regardless of his
or her intent, enters or remains in or upon premises that are ... open to the public
does so with license and privilege ... "; therefore, the 'City' trespass ordinance cannot
be legally applicable to public property, such as CSU. Yet, enforcement of the 'City'
trespass ordinance, in this case, depended upon enforcing CSU 'exclusionary orders',
which are unconstitutional and illegal since they allow CSU campus police to violate
C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (1) that prohibits anyone from denying lawful access and use of
premises or facilities of any educational institution; yet, CSU campus police did when
issuing 'exclusionary orders', thus, these 'orders' are unlawful. Therefore, Plaintiff was
subjected to illegal prosecution and unlawful conviction for 'trespass'.
NOTE: C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (1) states:
(1) "No person shall, on or near the premises or facilities of any educational institution,
willfully deny to students, school officials, employees, and invitees:
(a) Lawful freedom of movement on the premises;
(b) Lawful use of the property or facilities of the institution;
(c) The right of lawful ingress and egress to the institution's physical facilities."
56
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 56 of 80
240. F.C.M.C. Sec. 17-1 (3) allows anyone in 'lawful control' over public property to
exclude anyone, at any time, for any reason, or for no reason whatsoever. This grants
local officials, i.e., the police, dictatorial powers over public property. Except, it is not
defined as to what constitutes 'lawful control'. City of Fort Collins and CSU campus
police have interpreted it as cart'e blanch'e authority to exclude anyone from public
property by issuing an 'exclusionary order', or simply by verbally stating the person is
permanently "trespassed" as City police have told Plaintiff on two occasions. Plaintiff
was "trespassed" from a public pool for being the last one out of the locker-room and
was "trespassed" from a Fort Collins community center for no reason whatsoever even
though Plaintiff possessed an active senior membership on both occasions.
241. The definition of "enters or remains unlawfully" used in F.C.M.C. Sec. 17-1(4) is
unconstitutionally over-broad and vague on its face; it intentionally omits reference to
the public right of access and use of places of public accommodation, allowing officers
to discriminate against individuals whomever the officer chooses by applying his or her
personal rules of conduct. The intentional omission of lawful orders in the definition
leaves a void filled by unlawful orders, and completely disregards the public. right of
access and use of public property contained in C.R.S. § 18-4-201 (3). The definition of
"enters or remains unlawfully" provided by F.C.M.C. Sec. 17-1(3) is blatantly unlawful,
especially in Plaintiffs case because it allowed CSU police officers to violate the law,
specifically, C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (1). As written and enforced, F.C.M.C. Sec. 17-1(3) and
(4) are unconstitutionally vague and over-broad in violation of the 14th Amendment.
57
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 57 of 80
•·-
THE FORT COLLINS 'CAMPING' ORDINANCES
242. The City of Fort Collins, by and through agents, employed officers, and elected
officials are engaged in a campaign against 'homeless' people. The City Council has
enacted ordinances against 'camping' and 'trespass' that are selectively enforced only
against people in the community that are suspected to be 'homeless' or 'indigent'.
243. THE FORT COLLINS ORDINANCE AGAINST CAMPING IS UNLAWFUL
Fort Collins Municipal Code (F.C.M.C.) Sec.17-181 states:
"It shall be unlawful for any person to camp or pitch a tent, or knowingly permit
any person to camp or pitch a tent, on public property within the City. Camping, for the
purposes of this Section, shall mean to sleep, spend the night, reside or dwell
temporarily with or without bedding or other camping gear and with or without
shelter, or to conduct activities of daily living such as eating or sleeping, in such
place unless such person is camping in compliance with Chapter 23 in a natural or
recreation area. Camping shall not include incidental napping or picnicking."
(Code 1972, § 60-22; Ord. No. 28, 1999, § 2, 3-2-99; Ord. No. 199, 2006 § 1, 1-16-07)
244. F.C.M.C. Sec. 17-181 is unconstitutionally null, void, and legally unenforceable
on numerous grounds, including, without exception or limitation: (a) It is vague and
over-broad, thus, it violates the Fifth Amendment Right to Life, Liberty and Property
without due process; (b) it denies Plaintiff of the Fifth Amendment Right to Live and to
use His private Property to 'conduct activities of daily living'; so it constitutes a 'Taking';
thus, Plaintiff is entitled to just compensation; (c) the discriminatory enforcement of the
ordinance denies Plaintiff egual protection of the law, and (d) it exacts fines of $3,000
and/or six months in jail, which constitutes cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by
the Eighth Amendment. Incredulously, the 'camping' ordinance even holds criminally
liable those citizens who knowingly permit others to 'conduct activities of daily living'.
58
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 58 of 80
----------
245. The City of Fort Collins also enacted an ordinance against camping on private
property; F.C.M.C. Sec. 17-182 uses the same definition of 'camping' but graciously
allows citizens of Fort Collins no more than two weeks per calendar year to eat, sleep
and conduct activities of daily living on their own property: the other fifty weeks of the
calendar year, Fort Collins residents are deemed criminally liable. The Fort Collins city
ordinances against 'camping' on public or private property effectively renders everyone
subject to criminal penalties for living in Fort Collins. However, the City of Fort Collins
ordinance against 'camping' is applied exclusively against indigent, 'homeless' people,
among whom Plaintiff is considered by local officials and police.
246. The City of Fort Collins ('City') has asserted a claim to regulate the personal life
of Plaintiff; the 'City' denies His Right to 'conduct activities of daily living such as
eating or sleeping' in Fort Collins; this constitutes 'Taking' prohibited by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The ordinance against camping denies Plaintiff the Right to
use private property. without being subject to deprivation of liberty by being jailed for
eating or sleeping, or using his Vehicle or private property to conduct activities of daily
living; the City asserts unreasonable regulatory control over Plaintiff's private property.
this constitutes the conversion of His Right to use His private property into the City's
claim to regulate the use of that private property for their own purposes; the City and
Individual Defendants have 'Taken', for their personal interests, Plaintiff's Right to use
his private property: this 'Taking' entitles Plaintiff to Just compensation pursuant to the
Fifth Amendment as adopted in the Colorado Constitution in Article II, section 15.
59
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 59 of 80
247. Plaintiff was charged (7) seven times with 'camping'; only one case was tried,
and Plaintiff was found 'not guilty' in 2014; case # 2014-0185514-MD. Most recently,
Plaintiff was cited with 'camping'; Citation # 384557; Fort Collins Municipal Court Case:
FC-20-4935-MD, which was dismissed on September 17, 2020, and closed.
248. On June 25, 2020 Officer Ryan Westlind approached Plaintiffs vehicle while He
was using His laptop; Officer Westlind harassed Plaintiff simply for parking in the area
and threatened to cite Plaintiff with 'camping' if He continued to park there.
249. On June 30, 2020, Plaintiff sent a letter notifying the City of His Intent to Sue if
the City charged Him with 'camping' for 'conducting activities of daily living'.
250. On August 7, 2020 Officer Dan Callahan issued and served Plaintiff a summons
and complaint for 'camping' on public property, and ordered Him to park elsewhere.
251. On August 18, 2020 Plaintiff sent a letter reminding the City of His Intent to Sue
because Officer Callahan harassed Him simply for parking in the same area.
252. On September 1, 2020 Plaintiff sent a letter to the Colorado Attorney General
requesting that she act pursuant to C.R.S. § 16-9-501, and provide a legal opinion on
the Fort Collins 'camping' ordinances. Plaintiff also requested the Attorney General to
provide a legal opinion on the City 'trespass' ordinance. Notably, the Fort Collins City
Attorney received a copy. However, the Attorney General took no action or replied.
253. On September 15, 2020, Plaintiff sent a letter to each member of the Fort Collins
City Council requesting that they consider repealing the ordinances against 'camping'.
Notably, the ordinance wa~ ruled unconstitutional by a Larimer District Judge.
60
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 60 of 80
254. Individual members of the city council of the City of Fort Collins are, or were,
personally invested or involved in commercial development projects in the city, many
members are, or were, commercial real estate agents; members of the city council do,
have, and would personally benefit from the 'camping' and 'trespass' ordinances.
255. The City ordinance against 'camping', F.C.M.C. Section 17-181 is intentionally
worded to be over-broad and vague, and lacks any guidance of construction, to allow
police officers to discriminate against those people suspected of being 'homeless'; the
'camping' ordinance is applied by police to harass 'homeless' people into leaving the
City. Every other citizen in the City is allowed to 'eat, sleep, and conduct activities of
daily living' without fear of being harassed and threatened with imprisonment, except
those assumed to be 'homeless'. The discriminatory enforcement of the City 'camping
ordinance violates the Fourteenth Amendment prohibition against states denying any
citizen their constitutional rights, and denying equal protection of the Law.
256. The City of Fort Collins ordinances prohibiting 'camping' are Unconstitutionally
over-broad and vague, which results in discriminatory interpretation and enforcement
against people subjectively considered by police officers, as 'homeless', like Plaintiff.
The ordinances against 'camping' are so extremely vague and over-broad, as written,
that they fail to provide adequate notice to enable someone of ordinary intelligence to
understand what conduct is prohibited. Even then, as written, the ordinances against
'camping' are so vague and over-broad that any 'activity of daily living' is prohibited,
thereby eliminating any alternative other than to disregard these ordinances.
61
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 61 of 80
257. As written and enforced, City of Fort Collins ordinances prohibiting 'camping' do
not serve any legitimate or legally-recognizable interest. In addition to state and local
fire prevention regulations, and restrictions on the possession and use of alcohol and
drugs, the Fort Collins Municipal Code includes numerous ordinances to address any
other conceivable public interest concern of anticipated misconduct associated with the
'camping' life-style of 'homeless' people; including, without exclusion or limitation:
Sec. 17-39. -Criminal mischief., Sec. 17-41. -Littering., Sec. 17-44. -Misuse of public
waters, Sec. 17-45. -Damage to public property, Section 17-46. -Appropriate use of
public facilities., Sec. 17-103, -Bodily waste. Sec. 17-121, -Disturbing tne peace. Sec.
17-124, -Disorderly conduct. Sec. 17-126. -Harassment, Sec. 17-127. -Panhandling.
Sec. 17-128, -Obstructing the public right-of-way. Sec. 17-129, -Unreasonable noise.
Sec. 17-131. -Nuisance gatherings, and Sec. 17-142. -Public nudity.
258. Obviously, there is no legitimate need for the City of Fort Collins to enact and
enforce the ordinances against 'camping' to impose criminal punishment upon citizens
for 'eating, sleeping or conducting activities of daily living'. Especially, since there is
already a Fort Collins ordinance that addresses this very issue of 'camping'. NOTE:
Fort Collins Traffic Code (F.C.T.C.) Sec. 1213(2) states that: "It shall be unlawful
for any person to occupy any parked motor vehicle or trailer, as defined in this Traffic
Code, or any parked recreational vehicle or trailer, as defined in Section 20-104 of the
City Code, on any street, roadway, parking lot open to the public, right-of-way or public
property for the purposes of living or sleeping therein ... "
259. Fort Collins Parking Services website states that the fine for violating F.C.T.C.
1213(2) is $100; while the same conduct of 'living or sleeping' subject the 'homeless'
who 'sleep or conduct activities of daily living' with cruel and unusual punishment of a
fine of $3,000 and six months in jail under the Fort Collins 'camping' ordinances.
62
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 62 of 80
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
_ Title 28 U.S. Code§ 2201, § 2202
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
CSU EXCLUSIONARY ORDER POLICY
260. The allegations of the preceding paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set
forth herein.
261. CSU 'exclusionary orders' are unconstitutional bec~use they constitute 'Bills of
Attainder' by imposing immediate punishment without a judicial trial, and because they
impose cruel and unusual punishment of permanent 'exclusion'.
262. CSU 'exclusionary orders' are unconstitutional as supported by case precedent,
in Watson v. Board of Regents of University of Colorado 512 P.2d 1162, in the Colorado
Supreme Court, and Dunkel v. Elkins, 325 F. Supp. 1235, by the U.S. District Court.
263. CSU exclusionary order policy lacks impartial review and appeal procedures in
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
264. CSU 'exclusionary orders' are unlawful since they violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983 et.
seq. by denying Plaintiff substantive and procedural due process since they allow for
immediate and permanent denial of access and use of CSU premises, without proper
appeal procedures prior to deprivation; there is no enforcement standard or instruction
for police to determine what conduct serves as lawful grounds for exclusion.
265. The CSU exclusionary order policy, as interpreted and applied, is over-broad in
that it allows permanent exclusionary orders to be issued for any conduct whatsoever,
even when there is no written policy against such conduct, as in this case.
63
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 63 of 80
266. The CSU exclusionary order policy is vague and over-broad, as interpreted and
enforced, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
267. The challenged CSU 'exclusionary order' policy, as interpreted, and enforced by
CSU campus police is over-broad and vague and fails to provide adequate notice to
enable people of ordinary intelligence to understand what conduct is prohibited.
268. The CSU exclusionary order policy as interpreted, and enforced by CSU campus
police, fails to establish adequate guidelines to govern CSU police officers, thereby it
authorizes and encourages CSU campus police to act in arbitrary and discriminatory
practices in enforcement against Plaintiff, and others similarly situated.
269. CSU 'exclusionary orders' are unlawful since they violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983 et.
seq. by denying equal protection of the law in violation of the 14th Amendment.
270. CSU 'exclusionary orders' are enforced with criminal citations for trespass.
271. Defendants have enforced and intend to continue to enforce CSU 'exclusionary
orders' in the unconstitutional and unlawful manner as described by Plaintiff.
272. Defendants have acted, and are threatening to act, under color of state law to
deprive Plaintiff of lawful equal access and use of CSU premises and facilities open to
the public, thereby depriving Him of equal protection of the law.
273. Plaintiff has suffered, and continues to suffer, actual and permanent irreparable
injury due to enforcement of the CSU 'exclusionary order' issued against Him, as was
reported in CCIC as a 'permanent civil restraining order'. Plaintiff has no other plain,
adequate or speedy remedy at law, so Plaintiff is entitled to Injunctive relief.
64
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 64 of 80
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Title 28 U.S. Code§ 2201, § 2202
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
Eighth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Violations
. -
274. The allegations of the preceding paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set
forth herein.
275. CSU 'exclusionary orders' are unconstitutional; they constitute 'bills of attainder'
by imposing punishment of permanent 'exclusion' without a judicial trial, and constitute
cruel and unusual punishment, which denies equal protection of the law.
276. Plaintiff asserts that because CSU 'exclusionary orders' are unconstitutional and
unlawful by violating C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (1) and contrary to C.R.S. § 18-4-201; thus, he
was unlawfully prosecuted, unlawfully convicted, and unlawfully imprisoned.
277. CSU 'exclusionary orders' are unconstitutional as supported by case precedent,
in Watson v. Board of Regents of University of Colorado 512 P.2d 1162, in the Colorado
Supreme Court, and Dunkel v. Elkins, 325 F. Supp. 1235, by the U.S. District Court.
278. CSU police issued Plaintiff 'exclusionary orders' for allegedly 'feeding squirrels',
which CSU police enforced against Plaintiff by issuing three trespass citations.
279. CSU campus police website contains all university policies and regulations; yet,
there is no policy or rule against 'feeding squirrels', nor is it even a city ordinance.
280. At trial, Plaintiff was found 'guilty' of 'trespass' under the Fort Collins Municipal
Code (F.C.M.C.) Sec. 40(a), which is broadly interpreted and enforced by local police
officers to .discriminatorily verbally ban anyone from public pr~perty without reason.
65
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 65 of 80
281. The City-of Fort Collins discriminatorily enforces the trespass ordinance by just
targeting the 'homeless', whom Plaintiff is considered by local officials and police.
282. Plaintiff was also found 'guilty' of 'trespass' under C.R.S. § 18-4-504, which is
interpreted and applied to presume that CSU 'exclusionary orders' are lawful; though
this was never proved, and C.R.S. § 18-9-109(1) prohibits anyone from denying lawful
access and use of educational facilities. The judge and prosecutor conspired to deny
Plaintiff due process by excluding any evidence, legal argument or testimony to prove
CSU 'exclusionary orders' are unlawful. The judge and prosecutor even committed jury
tampering by seating a clerk from the prosecutor's office on the jury. (A felony)
283. CSU police officers, 'City', 'County' and District Court 'judges' and prosecutors
violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 1985, and section 1986 by intentionally denying Plaintiff's
Right to due process and equal protection of the law, and denied Him a fair trial by
withholding exculpatory evidence and misapplication of the law; presuming that CSU
'exclusionary orders' are lawful, and by applying F.C.M.C. 17-40(a) to public property;
thus, Defendants unlawfully prosecuted, convicted and imprisoned Him.
284. Defendants have enforced and intend to continue to enforce the City and state
trespass laws in the unconstitutional and unlawful manner as described by Plaintiff.
285. Plaintiff has suffered, and he continues to suffer, actual, irreparable, permanent
injury due to enforcement of the state and city trespass laws, as was reported in CCIC
as two convictions for trespass. Plaintiff has no other plain, adequate or speedy remedy
at law, so Plaintiff is entitled to Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive relief.
66
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 66 of 80
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Title 28 U.S. Code§ 2201°, § 2202
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
FORT COLLINS 'TRESPASS' ORDINANCE
286. The allegations of the preceding paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set
forth herein.
287. Plaintiff asserts that the City trespass ordinance (F.C.M.C.) 17-40(a) cannot be
legally applicable to public property since the Fort Collins Municipal Code definition of
"enter or remain unlawfully" excepts those licensed, invited, or privileged. § 18-4-201
C.R.S. states in part: "A person who, ... , enters or remains in or upon premises that
are ... open to the public does so with license and privilege ... ".
288. Plaintiff asserts that the City of Fort Collins ordinance definition of 'trespass' is
intentionally and unconstitutionally over-broad and vague so as to allow police officers
to discriminatorily deny access and use of public places, such as CSU campus for any
reason, or no reason whatsoever, and in this case, deny Plaintiff His Eighth, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendment Rights to due process and equal protection of the law.
289. F.C.M.C. Sec. 17-1 (3) allows anyone in 'lawful control' over public property to
permanently exclude anyone, at any time, for any reason, or for no reason whatsoever;
local police have broadly interpreted the vague definition in F.C.M.C. Sec. 17-1 (3) as
unlimited grant of authority to discriminatorily deny access and use of public places to
'homeless' people, among whom Plaintiff is considered by local officials and police.
290. The challenged Fort Collins Ordinance provides for criminal penalties.
67
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 50 Filed 04/29/22 USDC Colorado Page 67 of 80
291. The definition of "unlawfully enters or remains" used in F.C.M.C. Sec. 17-1(4) is
unconstitutionally over-broad and vague on its face; it intentionally omits reference to
. .
the public right of access and use of places of public accommodation, allowing officers
to discriminate against individuals whomever the officer chooses by applying personal
rules of conduct; this violates the 14th Amendment Right to equal protection.
292. The vague and over-broad trespass Ordinance, as written and enforced by Fort
Collins and CSU police officers, fails to provide the constitutional standard of adequate
notice required to enable an ordinary person to understand what conduct is prohibited;
this deprived Plaintiff of His due process Rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
293. The challenged Ordinance, on its face and as interpreted, applied and enforced
by Fort Collins officials, fails to establish adequate guidelines to govern law enforcement
and hence, authorizes and encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
294. Defendants have 'Taken' Plaintiff's 5th Amendment Right of access and use of
public places, thus, Plaintiff is Entitled to Just Compensation as provided by Law.
295. By acting and threatening to act under 'color of state law' to deprive Plaintiff of
those rights guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the United States, Defendant,
Fort Collins has violated and threatens to continue violating 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
296. Plaintiff has suffered, and he continues to suffer, real and permanent irreparable
injury due to enforcement of the state and city trespass laws, as was reported in CCIC
for (2) two convictions for 'trespass'. Plaintiff has no other plain, adequate or speedy
remedy at law, so Plaintiff is entitled to Declaratory and Injunctive relief.
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FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Title 28 U.S. Code§ 2201, § 2202
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
FORT COLLINS 'CAMPING' ORDINANCES
297. The allegations of the preceding paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set
forth herein.
298. The City of Fort Collins, by and through agents, employed officers, and elected
officials are engaged in a campaign against 'homeless' people. The City Council has
enacted ordinances against 'camping' and 'trespass' that are selectively enforced only
against people in the community that are suspected to be 'homeless' or 'indigent'.
299. F.C.M.C. Sec. 17-181 is unconstitutionally null, void, and legally unenforceable
on numerous grounds, including, without exception or limitation: (a) It is vague and
over-broad, thus, it violates the Fifth Amendment Right to Life, Liberty and Property
without due process; (b) it denies Plaintiff of the Fifth Amendment Right to Live and to
use His private Property to 'conduct activities of daily living'; so it constitutes 'Taking';
thus, Plaintiff is entitled to just compensation; (c) the discriminatory enforcement of the
ordinance denies Plaintiff equal protection of the law, and (d) it exacts fines of $3,000
and/or six months in jail, which constitutes cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by
the 8th Amendment; therefore the 'camping' ordinances violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
300. The vague and over-broad 'camping' Ordinances, as written and as enforced by
Fort Collins officials, fails to establish adequate guidelines to govern law enforcement
and hence, authorizes and encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
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301. The City 'camping' ordinance, as written, and enforced by Fort Collins police is
vague and over-broad and it fails to provide adequate notice to enable a person of
ordinary intelligence to understand what conduct is prohibited, depriving Plaintiff of His
Rights under the Fifth and 14th Amendments and violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
302. The City of Fort Collins Ordinances prohibiting 'camping' are Unconstitutionally
over-broad and vague, which results in discriminatory interpretation and enforcement
against people subjectively considered by police officers, as 'homeless', like Plaintiff,
which violates 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by denying equal protection of the law.
303. Plaintiff was charged (7) seven times with 'camping'; only one case was tried,
and Plaintiff was found 'not guilty' in 2014; case # 2014-0185514-MD. Most recently,
Plaintiff was cited with 'camping'; Citation # 384557; Fort Collins Municipal Court Case:
FC-20-4935-MD, which was dismissed on September 17, 2020, and closed.
304. Defendants have 'Taken' Plaintiff's Fifth Amendment Right to 'conduct activities
of daily living', thus, Plaintiff is Entitled to Just Compensation as provided by Law.
305. Defendant, Fort Collins has violated and threatens to continue violating 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 by acting, and threatening to act, under color of state law to deprive Plaintiff of
His Rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and laws of the United States,.
306. Plaintiff has suffered, and he continues to suffer, real, and irreparable injury due
to enforcement of the City 'camping' ordinances in violation of His Constitutional Rights
under the 4th, 5th, 8th and 14th Amendments. Plaintiff has no other plain, adequate or
speedy remedy at law, so Plaintiff is entitled to Declaratory and Injunctive relief.
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PETITION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF:
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF:
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF CSU EXCLUSIONARY ORDER POLICY
1. An actual and immediate controversy exists between Plaintiff and Defendants.
Plaintiff maintains that the CSU 'exclusionary order' policy, as written, interpreted and
enforced, violates His Constitutional rights. Defendants assert that CSU exclusionary
order policy, as written, interpreted, and enforced, complies with the law.
2. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to Declaratory Judgment of His rights with respect
to this controversy. Without such a declaration, Plaintiff will be uncertain of His rights
and Defendants will be uncertain as to their restrictions to act under the law.
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF:
PROHIBITING ENFORCEMENT OF CSU EXCLUSIONARY ORDERS
3. Plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief. Defendants have enforced and threaten to
continue enforcing CSU 'exclusionary orders' in the unlawful manner complained of.
4. Defendants have acted, and are threatening to act, under color of state law, to
deprive Plaintiff of His Constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
5. CSU issued a permanent unlawful civil restraining order, without due process.
6. Plaintiff is suffering permanent and irreparable injury and continues to suffer a
real and immediate threat of permanent irreparable injury as a result of the existence,
operation, and enforcement of the challenged 'exclusionary orders'.
7. Plaintiff has no other plain, adequate or speedy remedy at law.
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SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF CITY TRESPASS ORDINANCE
8. An actual and immediate controversy exists between Plaintiff and Defendants.
Plaintiff contends that the Fort Collins 'trespass' Ordinance, as written and enforced,
violates His Constitutional rights. Defendants contend that the challenged Ordinance,
against 'trespass', as written and enforced, complies with the law.
9. Plaintiff asserts that the City trespass ordinance (F.C.M.C.) 17-40(a) does not
apply to public property because C.R.S. § 18-4-201 states that the pubic have license
and privilege to enter or remain in or upon premises that are ... open to the public, but
Defendants assert the right to exclude anyone from public property.
10. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to Declaratory Judgment of His rights with respect
to this controversy. Without such a declaration, Plaintiff will be uncertain of His rights
and liberty, and Defendants will be uncertain as to the limitations of their authority.
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
11. Plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief. Defendants have enforced and threaten to
continue enforcing the 'trespass' Ordinance in the manner described in this Complaint.
Defendants have acted and are threatening to act under color of state law to deprive
Plaintiff of His Constitutional rights. Plaintiff is suffering irreparable injury, and he will
continue to suffer actual and immediate threat of irreparable injury as a result of the
existence, operation, and enforcement of the challenged 'trespass' Ordinance. Plaintiff
has no other plain, adequate or speedy remedy at law.
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THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF:
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS
12. An actual and immediate controversy exists between Plaintiff and Defendants.
Plaintiff asserts that He was unlawfully denied due process of law and equal protection
of the law by Defendant City, County, and District court judges and prosecutors, and
these Individual Defendants deny Plaintiff was denied a fair trial, though all defense
evidence and testimony was excluded as "irrelevant". These Defendants contend that
Plaintiff was lawfully prosecuted, convicted, and imprisoned for 'trespass', and that the
'exclusionary orders' issued by CSU campus police are lawful; these Defendants also
argue the public is not expected. intended. or invited to CSU for any conceivable
purpose. (Judge McDonald) Daniel McDonald was the Chief District Court Prosecutor
when prosecutor, Alita King conspired with Larimer County Court Judge Thomas Lynch
to seat a clerk from the prosecutor's office on the jury in Plaintiffs trespass case.
Yet, Defendants deny any misconduct, and contend that Plaintiff received a fair trial.
14. These Individual Defendants contend that the state trespass statute and 'City'
trespass ordinance comply with the laws and U.S. and Colorado constitutions, and that
Plaintiffs trespass convictions were supported by the proper application, interpretation,
and enforcement of the law, and Plaintiffs constitutional rights were not violated.
15. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to Declaratory Judgment of His rights with respect
to this controversy. Without such a declaration, Plaintiff will be uncertain of His rights
and Defendant will be uncertain as to their restrictions to act under the law.
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FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF CITY CAMPING ORDINANCES
16. An actual and immediate controversy exists between Plaintiff and Defendants.
Plaintiff contends that the Fort Collins 'camping' Ordinance, as written, and enforced,
violates His Constitutional rights. Defendants contend that the challenged Ordinance,
against 'camping', as written, applied and enforced, complies with the law.
17. Individual City Defendants assert that the 'camping' ordinance does not deprive
Plaintiff of His constitutional rights; and justify their argument with claim of 'home-rule'
status and that they may criminalize and regulate 'conducting activities of daily living',
and that six (6) months in jail does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
18. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to Declaratory Judgment of His rights with respect
to this controversy. Without such a declaration, Plaintiff will be uncertain of His rights
and liberty, and Defendants will be uncertain as to the limitations of their authority.
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF:
19. Plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief. Defendants have enforced and threaten to
continue enforcing the 'camping' Ordinance in the manner described in this Complaint.
Defendants have acted and are threatening to act under color of state law to deprive
Plaintiff of His Constitutional rights. Plaintiff is suffering reoccurring irreparable injury
and he will continue to suffer a real and immediate threat of irreparable injury resulting
from the unconstitutional, Fort Collins 'camping' Ordinance as its written and enforced.
Plaintiff has no other plain, adequate or speedy remedy at law.
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Wlierefore, and uyon due consideration of tlie {aw,
Plaintiff respectfully requests the following Declaratory and Injunctive relief:
CSU EXCLUSIONARY ORDER POLICY
20. · Declaratory Judgment that CSU police 'exclusionary orders', are unconstitutional
as 'Bills of Attainder' since they impose punishment without judicial trial, and constitute
cruel and unusual punishment thereby they deny equal protection of the law, and that
they are unlawful since they allow CSU police to violate C.R.S. § 18-9-109(1).
21. Temporary and permanent injunction prohibiting the issuance or enforcement of
any verbal or written orders of temporary exclusion other than as provided by C.R.S. §
18-9-109 (2),(3) for conduct, which would 'disrupt, impair, interfere with, or obstruct the
lawful missions, processes, procedures, or functions of the institution'.
22. An Order to delete the CCIC report of a CSU permanent restraining order.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS
23. A Declaratory Judgment that Plaintiff was unlawfully deprived of His Civil Rights
by depriving Him of access and use of CSU; that C.R.S. § 18-4-201 grants the public
license and privilege that the City cannot revoke. C.R.S. § 18-4-201 grants the same
license and privilege under the trespass statute C.R.S. § 18-4-504, providing exception
just for disobeying lawful orders, and that CSU 'exclusionary orders' are not lawful
orders; that, Plaintiff was unlawfully denied access and use of CSU in violation of Title
42 U.S. Code§ 1983, § 1985, and§ 1986; and Declaratory Judgment Confirming that
Plaintiff is Entitled to Just Compensation for 'taking' his Civil Rights.
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FORT COLLINS TRESPASS ORDINANCE
24. A Declaratory Judgment that the Fort Collins trespass ordinance F.C.M.C. 40(a)
does not apply to public property because C.R.S. § 18-4-201 grants the public license
and privilege that the City cannot revoke or suspend, other than in such circumstances
that the public safety may require, yet limited by lawful restraints of the Constitution of
the United States and Colorado, and in compliance with U.S. and Colorado law.
25. A Declaration that, as written and enforced, F.C.M.C. Sections 17-1 (3) and (4)
are unconstitutionally vague and over-broad in violation of the 14th Amendment.
26. A Declaration that the definition of "enters or remains unlawfully" in F.C.M.C.
Sec. 17-1 (4) is over-broad and vague as written and enforced since it allows police
officers to broadly interpret such authority and verbally construct ad hoc regulations to
target individuals whose conduct is not otherwise illegal nor constitute grounds for law
enforcement officers to act with 'probable cause', thereby they lack 'lawful control'.
27. Declaration that the definition of "enters or remains unlawfully" used in F.C.M.C.
Sec. 17-1 (3) is over-broad and vague as written and enforced because it allows police
officers to broadly interpret such lawful control and authority to verbally ban individuals
permanently denying access and use of public places in violation of C.R.S. § 18-4-201
that grants the public license and privilege that officers cannot revoke or suspend.
28. Declaratory Judgment Confirming the Right to Just Compensation.
29. A temporary and permanent injunction against the City of Fort Collins prohibiting
enforcement of the 'trespass' ordinance, until it harmonizes with state law.
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FORT COLLINS CAMPING ORDINANCES
30. A Declaratory Judgment that the Fort Collins 'camping' ordinances, as written,
and enforced are unconstitutionally over-broad and vague because they do not provide
adequate notice to enable people of ordinary intelligence to understand what conduct is
prohibited; and they are written to enable officers to exercise broad discretion, which is
used to discriminate against 'homeless' people, which results in violations of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The definition of 'camping' provided
in F.C.M.C. Sec. 17-181 is exhaustive and all inclusive; literally every conduct of daily
living is deemed a criminal offense; even citizens who knowingly permit others to "eat,
sleep, or conduct activities of daily living" are deemed criminally liable.
31. A Declaratory Judgment that the City 'camping' ordinances are unconstitutional
on the basis that they deprive Plaintiff of life, liberty and property; and that it deprives
Plaintiff of equal protection of the law; and that it violates the Eighth Amendment that
prohibits cruel and unusual punishment; and that Fort Collins 'camping' and 'trespass'
ordinances deprive Plaintiff of His personal Interests and Right of access and use of
public property, and they deprive Plaintiff of His Right to use His personal property to
'conduct activities of daily living', and such deprivation of Rights constitutes a 'Taking'
under the Fifth Amendment; and that Plaintiff is entitled to Just Compensation.
32. Declaratory Judgment Confirming the Right to Just Compensation.
33. A temporary and permanent injunction against the City of Fort Collins prohibiting
enforcement of the ordinances against 'camping' on public or private property.
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SUMMARY CONCLUSION
CSU 'exclusionary orders' are unconstitutional as 'bill of pains and penalties' by
immediately banning Plaintiff, and unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment by
permanently banning Plaintiff, and unconstitutional by denying Him equal protection of
the law, and depriving Plaintiff of due process. CSU 'exclusionary orders' are unlawful
because they violate C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (1), which prohibits denying access and use of
CSU; and contrary to C.R.S. § 18-4-201, which recognizes that the public has license
and privilege to access and use public property. Therefore, the 'trespass' prosecution,
convictions, and imprisonment of Plaintiff were unconstitutional and unlawful; as such,
Plaintiff is Entitled to Declaratory and Injunctive relief, and Just Compensation.
Defendants, by and through agents, employed officers, and elected officials are
engaged in a campaign against 'homeless' people. CSU 'exclusionary orders' and the
verbal 'trespassed' orders issued by police and enforced with citations of 'trespass' or
'camping' are an obvious attempt to re-enact the 'vagrancy' ordinances and statutes,
which were determined to be unconstitutional over fifty (50) years ago.
The City of Fort Collins ordinances against 'camping' and 'trespass' are unlawful
and unconstitutional by violating the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment, and by violating the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment prohibition
against depriving Plaintiff the right of due process and equal protection of the law by
denying Plaintiff of His rights and private property interests and His rights and interests
in equal access and use of public places and places open to the public.
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I declare under penalty of perjury that I am the plaintiff in this action, that I have
read this complaint, and that the information in this complaint is true and correct to the
best of knowledge, information and belief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1746; 18 U.S.C. § 1621.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, in signing, I also certify that to
the best of my knowledge, information, and belief that this Complaint and Petition for
Relief: (1) is not being presented for an improper purpose, such as to harass, cause
unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; that (2) it is supported
by existing law or by a non-frivolous argument for extending or modifying existing law;
that (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified,
will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for discovery and/or
further investigation; and (4) the complaint otherwise complies with the requirements of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11.
NOTE: Plaintiff intentionally omits a paragraph 13.
Authorized and Issued on this day,
By: Robert-Lawrence: Perry, Man for: /s/ 1{,obert-Lawrence: 'Perry, .Jvt.an
Signed pursuant to C.R.S. 4-3-402
Dated this: February 22, 2022 ROBERT LAWRENCE PERRY
4786 McMurry Ave., Unit 242
Fort Collins, Colorado 80525
fort_ scout@yahoo.com
Phone: (970) 980-1849
NOTE: CHANGE OF ADDRESS
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Robert-Lawrence: Perry, hereby certify that I did file and send a complete,
correct and true copy of the foregoing Proposed Amended Petition for Relief to the
Attorney of Record for each Defendant by first-class U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, or by
emailing such as agreed by informed and prior consent to the following:
Attorneys for Defendants,
The City of Fort Collins, et al.
Darin Atteberry, City Manager
300 La Porte Ave., (City Hall)
Fort Collins, CO 80522
Phone: (970) 221-6520
hoffmank@hallevans.com
ratnerm@hallevans.com
The State of Colorado, et. al.
for: Steven Vasconcellos
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, Colorado 80203
Phone: (720) 508-6000
Carman.VanPelt@coag.gov
Dated this: February 22, 2022
Signed pursuant to C.R.S. 4-3-402 by,
Robert-Lawrence: Perry, Trustee for:
4786 McMurry Ave., Unit 242
Fort Collins, Colorado 80522
fort_scout@yahoo.com
Phone: (970) 980-1849
Colorado State University, et, al.
Attn.: Jannine Mohr, Attorney
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, Colorado 80203
Phone: (720) 508-6000
Skip.Spear@coag.gov
Allison .Ai ler@coag.gov
CSU Board of Governors, for:
Colorado State University, et al.
555 seventeenth St., Suite 1000
Denver, Colorado 80201
Phone: (970) 491-6425
Denise.Munger@coag.gov
Isl 'Robert-Lawrence: Perry, Jvt.an
ROBERT LAWRENCE PERRY, Person
NOTE: CHANGE OF ADDRESS
PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF
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