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Home My WebLink About2021-cv-2306-RM-KLM - Perry V. State Of Colorado, Et Al - 039 - Pl's Motion To Amend Petition For ReliefV. and, and, IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO Civil Action No. 1 :21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Robert-Lawrence: Perry, Plaintiff I Each 'STATE OF COLORADO' Individual employee, executive officer, and/or administrative dfficial acting personally, individually, and/or in combiriation namely, Alita King, Thomas Lynch, and Daniel MbDonald, and each 'doe' administrator, agent, and/or ekecutive, and FI LED UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DENVER, COLORADO FEB 23 2022 Steven Vasconcellos, and 'doe' judicial ~dministrators; JEFFRliY P. COLWELL I . CL&RK The 'CITY OF FORT COLLINS', et. al., i~cluding each Individual administrative official, agent, employee and or executive officer, acting personally, individually, and or together, including each individual mehiber of the city council and Mayor, the City Attorney, th~ 1 City Manager, Darin Atteberry, Ross Cunniff, Gerry Horak, Ray Martinez, Kristin Stephens, Ken Summers, Wade Troxell, including 'doe' agents, administrators, executives, bfficers and / or each 'doe' appointee administrator, agent, police officer, official, and 'City' employees, namely, Brandi Lynn Neita, Dan Callahan, Jill Hueser, and Ryan We~tlind; CSU BOARD OF GOVERNORS, for 'CSU', and each individual member of the 'CSU Board of Governors', for 'COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY' and each 'doe' and or named administrators, agents, employees or officials acting personally, individually, and or together, namely, Scott Harris, Jeff Goetz, Jesse Ihnen, Michael Lohman, Phil Morris, Derek Smith, Lynn Johnson, Mark Gill, and Nie Olsen, and each heir appointee and/or official; each Individual Jointly and Severally Liable as Co-Defendants. MOTION TO AMEND PETITION FOR RELIEF MOTION TO AMEND PETITION FOR RELIEF 1 Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 94 SUMMARY STATEMENT Plaintiff is a 68 year-old man, who due to a series of unfortunate circumstances has become homeless; Plaintiff is indigent and physically disabled, and depends upon food assistance programs and social security disability benefits. Plaintiff was issued a permanent 'exclusionary order' form by Defendant CSU campus police, which denies Plaintiff access and use of CSU campus and the public transportation facility located thereon. CSU campus police enforce CSU 'exclusionary order' policy with citations of trespass issued to Plaintiff under the state private property trespass statute and City of Fort Collins trespass ordinances, misapplied in this case to public property (CSU). CSU 'exclusionary order' policy presumes that CSU administrators, executives and campus police may 'exclude' or banish Plaintiff for any reason whatsoever, in this case for 'feeding sguirrels'. Plaintiff argues that 'exclusion' or banishment from public property, like CSU is unconstitutional, and Plaintiff cites case precedents in support of his assertion, including citations of state law C.R.S. §18-4-201 that acknowledges the right of access and use of public property, and C.R.S. §18-9-109(1), which prohibits denying access and use of public educational institutions, like CSU. Counsel for Defendant, CSU Board of Governors by, or on behalf of, individual CSU administrators and campus police officers who issued Plaintiff a permanent CSU 'exclusionary order' for allegedly 'feeding squirrels' assert that these Defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity, and that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 2 MOTION TO AMEND PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 94 Defendant, 'City' enacted and enforced an unconstitutional trespass ordinance that allows police officers to permanently deny access and use of public property by simply ordering the person to leave, which the 'City' has interpreted, and now argues that, though Plaintiff left when issued an 'exclusionary order, he trespassed upon CSU (public property) because he "failed to leave" CSU campus, permanently. City Defendants assert that the 'City' and administrative, executive and judicial employees and officials are entitled to immunity from all claims of unconstitutional acts and even violations of federal and state criminal statutes simply by asserting that they claim 'Home-rule status'; that the Colorado Constitution authorized them to disregard the United States Constitution and Colorado law; that City ordinances even supersedes state law. Counsel for 'City' defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Counsel for individual State of Colorado Defendants, including administrative or executive officials who acted under color of law and in their official capacities to deny Plaintiff access and use of CSU campus argues that these individual defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity, and that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief many be granted, and that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff responded and objected to each Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, and he asserts that he is entitled to file an amendment to the Petition for Relief to address the alleged inadequacies in Plaintiffs 'Amended Petition for Relief, and asserts that such amendment will satisfactory address all factual and legal issues raised. 3 MOTION TO AMEND PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 3 of 94 Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court grant this Motion to Amend Petition for Relief, and grant such further and other relief as provided by law. Authorized and Issued on this day, Dated this: February 22, 2022 By: Robert-Lawrence: Perry, Man Signed pursuant to C.R.S. 4-3-402 s/s 'Robert-Lawrence: 'Perry, .1vlan For: ROBERT LAWRENCE PERRY, Person CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I confirm that I have conferred with the opposing counsel in good faith regarding this motion, as required under local rule D.C. COLO. LCivR 7.1 (a). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, in signing, I also certify that to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief that this Complaint and Petition for Relief: (1) is not being presented for an improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; that (2) it is supported by existing law or by a non-frivolous argument for extending or modifying existing law; that (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for discovery and/or further investigation; and (4) the complaint otherwise complies with the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11. 4 MOTION TO AMEND PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 4 of 94 Now, Plaintiff, Robert-Lawrence: Perry, a Man, domiciled for more than 30 years in Colorado, a state of the Union of States in America, respectfully submits this Affidavit in Support of Petition for Relief for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. JURAT CERTIFICATE (Larimer County Colorado in) (the Colorado Republic within) ss. (the United States Republic) 'TJ-f'ES'E 'T'R/U'TJfS SJ-f.:A.££ 'B'E .7tCXN01¥£'E1J{i'E1J: NOTE: All Capitalized terms are conditionally defined by Robert-Lawrence: Perry, which are intended to be generally construed in the ordinary understanding and by common language usage; not as defined by any law dictionary, code, Law, statute or ordinance. 1. I, Robert-Lawrence: Perry, common-law copyright name of a Man, hereby affirm upon my solemn Oath and upon my immortal soul, with God as my witness, that the following statements are True and Factually Accurate to the Best of my Knowledge, Information and Belief, under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America, the Republic comprised of 50 Independent States of the Union. 2. I was born February 15, 1954; I am 'indigent' and/or 'homeless'; I am disabled, and subsist on state food assistance and social security disability benefits. 3. I am a Colorado State University alumnus, and I used the CSU library and Fort Collins public bus terminal located on campus until I was permanently banned for allegedly 'feeding squirrels'. CSU 'exclusionary orders' are permanent unless lifted by CSU administrative officials. My requests for CSU administrative officials / CSU Board of Governors to lift the permanent 'exclusionary order' were denied or ignored. 5 MOTION TO AMEND PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 5 of 94 4. CSU police 'exclusionary order' policy cites C.R.S. § 18-9-109 as legal authority that 'authorizes' them to issue 'exclusionary orders'. However, this statute states that it is unlawful to willfully deny access and use of educational institutions. C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (1) states: (1) "No person shall, on or near the premises or facilities of any educational institution, willfully deny to students, school officials, employees, and invitees: (a) Lawful freedom of movement on the premises; (b) Lawful use of the property or facilities of the institution; (c) The right of lawful ingress and egress to the institution's physical facilities." 5. I repeatedly requested for CSU General Counsel attorneys to state CSU policy regarding 'feeding of squirrels', and interpret the application of the 'exclusionary order' policy to 'feeding squirrels'. CSU legal counsel refused to respond or interpret the law justifying the 'exclusionary order' issued against me solely for 'feeding squirrels'. There is no state statute or U.S. law that allows for exclusion from public places. 6. On May 17, 2019 CSU police officer Derek Smith issued me an 'exclusionary order'. Further, Officer Derek Smith issued me a citation for 'trespass' under C.R.S. § 18-4-504. Later that day, Derek Smith accessed the CCIC database and unilaterally entered an report of permanent civil restraining order; yet, there was in fact, no such permanent restraining order issued by any judge; thus, this report is fraudulent. 7. On July 12, 2019, Derek Smith issued me a 'trespass' citation, except under the F.C.M.C. section 17-40(a), this city ordinance allows police officers to tell someone that they are permanently "trespassed" (banned) from any public place in Fort Collins. 8. I was trespassed from a Fort Collins public pool for being the last one out of the locker-room and was "trespassed" from a community center for no reason whatsoever even though I possessed an active senior membership on both occasions. 9. Fort Collins Municipal Code (F.C.M.C.) section 17-40(a) for trespass applies the definition of "Enter or remain unlawfully", F.C.M.C. Section 17-1, which exempts those persons who are licensed, invited, privileged or otherwise authorized to do so". 6 MOTION TO AMEND PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 6 of 94 10. Before July 2018, the City code definition of "enter or remain unlawfully" read: F.C.M.C. Section 17-1 "Enter or remain unlawfully" shall mean: (1) To enter or remain in or upon public or privately owned property when not licensed, invited, privileged or otherwise authorized to do so; 11. Since July 2018, the City code definition of "enter or remain unlawfully" reads: F.C.M.C. Section 17-1 "Enter or remain unlawfully" shall mean: (1) To enter or remain in or upon privately owned property when not licensed, invited, privileged or otherwise authorized to do so; 12. CSU police issued me a trespass citation on July 20, 2018; this was (17) days after the city counsel amended F.C.M.C. Section 17-1 that defines "unlawfully enters or remains", which was applied to F.C.M.C. section 17-40(a); the City trespass ordinance; this amendment allowed CSU police to apply the ordinance to public property. 14. C.R.S. § 18-4-201 defines what misconduct would constitute "enters unlawfully" or "remains unlawfully", and states: "A person who, regardless of his or her intent, enters or remains in or upon premises that are at the time open to the public does so with license and privilege unless the person defies a lawful order not to enter or remain, personally communicated to him or her by the owner of the premises or some other authorized person." 15. I motioned to dismiss the municipal trespass case based off of the fact that in accordance with the definition of "enters or remains unlawfully in C.R.S. § 18-4-201, I had license and privilege to enter or remain upon CSU property that was at that time open to the public. However, my motions to dismiss were denied. The prosecutor and municipal judge both agreed that C.R.S. § 18-4-201 was not relevant. 16. In each trespass case, I submitted proposed jury instructions that included the definition of "enters or remains unlawfully" as provided by C.R.S. § 18-4-201, which acknowledges the right of the public to access and use public property. However, in each trespass case, the jury was not advised on the definition of unlawfully enters or remains, nor was the jury advised of C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (1), which states it is unlawful for anyone to deny access and use of educational facilities, like CSU. (See# 5) 7 MOTION TO AMEND PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 7 of 94 17. I was sentenced in the municipal trespass case to 5 days in jail but suspended upon my not returning to CSU campus for one year from December 3, 2019. I was sentenced by the municipal court judge and ordered to not go to CSU for one year. Simply stated, I was banned from CSU campus by court order. 18. The municipal court judge issued a fraudulent "Order for Suspension of Penalty (Jail); Waiver of Rights and Plea of Guilty or No Contest" dated December 3, 2019. The 'Order' is fraudulent because I did not agree to waive my rights, nor did I plead guilty. I was not advised of my rights, nor did not sign the 'Order' that states "advised by court" on the signature line; only later I was e-mailed a copy of the fraudulent 'Order'. One of the appeal issues was the fraudulent nature of the 'Order'; I argued that it was void as fraud; therefore, the 'Order' was legally unenforceable, especially since the 'probation' was conditioned on the enforcement of an illegal 'exclusionary order', and the 'Order' itself was unlawful since it violated C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (1). which prohibits anyone from denying access and use of educational facilities, like CSU. 19. On appeal, I also challenged whether the municipal court judge and prosecutor were lawfully authorized by the City to conduct judicial proceedings; I argued that the municipal judge was acting under Colorado law as a 'master', rather than a municipal judge and that the real Municipal Judge was asked to recuse herself. The prosecutor and the so-called judge was hired specially under an amendment to the City Charter; Article VII, sec. 1, which states in part: "As Council determines necessary, the Council may designate one (1) or more reputable and gualified attorneys to serve as temporary judge." I reasonably believe that Brandi Lynn Neita was specially hired by the City to act as 'municipal judge' in my trespass case because of the timing of her appointment coincided within days of CSU police issuing me a trespass citation. 20. Article VI, sec. 3 states: "The Council may, upon the request of the City Attorney in special cases, employ special counsel if deemed necessary and advisable under the circumstances." I reasonably believe that Jill W. Hueser was hired as special counsel specifically for the prosecution of my trespass case. 8 MOTION TO AMEND PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 8 of 94 21. On September 1, 2020 I e-mailed and faxed a letter to the Colorado Attorney General requesting that she act pursuant to C.R.S. § 16-9-501, and provide a legal opinion on the Fort Collins City 'camping' ordinances. Notably, the Fort Collins City Attorney received a copy of this letter. However, neither the City Attorney or Attorney General acknowledged or replied. Also, on September 15, 2020 I e-mailed a letter to each member of the Fort Collins City Council requesting that they consider repealing both City 'camping' ordinances; however, they took no action. 22. I also mailed my written complaint to the Colorado Attorney General requesting that she provide an official interpretation of the trespass statute as it was being applied in my county trespass case; however, I never received a response from her office. The Attorney General refused to interpret the trespass statute to public property. 23. Larimer County Court Judge conspired with the county prosecutor, Alita King to replace a juror in my trespass trial, Madeline Griggs, with a woman from the office of the District Attorney. The woman who replaced Madeline Griggs has brown eyes and wore glasses, and seemed to be at least 30 years old, but juror, Madeline Griggs has blue eyes without corrective lens, and is 22 years old. I confirmed this myself after trial by logging on to Facebook. I later saw the unidentified brown-eyed woman in the Office of the District Attorney, who I reasonably believe is working as a clerk. 24. I appealed each conviction, and each appeal was assigned to the same judge who was the Chief District Court Prosecutor when prosecutor, Alita King conspired with Larimer County Court Judge Thomas Lynch by seating a clerk from the prosecutor's office on the jury in my county trespass case. Note: jury tampering is a felony. 25. Further, I filed an official complaint against Thomas Lynch with the state judicial misconduct committee and filed an official complaint against Alita King with the attorney regulation counsel; however, the intake counsel refused to conduct an investigation of the allegations of misconduct, unless both Thomas Lynch and Alita King confessed to their felony criminal conspiracy of jury tampering, obstruction of justice, and conspiracy against my civil rights in violation of Title 18 U.S. Code § 241 and § 242. 9 MOTION TO AMEND PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 9 of 94 26. I also spoke with some individuals working in the office of judicial administration to ask them who was the woman working in the prosecutor's office that was seated on the jury of my trespass case; although they refused to identify her, they did admit that judicial administration and judges' clerks have a PDF copy of the judge's signature. 27. Also, I mailed a written complaint to the State of Colorado and Larimer Office of Judicial Administration that one of their clerks was seated on the jury of my county trespass case; however, my complaint was ignored; I never got a response from them. When I asked the individuals in the Larimer Office of Judicial Administration about their access and use of the judge's signature to issue judgments and orders, they admitted that they do use the judge's PDF signature, but "they do not use it willy-nilly". 28. When I received a copy of the Registry of Actions of each appeal of my trespass cases I saw that each appeal was "administratively reviewed" and that a PDF copy of the judge's signature was attached to each Order Confirming Conviction. The appeals were not judicially reviewed. Therefore, I reasonably believe that Larimer District Court Judge Daniel McDonald did not really issue either Order Confirming Conviction in the appeal of either trespass case. I reasonably believe that either the judge's clerk or an employee in judicial administration had used the judge's PDF signature to issue each 'Order Confirming Conviction', which I also reasonably believe was actually written by an attorney in the prosecutor's office; these acts constitute several felonies, including, filing a false public record, impersonating a judge, obstruction of justice and conspiracy against civil rights, none of which entitles these officials to sovereign immunity. 29. I was sentenced in the municipal trespass case to 5 days in jail but suspended upon my not returning to CSU campus for one year from December 3, 2019. 30. I was sentenced in the Larimer county trespass case to 60 days in Larimer jail; I served 6 days, with 54 days suspended upon the condition of my not returning to CSU campus for one year from January 22, 2020. 31. I filed a Complaint against CSU Board of Governors in Larimer District Court on August 20, 2018; it was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. 10 MOTION TO AMEND PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 10 of 94 32. Also, I reasonably believe that the District Court Judge was specially assigned to my 'appeals' of each of the trespass cases since he was appointed right after I was convicted by the county court yet before the appeals were ripe for review; also, before he was appointed judge, Daniel McDonald was the Chief Deputy District Attorney and supervisor for Alita King, the prosecutor in my trespass case, who conspired with the .county court judge, Thomas Lynch to seat a clerk from the prosecutor's office on my trespass case; also, he refused to recuse himself from my appeal of the county case although he decided the key issue in the appeal of the municipal trespass case that: "the public are not expected, requested, or intended (invited) to enter CSU". 33. I reasonably believe that a criminal investigation will produce physical evidence and witness testimony supporting these facts and the Petition for Relief. 34. The citations of law contained herein are accurate and true that I personally had copied from reliable sources . .J'urtfier .Jtffiant sayetfi not. I hereby affirm upon my solemn oath and upon my immortal soul, with God as my witness, that the foregoing statements are true and factually accurate to the best of my knowledge, information and belief, under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America, the Republic comprised of 50 Independent States of the Union. Dated this February 22, 2022 Signed as per C.R.S. 4-3-402 Robert-Lawrence: Perry, Man for: Subscribed and sworn to before me this February 22, 2022 Witness my hand and official seal. By~~ Seal -~c ANDY B MCftJITT MOTARY PUBLIC STATE OF COLORADO f\!OT,\H·( ID 2020404'1918 _M_v _co_w_i11s,_:.s1c•,,_;:?:1::-:s ('ECEMsrn 2, 2024 11 MOTION TO AMEND PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 11 of 94 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Robert-Lawrence: Perry, Plaintiff, hereby certify that I sent a complete, correct and true copy of the foregoing Motion to Amend Petition for Relief and attached a copy of the Second Amended Petition for Relief addressed to each Attorney of Record for all Defendants by first-class U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, and/or by emailing documents, such as agreed by informed and prior consent to the following: Attorneys for Defendants, The City of Fort Collins, et al. Darin Atteberry, City Manager 300 La Porte Ave., (City Hall) Fort Collins, CO 80522 Phone: (970) 221-6520 hoffmank@hallevans.com ratnerm@hallevans.com The State of Colorado, et. al. for: Steven Vasconcellos 1300 Broadway, 10th Floor Denver, Colorado 80203 Phone: (720) 508-6000 Carman.VanPelt@coag.gov Dated this: February 22, 2022 Signed pursuant to C.R.S. 4-3-402 by, Robert-Lawrence: Perry, Trustee for: 4786 McMurry Ave., Unit 242 Fort Collins, Colorado 80525 fort_ scout@yahoo.com Phone: (970) 980-1849 Colorado State University, et, al. Attn.: Jannine Mohr, Attorney 1300 Broadway, 10th Floor Denver, Colorado 80203 Phone: (720) 508-6000 Skip.Spear@coag.gov Allison .Ailer@coag.gov CSU Board of Governors, for: Colorado State University, et al. 555 seventeenth St., Suite 1000 Denver, Colorado 80201 Phone: (970) 491-6425 Denise.Munger@coag.gov Isl 'Robert-Lawrence: 'Perry, .1vlan ROBERT LAWRENCE PERRY, Person NOTE: CHANGE OF ADDRESS MOTION TO AMEND PETITION FOR RELIEF 12 Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 12 of 94 V. and, and, f I LED IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT UNITEOSTATESOIST=OURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO DENVER. COLO Civil Action No. 1 :21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Robert-Lawrence: Perry, Plaintiff FtB 23 2022 JEFFREY P. COLWELLK CLER Each 'STATE OF COLORADO' Individual employee, executive officer, and/or administrative official acting personally, individually, and/or in combination namely, Alita King, Thomas Lynch, and Daniel McDonald, and each 'doe' administrator, agent, and/or executive, and Steven Vasconcellos, and 'doe' judicial administrators; The 'CITY OF FORT COLLINS', et. al., including each Individual administrative official, agent, employee and or executive officer, acting personally, individually, and or together, including each individual member of the city council and Mayor, the City Attorney, the City Manager, Darin Atteberry, Ross Cunniff, Gerry Horak, Ray Martinez, Kristin Stephens, Ken Summers, Wade Troxell, including 'doe' agents, administrators, executives, officers and / or each 'doe' appointee administrator, agent, police officer, official, and 'City' employees, namely, Brandi Lynn Neita, Dan Callahan, Jill Hueser, and Ryan Westlind; CSU BOARD OF GOVERNORS, for 'CSU', and each individual member of the 'CSU Board of Governors', for 'COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY' and each 'doe' and or named administrators, agents, employees or officials acting personally, individually, and or together, namely, Scott Harris, Jeff Goetz, Jesse Ihnen, Michael Lohman, Phil Morris, Derek Smith, Lynn Johnson, Mark Gill, and Nie Olsen, and each heir appointee and/or official; each Individual Jointly and Severally Liable as Co-Defendants. PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF 1 Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 13 of 94 MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 Plaintiff, Robert-Lawrence: Perry, a Man dwelling in Colorado, one state of the Union of States in America, respectfully files this Amended Petition for Relief, under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et. seq., and Request for Declaratory Judgment of Unconstitutional, as written and applied, statutes and ordinances pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, § 2202. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. This action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States under 42 U.S. Code§ 1983. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S. Code §§ 1331 and 1343. This Court has jurisdiction to issue the declaratory relief requested pursuant to the Declaratory Relief Act, Title 28 U.S. Code§§ 2201, 2202. 2. Plaintiff requests a three-judge panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284. 3. Venue is proper in the District of Colorado pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b). The Corporate and Individual Defendants and the Plaintiff reside in the District of Colorado, and the events described in this Petition occurred within the District of Colorado. PARTIES Plaintiff: 4. Plaintiff, Robert-Lawrence: Perry, has lived in Fort Collins Colorado continuously since 1990; he is 68 years old; currently he is 'indigent' and/or 'homeless'. He subsists on state food assistance and social security disability benefits. 2 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 14 of 94 5. Defendant, 'City of Fort Collins', is a Municipal Corporation, listed on Dun and Bradstreet, with their office in the State of Colorado. It has adopted and enforces the camping and trespass Ordinances challenged in this case. It is the policy and practice of the 'City of Fort Collins', through the actions of its police officers, its city prosecutor, and municipal court judge who interpret and enforce the ordinances against 'camping' and 'trespass' in the unconstitutional manner that is described and challenged in this Complaint. The intentional acts and omissions of Defendants, the City of Fort Collins, (City) and Colorado State University (CSU), and the County of Larimer, by and through their administrators, appointed or elected officials, or employed officers, complained of herein as unconstitutional, are carried out under color of state law. 6. Defendant, Colorado State University (CSU), a public educational institution, is located in Fort Collins, Colorado; both CSU and 'CSU BOARD OF GOVERNORS' are listed as businesses on Dun and Bradstreet, with offices in the State of Colorado. 7. Defendant, Colorado Judicial Administrator, Steven Vasconcellos, resides in the State of Colorado, and is responsible for judicial administration in Colorado. 8. Defendant, 'STATE OF COLORADO', is the legal business name of the 'Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management'; the Legal business name of the Colorado Department of Public Safety, Division of Homeland Security; the businesses are listed on Dun and Bradstreet, with principal offices in Colorado. The omissions and Intentional acts by Defendant complained of as unconstitutional are carried out under color of state law by its employed agents, officers, and appointed or elected officials. 3 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 15 of 94 SUMMARY STATEMENT OF CAUSES 9. Plaintiff seeks declaratory judgment and injunctive relief due to unlawful actions by Defendants, who through their employed agents, officers, and appointed or elected officials denied Plaintiff lawful access and use of Colorado State University. 10. Colorado State University (hereinafter CSU) police issued 'exclusionary orders' against Plaintiff for allegedly 'feeding squirrels', and issued citations for trespass when Plaintiff disregarded such 'orders' as unconstitutional, which was determined by the Colorado Supreme Court and the United States District Court over 50 years ago. 11. At trial, Plaintiff was found 'guilty' of 'trespass' under the Fort Collins Municipal Code (F.C.M.C.) Sec. 40(a), which is broadly interpreted and enforced by local police officers to discriminatorily verbally ban anyone from public property without reason. 12. Also, Plaintiff was found 'guilty' of 'trespass' under C.R.S. § 18-4-504, which is interpreted and applied to presume that CSU 'exclusionary orders' are lawful; though this was never proved, and C.R.S. § 18-9-109(1) prohibits anyone from denying lawful access and use of educational facilities. The judge and prosecutor conspired to deny Plaintiff due process by excluding any evidence, legal argument or testimony to prove CSU 'exclusionary orders' are unlawful. The judge and prosecutor even committed jury tampering by seating a clerk from the prosecutor's office on the jury. (A felony) 14. The City of Fort Collins prosecuted Plaintiff seven (7) times for 'camping', which is vaguely and broadly defined as: "to spend the night, reside or dwell temporarily, or to conduct activities of daily living such as eating or sleeping." 4 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 16 of 94 SUMMARY STATEMENT OF CLAIMS 15. Plaintiff asserts that CSU campus police officers and administrative officials did violate Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, §§ 1985, and sec. 1986 by knowingly and intentionally denying Plaintiff access and use of Colorado State University premises and facilities open to the public, in violation of His Fifth, Eighth and 14th Amendment Rights. 16. 'Exclusionary orders' as was issued by CSU campus police were determined to be unconstitutional in Watson v. Board of Regents of University of Colorado 512 P.2d 1162, in the Colorado Supreme Court, and Dunkel v. Elkins, 325 F. Supp. 1235, by the United States District Court. CSU 'exclusionary orders' are also unconstitutional as 'bills of pains and penalties' or 'Bills of Attainder, since they impose punishment of 'exclusion' without benefit of a judicial trial. Further, 'exclusion' or 'banishment' is not provided for as punishment by any federal or state law, and was determined to be unconstitutional. Also, CSU police 'exclusionary orders' are permanent unless lifted, which constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiff has been denied substantive due process and equal protection of the law. 17. Plaintiff asserts CSU campus police officers, and 'City' and 'County' judges and prosecutors did violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 1985, and section 1986 by knowingly and intentionally denying Plaintiffs Right to substantive due process and refused to advise the jury of the definition of "unlawfully enters or remains" under C.R.S. § 18-4-201, which states that: "A person who, ... , enters or remains in or upon premises that are ... open to the public does so with license and privilege ... ". End quote. 5 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 17 of 94 18. Plaintiff asserts that the City trespass ordinance (F.C.M.C.) 17-40(a) cannot be legally applicable to public property, like CSU since the Fort Collins Municipal Code definition of "enter or remain unlawfully" is specifically limited to private property, and C.R.S. § 18-4-201, states: "A person who, ... , enters or remains in or upon premises that are ... open to the public does so with license and privilege ... ". In addition, Plaintiff is a "public invitee"· defined under Restatement (2nd) of Torts § 332(2) ( 1965). Therefore, the Municipal Court conviction for 'trespass' was unlawful. 19. Plaintiff asserts that the City of Fort Collins ordinance definition of 'trespass' is intentionally and unconstitutionally over-broad and vague so as to allow police officers to discriminatorily deny access and use of public places, such as CSU campus for any reason, or no reason whatsoever, and in this case, deny Plaintiff His Eighth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment Rights to due process and equal protection of the law. 20. Plaintiff asserts that employed officers, and appointed or elected officials of the City of Fort Collins, violated Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 1985, and § 1986 by knowingly and intentionally denying Plaintiff His substantive due process rights in violation of the Fifth, and 14th Amendments, by enforcing an over-broad and vague ordinance against 'camping', defined as: 'eating, sleeping or conducting activities of daily living'. 21. Plaintiff asserts that the City of Fort Collins ordinance definition of 'camping' is intentionally and unconstitutionally over-broad and vague so as to allow police officers to discriminatorily deny access and use of public places, in this case denying Plaintiffs Eighth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights to equal protection of the law. 6 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 18 of 94 THE CIVIL RIGHTS CONSPIRACY 22. The City of Fort Collins, by and through agents, employed officers, and elected officials are engaged in a campaign against 'homeless' people. The City Council has enacted ordinances against 'camping' and 'trespass' that are selectively enforced just against people in the community that are assumed to be 'homeless' or 'indigent'. The campaign includes police officers issuing verbal orders permanently banning anyone, suspected as 'homeless', from public property, such as CSU campus, using the vague and over-broad powers granted by the City 'camping' and 'trespass' ordinances. 23. For their part, CSU administrative and executive officials adopted and enforced the 'exclusionary order' policy challenged as unconstitutional. CSU police enforce the 'exclusionary orders' with trespass citations exercising the broad discretion afforded by the 'trespass' ordinance, and state statute, by erroneously presuming that 'exclusionary orders' are enforceable with 'trespass' citations for being on public property. 24. CSU 'exclusionary order' policy immediately denies access to CSU campus to the identified 'subject' issued an 'exclusionary order' form, that functions as a personal 'no trespass' notice, subject to enforcement with criminal citations of 'trespass'. 25. V.P. for University Operations, Lynn Johnson, implemented CSU 'exclusionary order' policy that allows CSU campus police to, prejudicially, deny access and use of CSU campus to whoever they want; in this case, permanently excluding Plaintiff from CSU campus for allegedly 'feeding squirrels'. Notably, CSU does not have a policy against 'feeding squirrels', nor is there any such local or state prohibition. 7 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 19 of 94 26. CSU campus police are enforcing CSU 'exclusionary order' policy, which was authorized by Lynn Johnson, V.P. for University Operations, further supported by CSU then-acting Chief of Police, Scott Harris and then-acting CSU Chief of Staff, Mark Gill, who appointed a CSU employee, Nie Olsen to unilaterally affirm the 'exclusionary order' CSU campus police issued against Plaintiff. Nie Olsen acted as a judge and hearsay witness during the 'administrative appeal' of the permanent 'exclusionary order'. 27. Plaintiff was issued the first "exclusionary order" by CSU campus police officer, Jesse Ihnen on May 18, 2016, for allegedly 'feeding squirrels'. Lynn Johnson, CSU VP for University Operations, lifted the 'exclusionary order' after Plaintiff submitted a written appeal challenging CSU "exclusionary order" policy as unconstitutional and cited other criminal and civil statutory citations which conflict with CSU "exclusionary order" policy. C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (1 ), prohibits denying access and use of university property, unless such person is interfering with the functions of the university, either through the use of force or violence, or the threat of force or violence. [See: C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (2)] 28. Then, in response, CSU Vice President for University Operations, Lynn Johnson, amended CSU 'exclusionary order' policy to remove reference to C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (2) after Plaintiff objected to the first 'exclusionary order' issued against him based solely upon him 'feeding squirrels'. On July 21, 2016, CSU 'exclusionary order' policy was amended to redefine the purpose of the policy for: "maintenance of its public buildings and property, including the prohibition of activities or conduct within public buildings or on public property". Then, this was applied in Plaintiff's 2019 'trespass' cases. 8 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 20 of 94 29. By such amendment to CSU 'exclusionary order' policy removing any reference to C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (2), and such statutory limitations provided for by law, it allowed CSU campus police to discriminate against Plaintiff to apply "exclusionary order" policy to such conduct as: 'feeding squirrels'. Curiously, CSU 'exclusionary order' policy was amended after Plaintiff filed this petition for relief; CSU 'exclusionary order' policy once again cites C.R.S. § 18-9-109 as statutory authority, with conditional application. 30. CSU campus police cited Plaintiff with 'trespass' under C.R.S. § 18-4-504, and Fort Collins Municipal Code (F.C.M.C.) section 17-40(a), that applies the definition of "Enter or remain unlawfully" defined by F.C.M.C. Sec. 17-1. However, neither the state trespass statute nor city trespass ordinance applies to public property. like CSU. 31. C.R.S. § 18-4-201 defines what conduct would constitute "enters unlawfully" or "remains unlawfully", and provides exception for public property; thus, Plaintiff should not have been cited for 'trespass on CSU campus. In fact, C.R.S. § 18-9-109 prohibits denying access and use of educational facilities, such as CSU. 32. Plaintiff was convicted twice of trespass; once in county and once in municipal court since each judge refused to allow his jury instructions, nor even allow Plaintiff to cite C.R.S. § 18-4-201 or C.R.S. § 18-9-109. Defendants named herein denied Plaintiff due process of a fair trial, and denied Him equal protection of the law. 33. CSU campus police officers named herein testified at Plaintiff's 'trespass' trials that they issued Plaintiff 'exclusionary order' forms and cited Plaintiff for 'trespass' when he disregarded such forms as unconstitutional and unlawful. 9 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 21 of 94 34. The testimony of CSU campus police officers sworn under oath at Plaintiffs trials constitutes a confession that they intentionally denied Plaintiff access and use of CSU campus in violation of C.R.S. § 18-9-109(1). CSU campus police officers have admitted to their participation in the conspiracy to deny Plaintiffs civil, constitutional and statutory rights in violation of 42 U.S. Code§ 1983, § 1985, and section 1986. 35. CSU campus police officers acted under color of law, in their official capacities, and upon authority of CSU administrative officials to deny Plaintiffs constitutional right and equal protection of the law, i.e. C.R.S. § 18-9-109(1) and C.R.S. § 18-4-201 that would have otherwise prevented them from denying Him access to CSU campus and prohibited them from enforcing CSU 'exclusionary order' policy with 'trespass' citations that would not otherwise be applied to public property. like CSU campus. 36. In coordination with CSU administrative officials to enforce 'exclusionary orders, CSU professor and then-mayor, Wade Troxel and City of Fort Collins council members, two of whom were also CSU professors, amended the 'trespass' ordinance to remove reference to public property from the definition of trespass in F.C.M.C. Sec. 17-1. 37. The intentional amendment and deletion of reference to public property and the acknowledged right of the public with license and privilege to enter or remain on public property, coincided with other acts by the City to violate Plaintiffs constitutional rights. Contemporaneous with Plaintiff being issued a trespass citation; the City amended the City Charter, to allow them to hire private attorneys to act as judge and prosecutor in Plaintiffs trespass case, thus facilitating their § 1985 civil rights conspiracy. 10 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 22 of 94 38. The amendment of CSU 'exclusionary order' policy to allow CSU campus police to cite Plaintiff with 'trespass', and amendment of the definition of trespass in F.C.M.C. Sec. 17-1 to delete reference to public property and the right of the public with license and privilege to enter or remain on public property. was still not enough to insure that the jury would convict Plaintiff of 'trespass' under C.R.S. § 18-4-504, which has never been applied to public property; the Larimer co~nty district court prosecutor, Alita King and county court judge Thomas Lynch refused to allow jury instructions, nor even allow Plaintiff to cite C.R.S. § 18-4-201, that defines what constitutes trespass and exempts public property: nor would they permit jury instruction on C.R.S. § 18-9-109(1), which prohibits denying access and use of educational facilities, like CSU. 39. In order to insure that Plaintiff would be 'convicted' of 'trespass', Larimer county district court prosecutor, Alita King conspired with county court judge Thomas Lynch to tamper with the jury by seating a clerk from the prosecutor's office on the jury. 40. Though, to insure that Plaintiff's 'trespass' convictions would be affirmed by the Larimer District Court, the State of Colorado also appointed then Larimer Chief Deputy District Attorney Daniel McDonald to be the Larimer District Court Judge, assigned by Judicial Administration to preside over the appeal of each of Plaintiff's trespass cases. However, to insure that Plaintiff's trespass convictions were affirmed, some unidentified person within Larimer County Judicial Administration used a PDF image of the judge's signature to issue an "Order affirming Conviction' of each of Plaintiff's 'trespass' cases, thereby denying Plaintiff due process and equal protection of the law. 11 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 23 of 94 SUMMARY ARGUMENT 41. Plaintiff asserts that CSU 'exclusionary orders' are unlawful because they allow CSU police to commit a crime; denying lawful access and use of CSU premises in violation of C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (1). CSU 'exclusionary orders' are unconstitutional as supported by precedent, in Watson v. Board of Regents of University of Colorado 512 P.2d 1162, in the Colorado Supreme Court, and Dunkel v. Elkins, 325 F. Supp. 1235, by the United States District Court. Permanent CSU 'exclusionary orders' are also unconstitutional as 'bills of pains and penalties', and cruel and unusual punishment. 42. Plaintiff asserts that CSU 'exclusionary order' policy, as written and enforced is unconstitutional because it allows CSU campus police to violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by immediately and permanently denying all lawful access and use of CSU premises for unlawful reasons, such as for Plaintiff allegedly 'feeding squirrels'. CSU 'exclusionary order' policy cites C.R.S. § 18-9-109 as legal authority; yet, Plaintiff was not charged with refusing to leave, nor accused of committing an act which would 'disrupt, impair, interfere with, or obstruct the lawful missions, processes, procedures, or functions of the institution.' See also: (Colo. 2005) People v. In the interest of C.A.J. 05-CA-2413 43. CSU police 'exclusionary order' policy and administrative "appeal process" fails to allow substantive or procedural due process; CSU police 'exclusionary order' policy allows an employee from the Office of CSU President to affirm an 'exclusionary order' without evidentiary standard; no evidence or witnesses are necessary and hearsay is allowed; this resulted in violation of Plaintiff's Fifth and 14th Amendment Rights. 12 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 24 of 94 44. Plaintiff asserts that the City trespass ordinance (F.C.M.C.) 17-40(a) cannot be legally applicable to public property since the Fort Collins Municipal Code definition of "enter or remain unlawfully" excepts those licensed, invited, or privileged. § 18-4-201 C.R.S. states: "A person who, regardless of his or her intent, enters or remains in or upon premises that are ... open to the public does so with license and privilege ... ". 45. Plaintiff asserts that the City trespass ordinance (F.C.M.C.) 17-40(a) cannot be legally enforced by CSU police because CSU 'exclusionary orders' are unconstitutional and violate C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (1 ), which prohibits denying lawful access and use. 46. The City and County unlawfully convicted Plaintiff of 'trespass' because the jury was not advised of C.R.S. § 18-4-201 and C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (1), which prohibits CSU campus police from denying access and use of CSU campus. 47. The County illegally 'convicted' Plaintiff of 'trespass' because the prosecutor and judge conspired by seating a clerk from the prosecutors office on the jury. 48. The City of Fort Collins ordinances prohibiting 'camping' are Unconstitutionally over-broad and vague, which results in discriminatory interpretation and enforcement against people subjectively considered by police officers, as 'homeless', like Plaintiff. The ordinances against 'camping' are so extremely over-broad and vague, as written, that they fail to provide adequate notice to enable someone of ordinary intelligence to understand what conduct is prohibited. Even then, as written, the ordinances against 'camping' are so vague and over-broad that any 'activity of daily living' is prohibited, thereby eliminating any alternative other than to disregard these ordinances. 13 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 25 of 94 ARGUMENT The City trespass ordinance is unconstitutional. 49. Plaintiff asserts that the City trespass ordinance (F.C.M.C.) 17-40(a) cannot be legally applicable to public property since C.R.S. § 18-4-201 C.R.S. states: "A person who, regardless of his or her intent, enters or remains in or upon premises that are ... open to the public does so with license and privilege ... ". 50. Fort Collins Municipal Code (F.C.M.C.) section 17-40(a) for trespass applies the definition of "Enter or remain unlawfully" defined by F.C.M.C. Section 17-1. In 2018, City officials intentionally deleted the reference to public property from F.C.M.C. Sec. 17-1. Before July 2018, the City code definition of "enter or remain unlawfully" read: F.C.M.C. Section 17-1 "Enter or remain unlawfully" shall mean: (1) To enter or remain in or upon public or privately owned property when not licensed, invited, privileged or otherwise authorized to do so; Since July 2018, the City code definition of "enter or remain unlawfully" reads: F.C.M.C. Section 17-1 "Enter or remain unlawfully" shall mean: (1) To enter or remain in or upon privately owned property when not licensed, invited, privileged or otherwise authorized to do so; 51. The intentional amendment and deletion of reference to public property and the acknowledged right of the public with license and privilege to enter or remain on public property coincided with other acts by the City to violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Contemporaneous with Plaintiff being issued a trespass citation, the City amended the City charter and 'trespass' ordinance, and hired private attorneys to act as judge and prosecutor in Plaintiff's trespass case, thereby aiding the § 1985 conspiracy. 14 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 26 of 94 52. Plaintiff asserts that the City trespass ordinance cannot lawfully apply to public property, like CSU campus because it unconstitutionally denies Plaintiff's right to equal protection of the law (C.R.S. § 18-4-201) which provides that the public have license and privilege of access and use of public property, and that the trespass ordinance is unconstitutionally over-broad and vague by granting police unlimited dictatorial power and discretion to seize control over public property to permanently deny anyone access and use of public property for any reason or for no reason whatsoever. F.C.M.C. Sec. 17-1 (3) allows anyone in 'lawful control' over public property to exclude anyone; except, what constitutes 'lawful control', is not defined thus it is over-broad and vague. To the extent that the City 'trespass' ordinance grants police 'lawful control' over all public property, Plaintiff asserts that such control constitutes a taking under Article II Section 15 of the Colorado Constitution, which entitles Plaintiff to compensation. 53. The definition of "enters or remains unlawfully" used in F.C.M.C. Sec. 17-1 (3) is unconstitutionally over-broad and vague on its face; it intentionally omits reference to the public right of access and use of places of public accommodation, allowing officers to discriminate against individuals whoever the officer chooses completely disregarding the public right of access and use of public property contained in C.R.S. § 18-4-201 (3). The definition of "enters or remains unlawfully" provided by F.C.M.C. Sec. 17-1(3) is blatantly unlawful, especially as applied in Plaintiff's case because it allowed CSU police officers to violate the law, specifically, C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (1), that prohibits anyone from denying assess and use of educational institutions. 15 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 27 of 94 54. Plaintiff alleges facts that then CSU Police Chief, Scott Harris, acting under color of law, and in his official capacity, permanently denied Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment right of equal access and use of CSU campus, and that Vice President for University Operations and CFO, Lynn Johnson, who adopted and amended CSU 'exclusionary order' policy to abandon the previous reference to state law, and appointed Nie Olsen I then CSU employee, to unilaterally affirm the 'exclusionary order' against Plaintiff, and that then CSU Chief of Staff, Mark Gill, acted individually, and in coordination with the Chief of Police, in his official capacity when he denied Plaintiff's appeal to enforce CSU 'exclusionary order' policy, and willfully, permanently denied Plaintiff access and use of CSU property and all facilities thereon, including the Fort Collins public transportation central bus terminal located on campus. 55. Plaintiff alleges facts that Larimer County prosecutor, Alita King, Larimer County Judge Thomas L. Lynch, acting in their official capacities violated Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and equal protection of the law, by tampering with the jury by seating a clerk from the prosecutor's office on the jury. thus, deprived him of liberty and privileges by unlawfully enforcing the trespass statute C.R.S. § 18-4-504 in not advising the jury that, by definition, pursuant to C.R.S. § 18-4-201 the public have license and privilege to enter and remain on public property, and unidentified individual Defendant's in the office of judicial administration, who wrote the 'Judgment Affirming Conviction' and forged the judge's signature with a PDF copy: thus, Plaintiff was denied substantive due process and lawful appeal of his 'trespass' conviction. 16 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 28 of 94 The City ordinances prohibiting 'camping' in the City are unconstitutional. 56. Plaintiff asserts claims that the City ordinances prohibiting 'camping' on public or private property are both unconstitutionally vague and over-broad on their face, and as applied in this case, since they generally prohibit living in Fort Collins. Also, Plaintiff asserts that the City ordinances prohibiting 'camping' are discriminatory because they are only enforced upon 'homeless' people, like Plaintiff, as part of a City policy to rid Fort Collins of 'homeless' people. Plaintiff asserts that the City ordinances prohibiting 'camping' are unconstitutional because they impose cruel and unusual punishment of excessive fines or (6) six months in jail for conducting activities of daily living. 57. Plaintiff was charged (7) seven times with 'camping'; most recently, Plaintiff was cited with 'camping'; Municipal Court Case: FC-20-4935-MD, which was dismissed on September 17, 2020; therefore, the statute of limitation has not expired. 58. The City of Fort Collins ordinance prohibiting "camping" is over-broad and vague due the lack of guidance in the enforcement that grants police unlimited discretion to use it to discriminate against 'homeless' people, such as Plaintiff. The Fort Collins city ordinances against 'camping' on public or private property effectively renders everyone subject to criminal penalties for living in Fort Collins. Yet, the City ordinance against 'camping' is applied exclusively against indigent, 'homeless' people, such as Plaintiff. Since Plaintiff intends to continue to live in Fort Collins, he is subjected to continual threat of being jailed for exercising his equal and fundamental right to live and be in public places. Plaintiff has 'standing' to assert his 14th Amendment rights. 17 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 29 of 94 ABBREVIATED CITATIONS OF LAW Fort Collins Municipal Code (F.C.M.C.) 17-40(a) states in pertinent part: "No person shall enter or, remain unlawfully in or upon property, whether publicly or privately owned." F.C.M.C. Section 17-1 states in part: "Enter or remain unlawfully" shall mean: (1) To enter or remain in or upon public or privately owned property when not licensed, invited, privileged or otherwise authorized to do so; ... " C.R.S. § 18-4-201 defines what misconduct would constitute "enters unlawfully" or "remains unlawfully", and states: "A person who, regardless of his or her intent, enters or remains in or upon premises that are at the time open to the public does so with license and privilege unless the person defies a lawful order not to enter or remain, ... " C.R.S. § 18-1-901 (3)(n) defines "Public place" and states: "Public place" means "a place to which the public or a substantial number of the public has access, and includes but is not limited to highways, transportation facilities, schools, places of amusement, parks, playgrounds, and the common areas of public and private buildings and facilities." C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (1) states: (1) "No person shall, on or near the premises or facilities of any educational institution, willfully deny to students, school officials, employees, and invitees: (a) Lawful freedom of movement on the premises; (b) Lawful use of the property or facilities of the institution; (c) The right of lawful ingress and egress to the institution's physical facilities." SUPPORTING CITATIONS OF CASE PRECEDENT In Dunkel v. Elkins, 325 F. Supp. 1235, the U.S. District Court stated that: "Defendants urge that plaintiff's use of public land and property is a "privilege withdrawable by the State at any time for any reason." "We do not agree." In the case of Watson v. Board of Regents of University of Colorado 512 P.2d 1162, the Colorado Supreme Court issued the opinion that: "The University of Colorado opened its doors to the public. Accordingly, on this basis, we hold that a non-student's right to access to University functions and facilities, which are open to the public at-large, cannot be permanently denied without due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. .. " 18 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 30 of 94 CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW STANDARD 59. The United States Constitution Amendment XIV, Section 1 states: "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or-immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 60. The Mathews balancing test requires balancing the Right, Liberty or Interest in property, and the probability of erroneous deprivation of that interest, compared with a legitimate public interest that government seeks to serve by such action or policy that deprives the Liberty, Rights or property Interests of such individuals by such action or policy. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US 319, 332, 96 S Ct 893, 47 L Ed 2d 18 (1976). 61. Plaintiff submits these issues, including whether CSU 'exclusionary order' policy, Fort Collins 'trespass' and 'camping' ordinances, as written and applied, are lawful: 62. Whether an administrative regulation, ordinance or statute as written or applied denies, substantially prohibits, or unreasonably interferes with Plaintiff in the practical exercise of his rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution. 63. Whether an administrative regulation, ordinance or statute as written or applied is not reasonably related to achieving a legitimate public interest, or disproportionately severe in relation to the affect of denying or impairing Plaintiffs constitutional rights. 64. Whether the administrative policy, regulation, ordinance or statute as written or applied denies, impairs or fundamentally infringes upon Plaintiffs constitutional rights or His Inalienable Personal Interests in 'conducting activities of daily living', and whether such infringement of His Constitutional and Inalienable Rights constitutes a 'Taking'. 19 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 31 of 94 FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 65. Colorado State University (hereinafter CSU) has adopted and enforced a policy, which allows CSU campus police to issue an "exclusionary order", which denies access and use of CSU campus to, Plaintiff, the identified subject of the "exclusionary order". 66. CSU "exclusionary orders" function as a written personal "no trespass" notice to persons identified as the subject of the "exclusionary order", in this case, Plaintiff. 67. CSU is a publicly-funded, land-grant state public university; not private property. 68. CSU is not a private university; CSU is open to the general public for use of the campus library, Fort Collins Transfort bus station, CSU stadiums for events, and hosts events in the student union, with public access roads and parking facilities. 69. The legal definition of "Public place" provided by C.R.S. § 18-1-901(3)(n) would include Colorado State University, as a public school. 70. C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (1) states: "No person shall, on or near the premises or facilities of any educational institution, willfully deny to students, school officials, employees, and invitees: (a) Lawful freedom of movement on the premises; (b) Lawful use of the property or facilities of the institution; (c) The right of lawful ingress and egress to the institution's physical facilities." 71. CSU police "exclusionary order" policy cites C.R.S. 18-9-109 as legal authority that presumably 'authorizes' them to issue an 'exclusionary order' form to Plaintiff. 72. Plaintiff is a "public invitee", defined under Restatement (2nd) of Torts § 332(2) (1965); so, Plaintiff should also be an "invitee" as used in C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (1). 20 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 32 of 94 73. Plaintiff is an "invitee" for the purposes of C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (1). 74. Plaintiff is a 67 year-old alumnus of Colorado State University. 75. Plaintiff did use the CSU library and Fort Collins public bus terminal located on campus until he was permanently banned for allegedly 'feeding squirrels', 76. CSU campus police issued Plaintiff several "exclusionary orders", exclusively for allegedly 'feeding squirrels' on campus; no evidence was offered to prove Plaintiff fed squirrels, and no witnesses ever testified that Plaintiff had fed squirrels. 77. CSU campus police website contains university policies and regulations; except, there is no CSU policy or regulation against 'feeding squirrels' that was posted on the CSU police website, nor is 'feeding squirrels' a city or county ordinance or state law. 78. C.R.S. § 18-4-201, states in part: "A person who, ... , enters or remains in or upon premises that are ... open to the public does so with license and privilege ... ". 79. F.C.M.C. Section 17-1 did state: "Enter or remain unlawfully" shall mean: (1) To enter or remain in or upon public or privately owned property when not licensed, invited, privileged or otherwise authorized to do so; ... 80. CSU police exclusionary order policy provides an administrative appeal process; however, there is NO evidentiary standard, hearsay statements are permitted, and NO evidence and NO witnesses are reguired. 81. CSU "exclusionary order" policy provides for immediate exclusion or banishment by CSU campus police, which were enforced by citations of trespass under Fort Collins Municipal Code Section 17-40(a), and C.R.S. § 18-4-504 issued against Plaintiff. 21 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 33 of 94 82. CSU police 'exclusionary order' policy cites C.R.S. 18-9-109 as legal authority that 'authorizes' police to issue an 'exclusionary order' form, that were issued against Plai.ntiff solely on the basis of allegedly 'feeding squirrels'. C.R.S. 18-9-109(2),(3) set expressly conditional and limited authority to remove someone from campus only for committing acts, which 'disrupt, impair, interfere with, or obstruct the lawful missions, processes, procedures, or functions of the institution'. 83. CSU 'exclusionary order' policy allows CSU campus police to exclude anyone immediately and permanently, for any reason whatsoever, and deny due process and equal protection of the law. 84. Plaintiff repeated notified CSU attorneys and CSU Office of General Counsel by email, that CSU campus police CSU 'Exclusionary orders' and the policy that provides for their use violated His Constitutional Rights of due process because it immediately deprived Him of access and use of public property without access to court review. 85. Plaintiff repeated notified CSU attorneys and CSU Office of General Counsel by email, that CSU campus police CSU 'Exclusionary orders' and the policy that provides for their use violated His Constitutional Rights and equal protection of the law because C.R.S. 18-9-109(1) prohibits denying access and use of educational institutions; thus, Plaintiff argued that CSU police committed a crime by issuing him 'exclusionary orders' banning Him from university property. 86. Plaintiff notified CSU Board of Governors that CSU campus police 'exclusionary order' policy violated His Rights, and requested action; however they did not reply. 22 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 34 of 94 .87. CSU website page of Office of Policy and Compliance contains a graphic chart, that lists the hierarchy of legal authority; demonstrating that CSU 'exclusionary order' policy is superseded by levels of legal authority, which are all superseded by the U.S Constitution, Federal Laws and Regulations, that then supersedes State Constitution, Laws and Regulations, which supersedes Colorado State University System I Board of Governors Policies, which supersedes Colorado State University Policies, which also supersedes College Policies; all of which supersedes individual Department Policies, such as CSU campus police and their 'exclusionary order' policy. See: http://opc.prep.colostate.edu/policy-hierarchy/ 88. CSU Office of Policy and Compliance (OPC) is part of the Department of Policy, Risk and Environmental Programs (PREP) in the Division of University Operations that is administered by Lynn Johnson, Vice President for University Operations. 89. The Office of Policy and Compliance submits proposed policies to stakeholders, including administrative professional council, namely, Lynn Johnson, Vice President for University Operations and CSU Chief of Staff, and CSU police command staff, namely CSU Chief of Police, who is also part of the public safety team; all of whom approved the CSU campus police 'exclusionary order' policy. https://opc.prep.colostate.edu/wp- contenVuploads/sites/2/2019/09/Policy-Development-slide-show-rev-9. 9 .19. pdf. 90. CSU campus police 'exclusionary order' policy was reviewed by the CSU Office of General Counsel, who must research applicable legal authority for compliance, then the 'exclusionary order' policy was adopted and signed by CSU president. 23 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 35 of 94 91. CSU 'exclusionary order' policy was promoted by Vice President for University Operations, Lynn Johnson, and adopted on August 12, 2016; Policy ID#: 6-6023-005. 92. CSU campus police 'exclusionary order' form policy states that after one year, the excluded person may request the CSU Chief of Police terminate the exclusionary order; when the CSU Chief of Police declines, then the excluded person may appeal to CSU Chief of Staff; when the Chief of Staff declines, then 'exclusionary order' form is presumed to be enforceable and permanent, effective for a persons life-time. 93. CSU campus police have issued Plaintiff several 'exclusionary order' forms for allegedly 'feeding squirrels'; notably, CSU does not have a campus policy or regulation against feeding squirrels, nor is there any local or state prohibition. 94. CSU campus police 'exclusionary orders' are deemed enforceable with citations for 'trespass'. http://policylibrary.colostate.edu/policy.aspx?id=562 95. CSU campus police charged Plaintiff with 'trespass' under C.R.S § 18-4-504, for disregarding a CSU campus police 'exclusionary order'. 96. CSU campus police charged Plaintiff with 'trespass' under Fort Collins Municipal code 17-40(a) for disregarding a CSU campus police 'exclusionary order'. 97. Plaintiff asserts that the City trespass ordinance (F.C.M.C.) 17-40(a) cannot be legally applicable to public property, like CSU since the Fort Collins Municipal Code definition of "enter or remain unlawfully" is specifically limited to private property 98. At no time during or after Plaintiffs 'trespass' trials was any evidence submitted nor did any witness testify that CSU is private property. 24 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 36 of 94 99. CSU "exclusionary orders" are unconstitutional as bills of pains and penalties as are bills of attainder prohibited by the U. S. Constitution Article I Section 10 Clause 1, because they impose immediate punishment (exclusion) without judicial trial. 100. CSU "exclusionary orders" are unconstitutional because they deprive persons of substantive due process, and equal protection of the law, including, but not limited to: sections of law allowing for public access to public property such as: C.R.S. § 18-4-201, and C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (1) that prohibits denying access and use of public educational institutions and public accommodations and facilities. 101. CSU "exclusionary orders" are unconstitutional because they impose permanent exclusion or banishment, which constitutes cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 102. Banishment is not provided for as punishment under any federal or state law. 103. Plaintiff was issued the first "exclusionary order" by CSU campus police officer Jesse Ihnen on May 18, 2016, that was lifted without the necessity of an exclusionary order appeal 'hearing', by CSU Vice President for University Operations, Lynn Johnson, after Plaintiff submitted a written appeal citing the constitutional and other criminal and civil statutory citations that conflict with CSU "exclusionary order" policy. 104. Contemporaneously with the "exclusionary order" issued on May 18, 2016, CSU campus police issued Plaintiff a citation for trespass under C.R.S. § 18-4-504, which was later voluntarily dismissed by the Larimer county prosecutor; he informed Plaintiff that being on public property does not constitute a crime. 25 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 37 of 94 105. Prior to July 21, 2016, CSU policy on issuing exclusionary orders stated the purpose and intent was, in part: "This policy applies to all persons whose actions are deemed to be harmful and/or disruptive to the university and/or to members of the campus community, or who pose a substantial threat of causing such harm or disruption if permitted to enter upon university property, as determined by any university official who has been delegated with authority to issue an Exclusionary Order under this Policy." 106. Prior to July 21, 2016, CSU policy on issuing exclusionary orders cited as the statutory authority C.R.S. § 18-9-109, citing or referencing sections (2) and (3). 107. CSU policy on 'exclusionary orders' was amended after Plaintiff objected to the first exclusionary order issued against him based solely upon him 'feeding squirrels'. 108. At all times relevant to this Petition all the 'exclusionary orders' issued against Plaintiff, CSU policy on issuing and enforcement of exclusionary orders stated that the intent and purpose as follows: "This policy provides direction to responsible university personnel for the issuance of orders excluding a person from entry upon university property. This policy is adopted pursuant to the inherent authority of the University to protect the safety of persons and property within its supervision and control and the specific authority vested in the university by law to adopt orders, rules, and regulations necessary for the administration, protection, and maintenance of public buildings and property. including the prohibition of activities or conduct within public buildings or on public property." End quote. 26 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 38 of 94 109. Colorado State University officials amended the stated purpose of the policy on exclusionary orders to include general language and undefined provisions, particularly regarding regulations for: "maintenance of its public buildings and property, including the prohibition of activities or conduct within public buildings or on public property"; by such July 21, 2016 amendment, it allowed CSU police to discriminate against Plaintiff and to apply "exclusionary order" policy to such conduct as: 'feeding squirrels'. 110. Colorado State University officials intentionally deleted the reference to harmful and disruptive conduct from the exclusionary order policy to eliminate the burden upon them to provide reasonable grounds to explain why people, like Plaintiff, were banned or identify what or how conduct, such as, feeding squirrels is harmful or disruptive. 111. CSU campus police issued Plaintiff several "exclusionary orders" applying CSU "exclusionary order" policy with the amended statement of intent and purpose allowing CSU campus police to exclude or ban Plaintiff for 'feeding squirrels'. 112. CSU campus police enforced "exclusionary order" policy with the amended text quoted in paragraph 48 that excluded any reference to C.R.S. § 18-9-109, specifically sections (2) and (3) in each case that Plaintiff was tried and convicted of 'trespass. 113. CSU campus police enforced "exclusionary order" policy by issuing Plaintiff (2) citations for trespass on CSU property. One trespass citation was issued pursuant to C.R.S. § 18-4-504, and another trespass citation was issued pursuant to Fort Collins Municipal Code Section 17-40(a) in applying CSU "exclusionary order" policy statement using the intent and purpose as it was amended AFTER July 21, 2016. 27 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 39 of 94 114. Recently, CSU administrative officials again amended CSU "exclusionary order" policy AFTER Plaintiff notified CSU and CSU Board of Governors of his intent to sue. NOW, CSU "exclusionary order" policy amended statement of intent and purpose once again cites the statutory authority of C.R.S. § 18-9-109, sections (2) and (3). 115. CSU exclusionary order policy assumes authority from C.R.S. §18-9-109 (3). 116. C.R.S. §18-9-109, (3) states: "No person shall willfully refuse or fail to leave the property of or any building or other facility used by any educational institution upon being requested to do so by the chief administrative officer, his designee charged with maintaining order on the school premises and in its facilities, or a dean of such educational institution, if such person is committing, threatens to commit, or incites others to commit any act which would disrupt, impair, interfere with, or obstruct the lawful missions, processes, procedures, or functions of the institution." 117. No CSU administrative official ever alleged that 'feeding squirrels' constituted an act of disruption, interference or obstruction described in C.R.S. §18-9-109 (3). 118. Colorado State University Policy ID#: 6-0160-001 defines 'disruptive activity' as: "Any act that unreasonably interferes with the rights of others to peaceably assemble or to exercise the right of free speech, disrupts the normal functioning of the University, damages property, or endangers health or safety is specifically prohibited. No person may attempt to, nor actually interfere with, impair or impede the institution's regularly scheduled classes, events, ceremonies, or normal and essential operations." End quote. 28 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 40 of 94 119. No CSU administrative official ever alleged that 'feeding squirrels' constituted an offense in violation of CSU Policy ID#: 6-0160-001 that defines 'disruptive activity'. 120. CSU exclusionary order policy assumes authority from C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (2). 121. C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (2) states: "No person shall, on the premises of any educational institution or at or in any building or other facility being used by any educational institution, willfully impede the staff or faculty of such institution in the lawful performance of their duties or willfully impede a student of the institution in the lawful pursuit of his educational activities through the use of restraint, abduction, coercion, or intimidation or when force and violence are present or threatened." (Emphasis added) 122. No CSU administrative official ever alleged that 'feeding squirrels' constituted an offense in violation of C.R.S. §18-9-109 (2). 123. I repeatedly requested for CSU General Counsel attorneys to state CSU policy regarding the feeding squirrels, and interpret the application of the 'exclusionary order' policy to 'feeding squirrels'. 124. CSU General Counsel attorneys refused to reply or interpret 'exclusionary order' policy as applied and enforced against Plaintiff solely for 'feeding squirrels'. 125. I repeatedly asked that CSU administrative officials provide me a statement on CSU policy regarding feeding squirrels; however, no university official has responded; therefore, I reasonably assumed that since there is no law, ordinance, CSU regulation, or policy against feeding squirrels that they took no official position on the issue. 29 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 41 of 94 126. Plaintiff notified Defendants of his intent to sue on January 31, 2018. Recipients of this e-mail Notice of Intent to Sue included, CSU General Counsel, Jason Johnson, Chief Financial Officer, Lynn Johnson, Chief of Police, Scott Harris, and Captain, Frank Johnson. Petitioner recited violations of his Inalienable, Constitutional, and Civil Rights under Statutory Law, and notified Defendants of his per diem claim for damages. Yet, Defendants were not deterred and issued two more 'exclusionary orders'. 127. On July 20, 2018 CSU police officer Phil Morris issued Plaintiff a citation for trespass under C.R.S. § 18-4-504, and issued an CSU 'exclusionary order' form. 128. CSU exclusionary order policy provides for immediate exclusion upon issuance of an exclusionary order, providing only an administrative "appeal" to CSU employees from the office of the President, and appointed by the Chief Administrative Assistant. 129. On August 7, 2018, a administrative exclusionary order 'appeal' was conducted by telephone by Nie Olsen, an employee in the Office of CSU President. During the telephone 'hearing', although there was no evidence or witness testimony presented, Nie Olsen stated he witnessed a man matching Plaintiffs physical description feeding squirrels on campus and unilaterally upheld the permanent CSU 'exclusionary order'. 130. Plaintiff submitted a written appeal to the exclusionary order review committee decision to uphold the exclusionary order against him to CSU President Chief of Staff, Mark Gill on August 10, 2018. This 'appeal' included a July 24, 2018 Objection and Response to the exclusionary order issued July 20, 2018, as well as, two affidavits in support of the Objection and Response and letter of appeal. 30 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 42 of 94 131. On August 24, 2018, Defendant, Mark Gill, Chief of Staff for the CSU President, notified Petitioner, by e-mail, that his decision was to uphold and affirm the exclusionary order 'appeal'; stating only: "The Exclusionary Order remains in effect." 132. Mark Gill was senior staff assistant responsible for a broad range of support for the Office of the President, including oversight of operations and ensuring effective implementation of initiatives on behalf of the President. Mark Gill personally endorsed the exclusionary order against Plaintiff, on behalf of CSU President, when he affirmed and upheld the decision of Nie Olsen after the exclusionary order review. 133. On November 20, 2018, I sent an e-mail letter and faxed both CSU Board of Governors and Jason Johnson, CSU General Counsel to request that they respond to my questions regarding 'exclusionary order' policy, and asked for an interpretation of that policy, particularly supported by legal citations of any Colorado statutory authority, which would authorize CSU issuing 'exclusionary order', and to respond within 10 days, or I would disregard any 'exclusionary order' and return to CSU; I received no response from any CSU official within 15 days, so I returned to CSU. 134. On May 17, 2019 CSU police officer Derek Smith issued me an 'exclusionary order'. Further, Officer Derek Smith issued me a citation for 'trespass' under C.R.S. § 18-4-504. Later that day, Derek Smith accessed the CCIC database and unilaterally entered an report of permanent criminal restraining order. 135. There was no 'permanent restraining order' issued by any judge as reported and entered into CCIC by CSU campus police officer Derek Smith on May 17, 2019. 31 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 43 of 94 136. On May 17, 2019 CSU campus police officer, Derek Smith accessed the CCIC database, then entered a false report of a permanent criminal protective order against Plaintiff; however, there was no court ordered restraining order prohibiting Plaintiff from entering CSU property, thereby CSU officer, Derek Smith committed numerous crimes against Plaintiff, including federal crimes regulating computer and internet use. 137. The Colorado Bureau of Investigation (CBI) is designated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division, as the CJIS Systems Agency for the state of Colorado. 138. Further, the responsibility of the Crime Information Management Unit (CIMU) is to manage all the policies and business practices followed by Colorado criminal justice agencies regarding numerous criminal justice computer systems, including the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), the Colorado Crime Information Center (CCIC) and the International Public Safety and Justice Network (Nlets) computer databases. 139. All CSU police officers are commissioned through Fort Collins Police Services and the Larimer County Sheriffs Office. Officers have full law enforcement authority on all university and state-owned property, as well as the city of Fort Collins and Larimer County. See C.R.S. 16-2.5-148. 140. All CSU police officers are state certified through the Colorado Peace Officers Standards and Training (POST) board and are commissioned by the CSU Board of Governors. Officers must successfully complete or challenge an POST-approved basic law enforcement academy prior to being appointed. 32 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 44 of 94 141. CSU campus police violated state law, C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (1) when they willfully denied Plaintiff access and use of CSU facilities. 142. Defendant, Colorado State University police officers: Jeff Goetz, Jesse Ihnen, Michael Lohman, Phil Morris, and Derek Smith unlawfully denied Plaintiff access and use of CSU campus in issuing unconstitutional 'exclusionary orders' then individually and in combination these officers conspired to unlawfully arrest and convict Plaintiff of allegedly trespassing on CSU campus. Individually, and in combination, administrators, employees and executives Lynn Johnson, and Nie Olsen, Chief of Police, Scott Harris, and CSU Chief of Staff, Mark Gill participated in the violation of Plaintiffs rights. 143. C.R.S § 23-30-102 (1) identifies the CSU Board of Governors authority; stating: "The board of governors of the Colorado state university system is a body corporate, capable in law of suing and being sued; ... having duties and powers to control, manage, and direct the fiscal and all other affairs of the Colorado state university system and the entities it governs; and of causing to be done all things necessary to carry out the provisions of this article." 144. C.R.S § 23-31-103 defines the control of the Board of Governors and states in part: "The board of governors of the Colorado state university system has the general control and supervision of the Colorado state university and lands and the use thereof, The board has plenary power to adopt all such ordinances, bylaws, and regulations, not in conflict with the law, as they may deem necessary to secure the successful operation of the university and promote the designed objects." 33 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 45 of 94 145. Defendants, Colorado State University (CSU) and CSU Board of Governors are each liable under Colorado and federal law for the actions of employees. 146. Defendant, CSU Board of Governors, is liable under United States and Colorado law for Plaintiffs claims relating to violation of His Civil and Constitutional Rights as is provided for by Article 11, Section 15 of the Colorado Constitution, and as provided by C.R.S. 38-1-101 et. seq., C.R.S § 13-21-131, and by (2nd) Restatement of Contracts, and civilly liable for depriving Plaintiff of His civil rights in violation of Title 42 U.S.C. § 1981, §1983, §1985, and §1986, and liable under Title 18 U.S.C. §241, §242. Further, non-government Defendant Individuals, including Administrative officials at Colorado State University are liable because they participated in denying Plaintiff equal access and use of CSU campus by adopting the CSU 'exclusionary order' policy and enforcing such policy in coordination with campus police, in violation of Plaintiffs Rights. 147. C.R.S § 23-31-106 states the duties of CSU President: "The president shall be chief executive officer of the Colorado state university, and it is his or her duty to see that the rules and regulations of the board of governors of the Colorado state university system and the faculty are observed and executed." 148. Defendants, City of Fort Collins and Colorado State University employee police officers violated Plaintiffs civil, constitutional, inalienable and statutory right of access and use of public places by denying Him access and use of public places and places open to the public, specifically CSU campus and all public accommodations, including the library, parking and transportation facilities, and other public places. 34 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 46 of 94 149. CSU police issued a Fort Collins 'camping' ordinance citation against Petitioner on August 20, 2017 simply because Petitioner parked on CSU property; the case was subsequently dismissed. 150. CSU exclusionary order policy is over-broad and vague in violation of Plaintiff's Constitutional Right to due process, which promotes an subjective interpretation and discriminatory enforcement by campus police in an arbitrary and capricious manner. 151. The CSU policy on exclusionary orders is intentionally vague and over-broad so as to permit interpretation and enforcement to be conducted in discriminatory fashion. 152. CSU exclusionary order policy provides for, and permits, campus police to ban people, like Petitioner, for any activity, even if not expressly prohibited by university policy or regulation, such as in this case, for allegedly feeding squirrels. 153. CSU policy on exclusionary orders provides for permanent exclusion from CSU unless either the CSU police chief or senior staff assistant to CSU President approves lifting the exclusionary order against Plaintiff', which they refused. 154. In Colorado, Plaintiff would be granted mandatory parole in one year if he were convicted of a class 6 felony; yet, the exclusionary order policy allows CSU Chief of police to decide IF exclusionary orders will ever be lifted, otherwise, the exclusionary order is permanent; a life sentence, for allegedly 'feeding squirrels'. 155. The discriminatory and disproportionately harsh treatment of Plaintiff by CSU is unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment barred by the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 35 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 47 of 94 156. CSU 'exclusionary order' policy authorized and granted CSU campus police the permission to discriminate against Plaintiff by denying him access and use of CSU. 157. Colorado State University Office of Equal Opportunity website page provides the mission statement and guiding principles, which include integrity, inclusion, respect and social justice, and states: "We create and nurture inclusive environments and welcome, value and affirm all members of our community, including their various identities, skills, ideas, talents and contributions. We honor the inherent dignity of all people within an environment where we are committed to freedom of expression, critical discourse, and the advancement of knowledge." The CSU statement on Equal Opportunity also states: "We have the right to be treated and the responsibility to treat others with fairness and equity, the duty to challenge prejudice, and to uphold the laws, policies and procedures that promote justice in all respects... We are accountable for our actions and will act ethically and honestly in all our interactions." 158. Petitioner accepted the offer, pledge and binding commitment for CSU to uphold the laws, honor the dignity of people, and treat them with fairness and equity, and be responsible and held accountable for their actions, just as in this case. 159. Colorado State University Policy ID#: 6-0160-001 on Discrimination states: "Discrimination is defined as: conduct that (a) excludes an individual from participation in, (b) denies the individual the benefits of, (c) treats the individual differently from others in, or (d) otherwise adversely affects a term or condition of an individual's employment, education, living environment or University program or activity." 36 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 48 of 94 160. Defendants converted Petitioner's Constitutional, Civil and Statutory Rights into their claim of authority to grant access to CSU that they can arbitrarily revoke for any reason, such as: for feeding squirrels. This constitutes a Taking of Plaintiff's property right of access; the interference by Defendant in denying Petitioner his property rights and his constitutional Right of Equal Access to public facilities can be described as the deprivation of his Rights in Property .. This exclusionary order constitutes the absolute conversion of Petitioner's property interests in his Rights to Due Process and Right of equal Access into Defendant's property claim of right to discriminate against him; this deprivation constitutes a Taking that Entitles Plaintiff to Just Compensation. 161. Defendants have assumed Private Control of Colorado State University without proper statutory authority, or by deliberate misconstruction and abuse of authorization, provided by C.R.S. §18-9-109 (3). Defendants' abuse of authority to discriminate and deny Petitioner his Constitutional, Civil, and Statutory Rights of Equal Access and Right to Due Process is in direct violation of United States and Colorado statutes providing Civil Rights, as well as, violation of the Colorado and United States Constitution. Their conduct can only be described as an intentional and flagrant usurpation of authority to convert public property into private property for their own interests and agendas. 162. Defendant, CSU has assumed authority in excess of that granted by state and federal law to enact regulatory provisions such as the CSU exclusionary order policy with inadequate appeal procedures to unlawfully discriminate against Plaintiff to deny him his Constitutional and Civil Rights. 37 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 49 of 94 163. Plaintiff is injured by the loss of his Statutory Right of Equal access to campus and other public facilities at CSU, as provided under C.R.S § 18-9-109(1); as a result of the willful conduct by CSU administrative officials, and employees. 164. Petitioner has suffered the complete loss of his Constitutional, Civil and statutory Rights to equal access to public facilities, due to Defendant's unauthorized assumption of control and authority to discriminate against Petitioner; Defendants, unlawfully, have seized Petitioner's Property Interests in his Constitutional, Civil and Statutory Rights to Equal Access by denying him Due Process; Petitioner is entitled to repossess all of his Private Property Rights, and entitled to Compensation as awarded by arbitration. 165. C.R.S. § 24-14-102 authorizes 'public entities' to purchase liability insurance and "crime insurance" in lieu of a public official personal surety bonds that would otherwise be required. 166. "Public entity" means the state of Colorado, principal departments listed in section 24-1-110, public colleges and universities, state or local commissions, state or local authorities, counties, cities, cities and counties, towns, municipalities, districts, special districts, boards, and school districts." C.R.S. § 24-14-102(2)(c)(III). "Crime insurance" means a form of insurance to protect public assets from loss due to dishonesty, theft, or fraud by a public official. C.R.S. § 24-14-102(2)(c)(I). 167. The principal departments listed in C.R.S. § 24-1-110 includes all executive and administrative offices, agencies, and instrumentalities of the executive department of the state government and their respective functions, powers, and duties. 38 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 50 of 94 168. By enacting C.R.S. § 24-14-102, the Colorado General Assembly has granted permission for all public entities, including each Defendant in this case, and even the Members of the General Assembly themselves to purchase "CRIME INSURANCE" that indemnifies them (immunity from prosecution) when they commit crimes. 169. Article VI of the United States Constitution states in pertinent part: "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding ... and Congress and members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution ... " 170. Despite the fact that article VI of the United States Constitution requires that all Members of State Legislatures shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution, members of the Colorado General Assembly have not taken an oath of office to support the United States Constitution. 171. Article XI I, section 8 of the Colorado Constitution states: "Every civil officer, except members of the general assembly and such inferior officers as may be by law exempted, shall, before he enters upon the duties of his office, take and subscribe an oath or affirmation to support the constitution of the United States and of the state of Colorado, and to faithfully perform the duties of the office upon which he shall be about to enter." End quote. 39 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 51 of 94 172. By exempting members of the General Assembly from taking an oath of office, Article XII has granted all members of the General Assembly sovereign immunity from charges of treason when they enact unconstitutional laws such as C.R.S. § 24-14-102, which grants themselves and all public entities, including these Defendants, immunity from prosecution when they commit crimes against the people. 173. Colorado law requires public officials to take oath of office. C.R.S. § 24-12-101 (1) states: "When a person is required to take an oath or affirmation before the person enters upon the discharge of a public office or position, the form of the oath or affirmation is as follows: I [name], do [select swear, affirm, or swear by the ever-living God) that I will support the constitution of the United States, the constitution of the state of Colorado, and the laws of the state of Colorado, and will faithfully perform the duties of the office of [name of office or position] upon which I am about to enter to the best of my ability." End quote. 174. The Fort Collins Charter, Article IV, section IV states: "Before entering upon the duties of the office, each member of Council, the City Manager, the City Attorney, the City Clerk, the Judge of the Municipal Court, and each director of a service area shall take, subscribe before, and file with the City Clerk an oath or affirmation that he or she will support the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the State of Colorado, this Charter, and the ordinances of the City of Fort Collins, and that he or she will faithfully perform the duties of the office or position. The City Clerk shall take and subscribe the oath before a notary public." End quote. 40 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 52 of 94 175. The United States Constitution establishes itself as the supreme law of the land as stated in Article VI of the United States Constitution adding that: "and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding ... " 176. Article XX, section 8 of the Colorado Constitution states: "Anything in the constitution of this state in conflict or inconsistent with the provisions of this amendment is hereby declared to be inapplicable to the matters and things by this amendment covered and provided for." End quote. 177. The City of Fort Collins has consistently applied, asserted and interpreted Article XX, section 8 of the Colorado Constitution to claim "home-rule status" and enforce the challenged ordinances without regard to other provisions of the Colorado Constitution, and without any recognition of the United States Constitution, or laws thereof. 178. The City of Fort Collins has consistently applied, asserted and interpreted Article XX, section 8 of the Colorado Constitution to enforce local ordinances, holding the City authority as above and unlimited by either the U.S. or Colorado Constitution; the City has interpreted the "home-rule" statutes as autonomous authority to regulate. 179. The Enabling Act, § 4 of the Colorado Constitution provides: " ... said convention is hereby authorized to form a constitution and state government for said territory; provided, that the constitution shall be republican in form ... , and not be repugnant to the constitution of the United States and the principles of the declaration of independence". (See 18 stat. 474, the Colorado Enabling Act of March 3, 1875) 41 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 53 of 94 180. In enacting Article XX, § 8 of the Colorado Constitution, the General Assembly has granted unconstitutional "home-rule" authority to the City of Fort Collins to enact and enforce the challenged as unconstitutional "camping" and "trespass" ordinances in violation of the 14th Amendment, and denied Plaintiff his constitutional and inalienable right to use his private property (use of his vehicle to conduct activities of daily living), with the "camping" ordinance, and to deny his right of access and use of public places (CSU and the public right-of-way) with the "trespass" ordinance. 181. Members of the General Assembly lack any constitutional authority or legitimacy to enact amendments to the original Colorado Constitution, which, are repugnant to the United States Constitution, in accordance with the Colorado Enabling Act of March 3, 1875; therefore, Article XII, § 8 of the Colorado Constitution that exempts members of the General Assembly from taking an oath of office is unconstitutional. 182. Members of the General Assembly lack any constitutional authority or legitimacy to enact amendments to the original Colorado Constitution, which, are repugnant to the United States Constitution, in accordance with the Colorado Enabling Act of March 3, 1875; therefore, Article XX, § 8 of the Colorado Constitution that grants the City of Fort Collins autonon_,ous 'home-rule' authority to disregard the Colora90 and United States Constitutions and to disregard Colorado or United States law, is without force or effect; the General Assembly cannot grant autonomous authority (without regard to the United States Constitution or laws enacted there-under) to either the City of Fort Collins or the members of the General Assembly itself. 42 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 54 of 94 183. Members of the General Assembly cannot enact amendments to the constitution of Colorado contrary to Article VI of the United States Constitution, which requires that all members of the state legislatures take an oath of office. 184. Members of the General Assembly cannot enact amendments to the Colorado constitution contrary to Article VI of the United States Constitution, which proclaims the United States Constitution, and that the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding ... " 185. Members of the General Assembly cannot enact amendments to the constitution of Colorado repugnant or contrary to Article VI of the United States Constitution, which would allow the General Assembly to enact any law that abridges the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the United States. 186. Article I of the Fourteenth Amendment states in part: "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 187. The State of Colorado cannot enact or enforce laws to "abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States ... nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 43 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 55 of 94 188. Members of the General Assembly cannot enact amendments to the constitution of Colorado repugnant or contrary to Article VI of the United States Constitution, which would grant (home-rule') authority under Amendment XX of the Colorado Constitution granting the City of Fort Collins authority to enact or enforce any law that abridges the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the United States. 189. Th~ City of Fort Collins cannot enact or enforce ordir:ian~es, which "abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States ... nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 190. The Fort Collins 'camping' and 'trespass' ordinances abridges or denies Plaintiff, and others similarly situated, ('homeless') their constitutional privileges of equal access and use of the public property (CSU) and property open to the public. 191. The Fort Collins 'camping' and 'trespass' ordinances denies Plaintiff, and others similarly situated, ('homeless') equal protection of the law because of the discriminatory enforcement in applying such ordinances only against 'homeless' people. 192. The Fort Collins 'camping' and 'trespass' ordinances constitute a 'taking' under the Fifth Amendment due to the fact that they deny Plaintiff the constitutional right of lawful access and use of private and public property, and property open to the public without Just Compensation. 193. CSU 'exclusionary orders' and Fort Collins 'camping' and 'trespass' ordinances constitutes an exercise of imminent domain and seizure of public property, rather than an exercise of police power to regulate. 44 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 56 of 94 194. Defendants, City of Fort Collins and Colorado State University employee police officers have taken an oath to uphold the laws and Colorado and U.S. Constitutions. 195. Defendants, City of Fort Collins and County of Larimer, prosecutors and judges have taken an oath to uphold the laws and Colorado and U.S. Constitutions. 196. The signed or affirmed verbal oath of office of each public official constitutes a "contract" defined in (2nd) Restatement of Contracts, as "A promise for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, and the performance of which the law recognizes as a duty." And, "A promise is a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made." See (2nd) Restatement of Contracts, sections 1 and 2. 197. The Oath of Office for Colorado public officials requires that the official affirm or swear to support the laws and the U.S. and Colorado Constitutions. An official affirms or swears the oath of office before a notary public and the oath of office is filed in the public record. An oath of office constitutes a promise and manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting contrary to a duty to support the law and the Colorado and U.S. Constitutions, particularly with regard to the Colorado and U.S. 'Bill of Rights.' A breach of the promise the law recognizes as a duty, and the breach of which the law provides a remedy including arbitration or civil claims filed in U.S. District Court under Title 42, Sec. 1983, and under Colorado law pursuant to C.R.S. § 13-21-131 (1). 198. An oath of office constitutes a 'contract' as defined by the (2nd) Restatement of Contracts, sections 1 and 2. 45 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 57 of 94 199. In my 2016 'Verified Claim of Private Rights and Status', I accepted the oaths of ~ . . office of public officials; in exchange, I pledged my loyalty and oath as consideration. 200. Plaintiff accepted the oaths of office of all public officials as consideration and promise to uphold the law and Colorado and U.S. constitutions in exchange for official authority and financial benefits in compensation; thus, forming a consolidated contract when Plaintiff incorporated their oaths into His Claim of Private Rights and Status. 201. Defendants, City of Fort Collins and State of Colorado officials who are bound by their oaths of office have breached their duty and promise to uphold the Constitutions of the United States; thereby Plaintiff is entitled Relief and Compensation. 202. Defendants, City of Fort Collins and County of Larimer, prosecutors and judges have unlawfully prosecuted, convicted, and imprisoned Plaintiff for an alleged 'trespass' on public property by using the CSU library and public bus terminal at CSU. 203. Defendant, City of Fort Collins Municipal Judge, Brandi Lynn Neito, and City of Fort Collins prosecutor, Jill Hueser, individually and in combination, conspired to deny Plaintiffs right of equal access and use of CSU property and facilities. 204. Defendants, City of Fort Collins and State of Colorado are liable under Colorado and federal law for the actions of administrators, agents, employees and officials. 205. Defendant, County of Larimer, Judge, Thomas L. Lynch, and county prosecutor, Alita King and former Chief Larimer District Court prosecutor, now District Court Judge, Daniel McDonald, individually and in combination, conspired to deny Plaintiffs right of equal access and use of CSU property and facilities. 46 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 58 of 94 206. On December 3, 2019, acting as Fort Collins Municipal Court temporary judge, Brandi Lynn Neito issued an "Order for Suspension of Penalty (Jail); Waiver of Rights and Plea of Guilty or No Contest", that is fraudulent because Plaintiff did not sign the alleged plea agreement, nor was he advised by the court, nor did he plead 'guilty', nor did he agree to waive any of his civil, constitutional or statutory rights. 207. The "Order for Suspension of Penalty (Jail); Waiver of Rights and Plea of Guilty or No Contest" contains an unlawful condition for suspension of jail sentence upon the stipulation that Plaintiff would be denied access and use of Colorado State University property for one year. 208. The "Order for Suspension of Penalty (Jail); Waiver of Rights and Plea of Guilty or No Contest" is unconstitutional because it denied Plaintiff equal access and use of Colorado State University; also, this Order is unconstitutional since it violated Plaintiff's civil rights and equal protection of the law; Brandi Lynn Neito denied Plaintiff's civil and statutory right to equal access and use of CSU property and all public accommodations, including the Fort Collins public bus facility on campus. 209. On January 22, 2020, Larimer County Judge, Thomas Lynch issued an Order sentencing Plaintiff to 66 days in Larimer County Jail, 60 days were suspended upon condition that Plaintiff was denied access and use of Colorado State University for one year; this condition of suspended sentence was unconstitutional and unlawful since it denied Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment privileges and immunities, and Right of equal protection of the law. 47 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 59 of 94 210. Larimer District Court Judge McDonald issued the Order Affirming Conviction in Plaintiff's municipal court trespass case, which includes an order denying Plaintiff's right of access and use of Colorado State University property for one year from December 3, 2019 until December 3, 2020. 211. Employees of Larimer County Court Judicial Administration have access and use of a PDF copy of a judge's electronic signature; Plaintiff notified Judicial Administrator, Steven Vasconcellos of the unauthorized use, but he did not reply. 212. Plaintiff's appeal of the trespass conviction and sentencing order was denied by unidentified individuals in the office of judicial administration, who wrote the 'Judgment Affirming Conviction' and forged the judge's signature with a PDF copy. Alternatively, an attorney acting for the City of Fort Collins wrote the 'Judgment Affirming Conviction' of 'trespass' in municipal court and forged the judge's signature with a PDF copy. 213. Larimer District Court Judge McDonald issued an Order Affirming Conviction in Plaintiff's county trespass case, that includes an order denying Plaintiff's right of access and use of CSU property for one year from January 22, 2020 to January 22, 2021. 214. Alternatively, an employee within Larimer County Court Judicial Administration used the PDF copy of Larimer District Judge Daniel McDonald's electronic signature to issue the Order Affirming Conviction in Plaintiff's Larimer County Court trespass case. 215. Alternatively, an attorney with the Larimer District Attorney wrote the 'Judgment Affirming Conviction' in Plaintiff's county trespass case and forged the judge's signature with a PDF copy. 48 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 60 of 94 STATEMENT OF CAUSES AND CLAIMS CSU EXCLUSIONARY ORDERS ARE UNLAWFUL 216. Defendants, Colorado State University, (CSU), CSU BOARD OF GOVERNORS, and CSU President adopted and enforce an unconstitutional, as written and applied, policy to permanently exclude Plaintiff from CSU property. Plaintiff was permanently banned from CSU property by campus police who issued several 'exclusionary order' forms for allegedly 'feeding squirrels'. When Plaintiff disregarded these 'exclusionary order' forms, campus police issued three citations for 'trespass'. The first citation was summarily dismissed by a Larimer County Prosecutor because he stated that CSU is public property, and that just being on public property does not constitute an offense. However, CSU campus police were not deterred and subsequently issued Plaintiff (2) two more 'trespass' citations for him disregarding CSU 'exclusionary order' forms. 217. One 'trespass' case was prosecuted under Fort Collins Municipal Code section 17-40(a); the second 'trespass' case was prosecuted under C. R.S. 18-4-504. Notably, the state trespass statute and the City trespass ordinance differ in that the ordinance does not require the alleged offender to defy a lawful order, whereas the state statute requires the alleged offender to defy a lawful order. However, neither judge decided whether CSU 'exclusionary order' forms are either Constitutional or Lawful orders. In each case Plaintiff was found guilty, and sentenced to 66 days in Larimer County jail, despite the fact that C.R.S. 18-9-109(1) states that it is unlawful for anyone to deny access and use of educational facilities, yet CSU campus police do. 49 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 61 of 94 ·i 218. On July 20, 2018 CSU police officer Jesse Ihnen wrote a County Court citation for trespass, Plaintiff was immediately ejected, without an administrative hearing. CSU 'exclusionary order' policy does not provide for an administrative review of CSU police 'exclusionary orders' before Plaintiff is permanently deprived access and use of CSU campus. Further, CSU 'exclusionary orders' are unconstitutional as 'bills of attainder', because they impose punishment without benefit of a judicial trial. 219. CSU police exclusionary order policy and administrative appeal process fails to provide substantive or procedural due process; hearsay statements are permitted, NO evidence and NO witnesses are required, and there is NO evidentiary standard. 220. On August 7, 2018, a administrative exclusionary order 'appeal' was conducted by telephone by Nik Olsen, an employee in the Office of CSU President. During the telephone 'hearing', although there was no evidence or witness testimony presented, Nie Olsen stated he witnessed a man matching Plaintiffs physical description feeding squirrels on campus and unilaterally upheld the permanent CSU 'exclusionary order'. 221. On May 17, 2019 CSU campus police officer Derek Smith issued Plaintiff an 'exclusionary order'. Later that day, Derek Smith accessed the CCIC database and unilaterally entered an illegal report of permanent civil restraining order; thereby, Plaintiff was deprived of His Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. 222. On May 17, 2019 CSU police Officer Derek Smith issued Plaintiff a citation for 'trespass' under C.R.S. § 18-4-504. On July 12, 2019, Derek Smith issued Plaintiff a 'trespass' citation, except under the Fort Collins Municipal Code section 17-40(a). 50 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 62 of 94 223. CSU campus police website contains university policies and regulations; there is no CSU ~olicy or regulation a~ainst 'feeding squirrels', nor is it even a city ordina_nce. 224. CSU police 'exclusionary order' policy cites C.R.S. 18-9-109 as legal authority that 'authorizes' them to issue an 'exclusionary order' form, that were issued against Plaintiff solely on the basis of allegedly 'feeding squirrels'. However, C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (3) states: "No person shall willfully refuse or fail to leave the property of or any building or other facility used by any educational institution upon being requested to do so by the chief administrative officer, his designee charged with maintaining order on the school premises and in its facilities, or a dean of such educational institution, if such person is committing, threatens to commit, or incites others to commit any act which would disrupt, impair, interfere with, or obstruct the lawful missions, processes, procedures, or functions of the institution." 225. At no time before or during the trespass trials did any CSU police officer testify that Plaintiff committed any act that would disrupt, impair, interfere with, or obstruct the lawful missions, processes, procedures, or functions of the institution. 226. C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (2) states: No person shall, on the premises of any educational institution or at or in any building or other facility being used by any educational institution, willfully impede the staff or faculty of such institution in the lawful performance of their duties or willfully impede a student of the institution in the lawful pursuit of his educational activities through the use of restraint, abduction, coercion, or intimidation or when force and violence are present or threatened." (Emphasis added) 227. At no time before or during the trespass trials did any CSU police officer testify that Plaintiff committed any act that might impede the staff or faculty of such institution in the lawful performance of their duties or willfully impede a CSU student in the lawful pursuit of his educational activities through the use of restraint, abduction, coercion, or intimidation, or threatened use of force or violence. 51 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 63 of 94 228. In both trespass cases, Plaintiff cited several Colorado statutes as evidence to establish that he had constitutional and legal right to be present on CSU property as a ' -~ • + ·• 'member of the public'. In both trespass cases, Plaintiff cited C.R.S. § 18-1-901 (3)(n) that defines "Public place", which includes such places where the public has access including schools and transportation facilities; CSU is a public school, with a library the public is invited; Plaintiff has a CSU library card. CSU has public bus transportation facilities on campus, and Plaintiff has a senior Fort Collins bus pass. Plaintiff is an alumnus of Colorado State University: he used the bus and library each day before CSU police permanently banned him by issuing an 'exclusionary order' form. NOTE: C.R.S. § 18-1-901 (3)(n) defines "Public place" and states: "Public place" means "a place to which the public or a substantial number of the public has access, and includes but is not limited to highways, transportation facilities, schools, places of amusement, parks, playgrounds, and the common areas of public and private buildings and facilities." C.R.S. § 18-4-201 defines what misconduct would constitute "enters unlawfully" or "remains unlawfully", and states: "A person who, regardless of his or her intent, enters or remains in or upon premises that are at the time open to the public does so with license and privilege unless the person defies a lawful order not to enter or remain, personally communicated to him or her by the owner of the premises or some other authorized person." 229. Plaintiff cited C.R.S. § 18-4-201 as statutory authority to prove he is an 'invitee' and C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (1) proves that CSU police 'exclusionary orders' are unlawful. NOTE: C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (1) states: (1) "No person shall, on or near the premises or facilities of any educational institution, willfully deny to students, school officials, employees, and invitees: (a) Lawful freedom of movement on the premises; (b) Lawful use of the property or facilities of the institution; (c) The right of lawful ingress and egress to the institution's physical facilities." PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF 52 Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 64 of 94 230. CSU police presume that access and use of CSU campus is a privilege, which can be withdrawn for any reason whatsoever, simply by issuing an 'exclusionary order' even for allegedly 'feeding squirrels'. In each trespass case, Plaintiff even cited two superior court decisions that ruled unconstitutional the previous attempts by university officials to permanently 'exclude' or deprive members of the public from lawful access and use of university facilities. In Dunkel v. Elkins, 325 F. Supp. 1235, the U.S. District Court addressed this exact issue in 1971, and stated the opinion that: "Defendants urge that plaintiffs use of public land and property is a "privilege withdrawable by the State at any time for any reason." "We do not agree." 231. In other words, a United States District Court said that the use of public land is not a privilege, which the State may withdraw 'at any time for any reason'; such as for allegedly 'feeding squirrels', which is not an offense or even a CSU regulation. Note: In the case of Watson v. Board of Regents of University of Colorado 512 P.2d 1162, the Colorado Supreme Court issued the opinion that: "The University of Colorado opened its doors to the public. Accordingly, on this basis, we hold that a non-student's right to access to University functions and facilities, which are open to the public at-large, cannot be permanently denied without due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment ... " 232. In each trespass case, Plaintiff moved to dismiss the case relying upon the law and superior court decisions; however, each judge disregarded the presented citations of statutory authority and legally-binding case precedent. In fact, the judges refused to include these in jury instructions, and prevented Plaintiff from asserting an affirmative defense of mistake of law, and even prohibited Plaintiff from mentioning these citations of legal authority before the jury; thereby assuring an unlawful 'guilty' verdict. 53 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 65 of 94 233. CSU 'exclusionary orders' are 1:1nconstitutional as 'bills of pains or penalties', as are 'bills of attainder' since they impose immediate punishment of 'exclusion' without benefit of a judicial trial. CSU 'exclusionary orders' impose immediate 'exclusion' or banishment, which has been held unconstitutional in numerous court decisions; also, banishment or 'exclusion' is not provided for as punishment under any federal or state law, and such 'exclusion' denies Plaintiff the right of equal protection of the law. 234. In 1946, the United States Supreme Court specifically defined what constitutes 'Bills of Attainder' or 'bill of pains and penalties'; the United States Supreme Court stated that a bill of pains and penalties, or bill of attainder: 1) specifically identified the people to be punished; 2) imposed punishment; and 3) did so without benefit of judicial trial. See: United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946). 235. CSU campus police 'exclusionary orders' are unlawful as 'Bills of Pains and Penalties', or 'Bills of Attainder' prohibited by the U. S. Constitution Article I Section 10 Clause 1, because they impose immediate punishment without judicial trial. Rather than provide substantive and procedural due process, CSU 'exclusionary order' policy substitutes an administrative 'hearing' conducted over the phone by a CSU employee, who issues summary judgment without any evidentiary standard, without any evidence or witnesses necessary. Also, permanent banishment constitutes imposition of cruel and unusual punishment, which is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. CSU 'exclusionary orders' are unconstitutional; therefore, Plaintiff was unlawfully arrested, prosecuted, convicted, and imprisoned for 'trespass'. 54 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 66 of 94 CITY OF FORT COLLINS 'TRESPASS' ORDINANCE 236. Plaintiff was prosecuted under the Fort Collins Municipal Code, Section 17-40(a), which awkwardly combines public and private property into one 'trespass' ordinance. NOTE: Fort Collins Municipal Code (F.C.M.C.) 17-40(a) states: "No person shall enter or remain unlawfully in or upon property, whether publicly or privately owned. For the purposes of this Section, the term property shall include, but not be limited to, any land, dwelling, building, conveyance, vehicle or other temporary or permanent structure." 237. Plaintiff asserts that the City trespass ordinance (F.C.M.C.) 17-40(a) cannot be legally applicable to public property since the Fort Collins Municipal Code definition of "enter or remain unlawfully" excepts those licensed, invited, or privileged. F.C.M.C. Section 17-1 stated: "Enter or remain unlawfully" shall mean: (1) To enter or remain in or upon public or privately owned property when not licensed, invited, privileged or otherwise authorized to do so; (2) To enter or remain in or upon publicly owned property that is not open to the public; (3) To fail to leave property, whether privately or publicly owned, after being directed to do so by a person lawfully in control of the property; or (4) To conduct oneself in a public place in violation of any rule or regulation issued by any officer or agency having the power of control, management, or supervision thereof, which limits or prohibits the use, activities or conduct in such public place, provided that the rule or regulation is: (i) prominently posted at all public entrances to the property; (ii) posted in such a way as to be clearly visible from the site of the infraction; or (iii) actually known to the offender. C.R.S. § 18-4-201 defines what misconduct would constitute "enters unlawfully" or "remains unlawfully", and states: "A person who, regardless of his or her intent, enters or remains in or upon premises that are at the time open to the public does so with license and privilege unless the person defies a lawful order not to enter or remain, personally communicated to him or her by the owner of the premises or some other authorized person." (Emphasis added) 238. F.C.M.C. Section 17-1 is not applicable to public property as it also conflicts with C.R.S. § 18-1-901(3)(n) that defines "Public place" where the public has access. 55 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 67 of 94 NOTE: C.R.S. § 18-1-901(3)(n) defines "Public place" and states: "Public place" means "a place to which the public or a substantial number of the public has access, and includes but is not limited to highways, transportation facilities, schools;places of amusement, parks, playgrounds, and the common areas of public and private buildings and facilities." 239. Since C.R.S. § 18-1-901(3)(n) defines "Public place" as "a place to which the public has access", including schools, such as CSU; and, since F.C.M.C. Sec. 17-1 defines "Enter or remain unlawfully" and states: "To enter or remain in or upon public or privately owned property when not licensed, invited, privileged"; this allows for an exemption; and, since C.R.S. § 18-4-201 states that: "A person who, regardless of his or her intent, enters or remains in or upon premises that are ... open to the public does so with license and privilege ... "; therefore, the 'City' trespass ordinance cannot be legally applicable to public property, such as CSU. Yet, enforcement of the 'City' trespass ordinance, in this case, depended upon enforcing CSU 'exclusionary orders', which are unconstitutional and illegal since they allow CSU campus police to violate C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (1) that prohibits anyone from denying lawful access and use of premises or facilities of any educational institution; yet, CSU campus police did when issuing 'exclusionary orders', thus, these 'orders' are unlawful. Therefore, Plaintiff was subjected to illegal prosecution and unlawful conviction for 'trespass'. NOTE: C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (1) states: (1) "No person shall, on or near the premises or facilities of any educational institution, willfully deny to students, school officials, employees, and invitees: (a) Lawful freedom of movement on the premises; (b) Lawful use of the property or facilities of the institution; (c) The right of lawful ingress and egress to the institution's physical facilities." 56 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 68 of 94 240. F.C.M.C. Sec. 17-1 (3) allows anyone in 'lawful control' over public property to exclude anyone, at any time, for any reason, or for no reason whatsoever. This grants local officials, i.e., the police, dictatorial powers over public property. Except, it is not defined as to what constitutes 'lawful control'. City of Fort Collins and CSU campus police have interpreted it as cart'e blanch'e authority to exclude anyone from public property by issuing an 'exclusionary order', or simply by verbally stating the person is permanently "trespassed" as City police have told Plaintiff on two occasions. Plaintiff was "trespassed" from a public pool for being the last one out of the locker-room and was "trespassed" from a Fort Collins community center for no reason whatsoever even though Plaintiff possessed an active senior membership on both occasions. 241. The definition of "enters or remains unlawfully" used in F.C.M.C. Sec. 17-1(4) is unconstitutionally over-broad and vague on its face; it intentionally omits reference to the public right of access and use of places of public accommodation, allowing officers to discriminate against individuals whomever the officer chooses by applying his or her personal rules of conduct. The intentional omission of lawful orders in the definition leaves a void filled by unlawful orders, and completely disregards the public. right of access and use of public property contained in C.R.S. § 18-4-201 (3). The definition of "enters or remains unlawfully" provided by F.C.M.C. Sec. 17-1(3) is blatantly unlawful, especially in Plaintiffs case because it allowed CSU police officers to violate the law, specifically, C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (1). As written and enforced, F.C.M.C. Sec. 17-1(3) and (4) are unconstitutionally vague and over-broad in violation of the 14th Amendment. 57 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 69 of 94 •·- THE FORT COLLINS 'CAMPING' ORDINANCES 242. The City of Fort Collins, by and through agents, employed officers, and elected officials are engaged in a campaign against 'homeless' people. The City Council has enacted ordinances against 'camping' and 'trespass' that are selectively enforced only against people in the community that are suspected to be 'homeless' or 'indigent'. 243. THE FORT COLLINS ORDINANCE AGAINST CAMPING IS UNLAWFUL Fort Collins Municipal Code (F.C.M.C.) Sec.17-181 states: "It shall be unlawful for any person to camp or pitch a tent, or knowingly permit any person to camp or pitch a tent, on public property within the City. Camping, for the purposes of this Section, shall mean to sleep, spend the night, reside or dwell temporarily with or without bedding or other camping gear and with or without shelter, or to conduct activities of daily living such as eating or sleeping, in such place unless such person is camping in compliance with Chapter 23 in a natural or recreation area. Camping shall not include incidental napping or picnicking." (Code 1972, § 60-22; Ord. No. 28, 1999, § 2, 3-2-99; Ord. No. 199, 2006 § 1, 1-16-07) 244. F.C.M.C. Sec. 17-181 is unconstitutionally null, void, and legally unenforceable on numerous grounds, including, without exception or limitation: (a) It is vague and over-broad, thus, it violates the Fifth Amendment Right to Life, Liberty and Property without due process; (b) it denies Plaintiff of the Fifth Amendment Right to Live and to use His private Property to 'conduct activities of daily living'; so it constitutes a 'Taking'; thus, Plaintiff is entitled to just compensation; (c) the discriminatory enforcement of the ordinance denies Plaintiff egual protection of the law, and (d) it exacts fines of $3,000 and/or six months in jail, which constitutes cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Incredulously, the 'camping' ordinance even holds criminally liable those citizens who knowingly permit others to 'conduct activities of daily living'. 58 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 70 of 94 ---------- 245. The City of Fort Collins also enacted an ordinance against camping on private property; F.C.M.C. Sec. 17-182 uses the same definition of 'camping' but graciously allows citizens of Fort Collins no more than two weeks per calendar year to eat, sleep and conduct activities of daily living on their own property: the other fifty weeks of the calendar year, Fort Collins residents are deemed criminally liable. The Fort Collins city ordinances against 'camping' on public or private property effectively renders everyone subject to criminal penalties for living in Fort Collins. However, the City of Fort Collins ordinance against 'camping' is applied exclusively against indigent, 'homeless' people, among whom Plaintiff is considered by local officials and police. 246. The City of Fort Collins ('City') has asserted a claim to regulate the personal life of Plaintiff; the 'City' denies His Right to 'conduct activities of daily living such as eating or sleeping' in Fort Collins; this constitutes 'Taking' prohibited by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The ordinance against camping denies Plaintiff the Right to use private property. without being subject to deprivation of liberty by being jailed for eating or sleeping, or using his Vehicle or private property to conduct activities of daily living; the City asserts unreasonable regulatory control over Plaintiff's private property. this constitutes the conversion of His Right to use His private property into the City's claim to regulate the use of that private property for their own purposes; the City and Individual Defendants have 'Taken', for their personal interests, Plaintiff's Right to use his private property: this 'Taking' entitles Plaintiff to Just compensation pursuant to the Fifth Amendment as adopted in the Colorado Constitution in Article II, section 15. 59 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 71 of 94 247. Plaintiff was charged (7) seven times with 'camping'; only one case was tried, and Plaintiff was found 'not guilty' in 2014; case # 2014-0185514-MD. Most recently, Plaintiff was cited with 'camping'; Citation # 384557; Fort Collins Municipal Court Case: FC-20-4935-MD, which was dismissed on September 17, 2020, and closed. 248. On June 25, 2020 Officer Ryan Westlind approached Plaintiffs vehicle while He was using His laptop; Officer Westlind harassed Plaintiff simply for parking in the area and threatened to cite Plaintiff with 'camping' if He continued to park there. 249. On June 30, 2020, Plaintiff sent a letter notifying the City of His Intent to Sue if the City charged Him with 'camping' for 'conducting activities of daily living'. 250. On August 7, 2020 Officer Dan Callahan issued and served Plaintiff a summons and complaint for 'camping' on public property, and ordered Him to park elsewhere. 251. On August 18, 2020 Plaintiff sent a letter reminding the City of His Intent to Sue because Officer Callahan harassed Him simply for parking in the same area. 252. On September 1, 2020 Plaintiff sent a letter to the Colorado Attorney General requesting that she act pursuant to C.R.S. § 16-9-501, and provide a legal opinion on the Fort Collins 'camping' ordinances. Plaintiff also requested the Attorney General to provide a legal opinion on the City 'trespass' ordinance. Notably, the Fort Collins City Attorney received a copy. However, the Attorney General took no action or replied. 253. On September 15, 2020, Plaintiff sent a letter to each member of the Fort Collins City Council requesting that they consider repealing the ordinances against 'camping'. Notably, the ordinance wa~ ruled unconstitutional by a Larimer District Judge. 60 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 72 of 94 254. Individual members of the city council of the City of Fort Collins are, or were, personally invested or involved in commercial development projects in the city, many members are, or were, commercial real estate agents; members of the city council do, have, and would personally benefit from the 'camping' and 'trespass' ordinances. 255. The City ordinance against 'camping', F.C.M.C. Section 17-181 is intentionally worded to be over-broad and vague, and lacks any guidance of construction, to allow police officers to discriminate against those people suspected of being 'homeless'; the 'camping' ordinance is applied by police to harass 'homeless' people into leaving the City. Every other citizen in the City is allowed to 'eat, sleep, and conduct activities of daily living' without fear of being harassed and threatened with imprisonment, except those assumed to be 'homeless'. The discriminatory enforcement of the City 'camping ordinance violates the Fourteenth Amendment prohibition against states denying any citizen their constitutional rights, and denying equal protection of the Law. 256. The City of Fort Collins ordinances prohibiting 'camping' are Unconstitutionally over-broad and vague, which results in discriminatory interpretation and enforcement against people subjectively considered by police officers, as 'homeless', like Plaintiff. The ordinances against 'camping' are so extremely vague and over-broad, as written, that they fail to provide adequate notice to enable someone of ordinary intelligence to understand what conduct is prohibited. Even then, as written, the ordinances against 'camping' are so vague and over-broad that any 'activity of daily living' is prohibited, thereby eliminating any alternative other than to disregard these ordinances. 61 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 73 of 94 257. As written and enforced, City of Fort Collins ordinances prohibiting 'camping' do not serve any legitimate or legally-recognizable interest. In addition to state and local fire prevention regulations, and restrictions on the possession and use of alcohol and drugs, the Fort Collins Municipal Code includes numerous ordinances to address any other conceivable public interest concern of anticipated misconduct associated with the 'camping' life-style of 'homeless' people; including, without exclusion or limitation: Sec. 17-39. -Criminal mischief., Sec. 17-41. -Littering., Sec. 17-44. -Misuse of public waters, Sec. 17-45. -Damage to public property, Section 17-46. -Appropriate use of public facilities., Sec. 17-103, -Bodily waste. Sec. 17-121, -Disturbing tne peace. Sec. 17-124, -Disorderly conduct. Sec. 17-126. -Harassment, Sec. 17-127. -Panhandling. Sec. 17-128, -Obstructing the public right-of-way. Sec. 17-129, -Unreasonable noise. Sec. 17-131. -Nuisance gatherings, and Sec. 17-142. -Public nudity. 258. Obviously, there is no legitimate need for the City of Fort Collins to enact and enforce the ordinances against 'camping' to impose criminal punishment upon citizens for 'eating, sleeping or conducting activities of daily living'. Especially, since there is already a Fort Collins ordinance that addresses this very issue of 'camping'. NOTE: Fort Collins Traffic Code (F.C.T.C.) Sec. 1213(2) states that: "It shall be unlawful for any person to occupy any parked motor vehicle or trailer, as defined in this Traffic Code, or any parked recreational vehicle or trailer, as defined in Section 20-104 of the City Code, on any street, roadway, parking lot open to the public, right-of-way or public property for the purposes of living or sleeping therein ... " 259. Fort Collins Parking Services website states that the fine for violating F.C.T.C. 1213(2) is $100; while the same conduct of 'living or sleeping' subject the 'homeless' who 'sleep or conduct activities of daily living' with cruel and unusual punishment of a fine of $3,000 and six months in jail under the Fort Collins 'camping' ordinances. 62 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 74 of 94 FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF _ Title 28 U.S. Code§ 2201, § 2202 Declaratory and Injunctive Relief CSU EXCLUSIONARY ORDER POLICY 260. The allegations of the preceding paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 261. CSU 'exclusionary orders' are unconstitutional bec~use they constitute 'Bills of Attainder' by imposing immediate punishment without a judicial trial, and because they impose cruel and unusual punishment of permanent 'exclusion'. 262. CSU 'exclusionary orders' are unconstitutional as supported by case precedent, in Watson v. Board of Regents of University of Colorado 512 P.2d 1162, in the Colorado Supreme Court, and Dunkel v. Elkins, 325 F. Supp. 1235, by the U.S. District Court. 263. CSU exclusionary order policy lacks impartial review and appeal procedures in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 264. CSU 'exclusionary orders' are unlawful since they violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983 et. seq. by denying Plaintiff substantive and procedural due process since they allow for immediate and permanent denial of access and use of CSU premises, without proper appeal procedures prior to deprivation; there is no enforcement standard or instruction for police to determine what conduct serves as lawful grounds for exclusion. 265. The CSU exclusionary order policy, as interpreted and applied, is over-broad in that it allows permanent exclusionary orders to be issued for any conduct whatsoever, even when there is no written policy against such conduct, as in this case. 63 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 75 of 94 266. The CSU exclusionary order policy is vague and over-broad, as interpreted and enforced, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 267. The challenged CSU 'exclusionary order' policy, as interpreted, and enforced by CSU campus police is over-broad and vague and fails to provide adequate notice to enable people of ordinary intelligence to understand what conduct is prohibited. 268. The CSU exclusionary order policy as interpreted, and enforced by CSU campus police, fails to establish adequate guidelines to govern CSU police officers, thereby it authorizes and encourages CSU campus police to act in arbitrary and discriminatory practices in enforcement against Plaintiff, and others similarly situated. 269. CSU 'exclusionary orders' are unlawful since they violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983 et. seq. by denying equal protection of the law in violation of the 14th Amendment. 270. CSU 'exclusionary orders' are enforced with criminal citations for trespass. 271. Defendants have enforced and intend to continue to enforce CSU 'exclusionary orders' in the unconstitutional and unlawful manner as described by Plaintiff. 272. Defendants have acted, and are threatening to act, under color of state law to deprive Plaintiff of lawful equal access and use of CSU premises and facilities open to the public, thereby depriving Him of equal protection of the law. 273. Plaintiff has suffered, and continues to suffer, actual and permanent irreparable injury due to enforcement of the CSU 'exclusionary order' issued against Him, as was reported in CCIC as a 'permanent civil restraining order'. Plaintiff has no other plain, adequate or speedy remedy at law, so Plaintiff is entitled to Injunctive relief. 64 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 76 of 94 SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF Title 28 U.S. Code§ 2201, § 2202 Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Eighth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Violations . - 274. The allegations of the preceding paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 275. CSU 'exclusionary orders' are unconstitutional; they constitute 'bills of attainder' by imposing punishment of permanent 'exclusion' without a judicial trial, and constitute cruel and unusual punishment, which denies equal protection of the law. 276. Plaintiff asserts that because CSU 'exclusionary orders' are unconstitutional and unlawful by violating C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (1) and contrary to C.R.S. § 18-4-201; thus, he was unlawfully prosecuted, unlawfully convicted, and unlawfully imprisoned. 277. CSU 'exclusionary orders' are unconstitutional as supported by case precedent, in Watson v. Board of Regents of University of Colorado 512 P.2d 1162, in the Colorado Supreme Court, and Dunkel v. Elkins, 325 F. Supp. 1235, by the U.S. District Court. 278. CSU police issued Plaintiff 'exclusionary orders' for allegedly 'feeding squirrels', which CSU police enforced against Plaintiff by issuing three trespass citations. 279. CSU campus police website contains all university policies and regulations; yet, there is no policy or rule against 'feeding squirrels', nor is it even a city ordinance. 280. At trial, Plaintiff was found 'guilty' of 'trespass' under the Fort Collins Municipal Code (F.C.M.C.) Sec. 40(a), which is broadly interpreted and enforced by local police officers to .discriminatorily verbally ban anyone from public pr~perty without reason. 65 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 77 of 94 281. The City-of Fort Collins discriminatorily enforces the trespass ordinance by just targeting the 'homeless', whom Plaintiff is considered by local officials and police. 282. Plaintiff was also found 'guilty' of 'trespass' under C.R.S. § 18-4-504, which is interpreted and applied to presume that CSU 'exclusionary orders' are lawful; though this was never proved, and C.R.S. § 18-9-109(1) prohibits anyone from denying lawful access and use of educational facilities. The judge and prosecutor conspired to deny Plaintiff due process by excluding any evidence, legal argument or testimony to prove CSU 'exclusionary orders' are unlawful. The judge and prosecutor even committed jury tampering by seating a clerk from the prosecutor's office on the jury. (A felony) 283. CSU police officers, 'City', 'County' and District Court 'judges' and prosecutors violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 1985, and section 1986 by intentionally denying Plaintiff's Right to due process and equal protection of the law, and denied Him a fair trial by withholding exculpatory evidence and misapplication of the law; presuming that CSU 'exclusionary orders' are lawful, and by applying F.C.M.C. 17-40(a) to public property; thus, Defendants unlawfully prosecuted, convicted and imprisoned Him. 284. Defendants have enforced and intend to continue to enforce the City and state trespass laws in the unconstitutional and unlawful manner as described by Plaintiff. 285. Plaintiff has suffered, and he continues to suffer, actual, irreparable, permanent injury due to enforcement of the state and city trespass laws, as was reported in CCIC as two convictions for trespass. Plaintiff has no other plain, adequate or speedy remedy at law, so Plaintiff is entitled to Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive relief. 66 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 78 of 94 THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF Title 28 U.S. Code§ 2201°, § 2202 Declaratory and Injunctive Relief FORT COLLINS 'TRESPASS' ORDINANCE 286. The allegations of the preceding paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 287. Plaintiff asserts that the City trespass ordinance (F.C.M.C.) 17-40(a) cannot be legally applicable to public property since the Fort Collins Municipal Code definition of "enter or remain unlawfully" excepts those licensed, invited, or privileged. § 18-4-201 C.R.S. states in part: "A person who, ... , enters or remains in or upon premises that are ... open to the public does so with license and privilege ... ". 288. Plaintiff asserts that the City of Fort Collins ordinance definition of 'trespass' is intentionally and unconstitutionally over-broad and vague so as to allow police officers to discriminatorily deny access and use of public places, such as CSU campus for any reason, or no reason whatsoever, and in this case, deny Plaintiff His Eighth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment Rights to due process and equal protection of the law. 289. F.C.M.C. Sec. 17-1 (3) allows anyone in 'lawful control' over public property to permanently exclude anyone, at any time, for any reason, or for no reason whatsoever; local police have broadly interpreted the vague definition in F.C.M.C. Sec. 17-1 (3) as unlimited grant of authority to discriminatorily deny access and use of public places to 'homeless' people, among whom Plaintiff is considered by local officials and police. 290. The challenged Fort Collins Ordinance provides for criminal penalties. 67 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 79 of 94 291. The definition of "unlawfully enters or remains" used in F.C.M.C. Sec. 17-1(4) is unconstitutionally over-broad and vague on its face; it intentionally omits reference to . . the public right of access and use of places of public accommodation, allowing officers to discriminate against individuals whomever the officer chooses by applying personal rules of conduct; this violates the 14th Amendment Right to equal protection. 292. The vague and over-broad trespass Ordinance, as written and enforced by Fort Collins and CSU police officers, fails to provide the constitutional standard of adequate notice required to enable an ordinary person to understand what conduct is prohibited; this deprived Plaintiff of His due process Rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 293. The challenged Ordinance, on its face and as interpreted, applied and enforced by Fort Collins officials, fails to establish adequate guidelines to govern law enforcement and hence, authorizes and encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 294. Defendants have 'Taken' Plaintiff's 5th Amendment Right of access and use of public places, thus, Plaintiff is Entitled to Just Compensation as provided by Law. 295. By acting and threatening to act under 'color of state law' to deprive Plaintiff of those rights guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the United States, Defendant, Fort Collins has violated and threatens to continue violating 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 296. Plaintiff has suffered, and he continues to suffer, real and permanent irreparable injury due to enforcement of the state and city trespass laws, as was reported in CCIC for (2) two convictions for 'trespass'. Plaintiff has no other plain, adequate or speedy remedy at law, so Plaintiff is entitled to Declaratory and Injunctive relief. 68 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 80 of 94 FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Title 28 U.S. Code§ 2201, § 2202 Declaratory and Injunctive Relief FORT COLLINS 'CAMPING' ORDINANCES 297. The allegations of the preceding paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 298. The City of Fort Collins, by and through agents, employed officers, and elected officials are engaged in a campaign against 'homeless' people. The City Council has enacted ordinances against 'camping' and 'trespass' that are selectively enforced only against people in the community that are suspected to be 'homeless' or 'indigent'. 299. F.C.M.C. Sec. 17-181 is unconstitutionally null, void, and legally unenforceable on numerous grounds, including, without exception or limitation: (a) It is vague and over-broad, thus, it violates the Fifth Amendment Right to Life, Liberty and Property without due process; (b) it denies Plaintiff of the Fifth Amendment Right to Live and to use His private Property to 'conduct activities of daily living'; so it constitutes 'Taking'; thus, Plaintiff is entitled to just compensation; (c) the discriminatory enforcement of the ordinance denies Plaintiff equal protection of the law, and (d) it exacts fines of $3,000 and/or six months in jail, which constitutes cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the 8th Amendment; therefore the 'camping' ordinances violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 300. The vague and over-broad 'camping' Ordinances, as written and as enforced by Fort Collins officials, fails to establish adequate guidelines to govern law enforcement and hence, authorizes and encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 69 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 81 of 94 301. The City 'camping' ordinance, as written, and enforced by Fort Collins police is vague and over-broad and it fails to provide adequate notice to enable a person of ordinary intelligence to understand what conduct is prohibited, depriving Plaintiff of His Rights under the Fifth and 14th Amendments and violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 302. The City of Fort Collins Ordinances prohibiting 'camping' are Unconstitutionally over-broad and vague, which results in discriminatory interpretation and enforcement against people subjectively considered by police officers, as 'homeless', like Plaintiff, which violates 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by denying equal protection of the law. 303. Plaintiff was charged (7) seven times with 'camping'; only one case was tried, and Plaintiff was found 'not guilty' in 2014; case # 2014-0185514-MD. Most recently, Plaintiff was cited with 'camping'; Citation # 384557; Fort Collins Municipal Court Case: FC-20-4935-MD, which was dismissed on September 17, 2020, and closed. 304. Defendants have 'Taken' Plaintiff's Fifth Amendment Right to 'conduct activities of daily living', thus, Plaintiff is Entitled to Just Compensation as provided by Law. 305. Defendant, Fort Collins has violated and threatens to continue violating 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by acting, and threatening to act, under color of state law to deprive Plaintiff of His Rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and laws of the United States,. 306. Plaintiff has suffered, and he continues to suffer, real, and irreparable injury due to enforcement of the City 'camping' ordinances in violation of His Constitutional Rights under the 4th, 5th, 8th and 14th Amendments. Plaintiff has no other plain, adequate or speedy remedy at law, so Plaintiff is entitled to Declaratory and Injunctive relief. 70 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 82 of 94 PETITION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF: FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF CSU EXCLUSIONARY ORDER POLICY 1. An actual and immediate controversy exists between Plaintiff and Defendants. Plaintiff maintains that the CSU 'exclusionary order' policy, as written, interpreted and enforced, violates His Constitutional rights. Defendants assert that CSU exclusionary order policy, as written, interpreted, and enforced, complies with the law. 2. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to Declaratory Judgment of His rights with respect to this controversy. Without such a declaration, Plaintiff will be uncertain of His rights and Defendants will be uncertain as to their restrictions to act under the law. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF: PROHIBITING ENFORCEMENT OF CSU EXCLUSIONARY ORDERS 3. Plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief. Defendants have enforced and threaten to continue enforcing CSU 'exclusionary orders' in the unlawful manner complained of. 4. Defendants have acted, and are threatening to act, under color of state law, to deprive Plaintiff of His Constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 5. CSU issued a permanent unlawful civil restraining order, without due process. 6. Plaintiff is suffering permanent and irreparable injury and continues to suffer a real and immediate threat of permanent irreparable injury as a result of the existence, operation, and enforcement of the challenged 'exclusionary orders'. 7. Plaintiff has no other plain, adequate or speedy remedy at law. 71 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 83 of 94 SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF CITY TRESPASS ORDINANCE 8. An actual and immediate controversy exists between Plaintiff and Defendants. Plaintiff contends that the Fort Collins 'trespass' Ordinance, as written and enforced, violates His Constitutional rights. Defendants contend that the challenged Ordinance, against 'trespass', as written and enforced, complies with the law. 9. Plaintiff asserts that the City trespass ordinance (F.C.M.C.) 17-40(a) does not apply to public property because C.R.S. § 18-4-201 states that the pubic have license and privilege to enter or remain in or upon premises that are ... open to the public, but Defendants assert the right to exclude anyone from public property. 10. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to Declaratory Judgment of His rights with respect to this controversy. Without such a declaration, Plaintiff will be uncertain of His rights and liberty, and Defendants will be uncertain as to the limitations of their authority. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 11. Plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief. Defendants have enforced and threaten to continue enforcing the 'trespass' Ordinance in the manner described in this Complaint. Defendants have acted and are threatening to act under color of state law to deprive Plaintiff of His Constitutional rights. Plaintiff is suffering irreparable injury, and he will continue to suffer actual and immediate threat of irreparable injury as a result of the existence, operation, and enforcement of the challenged 'trespass' Ordinance. Plaintiff has no other plain, adequate or speedy remedy at law. 72 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 84 of 94 THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS 12. An actual and immediate controversy exists between Plaintiff and Defendants. Plaintiff asserts that He was unlawfully denied due process of law and equal protection of the law by Defendant City, County, and District court judges and prosecutors, and these Individual Defendants deny Plaintiff was denied a fair trial, though all defense evidence and testimony was excluded as "irrelevant". These Defendants contend that Plaintiff was lawfully prosecuted, convicted, and imprisoned for 'trespass', and that the 'exclusionary orders' issued by CSU campus police are lawful; these Defendants also argue the public is not expected. intended. or invited to CSU for any conceivable purpose. (Judge McDonald) Daniel McDonald was the Chief District Court Prosecutor when prosecutor, Alita King conspired with Larimer County Court Judge Thomas Lynch to seat a clerk from the prosecutor's office on the jury in Plaintiffs trespass case. Yet, Defendants deny any misconduct, and contend that Plaintiff received a fair trial. 14. These Individual Defendants contend that the state trespass statute and 'City' trespass ordinance comply with the laws and U.S. and Colorado constitutions, and that Plaintiffs trespass convictions were supported by the proper application, interpretation, and enforcement of the law, and Plaintiffs constitutional rights were not violated. 15. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to Declaratory Judgment of His rights with respect to this controversy. Without such a declaration, Plaintiff will be uncertain of His rights and Defendant will be uncertain as to their restrictions to act under the law. 73 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 85 of 94 FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF CITY CAMPING ORDINANCES 16. An actual and immediate controversy exists between Plaintiff and Defendants. Plaintiff contends that the Fort Collins 'camping' Ordinance, as written, and enforced, violates His Constitutional rights. Defendants contend that the challenged Ordinance, against 'camping', as written, applied and enforced, complies with the law. 17. Individual City Defendants assert that the 'camping' ordinance does not deprive Plaintiff of His constitutional rights; and justify their argument with claim of 'home-rule' status and that they may criminalize and regulate 'conducting activities of daily living', and that six (6) months in jail does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 18. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to Declaratory Judgment of His rights with respect to this controversy. Without such a declaration, Plaintiff will be uncertain of His rights and liberty, and Defendants will be uncertain as to the limitations of their authority. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF: 19. Plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief. Defendants have enforced and threaten to continue enforcing the 'camping' Ordinance in the manner described in this Complaint. Defendants have acted and are threatening to act under color of state law to deprive Plaintiff of His Constitutional rights. Plaintiff is suffering reoccurring irreparable injury and he will continue to suffer a real and immediate threat of irreparable injury resulting from the unconstitutional, Fort Collins 'camping' Ordinance as its written and enforced. Plaintiff has no other plain, adequate or speedy remedy at law. 74 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 86 of 94 Wlierefore, and uyon due consideration of tlie {aw, Plaintiff respectfully requests the following Declaratory and Injunctive relief: CSU EXCLUSIONARY ORDER POLICY 20. · Declaratory Judgment that CSU police 'exclusionary orders', are unconstitutional as 'Bills of Attainder' since they impose punishment without judicial trial, and constitute cruel and unusual punishment thereby they deny equal protection of the law, and that they are unlawful since they allow CSU police to violate C.R.S. § 18-9-109(1). 21. Temporary and permanent injunction prohibiting the issuance or enforcement of any verbal or written orders of temporary exclusion other than as provided by C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (2),(3) for conduct, which would 'disrupt, impair, interfere with, or obstruct the lawful missions, processes, procedures, or functions of the institution'. 22. An Order to delete the CCIC report of a CSU permanent restraining order. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS 23. A Declaratory Judgment that Plaintiff was unlawfully deprived of His Civil Rights by depriving Him of access and use of CSU; that C.R.S. § 18-4-201 grants the public license and privilege that the City cannot revoke. C.R.S. § 18-4-201 grants the same license and privilege under the trespass statute C.R.S. § 18-4-504, providing exception just for disobeying lawful orders, and that CSU 'exclusionary orders' are not lawful orders; that, Plaintiff was unlawfully denied access and use of CSU in violation of Title 42 U.S. Code§ 1983, § 1985, and§ 1986; and Declaratory Judgment Confirming that Plaintiff is Entitled to Just Compensation for 'taking' his Civil Rights. 75 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 87 of 94 FORT COLLINS TRESPASS ORDINANCE 24. A Declaratory Judgment that the Fort Collins trespass ordinance F.C.M.C. 40(a) does not apply to public property because C.R.S. § 18-4-201 grants the public license and privilege that the City cannot revoke or suspend, other than in such circumstances that the public safety may require, yet limited by lawful restraints of the Constitution of the United States and Colorado, and in compliance with U.S. and Colorado law. 25. A Declaration that, as written and enforced, F.C.M.C. Sections 17-1 (3) and (4) are unconstitutionally vague and over-broad in violation of the 14th Amendment. 26. A Declaration that the definition of "enters or remains unlawfully" in F.C.M.C. Sec. 17-1 (4) is over-broad and vague as written and enforced since it allows police officers to broadly interpret such authority and verbally construct ad hoc regulations to target individuals whose conduct is not otherwise illegal nor constitute grounds for law enforcement officers to act with 'probable cause', thereby they lack 'lawful control'. 27. Declaration that the definition of "enters or remains unlawfully" used in F.C.M.C. Sec. 17-1 (3) is over-broad and vague as written and enforced because it allows police officers to broadly interpret such lawful control and authority to verbally ban individuals permanently denying access and use of public places in violation of C.R.S. § 18-4-201 that grants the public license and privilege that officers cannot revoke or suspend. 28. Declaratory Judgment Confirming the Right to Just Compensation. 29. A temporary and permanent injunction against the City of Fort Collins prohibiting enforcement of the 'trespass' ordinance, until it harmonizes with state law. 76 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 88 of 94 FORT COLLINS CAMPING ORDINANCES 30. A Declaratory Judgment that the Fort Collins 'camping' ordinances, as written, and enforced are unconstitutionally over-broad and vague because they do not provide adequate notice to enable people of ordinary intelligence to understand what conduct is prohibited; and they are written to enable officers to exercise broad discretion, which is used to discriminate against 'homeless' people, which results in violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The definition of 'camping' provided in F.C.M.C. Sec. 17-181 is exhaustive and all inclusive; literally every conduct of daily living is deemed a criminal offense; even citizens who knowingly permit others to "eat, sleep, or conduct activities of daily living" are deemed criminally liable. 31. A Declaratory Judgment that the City 'camping' ordinances are unconstitutional on the basis that they deprive Plaintiff of life, liberty and property; and that it deprives Plaintiff of equal protection of the law; and that it violates the Eighth Amendment that prohibits cruel and unusual punishment; and that Fort Collins 'camping' and 'trespass' ordinances deprive Plaintiff of His personal Interests and Right of access and use of public property, and they deprive Plaintiff of His Right to use His personal property to 'conduct activities of daily living', and such deprivation of Rights constitutes a 'Taking' under the Fifth Amendment; and that Plaintiff is entitled to Just Compensation. 32. Declaratory Judgment Confirming the Right to Just Compensation. 33. A temporary and permanent injunction against the City of Fort Collins prohibiting enforcement of the ordinances against 'camping' on public or private property. 77 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 89 of 94 SUMMARY CONCLUSION CSU 'exclusionary orders' are unconstitutional as 'bill of pains and penalties' by immediately banning Plaintiff, and unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment by permanently banning Plaintiff, and unconstitutional by denying Him equal protection of the law, and depriving Plaintiff of due process. CSU 'exclusionary orders' are unlawful because they violate C.R.S. § 18-9-109 (1), which prohibits denying access and use of CSU; and contrary to C.R.S. § 18-4-201, which recognizes that the public has license and privilege to access and use public property. Therefore, the 'trespass' prosecution, convictions, and imprisonment of Plaintiff were unconstitutional and unlawful; as such, Plaintiff is Entitled to Declaratory and Injunctive relief, and Just Compensation. Defendants, by and through agents, employed officers, and elected officials are engaged in a campaign against 'homeless' people. CSU 'exclusionary orders' and the verbal 'trespassed' orders issued by police and enforced with citations of 'trespass' or 'camping' are an obvious attempt to re-enact the 'vagrancy' ordinances and statutes, which were determined to be unconstitutional over fifty (50) years ago. The City of Fort Collins ordinances against 'camping' and 'trespass' are unlawful and unconstitutional by violating the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, and by violating the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment prohibition against depriving Plaintiff the right of due process and equal protection of the law by denying Plaintiff of His rights and private property interests and His rights and interests in equal access and use of public places and places open to the public. 78 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 90 of 94 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I declare under penalty of perjury that I am the plaintiff in this action, that I have read this complaint, and that the information in this complaint is true and correct to the best of knowledge, information and belief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1746; 18 U.S.C. § 1621. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, in signing, I also certify that to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief that this Complaint and Petition for Relief: (1) is not being presented for an improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; that (2) it is supported by existing law or by a non-frivolous argument for extending or modifying existing law; that (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for discovery and/or further investigation; and (4) the complaint otherwise complies with the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11. NOTE: Plaintiff intentionally omits a paragraph 13. Authorized and Issued on this day, By: Robert-Lawrence: Perry, Man for: /s/ 1{,obert-Lawrence: 'Perry, .Jvt.an Signed pursuant to C.R.S. 4-3-402 Dated this: February 22, 2022 ROBERT LAWRENCE PERRY 4786 McMurry Ave., Unit 242 Fort Collins, Colorado 80525 fort_ scout@yahoo.com Phone: (970) 980-1849 NOTE: CHANGE OF ADDRESS 79 PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 91 of 94 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Robert-Lawrence: Perry, hereby certify that I did file and send a complete, correct and true copy of the foregoing Proposed Amended Petition for Relief to the Attorney of Record for each Defendant by first-class U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, or by emailing such as agreed by informed and prior consent to the following: Attorneys for Defendants, The City of Fort Collins, et al. Darin Atteberry, City Manager 300 La Porte Ave., (City Hall) Fort Collins, CO 80522 Phone: (970) 221-6520 hoffmank@hallevans.com ratnerm@hallevans.com The State of Colorado, et. al. for: Steven Vasconcellos 1300 Broadway, 10th Floor Denver, Colorado 80203 Phone: (720) 508-6000 Carman.VanPelt@coag.gov Dated this: February 22, 2022 Signed pursuant to C.R.S. 4-3-402 by, Robert-Lawrence: Perry, Trustee for: 4786 McMurry Ave., Unit 242 Fort Collins, Colorado 80522 fort_scout@yahoo.com Phone: (970) 980-1849 Colorado State University, et, al. Attn.: Jannine Mohr, Attorney 1300 Broadway, 10th Floor Denver, Colorado 80203 Phone: (720) 508-6000 Skip.Spear@coag.gov Allison .Ai ler@coag.gov CSU Board of Governors, for: Colorado State University, et al. 555 seventeenth St., Suite 1000 Denver, Colorado 80201 Phone: (970) 491-6425 Denise.Munger@coag.gov Isl 'Robert-Lawrence: Perry, Jvt.an ROBERT LAWRENCE PERRY, Person NOTE: CHANGE OF ADDRESS PROPOSED AMENDED PETITION FOR RELIEF 80 Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 92 of 94 PRESS FIRMLY TO SEAL 7021 0350 '0001 9218 1994 ~ UNITEDST/JTES IEiiiiJ, rv., 11.J.L .,en; v ,.._c ® • Expected delivery date specified for domestic use. PRIORITY® MAIL • Most domestic shipments include up to $50 of insurance (restrictions apply).* • USPS Tracklng9 included for domestic and many International destinations. • Limited international insurance.** • When used internationally, a customs declaration form is required. *Insurance does not cover certain items. For details regarding claims exclusions see the . "---.. :-\llail Manual at http://pe.usps.com. I mational Mail Manual at http://pe.usps.com for availability and limitations of coverage. I T RATE ENVELOPE 1TE • ANY WEIGHT CKED • INSURED _7 0 HI 1111111111 11111 ,s00001 000014 EP14F May 2020 OD: 121/2 x 91/2 To schedule free Package Pickup, scan the QR code. .: USPS.COM/PICKUP PRE •11 UNITEO S'mTES ,orrdl SERV/Ch 1006 I FROM: 80294 U.S . POSTAGE PAID PM 1-Day FORT COLLINS , CO 80525 FEB 2~1 22 AMOUNT $15.75 R2305K138808-65 7 PRIORITY. *MAIL* ~ UNn'EDSTIJTES lliifi POST/JL SERVICE~ VISIT US AT USPS .COM• ORDER FREE SUPPLIES ONLINE F ROM : f2_ o D S~1 l _ ;f 6tf'-~t--; i J <_? r {)J .. 01A?~ o L; r-1 5J_ f=0 "---' <--ulu ;V 5 C J # r '> 1 'c-; : r-. . ... -. ' lT / l\l 1 · ,. ' ' ,---' :.';. r>t,>.J ?_..,,( h\.'(,J' -~ D TO: 1J ,r. DI ;--;fl ( c 1 c UC{/Z-( 9 o I J c; -u± 5-1 ILe ~ 1 bi-Jv i1t /-(o So 2qY / / -:)S~Cj I Label 228, March 2016 ...._ -- FOR DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL USE I ~ I ti 11 1~ ~~ co-::E< ··~o •cN .g~ Q. i;' 'Cl~ Iii .• t..S 1ii~ ::E Q) ~~ ·c .l9 .g s Q. a. Cl • ~~ 5i ©> "'u. CV ira ... -e-m >, Cl) ".; f!! 0 .. "'J:! ~o :2 C e .!/! ~& ~I Iii a. ,,.~ .2 (= ~ 3: ~~ Jg e! "' Q) ~-g ·-cqo ::, C Q) .Q -s 1ii 0:§ ~;; 8._g Ki;- CD E -s !8 .!! !I Cl) Cl) c --1~ "' ~ I Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 93 of 94 \ \ UNITED ST/JTES POST/JL SERVICE® F'LAT RATE ENVELOPE ONE RATE • ANY WEIGHT To schedule free Package Pickup, scan the QR code. USPS.COM/PICKUP TRACKED • INSURED I Ill I 1111111111111111 I PS00001000014 I EP14F May 2020 ._ _________ ,.1._ OD:121/2x91/2 PRIORITY® MAIL VISIT US AT USPS.COM® ORDER FREE SUPPLIES ONLINE For Domestic shipments, the maximum weight is 70 lbs. For international shipments, the maximum weight is 20 lbs • .......:---------~---------· ---.. __ _. -a------ Case 1:21-cv-02306-RM-KLM Document 39 Filed 02/23/22 USDC Colorado Page 94 of 94