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HomeMy WebLinkAbout2018CV3112 - Sean Slatton V. Fort Collins Police Department, Todd Hopkins, Brandon Barnes And John Hutto - 137C - Exhibit C - Johnson Report Lt. Col. Robert T. Johnson (Ret.) Tel: (708) 217-8872 7813 Arquilla Palos Heights, IL 60463 e-mail: rtj2128@sbcglobal.net L a w E nfo rce m e n t P o lic y & Pra c t i c es C onsul t a n t RETIRED Mr. Mark S. Ratner June 21, 2021 C/O Hall & Evans, LLC 1001 Seventeenth Street, Suite 300 Denver, CO. 80202 Sean Slatton v. City of Fort Collins U.S. District Court - District of Colorado - Civil Action No, 1:18-cv-03112-RBJ-STV Dear Mr. Ratner: A copy of my Curriculum Vitae is enclosed regarding my qualifications, education and experience in the law enforcement field. I have not authored any publications in the past ten years. I have also provided a list of my expert witness testimony for the past four (4) years and my Fee Schedule. Based on my experience, knowledge and training of over forty-five years in law enforcement, with thirty-two (32) years in active service in a variety of positions/ranks, I have developed specialized knowledge that will aid the trier of fact to understand certain police practices, standards and training for which most jurors lack the base of knowledge to fully understand without some explanation. Those areas of knowledge and expertise include but are not limited to: Police Policies, Practices and Standards regarding Patrol, Investigations, Use of Force, Internal/Complaint Investigations and law enforcement in general. I have reviewed the following documents provided by you regarding the captioned matter. 1. Fort Collins Policies 2016 a. 208 - Training Policy b. 300 - Response to Resistance c. 301 - Response to Resistance Reporting and Review d. 306 - Restraint Devices e. 308 - Control Devices and Techniques f. 312 - Firearms g. 322 - Search and Seizure h. 1021 - Early Intervention System i. 1060 - Citizen Review Board 2. Body Worn Cameras (All Start with 16-21128 FC) a. 165-1 b. 165-2 c. 197-1 Page 2 of 21 d. 276-1 e. 280-1 f. 280-2 g. 280-3 h. 280-4 i. 283-1 j. 283-2 k. 283-3 l. 283-4 m. 283-5 3. Fort Collins Policies - CALEA a. 208 - Training Policy b. 300 - Response to Resistance c. 301 - Response to Resistance Reporting and Review d. 306 - Restraint Devices e. 308 - Control Devices and Techniques f. 322 - Search and Seizure 4. 2020-01-15 Plaintiff’s Responses to Defendant City of Fort Collins’ First Set of Discovery to Plaintiff 5. [094] Fourth Amended Complaint and Jury Demand 6. [114] Order RE Motion to Dismiss 7. a. 16-20128 8. b. 16-20128 Sire 9. Fort Collins Police Services Training Summary Report for Ofc. Hopkins (FCPS 0436-0440) 10. 2012-2016 OC and Baton Training for new officers, in-service and remedial (FCPS 0441- 0442) 11. Officer Hopkins’ Training Certificates (FCPS 0148-0224) 12. Slatton Poudre Valley Hospital Records (Slatton 000686-000695) 13. Photos IMG_4661- 4666 14. Officer Hopkins Training Summary 15. Officer Hopkins Training EXCEL Spread Sheet 16. Officer Barnes Training Summary 17. [FCPS 0443-0448] UOF2016-301 (7413983v1) Response to Resistance Report In addition to the materials you provided, I have reviewed the following documents which may be cited in my report: 1. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) Model Policy and Concepts and Issues Paper on Use of Force 2. USDOJ-NIJ - Research in Brief - Police Use of Tasers & Other Less-Lethal Weapons 3. Monadnock Baton Chart 4. Colorado Revised Statutes (2016) § 16-3-103. - Stopping of suspect. § 16-3-101. - Arrest - when and how made. § 18-1-707. - Use of physical force in making an arrest or in preventing an escape § 18-4-504. - Third Degree Trespassing § 18-8-104. - obstructing a peace officer… § 18-8-103. - Resisting arrest Page 3 of 21 5. CALEA Application for Certification for Safe Policing for Communities RE: Eligibility for Federal Grants 6. Illinois Law Enforcment Training and Standards Board Guidelines for Use of Force Training and related Table 7. Fort Collins’ Website https://www.fcgov.com/police/transparency 8. January 07, 2000 Memorandum Reference Citizen Review Board 9. Peel’s Principles of Modern Law Enforcment 10. Response to Resistance Tables and Statistics 11. Americans for Effective Law Enforcment (AELE) Monthly Law Journal (July 2012) – Teaching 4th Amendment-Based Use-of-Force 12. Force Continuums A Liability to Law Enforcement – FBI Law Bulletin (June 2002) 13. Colorado POST Basic Academic Training Program - 2000 STATUTES: CO Rev Stat § 18-8-103. Resisting arrest (1) A person commits resisting arrest if he knowingly prevents or attempts to prevent a peace officer, acting under color of his official authority, from effecting an arrest of the actor or another, by: (a) Using or threatening to use physical force or violence against the peace officer or another; or (b) Using any other means which creates a substantial risk of causing bodily injury to the peace officer or another. (2) It is no defense to a prosecution under this section that the peace officer was attempting to make an arrest which in fact was unlawful, if he was acting under color of his official authority, and in attempting to make the arrest he was not resorting to unreasonable or excessive force giving rise to the right of self-defense. A peace officer acts “under color of his official authority” when, in the regular course of assigned duties, he is called upon to make, and does - should be made by him. (3) The term “peace officer” as used in this section and section 18-8-104 means a peace officer in uniform or, if out of uniform, one who has identified himself by exhibiting his credentials as such peace officer to the person whose arrest is attempted. (4) Resisting arrest is a class 2 misdemeanor. 18-1-707. Use of physical force in making an arrest or in preventing an escape (1) Except as provided in subsections (2) and (2.5) of this section, a peace officer is justified in using reasonable and appropriate physical force upon another person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary: (a) To effect an arrest or to prevent the escape from custody of an arrested person unless he knows that the arrest is unauthorized; or (b) To defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of physical force while effecting or attempting to effect such an arrest or while preventing or attempting to prevent such an escape. Page 4 of 21 INCIDENT OVERVIEW In support of my opinions, I provide the following overview of the incident. This overview and the testimony cited is not exhaustive of everything I reviewed, but is offered to provide insight regarding the incident. The opinions expressed in this report are based on the listed items reviewed and may be revised if further information is received. In order to avoid redundancy, I did not summarize all materials I reviewed. _____________________________________________________________________________ Extracted from the Fort Collins Police Services Report of Officer Todd Hopkins On December 3rd, 2016 at 7:30 PM, Officer Barnes and I began working an off-duty job assignment at the Lincoln Center at 417 W. Magnolia. This was a sorority holiday formal for Kappa Delta. Both Officer Barnes, and I were in full police uniform. At approximately 9:30 P.M., Jackie Davison, who is the concessionaire for the Lincoln Center, yelled to me across the foyer and waved me over to her location. Davison was engaged in some sort of conflict with suspect Sean Slatton. I observed some sort of verbal altercation between Davison and Slatton, and there was clear concern and urgency to Davison waving me to her. It was obvious she needed me to intervene in this conflict. Slatton was a tall male, with a thin beard, and wearing a dark colored suit. Davison told me he "got in my face." Davison then yelled at Slatton, and pointed Slatton towards the door stating, "I'm done." This indicated to me, Slatton was being ejected from the event. Officer Barnes, and I approached Slatton. I stood in front of him and I told him he needed to leave the building, and the property. At first, he was resistant to my instruction and just stood there. He said something, but I could not understand exactly what it was. I repeated my instructions to Slatton, and told him he needed to leave immediately or he would face criminal charges. Slatton walked toward the doors, then exited the building. He remained right outside the double doors. Officer Barnes and I re-contacted Slatton outside the doors of the Lincoln Center. I asked Slatton if I was unclear about the instructions, I gave him to leave the building, and the property. Slatton already had a confrontation with staff, and was reluctant to comply with my instructions. I was concerned if Slatton lingered on the property after he had been trespassed there was a high likelihood Slatton could cause another incident or disturbance. Again, I asked him if I was unclear about my instructions for him to leave the property, then reinforced he needed to leave. He continued to argue with me and Officer Barnes. I then asked Slatton for his identification. Slatton refused, turned, and began to walk away from me. I asked him again for his identification and told Slatton to stop several times. Slatton refused. Due to his lack of compliance, I told Slatton he was under arrest. Slatton continued to walk away from me, and replied, "No I'm not." He continued walking, and his hands were concealed. In response to his resistance; I struck Slatton in the lower right leg with my straight baton one time. He reacted by spinning back around in an aggressive stance and I immediately applied oleoresin capsicum to his face at an estimated distance of eight feet. He yelled something to the effect of "mother-fucker," spun around and sprinted away eastbound on Magnolia, crossing Meldrum then on into a nearby parking lot, then behind some businesses. Officer Barnes and I made announcements over the radio that we were in a foot pursuit and gave the last known direction of travel of the Slatton. Area officers later caught the Slatton in the 400 block of S. Mason. Page 5 of 21 Officer Klamser picked me up in his patrol car nearby, and drove me to the scene where Slatton was taken into custody. Slatton was being medically treated there for exposure to oleoresin capsicum, and a baton strike. I positively identified him as the suspect from the sorority formal, and reported my contact, and use-of-force to Sergeant Heather Moore. I returned to the Lincoln Center, and authored a written narrative containing the details of the contact with Slatton. Officer Michael Harres remained with Slatton as he was transported to the hospital for medical clearance. I provided the narrative to Officer Harres for the booking process. ______________________________________________________________________ Review of Video 16-20128 _ FC 165-1- Not Verbatim/Not All Inclusive The initial part of the encounter between the officers and Slatton inside the Lincoln Center was not captured on the video. Once the body-worn-video camera was turned on, Slatton does not come into view until approximately 00:22 seconds and no voice until 00:30 seconds. At that point, Slatton is outside the doors to the Lincoln Center and Officer Hopkins makes reference to trespassing and requested I.D. Slatton says he was leaving and failed to produce identification after being requested to do so twice. At approximately 00:45 seconds, after Slatton ignored Officer Hopkins orders to stop (4 times) and is told that he was under arrest, and responds, “No, I’m not,” Officer Hopkins delivers a single baton strike to Slatton’s right leg and Slatton quickly turns back in Officer Hopkins’ direction and says what are you doing and is pepper sprayed and almost immediately takes off running at a very fast pace without further contact with Officer Hopkins or Officer Barnes in the immediate vicinity of the Lincoln Center. _____________________________________________________________________ Review of Slatton Poudre Valley Hospital Records – Not Verbatim/Not All Inclusive The patient is a 21-year-old male who presents for evaluation of eye and facial burning. The patient was brought in by ambulance. He was involved in an altercation with the police department. He was allegedly struck once along the outside of his right lower leg with a baton. He was also oh cc (SIC) sprayed. He presents here complaining of burning to both eyes. He also complains of burning to his face. He does acknowledge a little bit of alcohol consumption tonight. He denies any drug abuse. He denies any chest or abdominal injury. His eyes are currently his primary complaint. He complains of pain that is severe in quality. He does wear contacts. They have previously been removed. There are no other modifying factors or associated symptoms. The patient was thoroughly irrigated. His face and eyes were irrigated using normal saline. Initially he was complaining of considerable pain. However, on reevaluation the symptoms improved considerably. The hospital records indicate that Slatton was 21 years old, 6’3” and weighed 210 pounds. Slatton was treated and released into police custody the same day (12/03/2016). _____________________________________________________________________________ Synopsis of Qualifications of Robert Johnson The formation of my opinions is based on a review of the materials listed in my report and my training, education and experience of being involved in law enforcement for over forty-five Page 6 of 21 years, thirty-two (32) years in active service. As a retired Lieutenant Colonel from the Illinois State Police, I continue to serve as a private consultant and expert witness regarding Law Enforcement Policies and Practices, most frequently regarding Use of Force. I have also testified regarding other police policy and practices issues. I have consulted and testified for numerous police agencies as well as plaintiffs in litigation. I have been retained as an expert in approximately two-hundred (200) cases and have been qualified and testified at several civil trials in state and federal courts. I have conducted sensitive internal investigations as an independent investigator for local governmental entities regarding allegations of Police Misconduct, including allegations of excessive force. I have been trained in the proper use of force and the response and investigation of use of force incidents throughout my career. I have applied my training in the arrest of numerous offenders. I have been involved in numerous arrests that necessitated my using force. I have been trained by and certified by the Force Science Institute to recognize and articulate important human factors that can influence human behavior and memory in force encounters and other highly stressful circumstances. I have also been designated as a Certified Litigation Specialist from the Americans for Effective Law Enforcement (AELE). I have throughout the last few decades regularly received and reviewed a large number of law enforcement journals where use of force topics are addressed. I regularly attend training sessions regarding use of force. I have been certified and serve as an assessor for the Commission for the Accreditation of Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) and have conducted approximately thirty-five (35) assessments of law enforcement agencies throughout the United States. The reviews, include reviewing agency use of force incidents, reporting and a three-year analysis of agencies’ use of force incidents as well as their policies, practices and training, including the review of use of force lesson plans, use of force continuums/models and interviews, including use of force instructors. I have also reviewed the training transcripts of numerous officers in those departments. As a supervisor, command officer and law enforcement consultant I have reviewed, investigated and evaluated hundreds of uses of force incidents/investigations, including numerous officer- involved-shootings. I have conducted and/or overseen numerous use of force investigations and/or reviews. In my capacity as a command officer/law enforcement consultant I have written/assisted in the writing and review of use of force policies. I formed the Public Integrity Task Force (Cook County, IL - the nation’s second largest county) to investigate allegations of criminal misconduct, including excessive force by police officers and to investigate uses of deadly force and in-custody deaths. This task force has investigated virtually all police officer involved shootings in suburban Cook County (excluding Chicago) since its inception in 1996. As the Inspector/Director of Police (Western Region) for the National Passenger Railroad Corporation (Amtrak), I served on the Amtrak Police Department’s (APD) Use of Force Review Committee, reviewing all APD uses of force nationwide. I also chaired the APD Training Committee with oversight for the defensive tactics and firearms training subcommittees. I served on a committee with the department’s legal advisor and Internal Affairs Commander to re-write the department’s Use of Force policy. Page 7 of 21 OPINIONS/BASES FOR OPINIONS My opinions are based on my knowledge, training and experience including but not limited to: Police Policies, Practices and Standards regarding Patrol, Investigations, Use of Force, Internal/Complaint Investigations and law enforcement in general. This knowledge and experience has been acquired in thirty-two years of active service in a variety of field, supervisory, policy making and command positions as well as serving as an independent consultant regarding law enforcement policies, practices and operations for approximately twenty years. Reference is made to the Synopsis of my Qualifications and my Curriculum Vitae. It is not my intent to discount the accounts of any of the participants in the subject incident. I have reviewed the materials listed in my report and understand there are differences in the accounts and perception of the actions taken by the officers and those of Mr. Slatton. This is not unusual, based on my experience. My opinions are based on the totality of the information and the materials listed in my report. It is the responsibility of the court or the jury to make the determination of the contested facts. The opinions expressed herein are in accord with accepted law enforcement policies, practices, standards and training widely accepted in law enforcement and are to a reasonable degree of professional certainty in the field of law enforcement. NOTES: While I have listed my opinions separately and listed bases supporting each opinion, there is overlapping information in each that provides support for the other opinion. Both the Plaintiff’s expert and I refer to the Fort Collins Police Services’ Response to Resistance policy as a Use of Force policy as well as using the term Use of Force policy in relation to other departments’ policies. Opinion # 1. Officer Hopkins’ use of force in effecting the arrest of Sean Slatton complied with generally accepted law enforcment practices, standards and training and the Fort Collins Police Services’ Response to Resistance policy. The U.S. Supreme Court in the landmark decision, Graham V. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) stated, “Our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” The Colorado Statute §18-1-707. Arrest – Use of Physical force in making an arrest states; (1) Except as provided in subsections (2) and (2.5) of this section, a peace officer is justified in using reasonable and appropriate physical force upon another person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary: (a) To effect an arrest or to prevent the escape from custody of an arrested person unless he knows that the arrest is unauthorized; or Page 8 of 21 (b) To defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of physical force while effecting or attempting to effect such an arrest or while preventing or attempting to prevent such an escape. The U.S. Supreme Court also set forth the standard of “objectively reasonable” that courts use to examine whether a use of force is constitutional in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). Under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution a police officer may only use such force as is objectively reasonable. The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with 20/20 vision of hindsight. The reasonableness must account for the fact that officers are often forced to make split-second judgments in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving. The reasonableness inquiry in reviewing use of force is an objective one: the question is whether the officer’s actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them. The officer’s perception may be a consideration, but other objective factors will determine the reasonableness of force. The factors include but are not limited to: 1. The severity of the crime 2. Whether the subject poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officer(s) or others 3. Whether the subject is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) Model Policy on Use of Force states: Police Officers are authorized to use department approved non-deadly force techniques and issued equipment for resolution of incidents as follows: a. To protect themselves or another from physical harm. b. To restrain or subdue a resistant individual. c. To bring an unlawful situation safely and effectively under control. Law Enforcement officers are trained that they have a right to use reasonable force to control subjects who fail to comply with lawful police orders. Law enforcement officers are taught that their responses are based on the actions of the person being restrained/arrested and the level of force used by the officer is predicated on the level of the subject’s actions. In Use of Force training, Use of Force training materials, Use of Force policies, and Use of Force continuums, subject actions or levels of resistance are commonly classified in such or similar terms and levels of progression as follow: Cooperative Person - Is a person who is, or can be developed into, a cooperative individual. Passive Resistor - Is a person who exhibits no resistive movement in response to verbal and other direction. (A Passive Resister may merit an Active Resister response when presenting a credible threat to the officer or resister through: an agitated demeanor, verbal threats or words signifying an intent or ability to use violence or resistance). Page 9 of 21 Active Resistor - Is a person who exhibits resistive movement to avoid physical control or presents a credible threat to the officer through: an agitated demeanor, verbal threats or words signifying an intent or ability to use violence or resistance. Aggressive/Assailant - Is a person that performs physical actions, without weapons, that are aggressive and he or she demonstrates behavior that is likely to cause physical injury. Deadly Force Assailant - Is a person whose actions will probably cause death or great bodily harm. A suspect’s actions may begin at any of the five levels and escalate/de-escalate during the encounter. An officer’s initial response to the first two levels (Cooperative/Passive Resistance) is not use of force, but merely Officer Presence and/or Verbal Direction. If verbal direction fails with a passive resister, then the officer has force options/tactics that can be utilized. All control tactics and responses other than officer presence and verbal direction and subject actions other than a “Cooperative Person” have potential risk of injury for both the officer and the subject who the officer is attempting to gain control of. In most encounters, an officer’s or officers’ mere presence and verbal direction are sufficient to gain compliance and/or take the person into custody. Most people will stop their problematic behavior at the mere presence of a police officer and those that don’t will upon verbal direction from an officer. However, there is a small percentage of people that will ignore an officer’s presence and verbal direction necessitating that an officer, in response to the offender’s actions, escalate his/her response. Officers have a right to use reasonable force under such circumstances. The level of response by the officer(s) needs to be greater (but reasonable) than the resistance of the offender. Officers are not required to use the least intrusive or minimum amount of force that might resolve the situation, only that force which is reasonable, under the totality of the circumstances facing the officer. In fact, use of the least intrusive or minimum amount of force that might resolve the situation, rather than reasonable force that is more likely gain control, can make the situation worse. It is not a sound idea to require an officer involved at the moment in a tense evolving situation under stress and potentially with serious consequences to experiment, basically trial and error, with various tactics, techniques and tools that might not meet the force necessary to accomplish the task and gaining control more quickly. Doing so would place the officer and offender at added risk by giving the offender the opportunity to escalate their level of force and thereby resulting in the officer having to escalate to greater force than would have been necessary, had the officer used sufficient reasonable force to begin with. The primary objective of force is to gain control of the offender, not a stalemate. The quicker the incident can be reasonably resolved the better and safer for the officer and also frequently the offender. Officers are trained and know from experience that when an offender ignores an officer’s order to comply, it is indicative that the suspect poses a likelihood to flee and/or physically resist and/or attack the officer. The question to be answered at the point in the interaction between the officers and Slatton where force was used is whether the force used was objectively reasonable based on the information known to the officers at the time force was used. Page 10 of 21 Officers Hopkins and Barnes had reason to arrest Slatton as Slatton did not initially leave the property of the Lincoln Center when told to do so, failed to produce identification and/or identify himself, walked away and continued to walk away after being told he was under arrest. Not only did Slatton walk away but in response to being told he was under arrest responded, “No, I’m not” and continued walking away. At that point Slatton was not free to leave, had no right to resist arrest and Officer Hopkins acted consistent with accepted law enforcement practices, standards and training to use necessary and reasonable force to make the arrest. The officers in essence had two choices, use some level of force to arrest Slatton or let him flout the law and leave without any consequences for his illegal actions. As he had not been identified and failed to comply with orders to produce identification, there was a need to make a relatively quick decision before he left the area. It is important that citizens obey an officer’s orders. Letting people ignore lawful commands without consequences undermines the rule of law. As Slatton had not been identified at that point in time, letting him leave and seeking a warrant was not a reasonable option. Officers are trained to make threat assessments in the decision to use force and the amount of force to be used. When an officer makes a threat assessment, they need to consider several factors which including but certainly not limited to words and body language. The Fort Collins Police Services’ Response to Resistance policy in effect in 2016 - Policy 300 - Response to Resistance 300.3.2, list Factors Used to Determine the Reasonableness of Force list numerous factors (a-q). No policy can list all the factors that may arise in an incident where force may be necessary. In the subject case, Mr. Slatton after being told to stop, that he was under arrest and saying “No, I’m not” and walking away, refusing to stop is considered active resistance in police use of force training and law enforcement Use of Force Continuums. Not only did Slatton’s movement to avoid control classify him as an Active Resister but a reasonable police officer would assume that an offender who after being told they’re under arrest says “No, I’m not” and continues walking away could pose a credible and potentially violent threat, once hands are placed on him. I’ve had suspects, as well as having reviewed numerous arrest reports, where suspects when told they were under arrest, said words to the effect that they were not. Many of those suspects subsequently resisted arrest, necessitating use of force, frequently ending up in injuries to the suspect and/or officer(s). In addition to the words that Slatton used, other factors in a threat assessment would include but not necessarily limited to Slatton’s body language, age, size, physical appearance, demeanor and the suspicion he had been drinking. In evaluating the force used in an incident, the Quantum of Force is used as a tool for evaluating the reasonableness of the force. The Quantum of Force is the foreseeable effects and injuries of a chosen force option under the totality of circumstances of the force option(s) used. In this case, Officer Hopkins initially used a single baton strike/stunning technique to Slatton’s leg followed by a dose of O.C. (pepper spray) after Slatton failed to comply with his orders to produce identification, was told to stop, that he was under arrest, stated he wasn’t under arrest and continued to ignore commands and continued walking away from Officer Hopkins who administered a single baton strike to Slatton’s right leg. Slatton, whose back was turned, turned quickly towards Officer Hopkins and said, what are you doing and was pepper sprayed. A baton is classified as an impact weapon and is the principal police impact weapon carried by police. When using a baton an officer needs to choose an appropriate target area. The target area is dependent on the level of resistance being encountered. The area to be targeted should be based on the potential risk of trauma to the body of the offender. The lowest injury risk target Page 11 of 21 areas include large muscle groups such as the thigh, buttocks, calf and bicep. In the subject case, the baton strike/stunning technique was delivered to large muscle mass, the calf (See IMG_4661 & _4662). The likely injury of a baton strike to the thigh or calf is classified on the Monadnock Baton Chart as “Minimal level of resultant trauma. Injury tends to be temporary.” In essence, some bruising or a contusion may occur which would be dependent on the level of force of the strike. Obviously, a baton strike can be at varying levels of force. In this incident I have noted that the medical records reflect a contusion, aka a bruise, to Slatton’s leg. In reviewing the video, Slatton’s reaction to the baton strike is to continue videoing and he states, “Right now, what are you doing.” Slatton’s actions and response are contrary to what I would expect if the baton strike was delivered with a high level of force, as he makes no sounds or verbalizes pain. The second force option employed by Officer Hopkins was O.C. (pepper spray). Pepper spray intended to be used as a disabling agent for law enforcement officers to use to attempt to overcome resistance, and to subdue persons with minimal injuries to officers, arrestees and others. Pepper spray does not generally cause injury, only temporary discomfort and pain. In training officers are frequently pepper sprayed as part of training regarding the use of pepper spray. A National Institute of Justice Study – Police Use of Force, Tasers and Other Less Lethal Weapons (2011) reported; “The study’s most significant finding is that, while results were not uniform across all agencies, the use of pepper spray and CED’s can significantly reduce injuries to suspects…” (pg. ii). “A few researchers have looked at how various approaches to force affect officer injury rates. Overall, the empirical evidence shows that getting close to suspects to use hands-on tactics increases the likelihood of officer injuries” (pg. 3). “Several studies found that when agencies adopted the use of pepper spray, they subsequently had large declines in assaults on officers and declines in officer and suspect injury rates, and associated injuries were usually minor. Pepper spray provides a way to reduce injuries” (pg. 3). placement of pepper spray and CeDs on the linear use-of-force continuum (pg.14) “People rarely die after being pepper sprayed or shocked with a Taser. However, if injury reduction is the primary goal, agencies that allow use of these less lethal weapons are clearly at an advantage. Both weapons prevent or minimize the physical struggles that are likely to injure officers and suspects alike. Although both cause pain, they reduce injuries, and according to current medical research, death or serious harm associated with their use is rare. In that sense, both are safe and similarly effective in reducing injuries. Both should be allowed as possible responses to defensive or higher levels of suspect resistance. This recommendation is supported by the findings and is now followed by most agencies that responded to the national survey” (pgs. 14-15). Page 12 of 21 The report concludes, “Although results were not uniform across the agencies, the analysis shows that the use of pepper spray and CEDs can have a significant and positive injury reduction effect (pg.8). The study also found that the use of unarmed tactics by officers increase the odds of an officer injury very significantly. In Richland County Sheriff’s Office found that pepper spray use decreased the odds of suspect injury by almost 70%” (pg. 7). The alternatives to using a pepper spray against an Active Resistor and Aggressive/Assailant includes but are not limited to: hands on (including holds, takedowns, punches, knee strikes, kicks, etc.,), batons/impact weapons, Tasers, etc. all of which create a greater risk of injury to the suspect/offender as well as the officer(s) involved. The use of a baton with a strike to a large muscle mass like a thigh or calf as well as the use of pepper spray would be consistent with accepted law enforcment practices, standards and training to gain control of an Active Resistor – Aggressive/Assailant. These tools would more likely result in a lower risk of injury to the resisting offender and the officer than going hands on. ______________________________________________________________________________ I have reviewed the report of Mr. David Kleiber, the Plaintiff’s expert. I take exception with much of his report. Mr. Kleiber cites 2020 changes in the Colorado statute that governs use of force by a peace officer in his report. Mr. Kleiber using changes in Colorado law that took effect in 2020 are inappropriate in judging actions or policies for an incident that took place in 2016. Mr. Kleiber lists and refers to five separate police department policies that he obviously had the ability to handpick and states there is a commonality amongst those policies in regard to emphasizing de-escalation and the use of the lowest levels of force to resolve the situation. I am not challenging those departments’ policies; but Officer Hopkins was not bound by other agencies’ policies, he was only bound by his own agency’s policies and the legal standard to use objectively reasonable force. In fact, while I would never advise it, but even if a department failed to have a Use of Force policy, that would not make force used by an officer of that department unconstitutional or objectively unreasonable. The force would need to be judged without consideration of the lack of policy; but based on the legal standard. Mr. Kleiber states that he reviewed the Fort Collins’ Use of Force policy and, “Conspicuously absent from the policy is the mention of de-escalation techniques prior to using physical force…” While the mention of de-escalation can be found frequently in Use of Force policies today, that was not the case back in 2016. Neither the IACP Model Policy nor their more in-depth Concepts and Issues Paper published in 2015 mention de-escalation. Further my personal experience is that de-escalation was rarely if ever mentioned in various use of force policies I reviewed that predate 2017. CALEA standards in 2016 did not address de-escalation and the term or use of de- escalation does not appear in Standard Commentary until April 2017 and in the CALEA Standard Statement, where it becomes binding until July 2020. The concept of using verbal and non-verbal tactics that comprise de-escalation, to slow down and stabilize potential use of force encounters has been around for decades, but the term de- escalation has become a popular term in more recent years after a number of highly publicized national use of force incidents and the use of the term in the 2017 National Consensus Policy and Page 13 of 21 Discussion Paper on Use of Force. I might point out that Sir Robert Peele who established the Metropolitan London Police Department in 1829 wrote his "Instructions to Police Officers" also known as Peel’s Principles of Modern Law Enforcment. Principle number 6 states; The police should use physical force to the extent necessary to secure observance of the law or to restore order only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is found to be insufficient to achieve police objectives; and police should use only the minimum degree of physical force which is necessary on any particular occasion for achieving a police objective. Police officers have used de-escalation tactics long before the term de-escalation became a popular term. Most police officers use de-escalation tactics almost daily in a number of situations such as domestic calls, dealing with volatile/irate people on the street, calls for service settings, traffic stops, etc. Officer Hopkins training certificates reflect that he successfully completed 40 hours of Crisis Intervention Team Training in February 2008 (FCPS 0205). It has been a standard practice in crisis intervention training to instruct officers regarding de-escalation tactics. De-escalation requires that the suspect to be de-escalated is willing and capable of listening. In this case, Slatton did not show a willingness to listen as he continued to walk away ignoring the officers’ commands Mr. Kleiber on pages 9-10 of his report lists factors contained in the Fort Collins Police Services’ Use of Force policy for officers to consider in determining the reasonableness of force, (a) thru (q). On a number of the factors, Mr. Kleiber states that Mr. Slatton was compliant. Yet on page 7 of his report, Mr. Kleber states that after being asked for his ID, Slatton asked for what reason?” And upon being told by Officer Hopkins, “I’m arresting you for trespass. Let me see your ID,” Slatton stated “I am leaving right now. I’m waiting for an Uber.” Mr. Kleber also states that after Officer Hopkins followed Slatton and stated, “Stop you are under arrest,” and after that Slatton turned away and slowly and calmly walked away from Officer Hopkins while stating, “No, I’m not.” Walking away from an officer after being told to stop and then continuing to walk away after being told you are under arrest, and stating, “No I’m not,” is not compliant nor is it cooperative. Kleiber states on page 9 (m) that if for some unknown reason, Slatton needed to be taken into custody and had escaped, the police could have easily identified him from others at the event center and sought a warrant at a later date. I disagree, Slatton had not been identified and the officers had no way of knowing at the time of the encounter, whether they would be able to identify him or not, if he left the scene. Mr. Kleiber states on page 9 (f) proximity of weapons or dangerous improvised device. (There was no reason to suspect Slatton had access to any weapons). While the officers did not observe Slatton with any weapons, he had not been searched for weapons and officers are trained that there are always weapons, including a firearm in an incident, that being their own firearm or weapons, that can become accessible to an offender if successful in disarming an officer. Further, a suspect’s personal weapons (hands, fists, knees, feet, etc.) are capable of injuring an officer. Page 14 of 21 Mr. Kleiber states on page 9 (k) potential for injury to officers, suspects, and others. (Little to no potential for injury to officers or others. Great degree of potential of injury to Slatton). I agree that there was little potential for injuries to others once outside the building. There was a potential of injuries to the officers if pre-emptive action was not taken and one or both officers went hands on. The use of the baton in the manner it was used and the use of pepper spray created a lower-level of the severity of injury than going hands-on and for instance, transitioning to a takedown, a common tactic for an active resister. Mr. Kleiber states on page 9 (l) Whether the conduct of the individual being confronted no longer reasonably appears to pose an imminent threat to the officers or others. (At no time did Slatton appear or act aggressively towards anyone). Mr. Kleiber’s commentary that “At no time did Slatton appear or act aggressively toward anyone” is contradicted by Officer Hopkins’ report in which he reported that Jackie Davison who was the concessionaire for the Lincoln Center yelled to him from across the foyer and waved him over to her location having been engaged in some sort of conflict with Slatton. He reported that he observed some sort of verbal altercation between Davison and Slatton and there was a clear concern and urgency to Davison’s waving to him and it was obvious that she wanted Officer Hopkins to intervene in the conflict. Officer Hopkins reported the Davison told him that Slatton “got in my face.” I also point out that Slatton’s non-compliance and statement that he was not under arrest in itself is a potential indicator of an assault, particularly if the officers tried to go hands-on. Mr. Kleiber states in his report, “It is extremely unlikely that any ‘objectively reasonable’ law enforcement officer would interpret Sean Slatton’s actions as anything other than initially ‘compliant’ and then later, at most ‘obstructive’ or ‘passively resistant.’ As the police video camera shows, at no point did Slatton become or show a propensity to become ‘argumentative’, ‘aggressive’, ‘combative’, or assaultive’.’’ (pg.10). I strongly disagree. I believe that almost all objectively reasonable objective law enforcment officers would interpret Slatton’s actions as non-compliant and actively resistant. The definitions that Mr. Kleiber provides in his report for Passive Resistor and Active Resister (pgs. 4-5) reflect that Slatton while initially compliant in leaving the Lincoln Center, later became a Passive Resister by refusing to follow commands but then moved to an Active Resister by not only following commands but then resisted attempts by the officer (Hopkins) to take positive physical control over him when he ignored multiple orders to stop, that he was under arrest and refused to stop, said he was not under arrest and continued to try to avoid physical control by the officers by walking away from them and subsequently running away on foot. Mr. Kleiber spends a portion of his report discussing Use of Force Continuums as well as providing two graphic color-coded continuums from the Las Vegas, NV. Police Department and Denver, CO. Police Departments. While I agree that many law enforcement agencies still use Use of Force Continuums, there has also been a shift from using Use of Force Continuums. Use of Force Continuums are being discarded by law enforcement agencies. The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) discontinued use of a Use of Force Continuum in 2005. The FBI has also discontinued use of a Use of Force Continuum, as have other law enforcment agencies, moving to training focusing on the Fourth Amendment standard, coupled with threat assessment analysis in determining the amount of force to be used. The below footnote is from the IACP Concepts and Issues Paper RE: Use of Force (2015): Page 15 of 21 1 Note that the IACP Law Enforcement Policy Center does not promote the concept of a use- of-force “continuum.” The term continuum is often interpreted to mean that an officer must start at one end of a range of use-of-force options and systematically work his or her way through each of the following, exhausting the usefulness of each before moving to the next. However, in reality, in an effort to maintain the safety of both the officer and the subject, an officer may need to move from one point of the continuum to another, without considering the options in a linear order. Mr. Kleiber included two use of force continuums in his report as well as making comments and listing six different levels of response. My experience in terms of the levels of response found in continuums and use of force policies vary somewhat from what Mr. Kleiber states. As an example, I have provided the Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board’s (ILETSB) - Guidelines for Use of Force Training as well as a continuum developed from that publication. For instance, the ILETSB utilizes five separate levels of suspect activity and officer responses. Further, such tools as Tasers and pepper spray are on the same level with each other as well as with other tactics such as takedowns, stunning techniques with and without control instruments, as tools and/or tactics for an Active Resister. My opinions do not rely on the subject publication or extracted table (Addendum I). I only include it to demonstrate that use of force continuums may differ with respect to the appropriate tools and tactics to use based on the level of the suspect’s resistance. The standard for evaluating force is still that of objective reasonableness. The fact that a certain tactic or tool is or is not listed on a Use of Force Continuum does not in and by itself make the use of that tactic or tool a constitutional or unconstitutional use of force. The courts judge an officer’s use of force based on the objective reasonableness test set by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Graham v. Connor (1989) case, not based on an agency’s selection of a Use of Force Continuum. There is no constitutional requirement that a police officer has to use de-escalation tactics, or that police officers have to consider less intrusive alternatives of force, only that the force be objectively reasonable. In fact, the language used by Chief Justice William Rehnquist speaks to the difficulty of trying to precisely define the options, tools or tactics to apply in terms of categorizing offenders’ actions as is done on Use of Force Continuums stating; "The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments - in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving -about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation. The test of reasonableness is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application." While Use of Force Continuums are still used by many agencies and I believe they have some value, use of force training needs to address and incorporate threat assessment training, as continuums are limited in providing the precise tactics or tools to be used in every situation. A problem with use of force continuums is that they tend to provide a cookie cutter or one-size- fit-all approach and cannot address the totality of information known to an officer in a given use of force situation. There are numerous factors that can make the force tactic or tool listed on the Page 16 of 21 continuum either excessive or that would call for using more force or a tool that is listed at a higher level of resistance. Some examples follow: • There is a significant difference between an officer on a traffic stop on a major interstate highway trying to control an offender actively resisting with traffic travelling at 70 mph within feet of the officer, versus trying to control an offender in an open field. The amount of force is different, as the one poses a definite life- threatening situation to the officer and offender where the other one has much less risk. • While a person who is standing and has not offered any physical resistance but ignoring an officer’s commands to place his hands on the trunk of a police car can be considered a passive resister, such cues as a bladed fighting stance and clenched fist might call for a greater level of force than listed on a continuum for a passive resister. Add in that the male suspect has a known history for fighting police officers and is much larger and physically fit than the officer. Such information could result in a threat assessment suggesting use of a Taser or pepper spray, rather than the officer using a pressure point(s) or tactics found in a policy or continuum for a Passive Resister. • Any number of variables can be present in a use of force situation that alters the tools and tactics to be used, i.e., gender, size, age, physical condition, threatening language used by an offender, known history of resistance by an offender. As stated earlier in this report, the Fort Collins Police Services’ policy in effect in 2016 - Policy 300 - Response to Resistance 300.3.2 Factors Used to Determine the Reasonableness of Force list numerous factors (a-q). There is no nationally accepted Use of Force Continuum. Sergeant Heather Moore’s Supplement (FC018-019) reflects that she responded to the scene of the arrest, ensured that Slatton was examined and treated for injuries, spoke to and recorded her interview of Slatton, took photographs of his injuries (calf and OC exposure) and placed them into evidence, reviewed video from Officer Hopkins’ point-of-view camera. Sergeant Moore fulfilled her supervisory responsibilities as required by FCPS Response to Resistance policy. Sergeant Moore reported that she found Officer Hopkins’ use of force to be within law, policy, and ethics. In addition to Sergeant Moore’s investigation of the use of force, Officer Hopkins completed a Response to Resistance Report (FC0443-0446) as required by policy for the Early Intervention System detailing the use of force. The report was reviewed by Lieutenants Yonce and Robinson. Opinion # 2. There is no evidence to support that Chief Hutto or the City of Fort Collins policies, customs, practices and training failed to meet accepted law enforcment practices, customs, standards and training and/or there was a failure to adequately train and supervise FCPS officers. Page 17 of 21 I have noted in reading Judge R. Brooke Jackson’s ruling on Officer Hopkin’s Motion to Dismiss, that Judge Jackson granted Officer Hopkins’ motion based on the fact that the Plaintiff’s proffered cases did not show that the conduct (force) used was a clearly established constitutional violation (pg.17). Given that it is my opinion that Fort Collins’ Response to Resistance Policy is consistent with accepted law enforcment practices and standards, I fail to understand why the City should have any greater reason than Officer Hopkins to conclude that there was a constitutional violation if the conduct was not a clearly established violation. ______________________________________________________________________________ The Colorado Peace Officer Standards and Training Board (POST) has the legislated responsibility to document and manage the certification and training of all active peace officers and reserve peace officers working for Colorado law enforcement agencies. To be eligible for appointment as a peace officer, an applicant must first be certified by the Peace Officer Standards and Training Board. Basic certification requires successful completion of a POST- approved Basic academy, successful completion of the POST certification examination, and a background check. Officer Todd Hopkins was awarded his certification on April 29, 2002. In order to maintain a peace officer certificate, an officer must meet the in- service training requirements set by the Colorado POST. In addition to use of force training that Officer Hopkins would have received in the Basic Academy and POST In-Service requirements, Officer Hopkins’ Training Summary reflects that he received ongoing use of force training. Officer Hopkins training certificates reflect that he successfully completed 40 hours of Crisis Intervention Team Training in February 2008 (FCPS 0205). It has been a standard practice in crisis intervention training to instruct officers regarding de-escalation tactics. In addition, Officer Hopkins received additional specialized training well above the state mandated training. ______________________________________________________________________________ The person responsible for formulating department policy, generally the Chief or his/her designee, has the discretion to set department standards higher than those mandated by law, thereby making lawful activities a violation of policy. A policy violation does not necessarily constitute a constitutional violation. Furthermore, a policy cannot account for or address every situation an officer may encounter. It is up to the chief executive of the law enforcement agency or his/her designee to determine if a specific action or actions constitutes a policy violation and if so, whether the violation is acceptable, given the totality of the circumstances. I have reviewed the following Fort Collins Police Services’ policies in effect in 2016: 208 - Training Policy 300 - Response to Resistance 301 - Response to Resistance Reporting and Review 306 - Restraint Devices 308 - Control Devices and Techniques 312 - Firearms 322 - Search and Seizure 1021 - Early Intervention System Page 18 of 21 1060 - Citizen Review Board These FCPS Policies were in effect in 2016 and were policies created by Lexipol, an industry leader in providing law enforcment policies for law enforcment. I have on several occasions as a CALEA Assessor/Team Leader and litigation consultant reviewed various policies for numerous law enforcment agencies created by Lexipol. Lexipol policies link CALEA Accreditation standards to the specific and appropriate policy issue. I have also found that Lexipol policies follow accepted law enforcment practices and standards. I found nothing in any of the listed FCPS policies that would provide guidance, suggest or require an employee to perform an action that would be contrary to accepted law enforcment practices, customs, standards and training. The FCPS policies incorporate CALEA standards in effect at that time. CALEA standards are recognized as containing law enforcment best practices. In fact, Pursuant to the Presidential Executive Order on Safe Policing for Safe Communities, dated June 16, 2020, the U.S. Department of Justice’s discretionary grant funding is only available to state, local, and university or college law enforcement agencies that have obtained (or are in the process of seeking) credentials certifying that they meet certain standards on use of force. The Executive Order on Safe Policing empowers the U.S. Attorney General to designate independent credentialing bodies. CALEA was selected as a credentialing body to certify that a law enforcement agency meets the conditions of eligibility for federal grants. The Response to Resistance policy quotes language from Graham v. Connor, setting an objectively reasonable standard and follows the principles of Tennessee v. Garner in the use of deadly force. The Response to Resistance policy also meets CALEA Standards and sets requirements that are over and above any required by law and are considered best practices to include but not limited to: • The policy also requires that any officer who witnesses another peace officer use physical force that exceeds state law or the Response to Resistance Policy to report in writing to their supervisor within 24 hours. • The policy requires; notification to a supervisor as soon as practical and a prompt written report by an employee using force to include, additional forms as specified in the agency’s Early Intervention System policy. • The policy requires a supervisor respond to the scene of a reportable force. • The photographing of any areas involving visible injury or complaint of pain. • The policy requires an officer render medical aid and that the responding supervisor ensures medical aid is provided. Page 19 of 21 • The policy states that officers rather than shooting at moving vehicles, move out of the path of the moving vehicle and only shoot when the officer reasonably believes deadly force is directed at the officer or other and there is no alternative to stop the threat. • Officers receive periodic training on the policy and demonstrate their knowledge and understanding. The Response to Resistance policy in effect at the time of the incident set forth a proactive and thorough list of Supervisory Responsibilities not often found in Use of Force policies that aid in the review/investigation of use of force and to ensure prompt medical aid when necessary. 300.7 SUPERVISOR RESPONSIBILITY A supervisor will respond to an incident in which there has been a reportable use of force. The supervisor is expected to accomplish (a.) through (h.) below: (a) Obtain the basic facts from the involved officers. Absent an allegation of misconduct or excessive force, this will be considered a routine contact in the normal course of duties. (b) Ensure that any injured parties are examined and treated. (c) Ensure that photographs have been taken of any areas involving visible injury or complaint of pain, as well as overall photographs of uninjured areas. These photographs should be retained until all potential for civil litigation has expired. (d) Identify any witnesses not already included in related reports. (e) Review and approve all related reports. (f) Complete a police report detailing the actions taken by the supervisor. (g) In the event that the supervisor believes the incident may give rise to potential civil litigation, a confidential TDR (Tour of Duty Report) should be completed and routed to appropriate personnel. (h) The supervisor shall initiate a separate administrative investigation if it is reasonable to believe that an application of force by an officer was not reasonable or within Policy. When a supervisor does not respond to the scene of an incident involving a reportable use of force, the supervisor is still expected to ensure completion of as many of the above items as circumstances permit. ______________________________________________________________________________ There are a number of steps that Fort Collin has implemented that reflect that they seek to hold their officers accountable and that they make a concerted effort to operate in an open and transparent manner. Some examples follow: Page 20 of 21 Citizen Review Board - The City’s establishment or a Citizen’s Review Board in 1999, while not unheard of, was much more and exception than a common practice at the time it was established and remains an exception rather than a common practice today. The City’s webpage lists the responsibilities of the Board as: Reviews internal investigations where a peace officer is alleged to have used force, discharged a firearm, committed a crime, when a person sustained severe injury, death, or alleged their civil rights were violated by a peace officer, or other investigations requested by the City Manager or Police Chief. Early Intervention System - The Fort Collins Police Services Early Intervention System (EIS) is a proactive non-disciplinary strategy to support employee performance by seeking to identify and mitigate against factors that may lead to negative performance issues, employee discipline and employee or department liability. It also allows the identification of training opportunities, training deficiencies, and ensures the use of proper and effective tactics and equipment. EIS has set Performance Indicators that are monitored that when viewed on a case-by-case basis may not be indicative of a problem. However, when viewed collectively, performance may be indicative of a pattern of problematic outcomes that is otherwise more difficult to identify. When an officer meets set agency established thresholds, the system will generate an alert. The Internal Affairs Sergeant will notify the employee’s immediate supervisor and manager of the alert through Blue Team. The employee’s immediate supervisor will conduct an EIS review. The EIS review is a proactive tool to assist supervisory personnel in early identification of employee stress, training needs, or other adverse job-related problems. The review is meant to support employees through mentoring and coaching to help align the employee with the Agency’s expectations if needed. Body Worn Cameras - The use of body-worn cameras is indicative of Fort Collins seeking to hold officers accountable. Fort Collins Police Services publicly available webpage – The webpage lists a wealth of information available to the public to include but certainly not limited to Internal/External Complaints RE: Officers, Arrest and Traffic Citation by Race and the FCPS’s Response to Resistance policy and Response to Resistance tables/statistics. Fort Collins’ webpage provides Response to Resistance tables with statistics reflecting a ratio of use of force to actual arrests made. The table also list the Total Incidents that Fort Collins officers responded to or initiated. A separate table provides the Response to Resistance Applications (tools, tactics & weapons used). I have included those tables as an attachment to this report. The table also provides Response to Resistance data by race. The tables include the following years 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 & 2019. During the five-year period, the statistics reflect that FCPS used force ranging between 2.0 - 2.7 times for every 100 arrests. During that time Total Police Incidents (Calls for Service + police-initiated calls ranged from approximately 104,000 & 113,000. Each police incident has the potential for confrontation not just arrests. Of course, force is only generally used when an incident generally involves a crime but a call that may not be based on a crime becomes a crime when a subject the police Page 21 of 21 come into contact with takes some type of action that constitutes a crime. The low percentage of use of force to arrests (2.0 - 2.7) and ratio to use of force to police incidents (1:624 -1:823) are indicative that FCPS officers do not quickly resort to force with a frequency that would suggest that they engage in a pattern of excessive force as alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint. It is my understanding that a request has been made to Plaintiff’s Counsel to produce the five Use of Force policies as well as more readable copies of the two color-coded Use of Force Continuums cited in Mr. Kleiber’ report. As I have not received those documents, I reserve the right to supplement my opinions and or expand on those opinions, if the above documents are received, as well as any other additional material or information that is received. Sincerely, Robert T. Johnson Attachments Addendum I